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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The relatively large size of the commercial banks in Jordan compared to other sectors in the 
economy as well as the turmoil in the MENA region motivated me to explore these 
organisations’ asset liability management framework. This thesis utilized quantitative methods 
to study bank liquidity risk and asset and liability management (ALM) in Jordanian commercial 
banks over the period 2004 to 2015. The thesis evaluates the impact of the ALM framework 
on Jordanian commercial banks during 2017/2018 using questionnaires that explored the 
current framework of the ALM, the role of the asset liability committee (ALCO), and its effect 
on risk-management techniques in terms of liquidity, interest rate, credit, and market risks. It 
also investigates the tools used by commercial banks to estimate and set their risk exposures. 
The results of the questionnaires indicate the existence of the ALM process in all of Jordan’s 
commercial banks whereas ALCO only had limited authority in terms of identifying and setting 
risk exposures. The findings of this study show liquidity risk to be one of the most significant 
risks that Jordanian commercial banks have to mitigate against most of these banks rely on 
central bank guidelines to manage and set their liquidity and funding liquidity risk limits. The 
breadth of commercial banks’ activities in Jordan as regards financing most of the economic 
sectors in the country through their role as financial intermediaries marks the importance of 
shielding them from liquidity risks. 
The thesis analysed the impact of internal bank factors such as profitability, capital, credit, size 
and quality of management on liquidity risk for thirteen Jordanian commercial banks while 
controlling for the regulatory and macroeconomic environment using a panel data model. The 
econometric results show that profitability has a positive impact on liquidity risk whilst the 
existence of an efficient management has a negative impact on liquidity risk. Finally, the 
impact of capital and credit on liquidity risk had an ambiguous effect due to the interactions 
between the different factors. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study  
In the last decade, many countries in the MENA1 region have started to implement various 
structural reform programmes. The financial and banking sectors have not been isolated from 
these reforms, which were directed towards preserving the stability of the financial system in 
the region. The speed and magnitude of these reforms differed between the MENA countries, 
which resulted in the banking industry in these countries developing different characteristics. 
The procedures and policies that charted the attitude of these banks have been affected by the 
regulatory and political developments in their region (Abed & Davoodi, 2003). 
Jordan, as a part of this region, has adopted a series of reforms with liberalization 
components concerning both the financial and real sectors in the economy since the early 1990s 
in collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank. These measures accelerated the Kingdom 
of Jordan’s economic and financial growth by attracting foreign investment and creating more 
jobs. However, the political instability in the MENA region since the awakening of the Arab 
Spring in 2010, and weakening global demand due to the Global Financial Crisis, exacerbated 
the challenges facing the economy. These shocks have weakened Jordan's external and fiscal 
positions (CBJ, 2013). In response to these challenges, Jordan adopted a national reform 
program backed by the IMF to stabilize the economy and address Jordan’s economic 
vulnerabilities by correcting for fiscal and external imbalances while safeguarding its currency 
peg (IMF, 2012). 
                                            
1 MENA countries according to the IMF classification include: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen (IMF, 2018).     
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The development of the monetary policy and regulatory frameworks came hand in hand 
with the adopted reforms in order to preserve Jordan’s monetary and financial stability, which 
is heavily influenced by exogenous factors. These policies have shifted from directly 
influencing market conditions through setting market interest rates and controlling monetary 
aggregates, to depending on indirect monetary policy tools to influence the market by 
manipulating short-term interest rates (Maziad, 2009). The evolution of monetary policy 
frameworks could be classified into three main stages: pre-currency crisis monetary policy 
where the financial sector was characterised by low complexity; post-currency crisis monetary 
policy where the monetary authorities shifted towards depending on indirect tools to influence 
the market; and the Arab spring framework where the authorities developed a toolkit to 
preserve financial stability in the face of the looming uncertainty in the region (IMF, 2012; 
CBJ, 2015). 
The massive evolution in macroeconomic fundamentals as well as the innovation in the 
banking industry have radically increased the importance of the sector as it is currently 
considered one of the key pillars supporting the Jordanian economy. Jordan’s banking sector 
currently includes 25 operating banks. These comprise 16 Jordanian banks, three of which are 
Islamic banks, and nine branches of foreign banks, including one foreign Islamic bank. These 
banks operate through a network of 785 branches and 82 representative offices. Thus, one could 
argue that the market is broadly saturated. However, the banking industry relies on traditional 
services; therefore, a wide range for expansion opportunities is still available (Almumani, 
2013). Furthermore, the banks’ outstanding balances of assets have accelerated dramatically 
by more than three-fold since the early 2000s to reach around USD 66.4 billion at the end of 
2015. In addition, total assets to GDP rose to on average 202.8 percent over 2000 to 2015. 
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Although it declined on a steady basis from 222.4 percent in 2001 to 176.92 percent in 2015, it 
still demonstrate the importance of ensuring the resilience and viability of the Jordanian 
banking system and illustrates the need to strengthen internal and regulatory control systems 
through ensuring that banks effectively manage both sides of their balance sheets .  
The image of the banking industry in Jordan has evolved over the past two decades from 
its traditional role as financial institutions in the business of taking deposits and advancing 
loans to now engaging in a wide range of products and services across the international markets 
(Choudhry, 2011). These developments have happened in parallel with the increasing 
complexity of the financial markets and the degree of financial innovation. Furthermore, the 
recent turbulence, high volatility, and uncertainty in the global financial markets have increased 
the need for banks to adopt a comprehensive framework to manage these developments. The 
nature of the operations within financial institutions and the risks that faces them is reflected 
in their balance sheets. More specifically, the asset side of a balance sheet expresses the risk of 
the surrounding environment, while most of the risks stemming from business operations are 
revealed on the liability side; aligning these risks is the main purpose of asset and liability 
management (ALM). This practice is considered to be a vital issue for banks’ strategic 
planning, assessment and management of their endogenous financial operations and external 
risks as it provides quantifiable measures of risk and management strategies (Choudhry , 2011; 
Tektas, 2005). In addition, ALM should also be seen in order to attain a defined net interest 
income to be regarded as a vibrant planning, coordination and control of assets and liabilities 
as well as their mixes, volumes, maturities, returns, and cost (Charumathi, 2008). Accordingly, 
                                            
2 Source: Central bank of Jordan and author’s calculation. 
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ALM includes credit, liquidity and interest rate management using a variety of tools that are 
calibrated to mitigate risks and optimize the working environment. Therefore, asset liability 
management is a necessity to express the needs to manage both assets and liabilities 
simultaneously in order to mitigate various and fundamental risks, and manage both sides of 
the balance sheet to control interest rate and liquidity risks (Bessis, 2011). In addition, setting 
the overall strategy for commercial banks to effectively manage asset-liability components 
requires focusing on various pillars. The first pillar is concerned with managing the banks’ 
liquidity position in terms of their liquid assets and maturity profile while taking into account 
the market conditions. The second pillar focuses on risks stemming from day-to-day operations 
such as default risk (Choudhry, 2011).  
The existence of financial institutions and their roles have been discussed at length in the 
literature. There are two primary reasons for the existence of these institutions, and banks in 
particular. The first is the provision of liquidity. Banks accept funds from depositors and use 
these funds to provide various services to borrowers through maturity transformation (BIS, 
2008). Liquidity lies in two main areas: financial securities in the markets and solvency. 
Financial instruments are often associated with their level of liquidity in terms of whether they 
are marketable and if there are financial barriers to transactions. On the other hand, solvency 
is closely related to the obligations of financial institutions to meet their payments to their 
counterparts (Fiedler, 2000), which can be dealt with through setting up appropriate liquidity 
management policies and balancing their portfolios The importance of the banking system in 
Jordan and the breadth of their financing to most of the economic sectors in the country due to 
their role as financial intermediaries marks the importance of having proper liquidity 
management practices in place. Liquidity problems at banks often arise from poor liquidity 
management as commercial banks’ commitments and transactions have implications for their 
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liquidity. Therefore, liquidity risk has become a key element in banks ' risk management 
frameworks to assist banks retain adequate liquidity to resist the effect of stresses they face. To 
ensure proper functioning of the banking system, the banks should conduct regular periodic 
assessment of the framework with their supervisory bodies.  
The global financial crisis and its impact on the banking system in advanced economies as 
well as in some emerging markets impacted financial stability substantially. Many large banks 
faced severe liquidity shortages and often the central banks intervened to prevent them from 
failing and provided them with funding (Vodova, 2011; Farhi & Tirole, 2012; Agnello & 
Sousa, 2012). In addition, protecting depositors as well as investors became an imperative issue 
for the authorities. 
 Therefore, banks started to pay more attention to sources of financial weakness, which 
are related in part to the liquidity risks that are represented by banks’ inability to meet their 
obligations due to sudden withdrawals from depositors or the improper management of 
resources. These turbulences have increased the need in the financial market to preserve 
liquidity positions through focusing on liquidity management and the risks stemming from 
liquidity positions. Therefore, the nature and structure of the Jordanian economy left most 
of its sectors more susceptible to exogenous shocks and spill-overs from the global economy 
as well as its neighbouring countries (CBJ, 2015). The relatively large size of the 
commercial banks in Jordan compared to other sectors of the national economy highlight 
the need for the Jordanian authorities to shield the banking sector from the negative effects 
of these crises. This is achieved through improving the efficiency of the industry by 
enhancing banking regulations and developing sound operational risk methodologies in the 
banking system to ensure the stability of the banking system. Many of these measures 
include liquidity and portfolio management (CBJ, 2000). These regulations are aimed at 
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preserving the viability of the banking system through achieving the right balance between 
risk-taking and profitability. Commercial banks and regulatory authorities are paying more 
attention to bank-specific indicators as signals for the internal control systems in these banks 
and the regulatory authorities for the soundness of the overall industry and at the micro 
level. Thus, adopting an effective framework that mitigates against risk and allocate 
resources more effectively is essential for the banking sector (Choudhry, 2011). 
The thesis discusses the necessity of ALM and the core functions of ALCO at Jordanian 
commercial banks. This part of the study relied on a survey of Jordanian banks to describe 
the ALM process and roles of the ALCO within their operations. The importance of this 
part stems from the challenges that the banking industry in Jordan faces: 
• Downside risk due to geopolitical instability in the region, which impacts the 
branches of Jordanian banks abroad. 
• The difficult macroeconomic environment that impacts banks’ ability to mitigate 
against risk while maximizing their profits. Hoarding liquidity may be one of the behaviours 
that may cause liquidity shortages in the market and limit the distribution of liquidity 
amongst banks through interbank lending.  
• The underdeveloped financial market, which limits banks’ ability to diversify their 
assets and hinders the alignment between short-term and long-term strategic plans. 
Therefore, having an efficient ALM framework is crucial to ensure the soundness of the 
banking sector. 
The second part of this thesis aims to identify the influence of internal factors on liquidity, 
such as profitability, capital, size and non-performing loans on liquidity risk that are proxied 
using the loan to deposit ratio (LTD) as well as the liquid assets to total assets ratio 
(LQATA). Furthermore, this research will fill a gap in the knowledge and understanding 
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concerning the impact of bank internal factors on liquidity risk exposures at commercial 
banks in Jordan as – to the best of my knowledge – few studies have addressed the impact 
of internal factors on liquidity risk among Jordanian commercial banks. The importance of 
this research comes from the fact that Jordanian banks constitute around 95% of the financial 
sector and have a high ratio of assets to GDP that exceeds 150% (CBJ, 2016).  Furthermore, 
current developments in the banking sector in Jordan are presenting additional challenges: 
• High downside risks stemming from the economy and the geopolitical issues in 
neighbouring countries are yet to be reflected in internal liquidity management strategies 
and implemented effectively. 
• The conservative nature of the Jordanian commercial banks as well as the market 
structure reveals that banks with high levels of liquidity tend to be more conservative in 
their approach towards the market, which could result in an inefficient use of resources and 
result in high costs from hoarding liquidity. On the contrary, banks with liquidity shortages 
tend to have a more aggressive approach to maximizing their profits and try to acquire 
expensive liquidity funding, hampering their performance. 
• Compared to advanced economies, Jordanian banks operate within an 
underdeveloped financial and money market. 
• Preserving a healthy banking sector is depends on banks’ ability to implement proper 
liquidity management. 
1.2 Research Motivation   
The availability of liquidity at banks is an integral part of safeguarding the banking system 
through ensuring banks’ ability to fulfil their obligations and have the creditworthiness of 
depositors. In Jordan, commercial banks play a vital role through providing a variety range of 
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services to many sectors in the economy. Thus, having enough liquidity and easy access to its 
sources is an essential requirement to ensure the strength of the banking system, economic 
stability and growth. Therefore, insulating this sector from exogenous shocks is one of the core 
functions of Jordan’s monetary authorities, mainly through regulatory measures. 
The nature and structure of the Jordanian economy has left most sectors more susceptible 
to exogenous shocks and spill-overs from the global economy as well as its neighbouring 
countries. The authorities in Jordan have tried to shield the banking sector from the negative 
effects of these crises and keep the system stable. They have done this by improving the 
efficiency of the industry by enhancing banks’ regulations and by developing sound operational 
risk methodologies in the banking system. Many of these measures included liquidity and 
portfolio management (CBJ, 2000). Furthermore, monetary authorities’ regulations have 
mitigated against liquidity risks in the banking system through managing liquidity buffers as 
they expect to receive funding from the central bank in the event of a shortage (Aspachs, et al., 
2005). The size of the commercial banks in Jordan compared to other sectors in the economy, 
the turmoil in the MENA region, and the recent turbulence in the global financial markets and 
its repercussions on the external portfolios of Jordanian banks all pose a serious threat to both 
the banking system and portfolios valuations. This reinforces the need for a comprehensive 
ALM framework for the banking sector to ensure that banks manage their liquidity properly.  
1.3 Aims and Objectives of This Research 
The thesis covers two main themes. The first section describes the current ALM framework 
and role of ALCO in Jordanian commercial banks through conducting a survey. More 
specifically, it aims to explore the commercial banks ' behaviour in Jordan in terms of 
managing their balance sheets and the tools that they use to mitigate risks. The second part 
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is concerned with those factors that impact liquidity risk at banks by focusing on internal 
factors such as profitability, capital, credit, size, and quality of management, while 
controlling for the impact of the regulatory and macroeconomic environment on commercial 
banks. It is hoped that the second part will help Jordanian commercial banks to identify the 
impact of internal factors on liquidity risk and could be applicable to commercial banks in 
other countries with similar characteristics to the Jordanian banking system. The study will 
be limited to Jordanian commercial banks, which is a main part of the banking sector in 
Jordan, notwithstanding the role of Islamic banks in the financial sector as well as the 
economy. Sharia-compliant banks have different products and practices that are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
1.4 Research Questions  
This research has been designed to test the following questions: 
Q1: Do Jordanian commercial banks have an effective ALM framework? 
Q2: Do Jordanian commercial banks with high profitability ratios face higher liquidity risk? 
Q3: Do Jordanian commercial banks with high non-performing loans face higher liquidity risk? 
Q4: Do large Jordanian commercial banks face higher liquidity risks? 
Q5: Do Jordanian commercial banks with higher capital face lower liquidity risks? 
Q6: Do Jordanian commercial banks with higher efficiency face lower liquidity risks? 
 
To achieve the main aims of this research and the research questions, the study formulated one 
main hypothesis for asset and liability management and five main hypotheses for liquidity risks 
at Jordanian commercial banks, as follows, for ALM: 
Hypothesis (1): Jordanian commercial banks have an effective ALM framework. 
This hypothesis will be tested through the following sub-hypothesis: 
Hypothesis (1.1): ALCO is effectively involved in implementing ALM strategies and policies 
in Jordanian commercial banks. 
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Hypothesis (1.2): Liquidity risk management in Jordanian commercial banks is consistent with 
the banks’ overall strategy and takes operational liquidity needs into consideration.  
Hypothesis (1.3): There are contingency funding plans in place in Jordanian commercial banks 
to deal with liquidity concerns.  
Hypothesis (1.4): Stress Testing scenarios in Jordanian commercial banks are efficient in 
liquidity management aspects. 
The study formulated five main hypotheses for the liquidity risks at Jordanian commercial 
banks as follows: 
 
I. Liquidity Risk and Profitability 
 Commercial banks with high profitability ratios face higher liquidity risk. 
II. Liquidity Risk and Credit Risk 
 Commercial banks with high non-performing loans face higher liquidity risk. 
III. Liquidity Risk and Bank Size 
 Large Commercial banks face higher liquidity risks. 
IV. Liquidity Risk and Capital 
 Commercial banks with higher capital face lower liquidity risks. 
V. Liquidity Risk and Banking Efficiency 
 Commercial banks with higher efficiency face lower liquidity risks. 
 
1.5 Research Structure 
This research is presented across five chapters. This chapter has introduction for the thesis and 
the second chapter provide an overview of commercial banks that operate in Jordan.  In chapter 
three, the study presents the ALM process within Jordanian commercial banks and the role of 
the ALCO, with a special focus on liquidity management. The fourth chapter investigates the 
impact of banks’ internal factors on their liquidity risk. Finally, the fifth chapter presents the 
study’s conclusions, recommendations and final remarks. 
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Chapter Two: Overview of the Jordanian Banking system 
2.1 Introduction 
In an extremely political volatile region, Jordan has a tiny, open economy. The structure 
of the economy and the macroeconomic policy framework has been largely shaped by 
exogenous shocks and spill-overs from regional economic partners. Thus, the economy is 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks, especially from its neighbouring trading partners’ countries.  
Another feature of the Jordanian economy is that it’s a service sector based economy, the 
service sector constituted around 66.6 percent from the country’s GDP in 2017 (CBJ, 2017). 
The “Finance, Insurance, Real estate and business services sector” constitutes around 24.4 
percent of the GDP in 2017 and 34.6 percent of the service sector on average for the period 
(2005-2017) (CBJ, 2017). 
The awareness about the challenges paved the way for establishing series of reforms with 
liberalization components concerning both financial and real sectors in the economy since the 
early 1990s in collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank. These measures accelerated 
Jordanian economy and financial growth by attracting foreign investment and creating more 
jobs. However, the political and military instability in the MENA region since the awakening 
of the Arab Spring in 2010, and the weakening global demand due to the global financial crisis 
exacerbated the challenges that faces the economy. These shocks weakened Jordan's external 
and fiscal positions (CBJ, 2013). As a reaction to these challenges, Jordan has adopted a 
national reform program backed by the IMF to steady the economy and address Jordan’s 
economic vulnerabilities (IMF, 2012). 
This chapter will discuss the evolution of the macroeconomic fundamentals of the 
Jordanian economy as well as the banking system. The first part will discuss the evolution of 
12 
 
the monetary policy frameworks, in order to preserve monetary stability that is heavily 
influenced by exogenous factors. The main reason for tackling the consecutive update of 
monetary policy changes is to illustrate the building blocks for the current monetary and 
regulatory policies adopted by the authorities in Jordan to preserve financial stability. The 
researcher has classified the evolution of monetary policy framework into three major 
categories, the pre-currency crisis, post currency crisis, and the Arab spring monetary 
framework. The reason behind this classification is that the major changes in the monetary 
frameworks could be attributed to exogenous shocks that compelled authorities in Jordan to 
adapt in order to stabilize the macroeconomic conditions. 
 Further, this chapter will summarize the evolution of the Jordanian banking sector with 
regards to balance sheet management (ALM) during the period of (2004-2015). This period 
witnessed a massive evolution in the banking industry compared to prior periods which were 
dominated by the heavy control over banking activities and sectoral reforms that paved the way 
for the current evolution in the banking industry. 
2.2 Monetary Policy Framework 
The degree of autonomy for the CBJ, which started its operations in 1964, increased 
considerably especially after the currency crisis in late 1980s. Thus, the study can divide the 
framework for monetary policy operations into three main parts; Pre-currency crisis monetary 
policy, Post-currency crisis monetary policy, and the Arab spring framework. The evolution in 
the monetary policy framework in all the stages depended on the evolution of the internal and 
external environment.  
At the early stage, the Jordanian authorities tried to establish the basic institutions to 
regulate the financial sector such as the Central Bank (1964) and (ASE) in (1978). 
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Consequently, the financial sector was characterized by low complexity with few choices of 
financial securities available for trading. The investors were mainly self-reliant in financing 
their own projects or depended on loans from traditional banks which was heavily controlled 
by the CBJ. At later stages the lending conditions were market-oriented after the currency crisis 
in 1989. Monetary policy in Jordan was directed towards influencing banks’ ability through 
influencing the amount of their excess reserves and their ability to access the discount window 
at the CBJ (Maziad, 2009). 
But in late 1993, the CBJ started to depend on the indirect monetary policy tools to 
influence the market by manipulating the short term interest rates through auctioning CDs 
(three and six months), the REPOs to manage the liquidity in the market. Before introducing 
the overnight window deposit facility to manage liquidity in a daily basis in the early 2000. 
The second stage, witnessed a shift in the overall policy framework as well as change in the 
operational target from the CDs to inter-bank rate. 
The third stage, which could be characterized by the ability of the CBJ to minimize the 
uncertainty in the economy witnessed an introduction of the weekly REPO, building a portfolio 
of government bonds to influence the liquidity quantity and structure in the market, the forward 
foreign exchange operation at the discretion of commercial banks, and the introduction of the 
CBJ main rate, as a reference for the banking system to manage their liquidity efficiently. These 
tools helped the CBJ to manage liquidity more effectively and influence the market at times of 
high uncertainty.  
2.2.1 The Pre-Currency Crisis Framework 
The CBJ started its operations in 1964, before that time many commercial banks were 
entrusted to carry these operations as the bank of the government, but after the establishment 
14 
 
of the CBJ and the announcement of its law in 1960, the CBJ started its main functions as a 
bank for the government and the banking sector in Jordan, a regulator for the bank notes and 
coins, cost and quantity of credit to meet the requirements of monetary stability and economic 
growth, and to manage the Jordan`s  gold and the foreign exchange reserves. The CBJ law was 
amended in 1966 due to some deficiencies and to allow the bank to be more resilient and 
increase its ability in addressing its main functions (CBJ, 1970).  
The main goal for this is to make the countries’ law, especially the public debt law, to be 
more compatible with the CBJ law and to have more powers in the supervision of banks 
operating in Jordan. In 1971, a new law for the CBJ was announced; the aim of this law is to 
be in line with the changes in the world monetary system. Further, the cabinet has taken the 
decision to fix the exchange rate with the US dollar. The monetary policy at that time has 
limited instruments and relied on direct intervention in the market to influence liquidity and 
credit conditions in the market as the monetary policy was set to accommodate the authority’s 
policies in stimulating the economy and support the adopted development plans. 
But since the early 1980s, the oil prices began to fall from around 30 USD per barrel to 15 
USD per barrel in 1986, and continued its downward trajectory till the end of the decade. The 
structural decrease in oil prices resulted in sharp reductions of capital flows, remittances, and 
grants to Jordan. These declines forced the authorities to rely heavily on external and internal 
borrowing to finance its budget deficit (Schlumberger, 2002). 
2.2.2 The Economic Crisis Of 1989 
The expansionary fiscal policy and debt reliance have led to the currency crisis in late 1989 
as the public debt reached high unsustainable levels. In 1988, the government's total debt 
reached around 203% of GDP, and interest payments increased due the increasing in foreign 
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debt to almost 11% of GDP in 1990-91. The conditions and the low level of foreign reserves 
forced the authorities to devaluate the JD strongly. (IMF, IEO, 2005). The pressures on the 
currency caused a substantial loss of reserves as foreign reserves fell to JD 110 million in 1988, 
from nearly JD 425 million in 1987 (Maziad, 2009). In 1988, the CBJ suspended currency sales 
and decided to float the JD which resulted in a sharp devaluation in the currency against the 
USD by 20.9 percent till the end of 1988. Further, the authorities decided to limit the transfers 
of foreign currency to abroad. (CBJ, 1992).  
The monetary policy in Jordan during that period was mainly passive, with little 
instruments available and relied on direct intervention in the market to determine the quantity 
of liquidity, cost of credit facilities extended and the supervision of the banking system was 
weak. The main focus for the monetary policy is to ensure monetary stability in Jordan and to 
support the authority’s fiscal expansion policies and development plans (Maziad, 2009). 
2.2.3 The Post-Currency Crisis Framework 
After the currency crisis in 1989, the authorities had no choice but to call the IMF for a 
comprehensive debt rescheduling process and initiate a stabilization program (Schlumberger, 
2002). The main focus of these programs was to reinstate fiscal policy on a sustainable path by 
ensuring fiscal discipline and limit the borrowing from the CBJ. These reforms were 
encouraged by the authorities and allowed the CBJ to develop a market-based comprehensive 
monetary policy framework. The CBJ have decided to liberalize the interest rates on deposits 
and on credit facilities in 1990. Further, the CBJ started its efforts for restructuring the banking 
system by introducing more measures that aims at preserving stability, such as imposing a 15 
percent legal reserve ratio on all deposits (Maziad, 2009). 
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Several monetary policy tools followed the liberalization of the interest rates in order to 
influence the market interest rates indirectly. Some of these tools such as the Re-Purchase 
Order Agreements (REPO), which was established in the early 1970s, were used in in the pre-
crisis era as a tool for providing liquidity for the banking system, not to influence interest rates 
as they were determined directly by the CBJ. In 1992, the CBJ introduced a new tool to absorb 
excess liquidity at the banking system by accepting deposits from commercial banks for a 
maturity of six months at an interest rate of 4 percent on a yearly basis. The CBJ began an 
auction system for issuing certificates of deposits in 1993, in order to manage the quantity, 
maturity, and the distribution of liquidity indirectly, thus the monetary aggregate (M2) became 
an intermediate target to achieve monetary objectives, and the CDs action interest rates became 
the operational target for the monetary policy in Jordan (Maziad, 2009; Khachatryan, et al., 
2006). 
The CBJ launched a new tool in 1998 to manage liquidity in the market on a daily basis, 
“the window rate”, which allowed the CBJ to absorb excess liquidity in the market, and provide 
a floor for the interbank rate. Thus, moving away from CDs as a main operational target to 
interbank with the window rate as a floor and the seven day REPO as the upper limit (ceiling). 
Further, the CBJ has continued his policy to preserve the attractiveness of the Jordanian Dinar 
by ensuring a spread margin between the JD and USD denominated assets. Prudent monetary 
policy contributed in restoring confidence and the rebound in the demand for the JD after the 
uncertainties of late 1998 and early 1999 (due to the pass away of King Hussein in Feb., 1999) 
(IMF, 2000). 
After 1999, the CBJ allowed a continued decline in the CDs yields in order to sterilize the 
economy from external flows to Jordan and encourage the banks to lend mare facilities to the 
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private sector in order to stimulate the economy (IMF, IEO, 2005). The efforts of the monetary 
authorities focused on building reserves buffers to defend the exchange rate peg and continue 
their reform process. In 2004, the country graduated from the IMF programs, but the authorities 
continued their efforts in reforming the country and attracting foreign investments to enhance 
growth through privatizing many state owned companies and opening many sectors in the 
economy for foreign investors. By decreasing the interest rate corridor width by 125 basis 
points in May 2007, the CBJ streamlined its interest rate structure and replaced the 7-day REPO 
facility with an overnight facility to ensure the symmetry with the overnight deposit window.  
(CBJ, 2008). 
In 2009, the spill-overs of the global financial crisis affected negatively the Jordanian 
economy, due to the weakening demand on Jordanian exports of goods and services, domestic 
exports declined, and the inflation rate contracted by -0.7 percent. In response to these 
developments the CBJ decreased its interest rates on its main monetary policy tools in 2009 by 
one point and half percentage , and by half percentage points in 2010 in order to stimulate the 
economy and encourage banks to extend more credit to the private sector (CBJ, 2011). Further, 
the authorities have guaranteed all the deposits at the Jordanian licensed banks for the whole 
year of 2009 to boost the confidence in the economy.   
2.2.4 Arab Spring Monetary Policy framework 
Since 2009, the Jordanian economy suffered from series form exogenous shocks that 
resulted in a deterioration in its fiscal and external accounts. Further, the increased uncertainty 
and the political instability in many countries in the region has affected negatively foreign 
investment flows, interrupted trade routes, and heightened the pressures on the government to 
accommodate a large numbers of refugees in Jordan. These developments resulted in a 
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deceleration in the real growth rate to reach around 3.0 percent after a registered high growth 
rates (averaging 6.7 percent during (2004-2009)). Further, the interruption of Egyptian gas 
pipeline due to sabotages in the Sinai Peninsula, which is used in electricity generation, 
weighted additional pressures on the government and increased the deficit of the government 
owned electricity company (IMF, 2012). 
The central bank of Jordan in 2012, update the monetary policy framework by introduce a 
new maturity of REPO (weekly), and established a short-term government securities portfolio 
that would affect the levels of liquidity on the market (IMF, 2013). In 2012, these tools and the 
forward forex operations supported the central bank of Jordan to inject the necessary dinar 
liquidity. As liquidity situations improved during 2013, some of the injected liquidity absorbed 
by the central bank of Jordan (IMF, 2013). Further, the CBJ reduced the interest rates on 
monetary policy instruments by 1.25 percentage points for 2013 and 2014.These policies 
helped to central bank in building up its reserves, which reached around USD 12.0 billion at 
the end of 2013. 
Additional, the amendments to the CBJ and commercial banking laws were approved by 
cabinet in 2015, which would foster transparency and provided the CBJ with the needed 
autonomy to practice its main functions more effectively. The banking law amendments 
included changes on the regulatory framework for corporate governance, and prudential 
requirements. The CBJ also introduced in early 2015 a new interest rate tool, the "CBJ Main 
Interest Rate" which would be accredited as a reference point for administering the policy, the 
main aim of this tool is to act as a reference sign for the banking system for the CBJ intentions 
and the desired interest rate at the market (CBJ, 2015). 
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The development in the macroeconomic and legislative environment walked hand in hand 
with the evolution of the supervisory policies in order to accommodate the changes in the 
domestic market as well as the increased interdependency between global financial markets. 
The following section will address the main changes in the supervisory policies and procedures 
in the banking sector. 
2.3 The Developments of Supervision Policies and Procedures  
The supervision over banking activities has developed in parallel with the advancements 
and innovations in the banking industry as well as the evolution of the monetary policy 
frameworks. Authorities tried to preserve monetary stability through insuring the soundness of 
the banking system and the existence of good corporate governance. Many regulatory measures 
have been administered to banks as a mean for ensuring the viability of the banking sector. 
This section will discuss briefly the main developments with regards to supervision in banks 
and some of the main measures and announcements that shaped the relationship between the 
regulatory authorities and the banking sector in Jordan. 
The regulatory authorities since the early 1970s till the commencement of the liberalization 
process in early 1990s have influenced the interest rates in the market directly. Further, the 
supervisory authorities have intervened directly in the way that banks manage their own 
balance sheets through introducing multiple restrictions on extending credit to the private and 
the public sectors and setting the limits for liquidity and credit concentration ratios. These 
restrictions included, for example, accepting deposits in foreign currencies from non-residents, 
setting limits on extended credit facilities to total deposits, so that it should not exceed a pre-
specified percentage, and limits on credit growth and as a percentage of their capital (CBJ, 
1969: 1989). These restrictions were employed to serve the overall goal of the central bank as 
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its operational targets were quantitative in nature which resulted in a heavily influenced 
banking sector by the central bank. 
The economic crisis in 1989 have paved the way for a more autonomous central bank and 
market-oriented reforms were interest rates are determined according to market forces. The 
supervisory authorities have adopted to these changes through monitoring the bank 
performance indicators and reduce restrictions on banks liquidity management, were they are 
responsible for managing their balance sheets and activities within the set guidelines by the 
central bank. These measures have been taken during 1993 to initiate the commencement of 
the indirect policies of influencing liquidity in the market through stopping the acceptance of 
licensed banks’ deposits at the CBJ, allowing banks to manage their clients’ portfolios in 
foreign currencies, and issuing certificates of deposits in domestic and foreign currencies to 
their clients (CBJ, 1993). 
Further, the supervisory authorities have set the main guidelines for managing commercial 
and Islamic banks’ portfolios in foreign currencies to ensure the stability in the banking sector 
through setting limits on the levels of investments, diversification, and rating of the investment 
tools (CBJ, 2000). Also, they set new rules for the level of credit concentration and contributed 
in drafting the electronic transactions law to keep up with the innovations in the banking 
industry (CBJ, 2001).  
The supervisory authorities sought to enhance the financial position of Jordanian banks 
through adopting these measures and raising the minimum capital requirements, setting an 
early warning system, and applying corporate governance instructions that complies with 
international standards and practices. Furthermore, there should be a certain organizational and 
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administrative framework under which responsibilities and authorities are clearly set and well 
specific to ensure effective supervisory frameworks (CBJ, 2012). 
As for financial and regulatory indicators, the CBJ has implemented Basel II standardized 
approach to calculate Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) since the year 2008 though the CAR level 
is well above the set 8 percent by the Basel committee (CBJ, 2012). Moreover, the supervisory 
authorities are in the process of implementing Basel III requirements to enhance liquidity 
management and solvency. 
In 2016, Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), issued a new guideline for stress testing of banks 
operating in Jordan these came after the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2009 
issued the main principles of stress testing and supervision. In 2012, the Committee issued a 
paper on the review of the application of the supervisory authorities to these principles, which 
are based on the stress testing practices and supervision that are released after the global 
financial crisis (BIS, 2009). In addition, the IMF has developed comprehensive methodologies 
for conducting these tests. The Central Bank issued these guideline and instructions in order to 
keep pace with the latest developments in this regard and in line with international best 
practices in particular. 
Stress tests are used to identify the risks facing the bank, to assist in capital planning and 
to help manage liquidity. Compression stress tests are a complementary tool to other risk 
management tools and are not a substitute for them. The CBJ explained the role of the board 
of directors and senior executive management in the stress tests process. For the board has to 
ensure that there is an effective framework for stress testing and high-risk management. The 
board has ultimate responsibility for the bank's stress test program and should ensure that the 
risk management department conducts periodic stress tests and that the board has a key role in 
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the adoption of the hypotheses and scenarios used and analysis of the results of tests and the 
adoption of actions to be taken based on these results. While, the role of the senior executive 
management is to implement and monitor the stress-testing program, and insure that a qualified 
staff is available and have the appropriate tools and methods to conduct stress tests as well as 
using the results of the stress tests to determine and assessing the bank's risk tolerance and 
planning process of capital and liquidity (CBJ, 2017).  Stress tests are approved by the board 
of directors and are documented in an appropriate manner. The documentation process includes 
the type and details of the stress tests and the scenarios used, the assessment of the basic 
hypotheses on which the tests were built at least annually, the periodicity of the implementation 
of stress tests and corrective actions Type and test results. The stress-testing program should 
include quantitative and qualitative methods to improve the comprehensiveness of these tests 
and to make them supportive and complementary to the risk management models and methods 
used by the bank, and the banks should consider two types of tests under the stress test, the 
sensitivity tests and scenario analysis tests (BIS, 2019). 
Sensitivity analysis tests are used to measure the impact of movements in risk factors - 
each individually - on the financial position of the bank. The relationships and overlaps 
between different risk factors are not considered. Therefore, the objective of these tests is to 
determine the sensitivity of the bank's financial position to one risk factor and to assess the 
bank's ability to address it. The scenario tests these tests are designed to assess the impact of 
probability scenarios that may be low but their impact on the financial position of the bank is 
significant, including tests based on historical events, and hypothetical tests that may occur. 
The internal audit department is responsible for at least annual review and evaluation, and the 
results of evaluation and review should be submitted to the board of directors (BIS, 2009).  The 
banks should use the results of stress tests to develop contingency plans to deal with different 
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risks and activate the use of risk mitigation instruments such as hedging. Stress tests cover all 
complex financial products as needed and include assessing the extent and impact of off-
balance sheet assets on other risk types, especially credit, market and liquidity risks and their 
influence on the bank's solvency and liquidity. Central bank will assess the framework of stress 
tests conducted by banks on a regular and comprehensive basis. The tests used should be 
proportionate with the degree of risk appetite identified by the bank, so that the chosen 
scenarios are commensurate with the size, nature and complexity of the bank's business and 
the risks associated with it (BIS, 2019). 
During all these stages the CBJ pursuit the development of the supervision in order to 
safeguard the banking system in Jordan through protecting the rights of the depositors and the 
shareholders. The supervision of the banking system in Jordan takes two forms; off-site 
supervision , where the supervision team monitors banking operations, periodic analysis of 
financial statements and periodic reports sent by banks to CBJ, as well as reviewing requests 
for licensing of fresh banks and branching Jordanian banks in Jordan and overseas (CBJ, 2012). 
While on-site supervision includes field visits to guarantee adherence to banking law, CBJ’s 
regulations and the evaluation the internal control system and management quality.   
2.4 The Development of the Jordanian Banking System in a Regional Context 
During the last decade, many countries in the MENA region have started to implement 
many structural reform programs. The financial sector in general and the banking sector in 
particular, was not isolated from these reforms, which were directed towards preserving the 
stability of the financial system in these countries. The speed and the magnitude of these 
reforms differed between the MENA Countries, which resulted in a deferent characteristic of 
the banking industry in these countries. The actions and policies that followed the attitude of 
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these banks have been affected by the regulatory and political developments in MENA (Abed 
& Davoodi, 2003). 
Many performance metrics could show how banks manage their resources in these 
countries. For example; the effectiveness and the ability of the banking sector, represented by 
the evolution of return on their assets ratio, which have been relatively high compared to other 
countries in the MENA area despite the higher ratio of non-performing loans in these countries3 
(Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and UAE), which could be attributed to factors that the 
banking industry have little control over.  
In addition, the conservative attitude of commercial banks in Jordan is considered one of 
the main features of the banking system as reflected in the return on equity ratio. Safeguarding 
the shareholders equity compared to other countries (Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and 
UAE) due to the political instability of the neighbouring countries and the reliance of these 
banks on traditional banking services to generate profits.  
The conservative approach for Jordanian banks and the high liquidity levels in the banking 
system validates the ability of these banks to a higher level of exposure and meets its 
obligations (Almumani, 2013).  
The interest margin to gross income express the value of the banks activities in grants loan 
and accepted deposits, the Jordan had the high percentage in MENA region as shown in figure1. 
Which illustrate the traditional image of the banks in maximise the spread between the interest 
that paid and the interest that got from loans.  
                                            
3 The researcher have selected these countries according to data availability, as many banks and countries in the 
MENA region do not publish data in an accurate and timely manner. 
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Figure 1: Main performance metrics of selected countries in the MENA region 
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The figure above shown the non-performing loans to total loans in Jordan is high 
comparing to other MENA countries (UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon) except in Algeria it 
has high than Jordan. Which indicated that Jordan involved with high risks toward the non-
performing loans. The higher ratio of non- performing loans could be attributed to the 
macroeconomic situation in Jordan and the conditions regarding the illiquidity degree of the 
market. The conservative attitude of commercial banks in Jordan shown in most of the ration 
above in figure 1. 
2.5 Branching Evolution of the Banking System in Jordan 
The massive evolution, which stated since the early 2000s increased the importance of this 
sector, as it is considered one of the key pillars supporting the Jordanian economy. It comprises 
25 operating banks, of which 16 Jordanian banks, 3 Islamic banks and 9 branches of foreign 
banks, of which one is an Islamic bank. These banks work via a 785-branch network and 82 
official offices. The population index therefore reached 12,1 thousand people per branch, for 
the total number of branches (CBJ, 2015).  
The market is arguably saturated; nonetheless, the banking industry is relying on 
traditional services, and therefore a wide range for expansion opportunities is still available 
(Almumani, 2013). Further, the development in the outstanding balance of assets have 
accelerated dramatically by more than three fold since early 2000s, to reach around than USD 
66.4 billion at the end of 2015. In addition, total deposits, domestic time deposits, and credit 
facilities of licensed banks increased intensely, reflecting a sound growth and the rise of its 
importance to financial and economic development. 
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Figure 2: The Banking system in Jordan (End of 2015) 
2.6 Soundness Indicators 
The soundness of the banking system can be noticed by examining the soundness 
indicators such as the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), which was at 19.06%, high above the 
regulatory requirements set by the central bank and the Basel committee at 12% and 8%, 
respectively. Moreover, the coverage ratio for Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) witnessed a 
steady rise during the last few years, reaching 74.7%. In addition, customer deposits witnessed 
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a healthy growth rate, averaging 10.3% during the period (2004-2015). On the other side of the 
balance sheet, credit facilities grew on average by 13.3% during the same period. Thus, 
impacting the average growth level of balance sheet (assets and liabilities) during the period 
(2004-2015) by 10.0% and 8.2%, respectively. The continued growth in both sides of the 
balance sheet sign for the strength in Jordanian banking system. 
Table 1: Financial soundness indicators 
- Source: Central Bank of Jordan database  
2.6.1 Developments in the Assets  
The importance of the banking system in the Jordanian economy could be well presented 
when taking a glance at the ratio of total assets to the GDP. This percentage has reached on 
average 197.2 percent during the period (2004-2015). Though, it declined on a steady basis 
from 220.3 percent in 2004 to 176.9 percent in 2015, it still demonstrate the importance of 
ensuring the resilience and viability of the banking system and illustrates the need to for 
strengthening internal and regulatory control systems through effectively managing the both 
sides of their balance sheets. 
The developments in the balance sheet of the Jordanian banks was influenced by multiple 
dynamics that impacted their management as well as their operational framework, which in 
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turn affected the dynamics of the balance sheet at these banks. The growth in the assets have 
been mainly driven by the growth in the credit facilities as it is considered one of the main 
Items in the consolidated balance sheet. Extending credit to public and private entities have 
also been affected by the business doing environment in the country. 
Changes in total assets during the period (2004-2015) were mainly influenced by changes 
in domestic assets, which include claims on the public sector. This item increased at a steady 
pace of 21.6% on average during the period under consideration. The steady rise in the 
government deficit, especially after the global financial crisis have increased the percentage of 
government securities owned by commercial banks in Jordan as a result of the government 
heavy reliance on internal borrowing through issuing securities and bonds to finance deficit. 
The claims on public sector as a share of total assets increased from 8.8 percent in 2004 to 
24.4 percent in 2015. Nonetheless, these developments did not affect negatively the structure 
of the assets backed by a good capital base and a strong liquidity position. Further, government 
securities and guaranteed debt is considered as a risk free investment with reasonable return. 
The structural reforms adopted by the government to strengthen the fiscal position did not 
resolve the persistent deficit in its budget, therefore, their reliance on internal borrowing 
through issuing bonds and treasury bills continued. Accordingly, limiting the available funding 
for the private sector and increasing its costs. The impact of the government structural reform 
programs as well as their efforts to privatize public companies impacted the changes in 
extended credit to the private sector as well as the macroeconomic environment in the country. 
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 Figure 3: Evolution of credit facilities extended to the private sector (2003-2015)4 
 
The growth of extended credit facilities to the private sector have increased dramatically 
since 2003 due to the repercussions of the Iraqi war effects and the near completion of structural 
reform programs by 2004. Credit facilities afterwards increased by around 20.3 percent on 
average for the period (2004-2008) as the economy have begun to reap the fruits of reforms, 
the large capital inflows to the Jordan form the GCC countries, and the establishment of several 
business entities by Iraqi investors fleeing from political instability in the neighbouring 
country. 
                                            
4 Source: Central bank of Jordan and author’s calculation. 
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The impact of the global financial crisis on the Jordanian economy transpired through 
multiple indirect channels. These factors impacted the macroeconomic conditions in the 
country as well as the risk appetite of investors. In addition, banks started to limit the extended 
credit to new investments which resulted in a decline in the average growth rate of domestic 
credit, reaching 4.7% in 2009. Moreover, the geopolitical unrest in the region that coincided 
with the Arab spring heightened the uncertainty of the economy as well as the financial system, 
which resulted in a slower pace of growth in credit, averaging 6.2% for the period (2010-2015). 
Figure 4: Change in the term structure of assets to total Facilities 
 
Loans and Advances and discounted bills constituted around 82 percent, on average, of 
total credit facilities extended by licenced banks in Jordan during 2004-2015. The term 
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structure of these facilities have changed gradually during the last decade towards focusing 
more on long term facilities, which shows that banks in Jordan are constantly changing and 
adapting their positions in the domestic markets to mitigate risk and adapt to the current market 
conditions. 
Facilities with three-month duration have been more volatile during the period (2004-
2015), with a standard deviation of 16.8 points, which reflects the variability in these facilities 
and the effect of various factor on its balance. On the other hand, assets with more than 12-
month duration has been less volatile thought the period under consideration. The reason 
behind that could be referred to the characteristics of facilities terms under different durations 
and the effects of market conditions and the macroeconomic cyclicality on their volumes. 
The banking industry in Jordan has been keener to change the term structure of the 
extended facilities through moving gradually away from short term lending and increase their 
position in long-term facilities. The 3-month duration facilities have decreased from 34.6 
percent of total facilities in 2004 to 20.2 percent in 2015, whereas facilities with a duration 
more than 12 months have increased from 43.7.0 percent in 2004 to 64.4 percent in 2015, other 
duration from 3-6 months and 6-12 months have been less volatile and held their positions 
throughout the period (2004-2015). These changes reflect the overall approach that the banking 
industry have adopted to manage their risks and their positions in the market. Indeed, the 
increase in long term lending could be realized through the decline of risk appetite due to the 
geopolitical instability in the region. This approach has compelled banks to build their asset 
management frameworks toward searching for less risker investors, which would explain their 
inflated portfolios of government securities and real economy projects that will have the ability 
to pay-off its obligations and contribute in real economic growth.  
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Figure 5: Ownership of non-Jordanians, capitalization of banks in the ASE 
 
However, the domestic market conditions have been affected by the ongoing turmoil in 
the region and the global financial situation, the banking sector is still considered a major part 
of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The capitalization of the banking sector constitutes 
around 54.2 percent in 2015, which reflects the importance of this sector to the Jordanian 
economy. The resilience in this sector attracted long-term investors to this sector as illustrated 
in the stability of foreigner’s ownership in banking market capitalization compared to the 
relative volatility of the non-Jordanian ownership in the total market capitalization. 
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2.6.2 Developments in Liabilities 
The funding sources for banking activities in Jordan comes from deposits as it is 
considered one of the main components of liability structure of the Jordanian balance sheets. 
The ratio of deposits to GDP, which is considered as a proxy for the development in the use of 
funds, have averaged around 105.4 percent during the period (2004-2015) which reflects a high 
size of the banking sector and its ability to affect the real economy. 
Figure 6: Liabilities composition in USD billion (2004-2015)5 
                                            
5 Source: Central bank of Jordan and author’s calculations. 
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Another major component of the balance sheet contributed to the development in the 
banking filed. Labilities shows the funding sources that commercial banks use to finance their 
operations in Jordan. The main component of liabilities is customers’ deposits, which 
constitutes more than 60.0% of total assets. Furthermore, time deposits constitutes that majority 
of the private sector deposits and a big part of total liabilities, averaging around 50% of 
liabilities during (2004-2015). 
The change in the structure of total liabilities have changed considerably during the past 
decade. Capital and allowances have increased noticeably by 20.2 percent and 41.3 percent, 
respectively, during (2005-2006) as banks have tried to strengthen their capital base. The 
growth in time and saving deposits have witnessed a steady increase, but the repercussions of 
the global financial crisis and the increased uncertainty in the region have decelerated its 
growth rate, especially in 2012 when it reached 1.0 percent.  
Nonetheless, time deposits are considered one of the major sources of funding for 
Jordanian banks. However, other items such as foreign liabilities have remained relatively 
stable throughout the period under consideration constituting around 16.8% percent of total 
liabilities throughout the period under consideration. Deposits of the private sector constitutes 
a major part of total deposits of the banking system, attained on average 90% during (2004-
2015). As for the currency composition of deposits, private sector deposits in foreign currency 
have took a downward trajectory from 37.8 percent in 2004 to 21.2 percent in 2015 which 
reflects the increased confidence in the national currency. 
The commercial banks in Jordan relies on customers’ deposits as a main source of funding. 
The loan to deposits ratio was at 65.5%, on average for the period (2004-2015). With some 
exceptions that is related to macroeconomic conditions, were it rose well above the average 
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due to the growth of extended facilities to public entities (guaranteed debt). Further, capital 
adequacy ratio as it reached 19.6 percent at the end of 2015. 
2.6.4 Market Concentration 
The level of concentration in the market is considered one of the important elements that 
reflects the competitive power amongst banks and a useful tool for screening the market 
structure (Rhoades, 1993). The Jordanian economy is arguably saturated with regards to the 
number of operating banks in Jordan (Almumani, 2013).  Since the early 2000s a number of 
new entrants have increased the degree of competitiveness in attracting deposits and lending 
facilities for various sectors, but the level of concentration is still high when taking into 
consideration that the Arab bank (ARBK) and the Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (THBK) 
denominates the banking industry in Jordan. 
Many studies have highlighted the effects of concentration in the banking industry. For 
example, De Nicolò & Loukoianova, (2007) found that bank risk decreases a less concentrated 
markets, while Keeley, (1990) found that the surge of competition after the relaxation of state 
restrictions in the U.S. during the 1980s decreased monompoly power and increased bank 
faliures. Thus, the regulatory authorities have to strike the right balance by monitoring the 
market and ensure the comply with the set regulations to ensure the stability of the banking 
sector.  
2.6.3 Hirschman-Herfindahl Index  
The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) index is the most common statistical measure of 
concentration. It focuses on the relationship between market structure and bank’s performance 
and takes into account the number of banks that constitutes the market by calculating the market 
share of all banks in the markets and summing the squares as follows: 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 = ∑ (𝑀𝑆𝑖)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(1) 
Where 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, 𝑀𝑆 the market share for the banks at the 
𝑖th year, and 𝑛 represents the number of banks in the market. 
Figure 7: Development of HHI for banks assets6 
 
The researcher have calculated the HHI index for the total assets, and for gross loans and 
total deposits as a measure of banking industry competition in Jordan in order to determine the 
                                            
6 Source: Bankscope database and author’s calculation. 
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level of concentration in the market on both sides of the balance sheet and their effects on 
banks’ profitability metrics. Bankscope data was employed in order to get individual bank data 
levels for the period (2005-2015).  
The banking industry in Jordan is a relatively small compared to other markets in the 
region. Though the number of operating banks is considered large, a relatively high level of 
concentration in the market share of assets exists when measured by the HHI. The level of 
concentration, measured by the market share of total assets took a downward trend since 2005 
due to new market entrants, mainly foreign banks, such as National Bank of Kuwait (NBK), 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD), and BLOM bank. Further, two Islamic banks have 
entered the markets in 2010 (AL-Rajhi bank) and 2011 (Jordan Dubai Islamic bank). 
Also, the downward path for HHI assets from (3,598) in 2005 to (2,502) in 2015 have been 
affected by various factors that is related to the macroeconomic conditions domestically as well 
as in the region and the global financial crisis, which took its tool in Jordan since 2009. Though 
the trajectory of HHI is have been decreasing overtime, it is still a little high as one bank is 
controlling around 45 percent of total assets of the banking sector, which sheds the light on the 
role of the regulatory authorities and its role in preserving stability and ensuring the viability 
of the banking sector. 
Further, market competition have increased during the past decade as the HHI index for 
both deposits and gross loans witnessed a parallel decrease during the period under 
consideration from 3,745.5 points and 3,480.8 points in 2005 to 2,461.9 points and 2,373.5 
points in 2015, respectively.  The individual data reveals that their market shares of gross loans 
to total deposits are close for most of the commercial banks with some differences as some 
banks are more conservative in seeking a higher market share of deposits to gross loans. These 
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differences reflects the variance in managing their balance sheets and different performance 
metrics targets. 
Figure 8: HHI index for deposits and gross loans7 
 
2.6.5 Profitability  
Obtaining fair earnings that ensures the viability of a firm is essential for maintaining 
ongoing activity. The European central bank defined the bank performance as the “capacity to 
generate sustainable profitability” where the main drivers of profitability are earnings, 
efficiency, risk-taking and leverage (ECB, 2010). The banking sector in Jordan is considered 
one of the highest banking sector (MENA) with an adequate level of liquidity and high level 
of profitability coupled with a strong capitalization (CBJ, 2014). 
                                            
7 Source: Bankscope database and author’s calculation. 
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Figure 9: Main Performance indicators8 
 
Variables in figure 9 shows that banking profitability rose in a continuously since 2004, 
except for 2009, as they were impacted by the global financial crisis as well as the domestic 
economic environment, though profitability ratios, such as ROE, declined since 2006 as banks 
increased their capital. On the other hand, the leverage ratio was relatively stable indicating a 
high reliance on private capital for financing operations. The major source of revenue was from 
extending credit to their clients. It is worth noting that interest margin to gross income was 
more that 60% during the period (2004-2015). Moreover, the ROA was low during the period 
showing that some resources are not allocated efficiently. 
                                            
8 Source: Central Bank of Jordan database and author’s calculation. 
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Many factors impact profitability at banks, favourable macroeconomic factors tends to 
raise banks profitability. Moreover, the market structure and the concentration level impacts 
profitability.  Many studies found that market concentration is associated with increased 
profitability (Kupiec & Lee, 2012). But these factors are dependent on the level of risk-taking 
and the adopted policies of balance sheet management. For example, the cost to income ratio 
which is considered relatively high for the Arab bank (49.3 percent) taking into consideration 
its market power as it controls around 49 percent9 of the total assets in the banking industry for 
the period (2005-2015). 
Jordanian commercial banks prudence has impacted their profitability which was low 
during the period (2004-2015), though stable. The researcher has calculated the average ROAA 
for the banks weighted by its assets size. Most of the banks are above the industry average 
(1.03 percentage points) with the exception of the Arab bank, Ahli Bank and Société générale 
de Banque-Jordanie which reflects that resource allocation management is relatively efficient. 
As for the Arab bank, the prudent manner of managing and allocating its resources is reflected 
on the return on asset ratio, which highlights that it could increase its profitability by increasing 
its exposure and preserve its soundness at the same time.    
Serious challenges face the banking industry due to the geopolitical tensions in the region 
as well as the innovations in financial products which changed the way managers perceive risk 
and stressed the importance of balance sheet management. These developments have placed 
liquidity management at the heart of the banking core responsibilities. Thus, several methods 
                                            
9 Source: Bankscope and authors’ calculations. 
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and tools have been developed in order to effectively manage liquidity in banks and charting 
managers’ decisions towards preserving the viability and stability of banks. 
Figure 10: ROAA for selected commercial banks in 201510 
 
2.7 Basel accords and Liquidity Risks 
The survival of banking institutions in the current financial system depends mainly on its 
ability to meet its contractual obligations by ensuring the availability of cash or collateral to 
                                            
10 Source: Bankscope database and author’s calculations. 
Source: Bank scope data base abd author's calculations
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fulfil those needs at the appropriate time by coordinating the various sources of funds available 
to the institution under normal and stressed conditions (Federal Reserve, D.B.S.R., 1994). The 
liquidity of an asset depends on the convertibility and the speed of conversion to cash with no 
or little loss (Nader, 2002).  Thus, liquidity risk is the uncertainty surrounding the speed and 
the availability of convertibility given the presence of a readily market in which there is active 
trading in the asset. It comes mainly from the inability of firms to raise funds to meet financing 
needs or the incapability to execute transactions at prevailing market prices due to lack of 
appetite of other market parties.  
Banking institutions are vulnerable to liquidity risks as their fundamental role includes the 
transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans. Consequently, they should focus 
on managing their liquidity to enable meeting obligations as they come due, without incurring 
unacceptable losses (BIS, 2008). Therefore, managing liquidity in terms of maturity and timing 
for assets and liabilities is considered a crucial part of financial management process which is 
widely known as working capital management. The ALM is a process that focuses on matching 
the supply and demand of funds through simultaneous forecasting of its dynamics in a manner 
that maintains liquidity risk within the set limits (Nader, 2002). 
Many studies have defined liquidity risk as the ability of the financial institutions to meet 
and settle its obligations as they come due (BIS, 2008; Federal Reserve, D.B.S.R., 1994; 
Chorafas, 2007; Drehmann, 2013; Choudhry, 2011; Vento & La Ganga, 2009) The ability of 
the bank to meet its obligations depend on the condition of the macroeconomic environment, 
sector and entity specifics (Choudhry, 2011). Further, liquidity risks stems from various 
resources that is related to day-to day operations with regards to lending and trading activities 
(Chorafas, 2007). Therefore, the inability of these institutions to meet their obligations will 
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render the bank in default (Drehmann, 2013). Accordingly, ensuring the availability of funding 
to meet the expected and unexpected future obligations without affecting daily operations or 
the financial position of the institution, which is known as liquidity risk funding, over a specific 
horizon with reasonable costs (BIS, 2008; Drehmann, 2013; Vento & La Ganga, 2009). 
The availability of various tools and techniques for managing liquidity has been widely 
identified, though many banks still have difficulties in managing their liquidity in a prudent 
manner. The global financial crisis illustrated the importance of proper functioning of the 
banking sector and how liquidity conditions can quickly change which highlights the 
importance of the central banks in safeguarding the proper functioning of the banking sector as 
a whole, and in some cases financial institutions. In response to these difficulties, Basel 
Committee have identified some basic principles in liquidity risk management for which banks 
should adhere to in order to ensure the soundness of the banking sector. It includes detailed 
guidance on risk management and supervision of funding liquidity risk (BIS, 2008; Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). 
2.7.1 Liquidity management under Basel Committee 
The Basel committee has identified sources for liquidity risk as Basel II considers the 
supervision of ALM under Pillar II (BIS, 2004). Thus, banking institutions monitor the changes 
in their liquidity positions through three main approaches, liquid assets positions, cash flows, 
and a combination of these two approaches. Further, several solutions to manage liquidity have 
been identified by the Basel committee. The adoption of the centralized or the decentralized 
approach depends on the structure of the institutions as financial institutions, flow of liquidity 
between parts of the institutions and the adopted policies and procedures (Chorafas, 2007).  
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Though liquidity management existed in the banking industry before Basel II for internal 
purposes, it is considered a new aspect of regulatory measures. The difference between Basel 
II and III with respect to liquidity management is that Basel II underestimated the importance 
of liquidity management, while Basel III introduced new management standards to strengthen 
the internal and regulatory supervision over liquidity management in the banking industry 
(Kubat, 2014). In 2013 Basel Committee11, introduced the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
(BIS, 2013). The LCR objective to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile 
of banks, and seeking to ensuring a bank has an appropriate stock of unencumbered HQLA 
consisting of assets that could be converted into cash with little or no loss of value in markets 
to fulfil its liquidity needs in a liquidity stress scenario for 30-calendar day (BIS, 2013): 
 𝐿𝐶𝑅 =
𝐻𝑄𝐿𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 
 (1.1) 
The HQLA consists of two levels of assets, level (1), which include coins and banknotes, 
central bank reserves, and marketable securities guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, IMF. 
On the other hand, level (2) assets include for example, corporate debt securities, marketable 
securities representing claims, residential mortgage backed securities, common equities shares 
that meet certain conditions, and level 2 assets after applied the haircuts not more than 40 
percent of the total stock of HQLA (BIS, 2013). While, the denominator is Total net cash 
                                            
11 The Basel Committee is the global primary committee that establish international standards for prudential 
regulation in the banking sector and aim`s is to improving the regulation, oversight and procedures of banks 
around the world with a view to enhance economic stability and providing a type of collaboration on banking 
supervisory issues (BIS, 2015). 
46 
 
outflows over the next 30-calendar day, the interest that expected to received or paid within 30 
day should be include in the cash flows in or out (BIS, 2013).  
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is another key reform in Basel's Committee and 
requires banks to keep the appropriate funding profile with their asset structure and off-balance 
sheet activities (BIS, 2014). Maintaining a suitable funding profile mitigate the likelihood of 
disruptions to regular funding resources, the NSFR fosters the funding stability, and boosts in 
provide a clear assessing funding risk across all the balance sheet in/off items, through their 
limits to the over reliance on short-term wholesale funding.  (BIS, 2014) : 
  𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 =
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  
≥ 100% (1.2) 
The available amount of stable funding is a portion of the capital and liabilities expected 
to be acquired during the period of consider the NSFR up to one year such as total amount of 
regulatory capital, the total amount of secured and unsecured borrowings and liabilities (BIS, 
2014).  While , the required stable funding which is residual maturities of the various asset that 
held in banks as well as banks off balance sheet exposures, such as coins and banknotes 
immediately, all central bank reserves, all claims on central banks with residual maturities of 
less than six months. NSFR should be equal to at least 100 percent (BIS, 2014).  
2.7.2 Principles for liquidity risk management and supervision 
Streamlining liquidity management supervision was one of the aims of the Basel 
committee for the banking institutions. They emphasized the existence of a robust liquidity 
management framework, which sets risks exposures that are consistent with the bank business 
strategy and funding their needs. The framework should take into consideration the business 
model of the bank as well as the currency exposures (BIS, 2008).  
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Furthermore, the framework should focus on funding diversification as well as managing 
liquidity for daily operations to meet their obligations on a timely basis, Moreover, 
differentiating between unencumbered and encumbered assets would increase the banks 
efficiency in managing their mismatches as well as their collateral positions.  (BIS, 2008). 
In addition, having a Contingency Funding Plan (CFP)12 is a crucial part to safeguard banks 
from emergency liquidity shortfalls through using different potential sources of liquidity and 
remaining within the set exposure limits. The bank strategy should have a buffer of high quality 
liquid assets, which would ease the stress of liquidity shortfalls (BIS, 2008). Finally, a 
comprehensive assessment for the bank’s liquidity management framework is important to 
ensure the viability of the bank and its resilience while facilitating cooperation with the 
supervisory authorities through transparency and the disclosure of financial information on a 
regular basis (BIS, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
12 CFP is a plan that sets out strategies for the management of various stress environments, lays down a clear lines 
responsibilities, is frequently tested to ensure the operationally strength for the plan (BIS, 2008). 
48 
 
Chapter Three: Asset and Liability Management 
3.1 Introduction  
Managing risks in a highly uncertain environment is considered a challenge for banks in the 
MENA region. The process of asset liability management is usually built on mitigating the 
impact of various risk on banks’ performance through aligning the bank performance with the 
risks stemming from internal factors as well as its environment with the adopted business 
model while identifying measures to mitigate the impact of these risks is still open to debate 
(Zenios & Ziemba, 2006). During the 1970s, asset liability management became one of the 
main practices used by financial institutions to mitigate against the impact of volatile interest 
rates, which increased mismatches between assets and liabilities , ALM is intertwined with 
strategic planning as it offer solutions for mitigating against risks arising from bank operations 
while focusing on maximising profits. Therefore, the decision-making process in financial 
institutions is more complex in nature than in other organisations as banks tend to support 
different lines of services (Choudhry, 2011).  
In Jordan, banks strive in managing their portfolios in a highly volatile region, especially 
since the break out of the Arab spring. Banks efforts crystalized through preserving their 
viability and continuing to have a solid performance through registering net profits (CBJ, 
2017). However, little studies, according to the best of my knowledge have focused on the 
Asset Liability management at Jordanian banks though it presents itself as a unique case worthy 
of studying due to the geopolitical unrest in the region and its impact on banks’ balance sheet 
as well as the domestic economic environment. Therefore, in this chapter the researcher will 
try to identify the main elements of the ALM process, the ALCO committee main functions 
and the tools and metrics used to set and mitigate risk exposures through using a survey that 
distributed to all commercial banks in Jordan.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
In this section, the researcher will discuss the existing literature on asset and liability 
management (ALM), asset and liability committee (ALCO) frameworks, and the mechanisms 
that these managements and committees use in Jordanian commercial banks. ALM has gained 
increased attention in recent decades due to the crucial role of banks in the stability of the 
global financial system. This requires banks to have reliable frameworks that can help them to 
mitigate against risks stemming from market fluctuations. Such market forces, according to 
Pragathi and Veena (2018), are highly unpredictable because of the macro effect of factors in 
both the domestic and global markets. Furthermore, the optimal structure of the balance sheet 
needs to be ascertained in strategic planning to maximising profits while also minimizing risk 
through greater efficiency in managing assets and liabilities. According to Chakroun and Abid 
(2013), in making such decisions, banks should analyse present and future conceivable 
economic circumstances while also addressing the many impositions of restriction on its 
environment. The concept of ALM was settled as strategy for a hedging reaction against the 
risk of financial institutions. In relation, Zawalinska (1999) stated that the evolution of ALM 
and how organisations developed depend on their experience in risk management. Therefore, 
the ALM process can be described as a dynamic process of planning and coordinating to 
achieve a bank or organisation’s desired goals. 
ALM has changed significantly over the past two decades with the growth and integration of 
financial institutions, and the emergence of new financial products and services (Tektas, 2005). 
In addition, new financial activities have increased the types of risk in the market today, which 
necessitates the use of qualitative skills to manage risks and improve the performance of 
financial institutions. As such, ALM is associated with the optimal investment of assets for 
achieving current goals and dealing with upcoming liabilities. ALM entails the joint assessment 
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and evaluations of risks as well as benefits for assets and liabilities. In this regard, the purported 
silo approach13, which is the more conventional method for discrete management of risks, is 
no longer suitable for financial institutions (Romanyuk, 2010). At the beginning, management 
was based on a simple gap that concerned analysing cash-flow risks and mismatches between 
assets and the other side of the budget. As banks’ risk management practices have developed, 
cash-flow gap models progressively moved to duration gap models, which are more concerned 
about the market value of financial institutions’ rate-sensitive assets and rate-sensitive 
liabilities (i.e. sensitive to changes in interest rates) rather than just the difference between them 
(Shrestha, 2015).  
ALM considers the decisions and actions taken with respect to both sides of the balance sheet 
to ensure that banks’ resources are effectively utilised to maximise profitability and mitigate 
against risks. In addition, macroeconomic variables have an impact on banks’ ability to 
generate profit. Shrestha (2015) reports that the fast development of the financial markets, and 
the vast movement of trading within capital markets, as well as the recent advent of risk-
analysis technology, necessitates the implementation of ALM. Consequently, the ALM 
strategy revolves around how banks arrange and match the main two sides of their balance 
sheets. Here, the first side concerns the uses of funds and the other concerns the sources of 
these funds, against various risks such as liquidity risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, 
and credit risks. In other words, asset liability management (ALM) is necessary to manage both 
balance sheet sides simultaneously to mitigate against fundamental14 and other types of risk 
and to maximise operational income. Therefore, ALM is a continuous and comprehensive 
                                            
13 Managing risks separately depending on the risk type (Romanyuk, 2010).  
14 This refers to factors far beyond an institution’s control such as political, economic, and social developments (Bessis, 2015).  
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strategy based on assessment and managing banking institutions effectively to achieve set goals 
while reducing banks’ exposure to various risks, thus ensuring efficient usage of banks’ 
available resources. Further, should also draw the guidelines for the optimal investment 
strategies that achieve the institution’s targets and safeguard investors’ equity (Choudhry, 
2011; Novickytėa & Petraitytėa, 2014). 
3.2.1 Theoretical Literature Review  
The nature of operations within financial institutions and the risks that face them are reflected 
in their balance sheets. More specifically, the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet expresses the 
risk of the surrounding environment, while most risks stemming from business operations are 
reflected in the liability side. Aligning these risks is the main purpose of ALM as it provides 
quantifiable measures of risk and strategies for managing them. Early studies have focused on 
various terms and scenarios under which funds are allocated; some considered liquidity and 
regulatory constraints, such as the capital adequacy ratio, (Chambers & Charnes, 1961; Cohen 
& Hammer, 1967) and changing financial structures accordingly. Others stressed the 
importance of liquidity classification, and the rates of the return and maturity (Bradley & 
Crane, 1972). These studies were based on Redington (1952), Markowitz (1952) and Myers 
(1968), who instigated the conceptual framework of ALM which latter studies used to build 
operating models for ALM. These studies focused on structuring assets and liabilities to make 
optimal trade-offs between liquidity, return, and risks (Kusy, 1986). Many important factors 
should be taken into consideration such as performance metrics and stakeholders’ views; for 
example, capital allocation strategies should reflect shareholders’ choices regarding different 
financial risks (Adam, 2008). 
These models provided more complex tools for organisations to manage their balance sheets 
more effectively and encouraged them to consider more diverse strategies to manage risks. 
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Redington (1952) focused on the concept of “matching” investments in terms of interest rate, 
immunization, and duration in the context of a firm’s net worth. Redington (1952) presumed a 
flat yield curve – that is, a single interest rate for all discounting of cash flows. Boyle (1978) 
and Shiu (1986) have pointed out the main defect of this approach as assuming a flat yield 
curve paves the way for the existence of arbitrage opportunities and fails to provide protection 
against general yield curve shifts. 
Redington’s model has been extended by Fischer and Weil (1971), who introduced a non-flat 
term structure and yield shifts. They developed the immunization strategy based on duration. 
Hiller & Schaack (1990) presented a classification of bond-portfolio in terms of asset liability 
and hedging methodology (dedication15 and duration matching). They modified the definition 
of duration to accommodate the increased complexity in asset liability components. Later 
developments of the Redington theory focused on new definitions and measures of 
immunization and duration corresponding to yield curve shifts. 
The incorporation of the concepts of immunization, which began as a short-term ALM model, 
and dedication within ALM gained the attention of financial modellers as a way to design 
robust portfolios. The main goal of decision makers is to enhance asset returns while managing 
liabilities to ensure that institutions can meet their financial obligations as they fall due. Thus, 
ALM provides decision makers with a wide variety of strategies and risks that should be 
considered on both the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet (Choudhry, 2011). Some 
ALM strategies focus on liability management, which is considered more conservative, by fully 
matching assets and liabilities. Others focus on matching changes in assets and liabilities 
                                            
15 Also known as cash matching, which is a passive management system that preserves some assets in order to 
serve future liabilities when they fall due. Further, it is considered as a long-term oriented ALM model. 
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according to interest rate sensitivities (immunized portfolios) through focusing on net present 
value and average duration of life. The main aim of immunization is to maintain the dominance 
of assets over liabilities at a minimum cost, which requires matching present values, interest 
rate sensitivities and changes in the portfolio over time. 
The efficient portfolio concept introduced by Markowitz in 1952 summarized the trade-off 
facing each investor, maximising return and minimizing costs. Investment decisions not only 
focus on decisions to invest in certain securities but also on how to divide capital among 
amongst different securities. The theory of portfolio selection identifies all feasible portfolios 
that minimize risk for a given level of expected return depending on one period mean-variance 
model (Kaplan, 1998).  In addition, it assumes normal distribution of returns and the 
employment of a risk aversion utility function. Further, it assumes that the value of an asset 
depends on the expectation and variance of its return and the covariance with the return of all 
other existing and potential investments (Kusy, 1986). Moreover, Markowitz defined a “good 
portfolio” as a tool that provides protection from a wide range of contingencies with respect to 
the investor’s risk-averse utility function. In addition, Markowitz specified salient features that 
affect investment returns such as political and macroeconomic factors, and the correlation 
between securities’ returns (Markowitz, 1968). However, the efficiency of the model depends 
mainly on its ability to produce reliable forecasts. 
Others have argued that portfolio selection models are inappropriate for making investment 
decisions due to the presumed risk-interdependence between securities. Myers (1968) 
attempted to identify the most appropriate objective criterion for investment appraisal and 
illustrated the need for risk-independence for securities to achieve market equilibrium, which 
implies risk dependence between securities and investment opportunities to maximise net 
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present value. Thus, diversification is not the appropriate objective for firms trying to maximise 
shareholder wealth.  
Pyle (1971) constructed the first static model based on Markowitz’s theory to deal with the 
portfolio risk problem where banks select the level of assets and liabilities throughout the 
model period. It was also based on the hedging theory of Tesler (1955), which investigates risk 
aversion and resorts to safety under uncertainty, but it neglected some important elements in 
banking operations such as liquidity transactions, matching assets and liabilities, and 
transaction costs (Telser, 1955). In addition, the model ignored other types of risks that induce 
uncertainty and only focused on portfolio risk. Later extensions have considered liabilities 
within asset mixes for the remainder of a portfolio (Sharpe & Tint, 1990). 
Most of these theories agree on the need to mitigate risk to maximise profits for financial 
institutions. However, their views of performance metrics are different as the identification of 
these measures relies on stakeholders’ views of capital allocation and the way managers 
perceive risks. The Redington theory focused on pension fund risk by immunizing fund 
valuations against interest rates by matching asset cash flows with projected liability flows. 
Furthermore, Markowitz’s theory focused on the portfolio risk of stock investment and 
highlighted the importance of diversification due to the correlation of returns among assets. 
Many approaches for managing assets and liabilities in financial institutions, and the banking 
sector in particular, have been discussed theoretically, which illustrates the strong need to 
mitigate against various risks in the banking industry and for regulators. Thus, managing risks 
stemming from banks’ operations and the surrounding environment is considered a continuous 
and dynamic process that requires specific strategies. 
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3.2.1.1 The Emergence and Importance of ALM 
Decision-making processes in financial institutions are more complex than most organisations 
as banks tend to support different lines of services. Thus, the main purpose of creating a general 
framework for financial institutions is to chart management decisions towards achieving set 
goals. Asset liability management (ALM) emerged in response to the need to manage both 
assets and liabilities simultaneously in order to mitigate against various risks as well as 
fundamental risks and maximise operating income. Furthermore, setting the overall strategy 
for commercial banks to manage effectively asset-liability components requires a focus on a 
number of key pillars. The first pillar is concerned with managing banks’ liquidity position in 
terms of liquid assets and maturity profiles, while taking into account the market conditions. 
The second pillar focuses on risks stemming from day-to-day operations such as default risk 
(Choudhry, 2011).  
Therefore, ALM is a vital issue for banks’ strategic planning, assessment and management of 
endogenous financial operations and external risks (Tektas, et al., 2005). In addition, ALM 
should be considered a dynamic process of planning, coordinating, and controlling assets and 
liabilities in term of their volume, maturities, yield, and costs in order to achieve a specified 
net interest income (Charumathi, 2008). Management must also mitigate against various types 
of risks stemming from banking operations. Thus, ALM should focus on potentially matching 
assets and liabilities in terms of their maturity and the interest rate sensitivity to minimise 
interest rate and liquidity risks and maximise shareholder value (Zawalinska, 1999).  
Consequently, ALM is a continuous and comprehensive strategy based on effective assessment 
and management of banking institutions to achieve set goals while mitigating against exposure 
to operational and market risks such as liquidity risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, and 
credit risks. ALM thus ensures efficient usage of banks’ available resources. Furthermore, 
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ALM should also draw guidelines for optimal investment strategies to achieve an institution’s 
targets and safeguard investors’ equity (Bessis, 2015). 
ALM has become an essential tool within the banking sector to address the multitude risks and 
challenges that banks may be faced with at present and in the near future. The implementation 
of ALM protects banks to a certain level, while also preparing the management of banks for 
such risks. The use of this approach can assist management in recognising banks’ existing 
market risk profiles and future risk profiles. 
Management can also assess the effect of alternative decisions for the aforementioned risk 
profiles. In addition, the assessment of these risk profiles assists bank management in 
determining the appropriate course of action based on their bank’s capacity to take risks 
(Meena, & Dhar, 2014). The entry of foreign players into the domestic banking market in recent 
years has led to changes within the financial markets and led to increasing rivalry between 
institutions. The markets have now have become more intricate, therefore necessitating 
strategic management tools (De, 2003). 
ALM is hence a broad term that describes several matters by differing market players. The 
main purpose of ALM is to manage interest-rate risk and liquidity risk. Aside from that, ALM 
also forms a general policy for credit risk and credit risk management, notwithstanding the 
tactical-level credit policy being fixed at a lower level among credit bodies. In relation to this, 
Novickytėa and Petraitytėa (2014) reported that the most common problem emerges when a 
bank’s liability costs increase at a faster rate than the revenues from their assets, or when falling 
interest rates mean that asset income drops at a faster rate liability costs. Notably, ALM’s 
fundamental principles appear to be more apt for commercial banking as opposed to investment 
banking. Nonetheless, ALM should be implemented within both types of banking. ALM 
connects different banking activities into one unit to ease management of liquidity and the 
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balance sheet. This is important so that a bank’s normal operations, service delivery, and 
consistent and profitable progress can be assured. The use of ALM allows a bank to identify 
possible problems and operating risks within its balance sheet and income statement 
(Novickytėa & Petraitytėa, 2014).  
Volatile interest rates and liquidity risks have compelled banks to shape their portfolio of assets 
and liabilities in a manner that minimises the risk in the portfolio. However, it is important that 
bank management sustain a sound balance between the gap, profitability and stability. In this 
regard, bank management must manage market liquidity risk and interest rate risk, which is 
why a framework is needed. According to Bessis (2015) and Choudhry (2018), the application 
of this framework allows management to tackle these risks and bank performance could be 
optimised.  
The use of ALM in banking systems involves bank operations in both sides of balance sheet. 
Brick (2014, p.12) ALM as a “forward-looking process involving the joint and simultaneous 
management of assets and liabilities to measure, monitor, and control the effects of changing 
interest rates on income, asset values, liquidity, and regulatory capital”. 
According to Shrestha (2015), the fast evolution of ALM has been driven by the following 
factors: recent advancements in the capital markets, theoretical and technological innovation 
in risk analysis, and financial intermediaries’ awareness of the need to adopt ALM. The 
conventional perception of banks’ activities is that a bank takes deposits with short-term 
maturities from a vast amount of people and give loans with long-term maturities to a small 
amount of borrowers. Therefore, these activities of transformation expose a bank to risks 
associated with credit, interest and liquidity. Therefore, banks need to make strategies or 
frameworks to manage, measure and control the risks associated with assets and liabilities to 
ensure the validity and stability of their activities. Strategies and frameworks will provide 
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information to management on the general overall position of a company, and from the 
incorporation of ALM, banks will achieve their sought-after efficiencies and performance 
(Romanyuk, 2010; Choudhry, 2011; Bessis, 2015). 
3.2.2 Empirical Literature Review 
The following section will discuss the existing empirical literature that has investigated the 
ALM in the banking sector. The surveyed empirical literature can be segmented into two main 
streams: one that focuses on the MENA countries, and the other that examines banks 
worldwide. The main findings of these studies were that the ALM is a crucial element that can 
be used in risk management to mitigate, control, and monitor various types of risks stemming 
from banking operations and external environmental factors. However, the literature on ALM 
for Jordanian banks is relatively scarce, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this 
study is the first to describe the ALM frameworks and the ALCO in Jordanian banks. In the 
next section, the study will discuss the ALM process and asset liability committees in banks. 
3.2.2.1 ALM Process and ALCO 
Balancing risks and profitability in the banking industry has been the main part of the decision-
making process. The inability to control surrounding environmental factors and their impact 
on business lines has compelled banking institutions to set up strategies and policies to mitigate 
the impact of these shocks and benefit from existing opportunities. Thus, the main role of ALM 
is to provide metrics for various types of risk exposure while maximising banks’ risk return 
profile such as net interest income and economic value (Choudhry, 2011). The majority of 
banks have established a committee known as an Asset-Liability Committee (ALCO)16 to 
                                            
16 It is also known by other acronyms; for example, Balance Sheet Risk and Management Committee (BRMC) 
or Asset-Liability Policy Committee (ALPC), but the most used term is ALCO. 
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effectively mitigate against various types of risks. Its main role is setting policies and building 
strategies on a balance sheet level based on detailed analysis of risk-return trade-off, and 
implementing the set goals for the different performance metrics that it monitors (Buehler, 
2008). ALCO is considered the implementation arm of ALM (Choudhry, 2018). The members 
of ALCO should include senior line managers and represent all of a bank’s business activities 
and processes (Greuning & Bratanovic, 2009). The committee members must meet on a regular 
basis to discuss recent developments in the various business lines represented and any changes 
in the surrounding environment (Choudhry, 2012). The frequency of ALCO meetings is 
important to achieve the committee’s goals and proposed strategy. The frequency of these 
meetings in banks is often influenced by the stability of those banks’ balance sheet and the 
complexity of their activities and products. If the market is more volatile and the banks’ 
activities more exposed to risks, meetings should take place at least once or twice a week (Dedu 
& Vasilache, 2008).  
ALCO meetings generate action plans, business policies and banking portfolio management 
solutions based on management reporting analysis focused on the banks’ lending margin, 
interest income, variance from last projection, customer business, and future business, by 
assessing projected returns, revenue and risk exposure. Further, meetings should consider 
acceptable levels of risk exposure, the existing risk limits, and hedging policies (Choudhry, 
2012). 
 The ALM process is undertaken by the financial department, which is responsible for interest 
rate risk, funding risk, internal transfer of funds, allocation of risks across business units, 
management control and reporting, or by a separate unit in the treasury department depending 
on the size of the bank, the variety of products and services it offers, and its organisational 
structure. One of the main responsibilities of the treasury department or separate desk is to 
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report to the ALCO; this report usually includes financial and business lines and risk 
management (Bessis, 2015).  
Figure 11: ALM Process 
  
As such, consistent evaluation and control are needed in ALM strategies and this is only 
attainable via reports and research, which allow the bodies operating in the banking sector and 
others to tackle such challenges, whether current or forthcoming (Suresh & Krishnan, 2018). 
The ALCO is dependent on reports from various units in the bank. Further, many ALM desks 
formulate their hedging strategy within the overall context of funding and liquidity policy. 
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Their hedging requirements are usually met through using plain vanilla products.17 Here, the 
ALCO takes into account the bank’s risk aversion level and need to manage its risk exposure, 
future expectations of interest rates, revenue level and profit maximisation, market volatility, 
and the overall cost of hedging (Choudhry, 2012). Figure12 (above) illustrates the asset and 
liability management process in banks. 
The ALM process could be viewed as top-down, and it starts with setting up policies and 
guidelines for the operating limits of risk-return trade-offs and communicating its 
recommendations to the bank’s board of directors. As a dynamic process, a periodic review of 
the bank’s current position and forecasts for its positions according to different scenarios are 
made in order to establish strategies and take any decisions that need to be made about the 
bank’s risk exposures. Decision-making is considered one of the main responsibilities of the 
ALCO committee (Choudhry, 2012).  
3.2.2.2 Reporting to ALCO 
Decisions are communicated to execution bodies and different units in the bank about its risk 
exposures and position. In addition, the ALCO receive reports from the various departments 
and units that represent the banks activities and business lines. Finally, the evaluation process 
of the selected strategies is undertaken through comparing the set guidelines with the actual 
achievements (Bessis, 2015; Choudhry, 2012; Faruk & Alam, 2014). The overall ALM report, 
which shows the components of the bank’s ALM and takes into account macroeconomic 
factors such as changes in the yield curve, may also include global balance sheet management. 
In addition, business line level reports are looked into; they focus on the return on capital 
generated by specific business lines.  
                                            
17 Standard type of option or financial instrument such as option bonds, futures, and swaps. 
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Furthermore, other reports contain an analysis of the gap and credit exposures. All of these 
reports must include interest income variations that are caused by market fluctuations and 
separate returns and risks according to product, business line, sector, and country. In addition, 
the reports should contain scenario planning under micro and macro level market conditions 
and the latest short-term projections (Choudhry, 2012). Thus, to obtain an insight into what a 
bank is trying to achieve with its ALM framework, it is important to evaluate the primary 
functions of its ALCO. Furthermore, the construction of policy statements and annual reviews 
should also take into account the changes that occur in the balance sheet and market dynamics 
(Faruk & Alam, 2014; Canada, 2004). Banks need to establish an ALM policy statement which 
entails specific descriptions of how bank management would manage their asset/liability 
position and clearly determine the authority and accountability for such asset/liability 
management. 
In addition, the role of the ALCO in the bank must be clearly defined, because it provides a 
framework containing its activities that are to be performed (Gabriel , 2016). Effective ALM 
can provide a correct balance in the risk and return management process (Choudhry, 2012). 
Further, it is important to have a suitable blend between skills and risk appetite. In addition, 
the operating forecasts and suitable metrics need to be set. When needs are aligned with market 
realities, a bank is operating within its preferred risk appetite (ADB, 2009).  
One of the core tasks of ALCO is to manage liquidity risk, which arises from volume and 
maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities. It requires an understanding of a bank’s day-to-
day liquidity needs, matching, interest rate sensitivity, and the effect of the interdependency of 
re-pricing and credit risk on liquidity (Bessis, 2015). The ALCO’s responsibility is to monitor 
the development of its bank’s balance sheet and capital requirements and set targets and limits 
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for risks. In addition, it reviews the bank’s liquidity risk management and funding structure 
and monitors performance against the approved risk appetite (NIB, 2015). 
The ALM process encompasses the identification of policy and liquidity, contingency solution 
plans and liquid asset holdings in order that the liquidity risk is within the preferred level 
(Novickytėa & Petraitytėa, 2014). Furthermore, ALCO must realize the effects of various 
factors on liquidity and cash flows such as the interest rate, credit, and capital risk. Thus, the 
inter-relations between these factors and liquidity are essential to identify in order to preserve 
the solvency of the bank and its ability to meet its financial obligations (Vij, 2005). One of 
ALCO's core tasks is to regularly monitor actual cash flows against projections. This is to 
determine that changes in loans and deposits are transitory (Choudhry, 2018). In addition, the 
committee are responsible for recognising the permanent changes that could affect balance 
sheet positions and take proper actions if necessary.  
Moreover, ALCO focuses on managing the maturities of banks’ assets with the objective of 
covering cash flows from matured assets to meet liquidity needs. Thus, determining the size 
and duration of liquidity buffers is considered a crucial part in managing liquidity as shortages 
may trigger massive withdrawals from depositors and an increase in the bank accessing credit 
facilities, making the bank more vulnerable to insolvency while also increasing the cost of 
raising money (Koch, et al., 1999).  
The differences between assets and liabilities take three basic shapes: cash matching, 
overfunding, and underfunding. The simplest approach to ALM is to match a bank’s assets to 
its liabilities. Somehow, this appears to be increasingly impractical due to the increased 
complexity in the financial system. In addition, with time, banks have progressed from the 
application of a single gap analysis to more sophisticated techniques. Nevertheless, analysing 
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the marginal gap18 and liquidity gap time profile between assets and liabilities with a future 
expectation of the gap position is still a crucial part of the ALM process (Bessis, 2015). 
The progression of strategies and methodologies is factored by diverse philosophies regarding 
the role that ALM and banks play in markets (ADB, 2009). In general, bank asset and liability 
management or treasury functions in developing markets are usually simplistic. In addition, a 
support function concentrates primarily on liquidity management. Hence, it is not unusual for 
these banks to not partake in more sophisticated capital markets transactions (e.g., derivatives) 
due to the dearth of knowledge regarding the instruments. Therefore, ALM or treasury 
functions within the context of developing markets have started to adopt more structure, more 
activities and a larger directive.  
Simply put, asset and liability management can take on full balance sheet management 
obligations, engaging in analytics and multifarious hedging activities. In general, this is called 
the ‘integrated treasury function’,19 whereby the main purpose is making profit while managing 
hedging; the construction of the structure of banks’ governance to provide comprehensive 
information to the board of the bank regarding the risks being run is mandatory and crucial 
(ADB, 2009).  
As for the overfunding and underfunding situations, generating mismatches causes liquidity 
and interest rate risk depending on the interest rate spreads between assets, liabilities, and their 
time profile. Targeting a funding profile depends on the decisions of the higher management 
and the ALCO committee about closing the gap or creating and maintaining mismatches 
(Bessis, 2015). Under cash matching, it is implicitly assumed that the amortization and 
                                            
18 Known also as the incremental gap, it represents the liquidity gap differences in variations between two adjacent time points (Bessis, 2015). 
 
19 Used in developing markets when the treasury function has more activities and a broader mandate (ADB, 2009). 
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repayment schedules of assets and liabilities are identical. Two aspects should be considered: 
managing their liquidity under normal business settings, and under stress circumstances 
(Choudhry, 2011).  
Every bank needs to establish a framework and plan of implementation for both sides; this 
framework will take into account the specifics of the business activities that the bank is 
partaking. Moreover, the risks associated with the numerous businesses are analysed and 
ranked, followed by the decision on the amount of risk that should be taken by the bank and 
the tools involved. Several tools of liquidity measurement that are employed in the banking 
industry are concentration ratios, dynamic cash flow gap, static funding gap, and liquidity stress 
measurement and liquidity asset ratios (Choudhry, 2018; Bessis, 2015). The Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (2017, p. 5) notes that the “ALM policy requires an effective 
system of internal control for market and liquidity risk. Such controls shall ensure the 
following: Implementation of: (a) appropriate limits and enforcement on risk taking; (b) 
adequate systems and standards for identifying, measuring, monitoring and evaluating risk; 
(c) standards for valuing positions and measuring performance; (d) a comprehensive ALM risk 
reporting and ALM review process; and (e) effective internal controls. Clear lines of authority 
and responsibility for the management and control of ALM risk”.  
As a concluding remark to this subject, asset and liability management is consistently evolving. 
Consequently, the ability of an ALCO to monitor and measure risks in the market determines 
the viability of a bank. Thus, they need detailed reports that reflect the bank activities and the 
market conditions. Therefore, each bank must have an appropriate ALCO committee to 
scrutinise risk and monitor its growth and stability (Joshi & Sontakay, 2017). Figure 13 
illustrates such general reporting input and output.  
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Figure 12: ALCO input and output reports 
Source: An Introduction to Banking: Liquidity risk and asset-liability management (Choudhry, 2011). 
The main report is the overall full balance sheet management reports. The other reports include 
specific business lines and products and reports showing the aggregate revenues and risks in 
every business line. Other reports consider market risk exposure and credit risk and are used to 
plan for various market conditions (Choudhry, 2011).  
3.2.2.3 Asset Liability Management in Global Context  
ALM emerged as banks needed to manage both their assets and liabilities simultaneously in 
order to mitigate various risks and maximise their operating income (Chorafas, 2007). Banking 
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risk management in general and asset and liability management in particular have received 
attention worldwide (DeYoung & Yom, 2008; Zawalinska, 1999; Kosmidou, et al., 2004; 
Tektas, 2005; Dash & Pathak , 2011; Shrestha, 2015; Tee, 2017; Chatterjee & Dutta, 2016; 
Meena, & Dhar, 2014; Suresh & Krishnan, 2018), specifically in the MENA area in the wake 
of the Arab Spring (AL-Mutairi & Naser, 2015; Mokni, et al., 2015; Abu Hussain & Al-Ajmi, 
2012; Selma , et al., 2013). 
Consequently, ALM is a way to mitigate against various possible risks and maximise 
operational income for banks. In the US, DeYoung and Yom (2008) employed the canonical 
correlation for a sample of US commercial banks for the 1990-2005 period. The results showed 
that the linkages between assets and liabilities are  dictated by bank size as well as the 
application of tools for mitigating risk including interest rate swaps and/or adjustable rate loans. 
They found that the associations between assets and liabilities appear to be stronger in smaller 
banks and weaker in larger ones. 
In addition, there appear to be systematic intuitive interactions between individual asset and 
liability accounts – notably a strong positive connection between long-term loans and core 
deposit funding, and between short-term loans and purchased funds financing (DeYoung & 
Yom, 2008).  
Kosmidou and Zopounidis (2004) employed the goal-programming model together with 
simulation analysis to study ALM in a Greek bank over a one-year period. They reported that 
for the bank under study, the optimal strategy was not the same as the actual strategy. For this 
reason, they suggested that the bank re-evaluate its present policies. In their study, the two 
primary goals of the program were solvency and liquidity, and they employed both solvency 
and liquidity as proxies for risk measurement. In particular, solvency was measured using 
capital to total weighted assets while the current ratio was employed as a measurement for 
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liquidity risk. While goal programming models and simulation analysis are integral tools in the 
construction of ALM strategies for optimal asset-liability positions, they also function as 
complements for the maximisation of liquidity and the mitigation of possible risks. 
In a study by Tektas et al. (2005) in Turkey, a goal-programming model was employed on two 
medium-scale commercial banks that engage in distinctive risk-taking behaviour. In this study, 
the authors tried to explain the impacts of different strategies employed by management when 
handling a crisis. In this regard, they were specifically concentrating on the banks’ programme 
goals, liquidity, capital adequacy ratio, deposit and loan market share, and revenues. 
Accordingly, optimistic and pessimistic scenarios were run in this study.  
In the optimistic scenario, the two banks are assumed to accomplish the prescribed goals in the 
programme. On the other hand, the study found that in the pessimistic scenario, the banks are 
expected to adjust their balance sheet accordingly. This study indicated that worsening 
conditions in the market cause interest rates and expenditure to change, and such changes 
impact bank’s revenue targets. Tektas et al. (2005) also mentioned that banks’ liquidity goals 
are also impacted because in this situation they will lose the ability to sell their government 
securities as economic agents would choose to retain higher liquidity. 
The impact of ALM on profitability and bank performance has been scrutinised by several 
researchers (Kosmidou, et al., 2004; Tee, 2017; Chatterjee & Dutta, 2016; Shrestha, 2015; 
Sayeed, 2010). Kosmidou et al. (2004) looked at 36 domestic banks and 44 foreign banks in 
the UK and found disparity between banks’ returns and linked it to the difference in the 
composition of asset-liability between foreign and domestic banks. Furthermore, they 
suggested paying more attention to liability management as opposed to asset management. The 
authors suggested how and where management should allocate their time and attention to 
improve these banks’ performance.  
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Dash and Pathak (2011) studied 57 public, private, and foreign banks in India in an attempt to 
determine optimal asset-liability positions and matches for profit maximisation within the 
constraints of liquidity and statutory requirements. The authors constructed a linear 
programming model to assess the impact of public ownership on ALM based on the outcomes. 
They reported that as opposed to private banks, the procedure of ALM used by Indian public 
banks appeared to be better and more diversified; this finding has been linked to the 
composition of the banks. In addition, banks should keep monitor their asset-liability positions 
carefully and balance their profitability, liquidity (Dash & Pathak , 2011). On the other hand, 
Zawalinska (1999) examined various approaches to ALM by commercial banks in Poland and 
highlighted the importance of privatizing public banks to improve their profitability, efficiency 
and risk management. 
In Nepal, the impact of ALM on the profitability of seven leading commercial banks was 
examined by Shrestha (2015). These seven banks generated almost half (49%) of the total net 
profit of Nepal’s entire commercial banking sector (30 banks) over seven years (2007-08 to 
2013-14). ALM in this context is used to determine the optimal investment of assets to meet 
banks’ present goals and future liabilities (Shrestha, 2015). In this study, Shrestha found a 
positive rate of return on assets with the rate differing based on the assets. He indicated that the 
cost rate on liabilities appears to be negative and the rate differs based on liabilities. 
Furthermore, the pooled OLS regression analysis results concluded that all assets including 
fixed assets and other assets have a positive effect on profitability.  
Conversely, Shrestha reported that liabilities have an adverse impact on the profitability of 
commercial banks. He listed GDP and inflation rate as the macroeconomic variables that 
negatively impact the profitability of commercial banks. In addition, he outlined the presence 
of a link between ALM and bank profitability, and that ALM affects the financial performance 
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of Nepalese commercial banks. Based on these outcomes, Shrestha (2015) recommends that 
banks focus on increasing public awareness of the need to attain greater saving and fixed 
deposits, as this will consequently improve banks’ performance in extending loans to 
customers. Therefore, in any market, macroeconomic environments and potential crises, which 
are considered one of the factors that impact profitability and ALM strategy planning, will 
depend on the cyclicality of economic conditions (Belete, 2013; Ali, et al., 2011; Shrestha, 
2015; Tee, 2017). A number of studies have found that cyclicality in macroeconomic variables 
is one of the factors that affects volatility in ALM policies. Also, they found the ALM policy 
tends to resist the economic cycle, which may induce some attention in planning and 
forecasting different scenarios of their operational effectiveness as the higher risks involved 
might cause higher losses (Novickytė & Petraitytė, 2014).  
Tee (2017) investigated the effect of ALM on the profitability of Ghana’s listed banks. The 
author carried out multiple linear regressions with ROA as the dependent variable with total 
assets and total liabilities – which denote banks’ blend of assets and liabilities – as the 
independent variables alongside interest rates and GDP as the economic factors. The study 
concluded that there is a positive relationship between total assets and bank profitability and a 
significant negative impact between total liabilities and bank profitability . The study also 
found that the interest rate, as one of the macroeconomic variables, imparted no significant 
impact on Ghanaian commercial banks’ profitability (Tee, 2017).  
Chatterjee and Dutta (2016) studied 26 public sector and 20 private sector banks in India over 
2004–2005 to 2012–2013 and examined the relationship between profits and asset–liability 
composition. Using panel data regression and their other results, they concluded that the 
earning before tax generated by all assets in public banks, while the private banks the earning 
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from loans and advances and deposits placings to banks. They classified the banks into two 
groups – high profit banks and low profit banks – using the median value of earning before tax.  
The low-profit banks had a greater return rate on loans and advances, investments and fixed 
assets and lower rates of return on deposits placings to banks as opposed to their high-profit 
counterparts. Moreover, the high-profit banks had the lowest cost rate on other funding whereas 
for the low-profit counterparts, ‘short-term funding’ appeared to be the cheapest funding 
source. As opposed to low-profit banks, the high-profit banks generally did not appear to have 
lower funding costs. In addition, non-performing assets had negative impact on profitability 
for both high-profit and low-profit, public and private banks (Chatterjee & Dutta, 2016).  
In the context of ALM strategies and liquidity practices in Indian banks, Meena and Dhar 
(2014) analysed and compared the liquidity ratios and ALM practices of three leading banks 
from the public, private and foreign sector over 10 years. The liquidity ratios of the banks were 
analysed in order to find out the banks’ short-term liquidity. In addition, the banks’ ALM was 
examined by determining their liquidity position via their maturity profile (the year profile for 
2011 was selected). Asset size was the criterion used in the study to choose the bank sample 
size. The results concluded that the general liquidity structures of banks in India is stable. 
However, the authors found that the amount of cash that these banks were keeping could cause 
issues in the long run as it was weakening their profits. They also noted that the State Bank of 
India is slightly different from the other nationalized banks in India. Furthermore, these leading 
banks have the capacity to impact the general structure of the maturity gap in their respective 
group. Nonetheless, the authors were also aware that ALM practices are entirely dictated by 
management. Indeed, banks have the prerogative to shape their own ALM structure in line with 
what they believe to be the most wide-ranging/comprehensive practice (Meena, & Dhar, 2014). 
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Nonetheless, banks generally follow a similar trend. Three categories of banks (public, private 
and foreign) were covered in this study; for each category, three leading banks were chosen. 
The banks became the benchmark for their corresponding sectors. For this reason, Meena and 
Dhar’s (2014) study is of value to banks that wish to employ these practices to further their 
success. These banks can also be compared and suggestions can be made to match the best in 
the business. The researchers concluded that the short-term liquidity positions of banks in India 
is generally very good, and that all of them are financing their short-term liabilities using their 
long-term assets. 
Suresh and Krishnan (2018) looked into asset and liability mismatches in banks in India 
(maturity gap). They selected two public and two private sector banks as their sample and used 
data from the financial years 2007-08 to 2016-17. This study particularly attempted to 
comprehend the patterns of short-term and long-term liquidity of these banks, in addition to 
the strategies employed to maintain liquidity risk. They opted to  use gap analysis (Suresh & 
Krishnan, 2018). 
This method was chosen due to the limitations faced by the study, including the non-
accessibility of confidential data in the public domain (e.g., data for structural liquidity 
statements and data for short-term dynamic liquidity statements). From the analysis, the authors 
found that public sector banks barely demonstrated any common trends. Nevertheless, in many 
cases, they found that both banks had negative mismatches in the short term and in the medium 
term as well. Hence, the study warned that maintaining negative gaps in the short run might 
cause banks to lose their interest income because of the future increase in interest rates. On the 
other hand, in the long run, the banks showed a positive gap; this sign is rather positive because, 
according to the authors, a positive gap denotes a strong base of long-term deposits and 
advances. Many other methods could have been used (e.g., VaR simulation, ratio analysis, 
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stress testing, ratio analysis and scenario analysis) but these depend on data availability (Suresh 
& Krishnan, 2018). 
Novickytėa and Petraitytėa (2014) studied the banking sector in Lithuania, particularly in terms 
of its ALM activity. Their study attempted to understand the degree of sustainability during 
different stages of the business cycle. In addition, they tried to identify how banks can handle 
their risk-based business cycles. 
The study found that the banks were inclined to take more risk over time and they noted the 
difference between the cycles of bank assets and liabilities and those of business activity levels. 
As such, banks appear to be managing their assets and liabilities while also trying to improve 
their activity and profitability. Analysing changes in items on the balance sheets of both types 
of bank (commercial and foreign) found that the financial sector appeared to be more willing 
to take more risk in ALM when there was an economic upturn but this changes during economic 
shocks. In addition, there is a very close link between the assets and liabilities of both 
Lithuanian commercial and foreign bank branches and GDP, the volatility of ALM policy is 
triggered by the variations or expectations of variation in the cycle of the Lithuanian economy. 
The study reported the presence of moral hazard in Lithuania’s financial sector; this is because 
the most risky balance sheet items change in a risk-free manner after the Bank of Lithuania 
deploys conservative measures. 
There are two types of banks in general: commercial banks (conventional banks) and Islamic 
banks. In Jordan, they have both types of bank but there are some differences in terms of the 
regulations that govern these banks and the external and internal operations and tools used, 
especially concerning ALM and risk management.  
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Mun and Thaker (2017) investigated the impact of ALM on the financial performance of 12 
Malaysian banks from both types – six conventional six banks and six Islamic six banks – 
during the period from 2010 to 2013. They used return on equity (ROE) as a measure for bank 
profitability, and employed the following variables: liquidity, capital adequacy, management 
efficiency, asset quality, size of bank, earnings quality and degree of risk aversion. From the 
outcomes obtained from correlation and regression analysis, they concluded that a positive 
relationship exists between ALM and banks’ financial performance. Hence, ALM significantly 
affects the profitability of both types of banks conventional and Islamic. They also noted the 
difference in findings for both bank types, and this difference was attributed to the different 
operative methods employed by each type. For instance, the Islamic banking system has to 
comply with Shariah law, which among other things prohibits Riba. This unique asset and 
liability structure causes Islamic banks to face more risks than conventional banks. In addition, 
owing to risk complexity from the nature of their business and the differences in financial 
products and services, the accounting standards and reporting methods for both systems differ 
as well. The asset and liability sides in banks describe the banks’ operations and the risks that 
they face. The assets side represents the risk of the surrounding environment, while most risks 
stemming from business operations are revealed on the liability side. Aligning these risks is 
the main purpose of asset and liability management (ALM), as it provides quantifiable 
measures of risk and strategies to manage it (Choudhry, 2011).  
A number of authors have studied the relationship between these sides over time. DeYoung 
and Yom (2008) studied the associations among and between asset and liability accounts, 
particularly looking at how the relationships changed between asset and liability accounts in 
US commercial banks over 1990-2005 . The study reported a weaker relationship between 
assets and liabilities among banks that intensively employ strategies of risk mitigation. 
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Furthermore, the authors indicated that the relationship appears to be stronger at large banks 
than at small banks. Moreover, they highlighted the shift of commercial banks in the US into 
non-traditional banking services in addition to the general shift from portfolio lending to 
securitised lending and contingent credit contracts. Consequently, these have produced streams 
of off-balance sheet income, which could decrease the dependency of banks on interest-based 
income while decreasing the impact of mismatch between assets and liabilities on the overall 
risk positions of banks. The development of banking activities and strong supervisory safety 
may have caused the decreased need for banks to practice strict ALM, weakening the link 
between assets and liabilities. Furthermore, over the past 20 years, they indicated that the 
structure of assets and liabilities possessed by banks should have become significantly more 
autonomous. However, the authors found no systematic empirical investigation regarding these 
phenomena. 
The recent global financial crisis started in the US in mid-2007 as a result of increasing default 
rates. The unfolding of the crisis cast into doubt the very survival of many financial institutions 
(ADB, 2009). Therefore, ALM became crucial to keep the financial system going, and to 
govern the business lines in these financial institutions. In Nigeria, Toby (2010) studied the 
management practices of a bank after the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis. They concluded 
that the meltdown of the Nigerian stock market had a significant influence on liquidity profiles 
in most Nigerian banks.  
Toby (2010) used a questionnaire and interviews to gather their data while the respondents 
were senior risk managers from 24 Nigerian deposit money banks. These Nigerian banks all 
had constrained balance sheets due to the loose monetary policy regime in the country, which 
is characterised by substantial decreases in monetary policy rate, minimum liquidity ratio, and 
cash reserve ratio. Moreover, the majority of the banks were focused on expanding their asset 
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base and thereby needed to control the funds source. The banks' funds management strategies 
were subject to liquidity and capital constraints, minimization of loan loss provisioning, and 
dealing exclusively with default risk on loans. The current management strategy in dealing 
with chronic liquidity and solvency problems still relies on accessing the inter-bank market, 
while strengthening and reviewing the banks' specific contingency plans. The 2007-2008 
Global Financial Crisis led to a reduction of capital inflows and investments in the Nigerian 
stock market, producing a 'confidence trap' and a build-up of non-performing margin loans. 
Somehow, after the global crisis, these banks depended more on purchased funds to meet their 
liquidity requirements. There are internal issues that impact good corporate governance in 
banks in Nigeria, including: weak risk management, difficulty changing management, conflicts 
of interest, non-existent dependable mechanisms for the board to obtain information, and 
unclear pay of directors. Toby’s (2010) study suggested improving the monitoring ability of 
the regulatory agencies and the pertinent professional bodies. This would minimize the abuses 
of corporate governance. In addition, they indicated that in surviving the global financial crisis, 
banks in Nigeria were plagued with high documentation of prudential violations and disclosure 
lapses. Banks in Nigeria do adopt IFRS as industry best practice but this only happened after 
the crisis had already occurred (Toby, 2010). 
Alam and Masukujjaman (2011) critically examine risk management practices in Bangladesh 
(types of risk facing the bank, procedures and techniques employed for risk minimization, etc.) 
among five commercial banks operating in the country. For each bank, five respondents were 
chosen, and therefore 25 respondents participated in the study altogether. Data were gathered 
using the questionnaire method. The authors found credit risk, operational risk and market risk 
as the banks’ major risks. Accordingly, the risks are handled via three layers of management 
system; the main risk oversight is the responsibility of the board of directors; the executive 
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committee monitors risk; while all banking activities are overseen by the audit committee. The 
study further revealed that the banks employ a credit policy with the approval of their board of 
director and a credit risk management division for their credit risk management. The credit 
division execute their activities autonomously. The overall credit risk status is directly reported 
to the board/audit committee by the division of internal control and compliance. In liquidity 
risk management, that assurance of liquidity can preserve the confidence of customers. In 
addition, in terms of the application of risk management techniques among these banks, internal 
rating systems and a risk-adjusted rate of return on capital were the important techniques used 
by banks (Alam & Masukujjaman, 2011). 
3.2.2.4 Asset Liability Management in MENA countries  
Over the last decade, many countries in the MENA region have started to implement a number 
of structural reform programs. The financial sector in general and the banking sector in 
particular have not been isolated from these reforms, which were directed at preserving the 
stability of the financial system. The speed and magnitude of these reforms differed between 
the MENA countries, which resulted in deferent characteristics of the banking industry 
developing in these countries, with each one’s procedures and policies that charted the attitude 
of these financial institutions having been affected by individual regulatory and political 
developments (Abed & Davoodi, 2003). The environment of financial institutions became 
much more dynamic after the global financial and economic crisis, and this uncertain market 
called for a well-designed financial safety net to prevent further crises and ensure the soundness 
and stability of the financial system (Mokni, et al., 2015).  
In the MENA region during the period from 2012 to 2013, Mokni, Echchabi and Taher (2015) 
examined the current risk management practices of Islamic and conventional banks. In this 
study, a total of 47 banks (24 conventional and 23 Islamic) were selected as a sample, and a 
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questionnaire was used to collect data, which comprised close-ended questions and a five-point 
scale. The study concluded that the banks in MENA region have effective risk strategies and 
effective risk management frameworks as 83.3% of the conventional banks in the study had a 
formal risk management system in place, while 87.5% of the conventional banks had a 
committee/section responsible for identifying, monitoring, and controlling different risks. 
Additionally, for both conventional and Islamic banks, credit risk was found to be the most 
crucial, while liquidity risk was the second most crucial.  
In term of the instruments used for managing liquidity risk, 87.5% of the conventional banks 
used central bank funds extensively, followed by cash reserves 75 percent and money market 
instruments 66.7 percent. The minimum used instruments were funds in other banks 45.8 
percent. In addition, both types of bank depend on conventional instruments to mitigate credit 
risk. 
Al-Mutairi and Naser (2015) conducted a study across the Gulf Co-operative Council (GCC) 
countries to find out the determinants of the capital structures of 47 commercial banks listed 
on those countries’ stock markets over the period 2001 to 2010. They concluded that both 
profitability and liquidity impact the capital structure decisions of banks, and that most of these 
banks were financed by debts, accounting for more than 80% of these banks’ capital. The study 
revealed that long-term debts are crucial in the financing of commercial banks in GCC.  
Additionally, the relationship between the level of leverage and a set of explanatory variables 
regarding the capital structure of GCC banks was examined. Here, the study obtained the 
capital structure determinants from the previous literature as follows: tangibility, bank growth, 
liquidity, risk, profitability, size, and bank age. Based on the obtained ROA, tangibility and 
size, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the capital structure 
of GCC banks and their profitability. On the other hand, a positive and statistically significant 
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link was found between the capital structure and age and growth of GCC banks (AL-Mutairi 
& Naser, 2015). These relationships are important for policy makers for the development and 
management of balance sheets, and for financial planning for banks. 
Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei (2007) studied the use of risk management practices and 
techniques among banks in the UAE regarding handling different risk types. The compared 
two groups of banks in terms of their risk management practices. The study used three 
categories of banks (eight conventional, four Islamic and five leading foreign banks) and 
employed a two-part questionnaire as the data collection tool. The first part contains 43 items 
that represent the constructs of understanding risk and risk management; risk identification; 
risk assessment and analysis; risk management; risk monitoring practices and credit risk 
analysis. The second part contains two items on risk identification methods, and the risks facing 
banks in the UAE. 
The study found the three most crucial risk types that UAE commercial banks are facing: 
foreign exchange risk, credit risk, and operating risk. In addition, the study noted an acceptable 
efficiency of UAE banks in their risk management. The most important variables in the 
practices of risk management for these banks are risk identification and risk assessment and 
analysis. Notably, for the large majority of the banks (90%), the four most crucial risk 
identiﬁcation methods are as follows: inspection by risk manager of the bank, audits, analysis 
of ﬁnancial statements, and risk survey. In addition, they found that the national and foreign 
banks of the UAE significantly differ in terms of their risk assessment practice and analysis, 
and in their risk monitoring and controlling. In addition, they recommended further researchers 
to study liquidity risk management in the UAE given that liquidity positions affect the stability 
of banks, and since risk management practices are primarily impacted by speciﬁc factors 
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including economic conditions, competition and regulations and financial planning – topics of 
great interest in the banking industry .  
In Bahrain, Abu Hussain and Al-Ajmi (2012) attempted to determine if risk management 
practices have a significant link with bank type (i.e. conventional or Islamic) and explored if 
those practices positively affected the notion of risk, risk management, risk identification, risk 
assessment analysis, risk monitoring, as well as credit risk analysis in banks. They used three 
categories of banks (8 conventional, 4 Islamic, and 5 leading foreign banks) – a similar sample 
to Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei (2007). They also selected a number of bankers from all staff 
levels in addition to risk management specialists as their sample, and employed the 
questionnaire as their instrument for data-gathering. They deduced that there was clear 
understanding of risk and risk management among banks in Bahrain. They also found that the 
banks were practicing efficient risk assessment analysis, risk monitoring, credit risk analysis, 
as well as risk management. Furthermore, they found that the conventional and Islamic banks 
in Bahrain use more traditional methods of risk identification than sophisticated methods. The 
most important risks that faced both types of bank are credit, liquidity and operational risk. In 
addition, they noted a significant difference between Islamic and conventional banks in terms 
of their understanding of risk and risk management. In particular, the risk levels that Islamic 
banks were facing were considerably higher than conventional banks. For liquidity, risks may 
be the result of a lack of active markets for Islamic Sharia’a-compliant money market 
instrument as well as restricted access to short-term financing, such as that from the central 
banks (Abu Hussain & Al-Ajmi, 2012; Mun & Thaker, 2017) . 
In Tunisia, Selma et al. (2013) examined the current practices and techniques of risk 
management of 16 banks. The self-administered questionnaire method was used to gather the 
data. In particular, this study attempted to understand the viewpoints of bankers in Tunisia 
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regarding the importance of transparency and public disclosure, while also attempting to gain 
knowledge of the banks’ risk profile. This study gained a 100% response rate with all 16 banks 
completing the questionnaire.  
This study noted considerable awareness among Tunisian bankers regarding the importance 
and role of effective risk management in decreasing costs and enhancing performance. In 
addition, they reported that the risk strategies and risk management frameworks that these 
banks employed were effective. They indicated that credit risk exposure methods were being 
underutilized by banks in Tunisia but that liquidity risk management analysis was strong and 
several liquid instruments were in use. Furthermore, collateral and guarantees for supporting 
credit facilities were the most popularly employed methods of risk mitigation amongst the 
Tunisian banks. They concluded that Tunisian banks do not use market value at risk (VAR) 
extensively as a tool to mitigate against market risk.  
3.2.2.5 Asset Liability Management in Jordan  
Within the financial industry, the banking sector is one of the most vital sector supporting 
sustainable economic development in Jordan. However, to the best of my knowledge, no other 
researchers have as yet described or evaluated the ALM process in Jordanian banks. Available 
research that took into account Jordanian banks mainly investigated the impact of various 
internal and exogenous factors on liquidity and credit risks as well as profitability. For instance, 
Al-Afeef and Al-Ta'ani (2017) tested the impact of liquidity risks, credit risk and interest rate 
risk on the stability of the Jordanian banking sector during 2005-2016 for ten conventional 
banks. Their results found a statistically significant impact for liquidity risk and interest rate 
risk on the stability of the banking sector, and no statistically significant impact of credit risk. 
The study recommended that banks should give risk management much more attention, and 
that banks try harder to monitor their assets as well as general economic conditions carefully.  
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Al-Tamimi and Obeidat (2013) studied and identified important factors that determine the 
capital adequacy of commercial banks in Jordan on the Amman Stock Exchange over the 
period 2000 - 2008 using Multiple Linear Regression Analysis and the Correlation Coefficient 
(Pearson Correlation). They show a significant relationship between capital adequacy and 
liquidity risks, interest rate risks, ROE and RIA, as well as a significant relationship between 
capital adequacy and the following independent valuables: capital risk, credit risks and revenue 
power. While there is a positive correlation and direct significant relationship between capital 
adequacy and liquidity risks, RIA, there is a negative correlation and negative significant 
relationship between capital adequacy and RoE, and interest rate risk. Furthermore, a negative 
non-significant correlation exists between capital adequacy and the following independent 
variables: capital risks, credit risks and revenue power (Al-Tamimi & Obeidat, 2013). Refer to 
Appendix 1, Table 38 for a summary of the main studies that investigated assets and liabilities. 
The next section defines the common risk measurement techniques used by financial 
institutions.  
3.3 Risk Measurement Techniques 
The reports that are submitted to the ALCO from various departments use various financial 
ratios and indices as measures for risks. The ALCO uses these to set limit exposures for various 
risks. These feed into the banks’ strategic plans and are reflected in their contingency plans as 
well as in their stress-testing exercises. The measurement of banks’ exposure to diverse types 
of risks can be carried out using several techniques including gap analysis (maturity gap 
analysis, duration gap) value at risk, simulation, etc. the study will discuss them in the 
following sections.  
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3.3.1 Gap Analysis  
Gap analysis is considered a crucial part of the content of ALCO reports as it is mainly used to 
measure the effect on the bank’s net worth of changes in interest rates as well as the cash 
difference or gap that exists between the absolute values of the bank’s assets and liabilities, 
which have sensitivity to movements in interest rates as shown below. 
3.3.1.1 Maturity Gap Analysis 
 
Maturity gap analysis encompasses the measurement of cash differences or a gap that exists 
between absolute values of a bank’s assets and liabilities, which are sensitive to movements in 
interest rates (Choudhry , 2018). This analysis technique measures the comparative sensitivities 
to interest rates of both assets and liabilities. Hence, the risk profile of the bank is ascertained 
in terms of its reaction to changes in rates. The calculation of gap ratio is as below: 
𝐺𝑎𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
Interest rate sensitive assets 
Interest rate sensitive liabilities 
 
 In this regard, a gap ratio with a value greater than one denotes that an increase in interest rates 
will cause the net present value of the bank to increase. Hence, the return on assets is increased 
at a rate that is greater than the increase in the cost of funding. In turn, the spread of income 
will become higher. On the other hand, a gap ratio that is less than one denotes that funding 
costs increase (Choudhry , 2018). Traditional gap analysis is deemed appropriate for measuring 
liquidity risk arising from an incongruity in the maturities of assets and liabilities. Liquidity 
risk is measurable through the computation of gaps over diverse time intervals as on a date 
specified. Gaps are computable as the dissimilarity between rate-sensitive assets and rate-
sensitive liabilities. For each maturity bucket, the liquidity gap is evaluated for a bank’s risk of 
liquidity (Vij, 2005). Gap analysis encompasses a technique for ALM applicable in the 
assessment of banks’ interest rate and liquidity risks (Charumathi, 2008). Vij (2005) indicated 
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that gap analysis gauges the control as well as the mismatch between both sides. In addition, 
management of active gap needs all markets in which an institution operates to be monitored; 
interest rate forecasts thereby become the determiner of active asset/liability management. 
3.3.1.2 Duration GAP 
 
The analysis of duration gap measures the effect on a bank’s net worth of changes in interest 
rates. This analysis concentrates on changes in the market value of assets and liabilities. 
Accordingly, the duration gap is expressed as follows:  
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑊 (𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ) 
In the above expression, W denotes the percentage of assets funded by liabilities. For this 
reason, Choudhry (2018) stated that the duration gap measures the effect of a change in interest 
rates on a bank’s net worth. A higher duration gap denotes higher exposure to interest rates. As 
explained in Beck et al. (2000), a bank’s net worth is equivalent to its assets minus its liabilities. 
In addition, the authors mentioned that the equalization of duration of assets and that of 
liabilities enables bank to immunize their net worth against changes in interest rates. In this 
regard, the aim is to make the duration gap (duration of asset portfolio minus that of bank 
liabilities) to be near zero as much as possible. Hence, a duration gap facilitates a bank’s 
understanding of the impact of interest rates on their financial standing in order to avoid risks 
(Beck, et al., 2000). 
3.3.2 Value at Risk 
Value at risk (VaR) encompasses the expected worst loss over a given horizon at a certain level 
of confidence (Jorion, 1996). As discussed in Engle and Manganelli (2001), VaR encompasses 
a methodology for the estimation of the market risk that a bank is exposed to, and it is expressed 
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as the maximum potential loss in terms of the value of a portfolio owing to adverse movements 
market for a specified probability.  
Conceptually, VaR is simple. It decreases the market risk that is linked to any portfolio to a 
singular number – namely the loss that is related to a specified probability (Engle & 
Manganelli, 2001). Engle and Manganelli (2001) also advocated the use of VaR to decide on 
the minimum capital required by bank in handling risk, and VaR is currently a standard measure 
employed by financial analysts in the computation of market risk. VaR models have long been 
employed by leading US banks and international banking authorities to determine market risk 
capital requirements by way of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment to the Basel Accord. 
Consequently, VaR is now a standard financial market risk measure for organisations both 
financial and non-financial (Berkowitz & O'Brien, 2002) .  
In the management of market risks, Berkowitz and O'Brien (2002) indicated that leading 
financial bodies have created large-scale models for risk measurement. With regard to these 
models, the authors noted that they may employ different approaches but that they all 
fastidiously gauge and aggregate the current standing of market risks. 
Employed as a statistical measure of risk exposure and the worst anticipated loss over a certain 
time interval under normal market conditions at a given confidence level of say 95% or 99%, 
VaR entails a dissemination of plausible outcome of future losses, which may happen to a given 
portfolio (Raghavan, 2015). In this regard, the real outcome will remain unknown until the 
event occurs, and while the actual event is still being anticipated, VaR will be a random variable 
with estimated outcome. According to Raghavan (2015), banks commonly use VaR models for 
market risk, advanced modelling approaches for credit risk as well as advanced approaches of 
measurement for operational risk. 
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3.3.3 Simulation 
Simulation encompasses a procedure that measures the possible effect on a banking book from 
a given change in interest rates and/or a change in the shape of the book itself. It therefore 
measures users’ levels of earning; this method can effectively cover both assets and liabilities 
(Choudhry, 2011). 
Bessis (2002: p.193) defines simulation as a process “that model(s) the behaviour of the 
balance sheet under various interest rate scenarios to obtain the risk and the expected target 
variables, interest income or the mark–to–market value of the balance sheet at market rates”. 
In general, the techniques of simulation evaluate in detail the probable impacts of interest rate 
changes on earnings and economic value (BOI, 2013). The forthcoming path of interest rates 
in addition to their effect on the flows of cash is simulated. Somehow, simulation generally 
involves a more in-depth analysis of various categories of on and off positions of the balance 
sheet. This enables the incorporation of certain suppositions regarding interest and principal 
payments and non-interest income and expenses, which emerge from each position type.  
Techniques of simulation can also integrate changes in the interest rate environment that are 
more refined and varied. Accordingly, in a static simulation, cash flows from just the existing 
on- and off-balance-sheet positions of a bank are evaluated. In the evaluation of earnings 
exposure, simulations are carried out to estimate the cash flows and resultant streams of 
earnings over a period specified. One or more assumed interest rate scenarios are employed. A 
change in a bank's approximate economic value can be computed after the resultant cash flows 
have been simulated over all of the projected lives of the bank's holdings and discounted back 
to their current values. Meanwhile, in the dynamic simulation approach, more in-depth 
suppositions regarding the forthcoming path of interest rates and projected changes in the 
bank’s business activity over time are applied. For example, the simulation could include 
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presumptions regarding the strategy used by a bank in changing its administered interest rates; 
the behaviour of its customers; and/or the stream of business to be faced by the bank in future. 
These presumptions regarding future activities and reinvestment strategies are employed in 
projecting anticipated cash flows and estimating dynamic earnings and economic value 
outcomes.  
3.3.4 Stress testing  
Central banks are requiring many banks to implement stress tests in order to ensure their 
stability in both the short term and the long term. The main aim of these tests is to ensure that 
banks can continue their operations under severe scenarios. It usually involves the stimulation 
of what could occur in a worst-case setting, often drawing on historical events or crises for 
reference (Bessis, 2015). Stress testing for banks is a vital tool of risk management, and this 
testing has become part of banks’ internal risk management (BIS, 2009). It assesses bank’s 
financial position under a harsh but conceivable scenario for facilitating a bank’s decision-
making. Stress testing equally refers to the mechanics of using certain individual tests, as well 
as to the bigger setting where the tests are created, assessed and utilised in decision-making 
processes. Equally, it is a supplementary tool for other approaches and measures of risk 
management. The authorities can also employ stress-testing in their quantification of the 
impacts of the stress test result in the plausible negative shocks could have on the capital 
positions of banks as a regulatory measure (BIS, 2009).  
Accordingly, stress tests can be carried out using two approaches: bottom-up and top-down. 
The former involves the use of  a bank’s own internal models while the latter involves the 
application of the regulatory authorities’ own models. The main advantage of the former is that 
it allows for better comprehension of the specified outcome drivers for individual banks, 
considering that the internal models of banks capture the idiosyncrasies of each institution. On 
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the other hand, the latter’s main advantage is that it allows for the comparison of results across 
banks as it employs common models for different bank tests (Anand, et al., 2014). This way, 
authorities can understand different banks’ respective susceptibilities to similar shocks (Anand, 
et al., 2014). Furthermore, banks should conduct stress testing on a regular basis and design 
scenarios in both the short and long term at both the banking level and market-wide, and 
individually and in combination (BIS, 2008). 
Stress-testing starts with specific hypothetical scenarios. These scenarios tend to incorporate 
paths for economic and financial market conditions, and could be predicted to have an adverse 
impact on banks. Diverse techniques are used to estimate the effect of the scenario on banks’ 
balance sheets (Dent, et al., 2016). Banks then have to consider different scenarios regarding 
their liquidity positions and risk and review the assumptions underlying their decisions 
concerning their funding positions on an annual basis (FCA, 2019). Therefore, the baseline 
projections can provide information about the banks’ proposed strategies for the coming years 
and might be a benchmark that could be used in analysing results under the hypothetical stress 
(Dent, et al., 2016). Consequently, the scenarios should be proportionate with the nature and 
complexity of each bank’s activities, as well as its liquidity risk exposure. 
These scenarios must address off- balance sheet items and other contingent liabilities. Stress 
tests should be applied on a regular basis to identify a bank’s current liquidity exposure; to 
confirm the liquidity risk tolerance established by that bank’s governing body; and to analyse 
the separate and combined effects of potential future liquidity stress on the bank’s liquidity 
position and cash flow as well as solvency (FCA, 2019). Stress test reviews should take into 
account changes in the market conditions and changes in the complexity of banks’ 
activities/business model (FCA, 2019). Moreover, the authorities must conduct stress tests on 
the banking system as whole to determine its stability and preserve its resilience. The result 
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can be used to shape banks’ hedging policy; to indicate financial stability risks; and to estimate 
individual banks’ capital requirements (Dent, et al., 2016). 
Figure 13 : The link between source of liquidity risks, stress testing and CFP 
 
 
Source: The Liquidity Management Guide: From Policy to Pitfalls (Adalsteinsson, 2014). 
The sources of liquidity risk that identifying by banks using as a base stone for stress testing 
model to ensure all or a part of sources being stress tested to shape the CFP to dealing with the 
stress conditions scenarios , and using the outcome to adjusted the overall liquidity framework 
as shown in Figure 14 (Adalsteinsson, 2014).  
3.3.5 Contingency Funding plan  
During the Global Financial Crisis, banks that did not have proper liquidity management 
techniques suffered from shortages of liquidity and higher costs due to their inability to secure 
adequate funding resources. A bank’s liquidity management process has to be sufficient to meet 
its daily obligations and cover its expected and unexpected normal operations. A general 
framework is needed for monitoring and identifying this liquidity process. A contingency 
funding plan (CFP) is a risk assessment tool used to address potential adverse liquidity events 
and to determine emergency cash flow requirements to mitigate again liquidity risk (FED, 
2010). 
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Banks without a comprehensive framework, including a contingency funding plan, can face 
serious risks regarding their solvency and durability (BIS, 2008). After the market turmoil 
broke out, banks did not conduct stress tests that factored in the possibility of market-wide 
strain or the riskiness or duration of the disturbance, as their views were that these disruptions 
were implausible. In addition, the result of the stress tests was not linked appropriately with 
the contingency funding plans, and sometimes failed to consider the possibility of some 
funding sources closing (BIS, 2008). CFPs are rather different from bank to bank as there is no 
accepted view on their best structure (Stragiotti, 2009). Therefore, contingent plans evaluate  
bank’s capacity to produce cash flow in order to meet its debt commitments and deposit 
withdrawals, or margin calls on collateral, when conditions become severe (Bessis, 2015). 
Consequently, the CFB is a policy and procedure that helps banks to address liquidity shortages 
in emergencies (BIS, 2008). In addition, the aims of a CFB are to ensure that a bank can 
prudently and efficiently manage unexpected liquidity fluctuations and minimize the needed 
for crucial liquidity in the short and long-term periods through estimating the liquidity needed 
under specific circumstances. 
The effectiveness of the CFB as a liquidity management plan in emergency depends on the 
aspects that it covers such as the nature of the business activity and complexity, and the size of 
these activities and risk exposure (Ismal, 2013). Therefore, the stressed market conditions and 
ability of banks to gains additional funds from the central bank and other liquidity facilities 
should be taken into account when designing contingency funding plans, including as normal 
liquidity management operations and emergency liquidity positions. The CFP encompasses a 
range of actions that the bank might take in anticipation of certain bank-specific or general 
developments or as a result of them (FCA, 2019).  
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The contingency funding plan as an assessment and comprehensive evaluation tool for bank 
liquidity strengths and weakness, which supplements ongoing balance sheet monitoring and 
provides knowledge to help mitigate risks to protect the bank in an emergency or in its day-to-
day business (Bryant, 2013).Therefore, a CFP must be reviewed on a regular basis, in general 
every three months, with the outcome reported to senior management or the board (DICO, 
2018). For the most part, the contingency funding plan anticipates liquidity needs in three main 
ways: identifying, quantifying,  ranking and analysing all the sources of funds depending on 
their priorities in both on/off balance sheets; determining strategies for assets and liabilities in 
order to match potential sources of cash flow and usage of funds in case of liquidity crises or 
shortages; and charting up an indicator to inform bank management of a particular limit for 
potential liquidity risks (BIS, 2008; Ismal, 2013). Therefore, the CFP effectively has to consist 
of alternative sources of funding the primary sources and the secondary sources, and includes 
a procedure for shortfalls in emergencies the high frequent of monitor ensure the effective of 
the action plan of the bank (DICO, 2018). 
3.4 Research Hypothesis 
Identifying elements of ALM frameworks at banks requires studying the structure of the 
banking system as well as the policies and procedures used to set banks’ strategies to manage 
both sides of the balance sheet. Researchers have tried to identify the main elements of the 
ALM framework within the context of the banking industry. In addition, they have sought to 
emphasise the importance of the ALCO as the implementation arm of ALM strategies and 
policies in order to mitigate against various risks including fundamental risks and to maximise 
their operating income. ALM has garnered increasing attention over the past few decades due 
to the crucial role of banks in the stability of the financial system.  
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3.4.1 Asset Liability Management  
The concept of the ALM was settled as strategy for a hedging reaction against the risk of 
financial institutions (Zawalinska, 1999). In addition, ALM is a comprehensive strategy that is 
based on assessment and managing banking institutions effectively to achieve their targets 
while mitigating against banks’ exposure to various risks (Choudhry, 2011). Moreover, ALM 
is a vital issue for banks’ strategic planning, assessment and management of endogenous 
financial operations and external risks (Tektas, et al., 2005).  
ALM frameworks work to maximise profitability while mitigating against the effects of risk 
factors (Bessis, 2011). An ALM framework should be compatible with a bank’s overall strategy 
(Charumathi, 2008). Further, any goals set for the ALM should be clear and take into account 
various types of risks that affect banking operations, which could be mitigated against through 
setting risk exposure limits and using various risk-mitigation tools (Zawalinska, 1999). 
Contingency funding plans are also useful in this regard, as are periodic stress tests.  
The risks stemming from banking operations involve lending and trading activities (Chorafas, 
2007; Choudhry, 2011) and ensuring the availability of funding to meet expected and 
unexpected future obligations. This can be done by broadening a bank’s funding sources and 
ensuring that it has adequate reserve buffers to cushion any liquidity shortfalls. In addition, 
ALM strategies and policies should be reviewed periodically through comparing actual 
performance with projections (BIS, 2008; Vento & La Ganga, 2009; Drehmann, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the developments in liquidity management supervision set by the Basel 
committee have increased the regulatory burden for banks. Although ALM was identified in 
the Basel II pillars, Basel III introduced new management standards to strengthen internal and 
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regulatory supervision over liquidity management in the banking industry (Kubat, 2014). 
Furthermore, regulatory authorities are paying more attention to the ALM process.  
Based on the aforementioned definition, the research main hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis (1): Jordanian commercial banks have an effective ALM framework 
 
 3.4.1.1 Asset Liability Committee  
 
The implementation arm of an ALM framework, the ALCO, is key to managing the ALM 
process and charting strategies and policies for individual business lines as well as a bank’s 
overall strategy. It does this by analysing the bank’s lending margin, interest income, variance 
from last projections, customer business and future business by assessing projected returns, 
revenue and risk exposure (Choudhry, 2018). The ALCO also considers acceptable risk 
exposure levels, existing risk limits, and hedging policies. 
The ALCO is dependent on reports from various units in the bank. Many ALM desks 
formulate their hedging strategy within the overall context of funding and liquidity policy. In 
addition, they also carry out scenario planning under micro and macro level market conditions 
and the latest short-term projections and evaluate selected strategies by compared targets with 
actual achievements (Bessis, 2011; Choudhry, 2012). Furthermore, the ALCO members meet 
on a regular basis to discuss recent developments in the bank’s supported business lines and 
changes in the surrounding environment (Choudhry, 2018). The ALCO also provides 
comprehensive information to the board of the bank regarding the risks being run (ADB, 2009). 
Based on the aforementioned definition, the first sub-hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis (1:1): ALCO is effectively involved in implementing ALM strategies and policies in 
Jordanian commercial banks. 
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Therefore, the independence of an ALCO in managing various risks is a matter of 
operational safety (IFC, 2012). Their focus should not only be directed to liquidity and interest 
rate risk; rather they should have a broader view of the risks stemming from the business 
environment as well as the risks stemming from their own banking operations (Bessis, 2011; 
Choudhry, 2012). In addition, regulatory authorities may influence the output of the ALCO 
report through its legislative powers in supervising the banking sector (IFC, 2008). 
 3.4.1.2 Liquidity Risk Management 
 
The inability to control surrounding environmental factors and their impact on business 
lines has compelled banking institutions to set up strategies and policies to mitigate against the 
impact of these shocks and benefit from existing opportunities (Choudhry, 2011) and to 
manage the liquidity risk that arises from maturity mismatches across assets and liabilities. It 
requires an understanding of a bank’s day-to-day liquidity needs (Bessis, 2015). Commercial 
banks’ strategies to effectively manage asset-liability components require a focus on various 
pillars. The first pillar is concerned with managing banks’ liquidity positions; and the second 
pillar focuses on the risks stemming from day-to-day operations (Choudhry, 2011). 
Appropriate liquidity risk management has to be consistent with a bank’s overall strategy and 
attention must be paid to daily liquidity operations.  
Based on the aforementioned definition, the second sub-hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis (1:2): Liquidity risk management in Jordanian commercial banks is consistent with 
the overall strategy of the bank and considers operational liquidity needs.  
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 3.4.1.3 Contingency Funding Plans 
 
Contingency plans evaluate liquidity situations in terms of banks’ capacity to produce cash 
flow to fulfil their debt commitments and deposit withdrawals, or margin calls on collateral 
when market conditions become severe (Bessis, 2015) . In addition, the CFP consist of policies, 
strategies, and procedures that serve as a scheme for a bank to address liquidity shortages in 
emergencies (BIS, 2008). Furthermore, the CFB aims to ensure that banks can manage liquidity 
fluctuations in short term or long term prudently and efficiently, and mitigate against urgent 
liquidity needs (Ismal, 2013). Moreover, the CFP provides a comprehensive assessment of 
banks’ liquidity strengths and weaknesses, which supplements ongoing balance sheet 
monitoring and provides risk-mitigation knowledge that management can use to protect the 
bank in emergency situations and in its day-to-day activities (Bryant, 2013). 
Effective CFPs provide alternative sources of funds and include procedures when shortfalls are 
encountered (DICO, 2018). 
Based on the aforementioned definition, the third sub-hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis (1:3): Contingency Funding Plans in Jordanian commercial banks focus on 
liquidity positions.  
 
 3.4.1.4 Stress-Testing 
 
Stress-testing is a vital risk management tool and has become part of banks’ internal risk 
management processes (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009). In addition, 
authorities can employ stress testing as a regulatory measure to quantify the impact of negative 
shocks on banks’ capital and liquidity positions (Anand, et al., 2014). Stress testing begins with 
specific hypothetical scenarios, which tend to incorporate economic and financial market 
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variables that might be expected to have an adverse impact on banks. Different techniques are 
used to estimate the impact of the scenario(s) on banks’ profits and balance sheets (Dent, et al., 
2016).  
In addition, the banks’ stress test together is more rigorous than the authority’s stress 
testing expectations which cover all the banking aspects. Furthermore, the most prevalent 
source of bank stress-test scenarios are historical conditions and expert judgements, followed 
by the use of supervisory scenarios and statistical methods (BIS, 2012). Most banks review 
their stress-testing framework at least every two years, while most banks review it annually 
(BIS, 2012). Therefore, the stress test aims to measure and understand the ability of banks’ to 
maintain a sufficient buffer to stay afloat under extreme scenarios (Iyer & Sahu, 2018). Based 
on the aforementioned definition, the fourth sub-hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis (1:4): Stress testing scenarios in Jordanian commercial banks are efficient in terms 
of liquidity management.  
In research survey, the researcher employed various data-collection techniques, namely 
open-ended questions, closed-ended question, and a Likert-scale in order to have a broader 
view of the structure of ALM in Jordanian commercial banks. The next section will discuss the 
methodology and research design used in this research.  
3.5 Methodology 
The methodology of any research encompasses the approach applied by the expert or specialist 
in their accomplishment of a given research project. In the work of Bryman (2008), the term 
‘methodology’ was described as the practices and techniques in the collection, processing, 
manipulation and construal of information whereby the information is then applied in testing 
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ideas and theories. A research methodology is a description of the framework of methods 
applied to data gathering, analysis, and presentation. 
Research methodologies come in two types: quantitative and qualitative. The former reaches 
conclusions using numerical data such as by testing the relationship among independent and 
dependent variables. It requires data to be collected in order to allow for the quantification and 
statistical treatment of information. This will support or disprove alternate knowledge 
statements. The quantitative methodology has the primary purpose of explaining and 
examining a topic via the correlation of many variables (Creswell, 2003). Conversely, 
qualitative research focuses on words rather than quantification of data gathered (Bryman, 
2016). Accordingly, Creswell and Clark (2007) explained qualitative methodology as 
comprising a set of research techniques for the purpose of interpreting a phenomenon. This 
section follows a quantitative research design, as the purpose of this research is to describe and 
evaluate the present framework of asset and liability management in Jordanian commercial 
banks. It also attempts to understand the risk-measurement tools applied. 
3.5.1 Research Design  
Bryman (2016) described the research design in providing structure for data gathering and 
analysis. Through its provision of the framework, the design of research functions as guidance 
all through the process of research from start to finish, enabling the completion of the work 
required. In conducting social research, its design should be determined first prior to data 
gathering and analysis.  
Research design is classable in many ways and the classification is in accordance with the 
objective of the criteria of classification itself. In this regard, explanatory, descriptive, and 
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exploratory research are the three most common classes of research. Each is described as 
follows: 
Explanatory research is the manner in which different independent variables are manipulated 
to ascertain how a dependent variable is impacted within an environment that is fairly 
controlled. This method looks into the relationships of cause and effect that occur among 
variables. Nonetheless, there are shortcomings of explanatory research such as high cost and 
administrative difficulties (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). 
Descriptive research is mainly useful for a researcher attempting to illustrate something 
associated with characteristics, functions, or any phenomena. This type of research is 
performed to illustrate the presence of something. Utilizing this research, a researcher employs 
events of the past to clarify present discernible facts. This research is characterised by explicit 
hypotheses, which in this instance were constructed earlier. Hence, according to Bryman 
(2008), the research design for descriptive research appears to be more structured and 
comprises many planning methodologies. 
Exploratory research offers comprehension of the issue that the researcher is addressing. This 
type of research assists the researcher in resolving an issue which has not yet been extensively 
researched. Therefore, the qualitative method offers an avenue for interpretative clarifications 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). 
Taking into account the association between these research design types, it is not so simple for 
a researcher to select a research approach that is deemed the best fit. It is crucial that the design 
chosen is applicable to the scrutinised problem while the procedure of carrying out the research 
is parsimoniously practicable and realistically within reach. This implies the significant impact 
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of the study’s nature and the accessible resources on the research design. The framework 
applied in this study includes the characteristic of descriptive research designs. Furthermore, 
the technique of survey is used in this study in order to understand the process of asset and 
liability management as well as the techniques and tools used to manage and mitigate types of 
risk in Jordanian commercial banks. As such, the researcher could explore the issue in question 
using the viewpoints of professionals in the industry. This chapter is descriptive, generated 
from the knowledge and findings of past works, as highlighted in the reviewed literature. 
Accordingly, this study has opted for the quantitative design. 
3.5.2 Research Strategy 
A research strategy is also a crucial research aspect and is associated with the manner in which 
the linkage between theory and empirical data can be established. In social research, the 
purpose of a research strategy is generally to link theory with empirical data, as can be seen in 
the social domain (Bryman, 2016). In social research, the two primary strategies of research 
employed are the deductive and inductive approaches. The deductive approach is concerned 
with developing a hypotheses based on a theory, and then drawing up the strategy of research 
to test those hypotheses (Wilson, 2014).  
In addition, the researcher relies on what is known pertaining to a given domain as well as to 
the theoretical considerations regarding the domain, and they work to infer hypotheses to be 
test in empirically (Bryman, 2016). In deductive approach, as a starting point the researcher 
begins from thinking up a theory regarding the topic of study. They then narrow down into 
more specific hypotheses, which can be tested, and then these are narrowed down even further 
when collecting the observations to address the hypotheses. The researcher moves from the top 
down, hence this is informally known as the top-down approach. These ways lead the 
researcher to be able to test their hypotheses and they can approve or reject their hypotheses 
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accordingly (Creswell, 2003; Lewis, et al., 2012). Meanwhile, the use of the inductive approach 
begins with from precise observations or findings to a wider generalisation or theory. Inductive 
reasoning works the other way round from deductive approach, and moves from specific 
observations or findings to broader generalizations and theory. Informally, call this a "bottom 
up" approach. The researcher begins with certain observations or arguments, followed by the 
construction of tentative hypotheses for testing, and to finish, creates a general theory (Blaikie, 
2007; Johnson, 2011; Myers, 2013). This research is focused on the descriptive approach, then, 
using the data gathered from the field, hypotheses are created and then tested using the gathered 
data. Therefore, a deductive strategy is appropriate for this study. 
3.5.3 Research Method 
The method of research encompasses the techniques, tools, and procedures deemed necessary 
for data gathering, analyses, as well as interpretation of the research venture (Bryman, 2016). 
In Creswell (2003), the notion of research method is viewed as the practices and techniques 
applied in the collection, processing, manipulation and interpretation of information, which are 
then usable for testing ideas and theories. The literature highlighted two kinds of research 
methods, namely quantitative and qualitative, where the former reaches conclusions according 
to numerical data, while the latter focuses on words rather than numbers. Furthermore, the 
quantitative method has a heavy reliance on statistical significance, whereas qualitative 
analysis primarily applies straightforward human ruling in the interpretation and organisation 
of the data gathered. As such, the qualitative method encompasses an assembly of research 
techniques applied in the interpretation of the phenomenon (Oppenheim, 2000; Greener, 2008; 
Lewis, et al., 2009; Bryman, 2016).  
Quantitative measurement has been viewed as having a greater level of accurateness, 
reliability, validity, and objectivity as opposed to qualitative measurement. The focal points of 
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qualitative research are observations and words, visual portrayals, anecdotes, construal, as well 
as other expressive explanations. The use of qualitative approaches enables more diverse 
responses, and these approaches also could adapt to new changes or issues that emerge while 
the research is ongoing. It is somehow noted that qualitative research can consume a lot of time 
and money. Still, this type of research appears to be popular in numerous fields. 
In this study, which is quantitative research, the questionnaire survey method has been chosen 
as the data-gathering tool. The survey questionnaire allows the researcher to obtain the 
appropriate answers to their research questions. In this regard, descriptive research is richer if 
it has a link to the literature review.  
3.5.4 Data Collection 
In the following sections, the specifics of the data collection methods are highlighted. 
3.5.4.1 The Questionnaire 
 
A tool for research comprising a sequence of questions aimed to capture information from 
respondents. This data collection tool has been widely used by many researchers because it can 
capture diverse types of primary data. These collectable data, as noted by De Vaus (2002), 
include data on motivation, attitude, behaviour, and on viewpoints regarding the topic under 
scrutiny.  
The questions set for the questionnaire must address the study aims, and a questionnaire that 
shows its appropriateness for the research objectives and questions set by the study is an 
effective questionnaire. The questionnaire must demonstrate clarity and unambiguity, while 
also be able to stimulate participation from respondents (De Vaus, 2002; Robson, 2016). 
Surveys that are correctly devised and implemented can become an effective and accurate tool 
for the determination of information regarding a population under scrutiny. Surveys allow 
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fairly fast attainment of outcomes. Furthermore, depending on sample size of a study and the 
methodology selected, surveys can be cost-effective to use. According to De Vaus (2002), 
countless advantages have been linked to survey questionnaires as opposed to other data-
gathering methods. 
Accordingly, the advantages of questionnaires include: standardized gathering of responses, 
which makes questionnaire more objective in nature; convenience to respondents in terms of 
completion time; quick to complete; low cost to administer; respondents are free to be honest 
in responding to the questions; and bigger potential coverage of respondents. Meanwhile, 
Oppenheim (2000) discussed the issues that have emerged with the questionnaire method as 
follows: possible reluctance of certain respondents to provide responses to the questions; 
possible superficial answers given by the respondents, particularly when the completion time 
is too lengthy (the researcher should thus avoid presenting too many questions in the 
questionnaire); respondents giving biased opinions, which could compromise the validity of all 
responses; lack of opportunity to rectify misunderstandings or probe or assist the respondents; 
possible misinterpretation of respondents of certain items; and failure of respondents to 
responding to the questions, which might affect the reliability and rate of response of the survey 
overall. 
Regardless, questionnaires have proven their usefulness and effectiveness in obtaining the data 
associated with the perceptions and opinions of banks on a given subject. Hence, a 
questionnaire survey is employed in this study to obtain the primary data from Jordanian 
commercial banks regarding their ALM practices. In this study, this method is one of the 
primary methods of gathering the main data. 
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3.5.4.1.1 Open- and closed-ended questions 
Questions can be in the form of open-ended questions or closed questions. In particular, open-
ended questions give participants freedom to respond any way they like. On the other hand, 
closed questions provide respondents with several answer options, of which they have to select 
one or more (De Vaus, 2002). Closed-ended questionnaires are simpler and faster for the 
respondents to respond to as they do not need to write any sentences in response. This type of 
questionnaire is also simpler to code. However, closed questions lack spontaneity and 
expressiveness. In addition, there is a possibility of bias as respondents are obliged to make a 
choice between several provided alternatives. Closed questions do, however, force respondents 
to concentrate on the options given (Oppenheim, 2000). 
By contrast, there are several advantages associated with open-ended questions. This type of 
question stimulates respondents to provide responses according to their liking. According to 
Creswell (2003), open-ended questions generate information that is unobtainable through 
closed questions. Furthermore, open-ended questions allow respondents to provide answers 
based on their knowledge or level of expertise. However, as acknowledged by Oppenheim 
(2000), designing the coding framework and executing the coding process consumes a lot of 
time. For researchers, it is therefore advantageous to have only a small number of open-ended 
questions. 
3.5.4.1.2 The characteristics of measurements 
The three main levels of measurement scales, as mentioned by De Vaus (2002), are nominal 
scale, ordinal scale and interval/ratio scale. As explained by the author:  
1 - Nominal scale is used in determining dissimilarity between categories of a variable but the 
categories cannot be ranked using any order. Nominal scale is useful in the measurement of 
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qualitative variables. This scale generates frequency data, which are suitable for non-
parametric statistical tests. 
2 - Ordinal scale is applied in answers that should be ranked using categories but these 
categories cannot be accurately quantified in terms of how much difference there is between 
them. 
3 – The ratio or interval scale allows for the ranking of categories. Categories that are 
appropriate under this scale can be quantified in terms of the differences between them. Among 
the commonly used are Likert scales. 
In this study, the researcher used multi categories of measurements appropriate to the questions. 
Figure 14 shows the research methodology that adopted for this research chapter.  
Figure 14: Research Methodologies  
     Source: Author plot  
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3.5.4.1.3 Questionnaire Sample  
Bryman (2016:174) stated that “a sample is the segment of population that is selected to be 
investigation”. To represent an entire population, the size of sample in a study has to be 
adequate. The determination of sample size is dictated by the population’s homogeneity; a 
larger sample is necessary if a pilot study shows significant population heterogeneity, while 
the study is mainly aimed at generalizing the results to the population and . In addition, 
sampling errors portability will be less in larger sample size (Robson, 2016). 
There are many sampling strategies, including cluster sampling, panel sampling, simple 
random sampling, stratified sampling, systematic sampling, and so forth. Each strategy has 
advantages as well as disadvantages. Regarding the variety of sampling methods, Robson 
(2011) mentioned the possibility of using them separately or together. Accordingly, there are a 
number of factors that generally affect the selection of methods: the nature and quality of 
research; the accessibility of supporting information regarding the research units; the need for 
accuracy and accurate measurement; the possibility of the expectation of sample analysis; and 
issues associated with operation and/or cost. 
The banking sector in Jordan comprises 25 banks, 4 of which are Islamic banks and the 
rest of which (21) are commercial banks. Thirteen of the latter are domestic banks while the 
rest are foreign. The study will focus on commercial banks operating in Jordan as Islamic banks 
are subject to different regulations, policies and procedures compatible with Shariah Law. 
Thus, non-probability sampling20 is used to define the targeted population. Furthermore, the 
                                            
20 The inclusion/ exclusion of elements in the sample at the discretion of the researcher (Hair Jr, et al., 2011) . 
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researcher will try to administer the survey questionnaire to all of the conventional commercial 
banks in Jordan. 
Table 2: The banking system in Jordan 
The survey questionnaire will contain descriptive questions that are designed to measure the 
characteristics of balance sheet management and the strategies used in relation to the role of 
the ALCO committee in Jordanian commercial banks. The targeted group will be carefully 
selected to ensure their involvement in the study subject. Thus, the questionnaire administered 
to the treasury managers or CEO depends on the degree of involvement and organisational 
structure of the Jordanian banks. 
3.5.5 Questionnaire Design  
The researcher mainly constructed the questionnaire based on deductions from the literature 
review as well as surveys on ALM within the banking industry and central banks. The 
researcher also drew on Choudhry (2011), the Basel committee standards, World Bank 
regulations, and materials from the Financial Conduct Authority for a theoretical foundation 
Type of banks No. % Notes 
Total banks in Jordan 25 100% 
Percentages of total population 
Commercial banks 21 84% 
Islamic banks 4 16% 
Total sample; of which: 21 84% 
Domestic commercial banks  13 61.9% 
As percentages of the total sample. 
Foreign commercial banks 8 38.1% 
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and conceptual framework for the questionnaire. In particular, Choudhry (2011) classed the 
conventional approaches that the majority of financial services industries are using. Apart from 
that, the broad practical experience that has been gained by the researcher in central and 
commercial banking greatly contributed to the design process of the questionnaire. 
The survey questionnaire covers seven main topics, namely; (I) Asset Liability Management; 
(II) Asset Liability Management Committee; (III) Liquidity Risk; (IV) Interest Rate Risk; (V) 
Credit Risk; (VI) Market Risk; and (VII) Contingency Funding Plans and Stress Testing (see 
Appendix 2-2). Furthermore, Figure 15 shows the topics covered in the survey questionnaire.  
Figure 15 : Questionnaire Sections  
     Source: Auther plot  
 
3.5.5.1 Ethical considerations 
Researchers are professionally and legally accountable to their study respondents. Following 
the attainment of permission from the respondents’ managers, the researcher was accountable 
for making sure that the respondents were clear about the survey in terms of its objectives. In 
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addition, the use of formal language in the questionnaire was needed to prevent discriminatory 
language. Furthermore, the researcher has to assume accountability for protecting the identity 
and identifiable information of individual respondents from being exposed to third parties such 
as clients and the public without express permission from the respondents themselves. Apart 
from that, the researcher is obliged to remain as objective as possible when performing their 
analyses (Greener, 2008). 
Accordingly, the researcher will avoid using offensive, discriminatory, or other unacceptable 
language in the formulation of the questionnaire. In addition, the researcher will seek the 
permission of the senior management teams in the Jordanian commercial banks in study sample 
in order to identify the right respondents, alleviate any inconvenience for the respondents, 
respect their privacy and anonymity, and ensure that an adequate level of confidentiality is 
maintained regarding the research data. Furthermore, the researcher will ensure the 
transparency and clarity of the survey objective and maintain the highest level of objectivity in 
research analyses. During the questionnaire’s distribution, the researcher contacted the central 
bank of Jordan, as it is the supervisory body for the banking sector in Jordan. They offered 
their help in distributing the questionnaire to all of the conventional banks in Jordan to get the 
feedback from the respondents.  
3.5.5.2 Pilot study 
This study was carried out prior to the execution of the main research study. The pilot study 
was to ascertain the feasibility of the research and was used to improve the research design. 
According to De Vaus (2002), a research questionnaire needs to be meticulously evaluated 
prior to final administration. A pilot test is therefore necessary owing to the fact that it brings 
to light any inadequacies prior to the full distribution of the document. As explained by Bryman 
(2016), a pilot study scrutinizes the general presentation, clarity and rationality of the 
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questionnaire, particularly with respect to the depth and length of the questions. In addition, 
the use of a pilot study allows the researcher to determine their respondents, and to determine 
if they respond to the questions correctly (Dillman, 2014). In this study, five commercial banks 
in Jordan were chosen as respondents of the pilot test. The proposed study sample for the pilot 
survey carried out in Jordan is presented below.  
 3.5.5.3 Pilot study sample selection scenarios 
The study evaluated the ALM framework presently employed by commercial banks operating 
in Jordan. There are 21 commercial banks operating in Jordan, which means that the overall 
population is 21 in number. From these 21 banks, 13 are domestic banks and the remainder are 
foreign. Primary indicators reflecting profitability, quality of management and market share of 
commercial banks are used. Meanwhile, the random sampling method was run using Microsoft 
Excel to select the commercial banks that participated in the pilot study. Accordingly, Connelly 
(2008) suggested that the sample of the pilot study should account for 10% of the anticipated 
sample of the main study. The data employed was provided by the BankScope database based 
on the accessibility of bank data to make the sample of pilot study scenarios. 
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Figure 16 : pilot study sampling scenarios  
Source: Author plot 
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Random Sampling  
This study chose to use the random sampling method to select the pilot study sample. For this 
purpose, all commercial banks in Jordan were arranged based on their establishment date. 
Then, Excel was used to draw the random sample. 
As already indicated, the suggested sample size is approximately 10% of the target population 
(Connelly, 2008), and in this study’s context, it refers to two banks. Somehow, this study has 
opted to enlarge the sample to account for approximately 25% of the overall target population. 
This expansion of size is to assure consistency between the pilot study and the actual survey. 
Accordingly, the details of the pilot study sample comprising five banks are shown in the table 
below. 
Table 3: Details of pilot study sample 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 
Deposits ARBK THBK JOKB AHLI CABK 
Total Assets ARBK THBK JOKB CABK AHLI 
Loans ARBK THBK JOKB UBSI AHLI 
Cost to Income Ratio SGBJ JOKB THBK BOJX AJIB 
ROAA BOJX INVB CABK THBK ABCO 
ROAE CABK JCBK THBK BOJX AJIB 
Random Sampling AHLI EXFB CABK THBK UBSI 
Arab Banking Corporation (ABCO), Jordan Ahli Bank Plc (AHLI), Arab Bank Plc (ARBK), Arab Jordan 
Investment Bank (AJIB), Bank of Jordan Plc (BOJX), Cairo Amman Bank (CABK), Invest Bank Jordan (INVB), 
Commercial Bank (JCBK), Jordan Kuwait Bank (JOKB), Société Générale de Banque-Jordanie (SGBJ), Housing 
Bank for Trade & Finance (THBK), Bank al Etihad (UBSI). Source: BankScope database. 
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3.5.5.4 Data Validity and Reliability 
 
Validity is a concept that relates to whether the questions in the questionnaire measure what 
they have been designed to measure. Validity relies on the degree of honesty and accurateness 
of the responses that the respondents provide and is not easy to measure. Conversely, reliability 
is a concept that relates to the consistency of the questions (De Vaus, 2002).  
Figure 17: Data collection process 
 
Source: Author plot 
 
  
 
 
113 
 
As mentioned in Oppenheim (2000), consistency, accuracy and explicability of outcomes are 
the primary constituents of data reliability. This implies the need for consistency during data 
collection. At the same time, the researcher should also attempt to achieve high precision and 
accuracy. All of these are affected by countless factors that are beyond the researcher’s control. 
Furthermore, bias should also be minimized during data collection. Meanwhile, this study has 
attained tolerable data validity and reliability, helped by the success of the central bank of 
Jordan in distributing the questionnaire to the respondents and following them up. In addition, 
a cover letter was constructed in this study. It provides explanation regarding the purpose of 
the research while also providing assurance of confidentiality in terms of responses see 
Appendix 2-1. The responses to the questionnaires were also checked in terms of their 
consistency. Multiple questions were used to inquire the same point. Lastly, several relevant 
practitioners and academics were invited to offer their opinion regarding the proposed drafts 
and their would-be impact on the validity and reliability of the data.  
3.6 Pilot study results overview  
The pilot study was useful in two main respects. It identified the main preliminary indicators 
and perceptions associated with the overall ALM framework that governs balance sheet 
management, risk metrics and perceptions at Jordanian commercial banks and the role of asset 
and liability committee in mitigating these risks. In addition, it provided useful feedback and 
pointers on the actual questionnaire structure and content, which helped in refining the final 
questionnaire before the full study commenced. This section presents the results of the pilot 
study that was conducted between June 2017 and July 2017 on Jordanian commercial banks. 
The primary elements of the pilot study are the organisational structure, asset liability 
management, the asset liability management committee, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, credit 
risk, market risk, contingency funding plans (CFP) and stress testing. 
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3.6.1 Organisational structure  
The organisational structure of the respondents in the pilot study reveals that the treasury 
department bears the main responsibility for managing banks’ balance sheet (80%), whereas 
20% of the banks indicated that the risk management department is responsible for managing 
the banks’ assets and liabilities. In addition, all of the banks indicated that they have an ALCO 
committee in their organisational structure. The results indicate that the CEO, Head of 
Corporate Banking, Head of Treasury, Head of Risk Management, and finance departments are 
part of the ALCO committee in all of the pilot study respondents. Figure 18 illustrates the 
organisational structure of the asset and liability management committee:  
Figure 18: Organisational structure of the asset and liability management committee 
 Source: Source: Pilot study results  
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 3.6.2 Asset Liability Management (ALM)  
All respondents in the pilot study sample indicated that an ALM process exists at their banks. 
In addition, they highlighted that the aim of the ALM process in Jordanian commercial banks 
is to manage liquidity risk and interest rate risk as these were ranked by the banks as the most 
important risks to be taken into consideration in the ALM process. The results also indicate 
that 80% of the ALM process at Jordanian commercial banks covers investment and hedging 
strategies and new product approvals, while 60% highlighted that ALM also covers 
methodologies for measuring risks and setting limits and controls and that various tools are 
used in ALM, including describing the evolution of balance sheet components and projections 
for assets and liabilities (100%), as shown in Figure 19. 
Figure 19: ALM process and covered topics 
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Source: pilot study results  
3.6.3 Asset Liability Committee  
Section IV of the survey deals with the ALCO committee and its functional scope, including 
its ability to set risk exposure limits and metrics used to quantify risk. It also deals with the 
reports provided to the ALCO by different departments at the bank and how frequently these 
are reviewed. The pilot study respondents indicated that the functional scope of the ALCO 
includes liquidity risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, and market risk (100% of the 
respondents). Some of the respondents (60%) indicated that credit risk is within the functional 
scope of the ALCO, whilst none of the respondents suggested that operational risk is within 
the functional scope of the ALCO. Moreover, all of the respondents indicated that the ALCO 
committee meets on a monthly basis. Furthermore, the results for the inputs provided to ALCO 
by various departments indicate that they focus mainly on the liquidity risk levels at the bank, 
overall bank performance, interest rate forecasts, deposit concentrations and costs of funding 
reports. Furthermore, the results indicate that all of the pilot study respondents (100%) 
suggested that their ALCO is not responsible for setting risk metrics but responsible for setting 
risk exposure limits (40% of the respondents). The ALCO report (output) is reviewed by 60% 
of the commercial banks on a monthly basis, while the remainder of the respondents (40%) 
indicated that the ALCO report is reviewed quarterly. In addition, the results indicated that it 
is reviewed by the board of directors (40%), the CEO and the supervisory authorities (60%), 
and by other departments (40%), as shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Asset Liability Committee Functional Scope and Reports 
Source: Pilot study results  
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 3.6.4 Liquidity risk  
The pilot study respondents indicated that liquidity risk is managed by multiple departments at 
commercial banks, mainly the treasury department (100%) and the risk management 
department (60%). Moreover, the respondents indicated that they use various methods to assess 
the magnitude of liquidity risk through the availability of unencumbered assets (100%), the 
concentration of funding (100%), liquidity metrics (80%), and market-related monitoring tools 
(60%). They deal with liquidity shortages mainly through the lender of last resort (80%), using 
secondary markets (100%) or additional borrowing (60%). Furthermore, they indicate that the 
head of treasury and ALCO are responsible for determining their bank’s liquidity technical 
reserves (60%), as shown in Figure 21. 
Figure 21 : Managing Liquidity Risk  
Source: Pilot study results  
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3.6.5 Interest Rate Risk  
Most respondents (80%) indicated that they rely on various techniques to manage interest rate 
risk such as maturity ladders and gap analysis. Furthermore, they rely on various methods to 
reduce interest rate risk such as maturity matching loans and deposits and gap analysis (80%) 
and through floating rate loans (60%), as shown in Figure 22. 
Figure 22: Managing Interest Rate Risk  
Source: Pilot study results  
 
3.6.6 Credit and Market Risks  
The respondents indicated that they rely on various methods to reduce credit risk and market 
risk. All of the pilot study sample indicated that they mainly use collateral (100%), determining 
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customer credit worthiness (80%), and loan commitment (40%) to mitigate or reduce credit 
risk. Furthermore, the pilot study relied on monitoring macro-financial indicators (100%) 
,while (80%) try to avoid high exposure (80%) to mitigate market risk exposure, as shown in 
Figure 23. 
Figure 23: Methods of Reducing Credit Risk and Market Risk  
Source: Pilot study results  
 
3.6.7 Contingency funding plan and stress testing 
The pilot study respondents – the five banks – indicated that they have a contingency funding 
plan (CFP) and that they review it on a yearly basis. Furthermore, they indicated that they 
perform stress-testing scenarios on a regular basis. Around 80% of the respondents review it 
on a quarterly basis, while the rest (20%) review it each year. 
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Figure 24: Frequency of performing stress testing 
Source: Pilot study results  
3.7 Questionnaire Results and Discussion  
As mentioned in the previous section, the questionnaire survey was conducted between 
November 2017 and February 2018. The questionnaires were distributed to 21 respondents in 
Jordan. The final sample comprised 20 surveys with a final response rate of 95.2%. One of the 
banks was not responsive to the survey due to the fact that it does not operate in Jordan as a 
regular bank but only focuses on extending credit to Jordanian and Iraqi firms that operate in 
the import-export business between both countries. The sample represented all the commercial 
banks in Jordan, including domestic and foreign banks. The data were collected from the survey 
and were coded according to the context of the answers of the open-ended questions in the 
survey. The SPSS programme software was used to get the necessary results, which could help 
in describing the current situation of the ALM process at Jordanian banks. Figure 25 illustrates 
the banking system in Jordan. 
 
 
122 
 
Figure 25: The Banking system in Jordan (End of 2015) 
Describing the current ALM framework in Jordan through a survey questionnaire mainly 
depended on the robustness of the methodology used for designing the questionnaire and 
putting in place a strategy for fieldwork in order to get more subjective and reliable results that 
could be used for laying the foundation to develop a suitable ALM framework strategy for 
Jordanian banks, which operate in a highly volatile region. The design of the survey has taken 
into consideration many aspects discussed above in order to ensure the success of the survey 
when carried out. 
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Table 4: Survey Questionnaire Summary 
Item Description 
Survey aim  
Describing the status of ALM process and ALCO at 
Jordanian commercial bank with a special focus on 
liquidity risk management. 
Survey questionnaire type  Quantitative 
Sampling methodology  Non-probability sampling 
Sample  21 commercial banks 
Desired completion time Less than 30 minutes 
Starting date 2017/2018 
Period needed for survey completion  3 months 
 
The primary elements of the questionnaire are the organisational structure, asset liability 
management, asset liability management committee, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, 
market risk, contingency funding plans (CFP)and stress testing. 
3.7.1 Demographics  
This part presents the demographic information of the respondents’ gender, age, educational 
level, working experience and position. Table 5 illustrates the demographic characteristics of 
the respondents. 
Table 5: Demographic characteristics of study respondents 
Item Frequency Percent Cumulative% 
Gender 
Male 10 50 50 
Female 10 50 100 
Age 
25-40 15 75 65 
41-54 5 25 100 
Educational Level 
Bachelor Degree 13 65 65 
Post Graduate Degree 7 35 100 
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Working Experience 
5-10 Years 3 15 15 
10-15 years 5 25 40 
More than 15 years 12 60 100 
The Position of the respondent 
Manager 18 90 90 
Manager Assistant 2 10 100 
The table illustrates the demographic characteristics of the study respondents at Jordanian commercial banks during the period of conducting the 
survey (November 2017 until February 2018). 
The table shows that the sample consists of ten males (50%) and ten females (50%). Some 
15 participants are between 25-40 years old (75%) while the rest of the participants are between 
41-54 years old (25%). For the educational level of the respondents, most (65%) hold a 
bachelor’s degree while the rest had a postgraduate degree (35%). Most of the respondents 
(60%) had more than fifteen years’ experience, while fewer (25%) had experience ranging from 
ten to fifteen years. The rest (15%) had five to ten years’ experience. The majority of the 
respondents had a manager position 90% while the rest were assistant managers. The results 
illustrate that the respondents have good experience in their field and high educational levels. 
The majority of the respondents also have more than fifteen years’ experience in the banking 
industry, with most of the respondents holding high-level management positions, which will 
help us to get good feedback.  
3.7.2 Organisational Structure 
This part presents the organisational structure of ALM and ALCO, the departments responsible 
for managing ALM, and the positions that represent the asset liability committee in Jordanian 
commercial banks. Table 6 illustrates the organisational structure of ALM and ALCO. 
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Table 6: The organisational structure of ALM and ALCO 
Item Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
Departments responsible for managing assets and liabilities 
Treasury Department 17 85 85 
Finance Department 2 10 95 
Risk Management Department 1 5 100 
Existence of ALCO 
Yes 20 100 100 
Department Represented in ALCO 
Head of Treasury 20 100 ----- 
CEO 19 95 ----- 
Head of Corporate Banking 18 90 ----- 
Head of Risk Management 18 90 ----- 
Head of Finance 18 90 ----- 
Head of Retail Banking  15 75 ----- 
Head of SME banking 10 50 ----- 
Other 4 20 ----- 
Head of Compliance Department 1 5 ----- 
Head of Internal Audit Department  1 5 ----- 
The table shows the organisational structure of ALM and ALCO at Jordanian commercial banks during the survey period (November 2017 until 
February 2018). 
The organisational structure of the respondents in the study reveals that the treasury 
department bears the main responsibility for managing the banks’ balance sheet at 17 banks 
(85%), whereas two banks (10%) indicated that the finance department is responsible for 
managing the banks’ assets and liabilities. One bank (5%) indicated that the risk management 
department is responsible for managing the bank’s assets and liabilities. In addition, all twenty 
banks (100%) showed that they have an ALCO in their organisational structure.  
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Furthermore, the results indicate that the head of treasury (100%) and CEO (95%), and 
(90%) heads of corporate banking, risk management and finance are part of the asset liability 
committee in Jordanian commercial banks. Also, 75% of the banks indicate that the head of 
retail banking is part of the ALCO; 50% include the head of SME lending. One bank indicated 
that the head of internal audit and head of compliance are also part of the ALCO. In addition, 
four banks indicated the existence of other members in the committee such as the head of credit, 
central operation, deputy CEO, credit risk officer, chief risk officer, treasury risk officer, and a 
deputy of general internal audit. The organisational structure of ALM at Jordanian commercial 
banks relies on the treasury department to manage the asset and liability sides. This is in line 
with the literature that one of the treasury department’s functions is managing assets and 
liabilities as well as reporting to the ALCO. They can also manage the A/L sides in a separate 
unit of the treasury desk depending on the size of the bank, the variegation in its products and 
services, and its organisational structure (Bessis, 2015; Choudhry, 2011). Furthermore, the 
ALCO members at Jordanian commercial banks represent most banking activities, which is in 
line with the optimal ALCO members structure in the banking industry: ALCO members 
should include senior business line managers representing all of the bank’s business activities 
and processes (Greuning & Bratanovic, 2009). 
3.7.3 Asset Lability Management (ALM)  
Balancing risks and profitability in the banking industry are a crucial part of bank decision-
making processes. The inability to control surrounding environmental factors and their impact 
on business lines has compelled banking institutions to set up strategies and policies to mitigate 
against the impact of these shocks and benefit from existing opportunities. Thus, the main role 
of ALM is to provide metrics for various types of risk exposure while maximising a bank’s 
risk-return profile (Choudhry, 2011). Section III will presents the aims of ALM process and 
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the main risks that are important to ALM. It will also set out the topics and tools covered by 
ALM policies and the frequency at which ALM strategies are assessed as well as other elements 
of ALM and its dependency on overall bank strategy. Table 7 presents the aims of ALM 
processes within Jordanian commercial banks:  
Table 7: Aims of ALM processes  
 
 
All Jordanian commercial banks (100%) indicated that an ALM process exists within their 
organisations, and the aim of ALM in 14 Jordanian commercial banks was stated as managing 
risk exposures (70%). In addition, 13 banks indicated examining asset and liability mismatches 
(65%) as an aim of ALM. Four banks (20%) indicated that pricing interest rate products was 
another function of ALM in Jordanian commercial banks, and three banks (15%) indicated 
liquidity stress-testing and ensuring compliance with CBJ rules and ratios as an aim of ALM. 
While, four banks (20%) present other aims in general, such as concentration of deposits and 
Item  Frequency percent Cumulative% 
Existence of ALM process 
Yes 20 100 100 
Aim of ALM process 
Managing risk exposures 14 70 ---- 
Asset and liability mismatches  13 65 ---- 
Pricing interest rate 4 20 ---- 
Liquidity stress testing 3 15 ---- 
Complying with CBJ rules and 
ratios 
3 15 ---- 
Quality and concentration of 
asset and liabilities 
1 5 ---- 
Other 4 20 ---- 
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funding, managing the best investments for assets and liabilities, managing costs and profits) 
as aims of ALM in Jordanian commercial banks. However, one bank’s (5%) respondents 
indicated assessing the quality and concentration of assets and liabilities as one of the important 
functions of ALM. Table 8 presents the risks considered important to the ALM process in 
Jordanian commercial banks: 
Table 8: Risk importance in ALM process 
Item  Frequency percent Cumulative% 
 
Highest risk exposure 
Liquidity risk 15 75 75 
Interest rate risk 2 10 85 
Credit risk 3 15 100 
Second risk exposure 
Liquidity risk 4 20 20 
Interest rate risk 14 70 90 
Credit risk 2 10 100 
Third risk exposure 
Market risk 8 40 40 
Credit risk 4 20 60 
Foreign exchange risk 3 15 75 
Operational risk 2 10 85 
Interest rate risk 2 10 95 
Liquidity risk 1 5 100 
Fifteen of Jordan’s commercial banks (75%) indicated that the most important function of 
ALM is to manage liquidity risk as the most important risk. Fourteen of Jordan’s commercial 
banks (70%) stated that interest rate risk as the second most important risk exposure monitored 
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by ALM. Seven banks (40%) indicated market risk as the third most important risk monitored 
by ALM in Jordanian commercial banks. Table 9 presents the main topics and tools used in the 
ALM process and the frequency of ALM assessment within Jordanian commercial banks. 
Table 9: ALM process main topics, management tools, and review 
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
Topics covered by ALM policies 
Investment and hedging strategies 16 80 ----- 
Methodology for measurement of risks 14 70 ----- 
New product approval 10 50 ----- 
Limit setting and control 12 60 ----- 
Others 3 15 ----- 
Management tools used for ALM 
Cash flow matching 16 80 ----- 
Asset/liability projections 15 75 ----- 
Duration matching 11 55 ----- 
Description 3 15 ----- 
Other 3 15 ----- 
Efficient frontier analysis 1 5 ----- 
Frequency of ALM assessment strategy 
Monthly 8 40 40 
Yearly 5 25 65 
Daily 2 10 75 
Occasionally 2 10 85 
Quarterly 2 10 95 
Other 1 5 100 
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As for the topics covered in the ALM process, the results indicate that the ALM processes 
of 16 banks (80%) cover investment and hedging strategies, while 14 banks (70%) pointed out 
that their ALM processes examine methodologies for measuring risks. Furthermore, twelve 
banks (60%) indicated that ALM covered limit setting and control, and ten banks (50%) 
presented a new product approval covered this area in ALM policies at Jordanian commercial 
banks. Three banks (15%) mentioned that ALM covers compliance with the regulator’s set 
ratio, funding policy and contingency plans, as well as the internal and external pricing of all 
balance-sheet products. 
As for the management tools used in ALM processes at Jordanian commercial banks, 16 
banks (80%) indicated that they use cash flow matching in ALM while 15 banks (75%) used 
asset liability projections. Furthermore, 11 banks (55%) used duration matching in their ALM. 
Only three banks (15%) used description and other tools such as sensitivity analysis, the 
CAMEL model and behavioural profiling (15%). Lastly, one bank used efficient frontier 
analysis.  
Eight of the respondent banks (40%) showed that they assess their ALM strategy on a 
monthly basis; five banks (25%) on a yearly basis; and six banks divided between quarterly, 
occasionally and daily. One foreigner bank responded that the frequency of their ALM 
assessment was no decided within their Jordan branches but managed by outside head office.  
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Table 10: The main elements of ALM and its dependency on bank overall strategy 
 
Table 10 shows the response results of seven statements regarding the main elements of 
ALM and it dependency on banks’ overall strategy. The average mean of the responses to these 
statements was 4.2 on a five-point Likert scale. The respondents’ answers to the seven 
statements indicated that ALM strategy was consistent with banks’ overall strategies within 
Jordanian commercial banks. However, there was no big difference between the highest and 
lowest means of the seven statements, as Table 11 shows. The highest mean (4.55) was that of 
the first statement, in which respondents viewed ALM strategy as being set by ALCO in 
Jordanian commercial banks. The lowest mean (3.85) was for statement five concerning 
ALM’s consideration of potential impacts on non-quantifiable risks. The Jordanian commercial 
banks strongly agreed that banks’ ALM strategy is consistent with their operational objectives 
Item Minimum Maximum Mean S.D 
1 The ALM strategy is set by ALCO. 4.00 5.00 4.55 0.51 
2 ALM strategy is set in accordance with the overall 
strategic objectives of the bank and disseminated 
throughout the bank. 
2.00 5.00 4.25 0.79 
3 ALM strategy is consistent with the operational 
objectives and takes into account the balance 
sheet structure, and the status of different product 
lines. 
3.00 5.00 4.35 0.59 
4 ALM is a dynamic process based on analysing, 
assessing, and reviewing the effectiveness of the 
set strategies based on reports and findings. 
3.00 5.00 4.45 0.60 
5 The ALM strategy considers potential impacts on 
non-quantifiable risks. 
3.00 5.00 3.85 0.59 
6 Risk exposure limits are set based on the overall 
strategy of the bank in a way that takes product 
line levels into consideration. 
3.00 5.00 4.00 0.56 
7 The ALM process incorporates operational, credit 
and market risks, as well as formulates risk 
exposure strategies and sets limits. 
3.00 5.00 4.00 0.65 
 Average   4.20  
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and take into account balance sheet structures and the status of different product lines. 
Furthermore, the ALM process is a dynamic process based on analysing, assessing, and 
reviewing the effectiveness of set strategies based on reports and findings. However, they 
agreed that the ALM process is incorporated into banks’ overall strategy and that risk exposure 
limits are set based on the overall strategy of the bank in a way that takes into consideration 
product line levels. In addition, they agreed that ALM takes into account incorporating 
operational, credit and market risks while formulating risk exposure strategies and setting 
limits. 
All of the Jordanian commercial banks have ALM processes in reaction to the multitude 
risks and challenges they are facing or may face in future. The main aim of ALM at Jordanian 
commercial banks is to manage risk exposure. In this case, it is in line with the main role of 
ALM in providing metrics for various types of risk exposure and to provide a hedging reaction 
against risks to financial institutions (Choudhry, 2011; Zawalinska, 1999). In addition, 
mismatches between assets and liabilities receive adequate attention from Jordanian 
commercial banks in the ALM process. Mismatch between the asset and liability sides is part 
of the concept of ALM in the early stages; banking management was based on gap analysis to 
analyse mismatching, which then developed into duration gap models (Shrestha, 2015). 
The Jordanian commercial banks focus on their liquidity risk exposure as they consider 
liquidity risk to be the most important risk to address. The banks actively manage their liquidity 
risk exposure within their business lines and take into account the regulatory limitations to the 
transferability of liquidity (BIS, 2008). Other researchers found credit risk to be the most 
common risk faced by banks. Mokni et al. (2015) found credit risk to be the most common risk 
faced by both types of bank (conventional and Islamic) in the MENA area, while liquidity risk 
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was the second most crucial risk. Alam and Masukujjaman (2011) in particular found credit 
risk to be the most important risk facing five banks in Bangladesh followed by operational risk 
and market risk. 
The main goal for banks is profit maximisation. While they achieve this through granting loans, 
they try to minimize the risks to their operations as much as possible. It is often a bank’s 
treasury department that implements ALM as they appear to work on ‘integrated treasury 
functions’ whereby they make profit while managing hedging (ADB, 2009). In addition, 
Jordanian commercial banks shown for setup methodologies for measuring risks, this preserve 
the viability of the bank but they need detailed reports that reflect the bank activities and the 
market conditions (Joshi & Sontakay, 2017). 
The topics covered in Jordanian banks’ policies are in line with the sound management 
framework published by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which stresses the need for 
an effective ALM policy. This requires an effective system for managing liquidity risk and 
insuring appropriate limits of risk taking (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s, 2017). In 
addition, they indicated the approval of new products covered as result of the emergence of 
new financial products and service over the past two decades (Tektas, 2005). Jordanian 
commercial banks use cash flow matching as a major tool in their ALM in order to preserve 
the solvency of their bank and their ability to meet their financial obligations (Vij, 2005). Most 
of the Jordanian commercial banks assess their ALM strategies monthly which is good sign 
and update their strategies in line with incoming development, events and actions.  
In addition, they show that ALM strategy setting by ALCO is consistent with their main 
functions (Choudhry, 2011). Furthermore, the ALM strategy at Jordanian commercial banks is 
set with the overall strategy and operational objectives and based on balance sheet structure 
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and the status of different product lines. Risk exposure limits are set in line with the bank’s 
overall strategy and take into consideration product business levels. ALM processes 
incorporate the operational, credit and market risks to formulate risks exposure strategies and 
limits.  
Indeed, the effectiveness of the ALM framework is considered one of the main factors that 
contributes to maximising profitability while mitigating the effects of risk factors (Bessis, 
2011). The ALM framework should be compatible with the bank’s overall strategy as well as 
the individual business lines’ strategy planning, coordinating, and controlling the assets and 
liabilities (Charumathi, 2008). In addition, ALM strategies and policies should be reviewed 
periodically by comparing actual performance with projections (BIS, 2008; Vento & La Ganga, 
2009; Drehmann, 2013). The results came in line with the resercher expectations in the 
hypothesis section as Jordanian commercial banks have an effective ALM framework 
3.7.4 The Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO) 
Section IV of the survey deals with the asset and liability committee (ALCO) and its 
functional scope, including its ability to set risk exposure limits and metrics used to quantify 
risk. It also deals with the reports provided to the ALCO by different departments at the bank, 
their report and the frequency of reviewing it. Table 11 shows the functional scopes that ALCO 
consider and the frequency of ALCO meetings as well as the reports provided to ALCO from 
various departments and units expressing the bank’s activities and business lines. 
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 Table 11: The functional scope of ALCO, frequency of its meetings and its inputs 
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
The functional scope of risks that ALCO considers 
Liquidity risk 20 100 ----- 
Interest rate risk 19 95 ----- 
Market risk 17 85 ----- 
Exchange rate risk 16 80 ----- 
Credit risk 14 70 ----- 
Operational risk 3 15 ----- 
Others  1 5 ----- 
Frequency of ALCO meetings 
Monthly 17 85 ----- 
Quarterly 2 10 ----- 
Reports provided to ALCO by other departments 
Liquidity reports and stress testing 15 75 ----- 
Balance sheet and income statement 
bank performance 
14 70 
----- 
Deposit concentration and big deposit 
report 
12 60 
----- 
Cost of funding report 9 45 ----- 
Market report 7 35 ----- 
Interest rate risk report and forecasting 6 30 ----- 
Regulatory compliance report 6 30 ----- 
Credit report and forecast 5 25 ----- 
Macroeconomic report 3 15 ----- 
Treasury report 3 15 ----- 
Bank investment report 3 15 ----- 
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Business line report 3 15 ----- 
Early warning indicators 1 5 ----- 
Repricing gap 1 5 ----- 
Profitability report 1 5 ----- 
A&L by currencies 1 5 ----- 
All of the respondents from the commercial banks in Jordan (100%) indicated that liquidity 
risk is one of the functional scopes of ALCO, in line with Bessis (2015). This shows that one 
of the core tasks of ALCO is to manage liquidity risk, which arises from volume and maturity 
mismatches of assets and liabilities. Table 12 shows nineteen banks in Jordan (95%) who 
consider interest rate risk to be a functional scope of ALCO; seventeen banks (85%) who 
consider market risk; sixteen banks (80%) who consider exchange rate risk; and 14 banks 
(70%) for credit risks. Three banks (15%) indicate operational risk. The results shows that the 
most Jordanian commercial banks see the main functional scopes of ALCO as being liquidity 
risk, interest rate risk and market risk.  
The ALCO in Jordanian commercial banks tend to meet mostly on a monthly basis, as indicated 
in Table 11. Seventeen banks (85%) meet on a monthly basis, while two banks (10%) meet on 
a quarterly basis. One banks does not specify the frequency of its ALCO meetings. The 
majority of Jordanian commercial banks therefore meet monthly for ALCO. The frequency of 
the ALCO meetings depends on the nature of each bank and its activities, but is usually monthly 
(Choudhry, 2011). The ALCO members meet on regular basis to discuss recent developments 
in their supported business lines and changes in the surrounding environment (Choudhry, 
2018). In those markets that are more volatile and where banks’ activities are more exposed to 
risk, the ALCO should meet every week if not twice (Dedu & Vasilache, 2008). This indicates 
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that the Jordanian market seems to be less volatile as the ALCO meets on a monthly basis 
or/and the activities of the banks are less exposed to risks and less complicated.  
The ability of the ALCO to monitor and measure risks determines the viability of the bank. 
Thus, they need detailed reports that reflect the bank’s activities and the market conditions 
(Joshi & Sontakay, 2017). Table 11 shows the reports that are provided to the ALCO from the 
various departments/units in the banks. The liquidity and stress testing reports are the main 
ones provided to the ALCO in fifteen banks (75%). Bank performance reports with balance 
sheet and income statements are provided to ALCO in fourteen banks (70%) while deposit 
concentration and big deposit reports are provided in twelves banks (60%). The cost of funding 
report is provided in nine banks (45%) while seven banks (35%) provide market reports and 
six (30%) provide interest rate risk reports and forecasting and regulatory compliance reports. 
Only three banks (15%) provide other reports such as macroeconomic reports, treasury reports, 
bank investment reports and business line reports. Finally, one bank (5%) provides reports of 
early warning indicators, repricing gaps, profitability reports, and assets and liabilities by 
currencies to its ALCO. The majority of Jordanian commercial banks provide reports related 
to their liquidity position and balance sheet, including their deposit concentration and cost of 
funding, while fewer than four banks only provide reports regarding the business lines which 
express the banks’ activities on a business level. Less than half of the bank respondents (30%) 
provide interest rate risk reports to ALCO. The overall reports show the components of banks’ 
assets and liabilities, take into account macroeconomic factors and include balance sheet 
management and business line level reports. These reports should contain scenario planning 
under micro and macro level market conditions and the latest short-term projections 
(Choudhry, 2012). 
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Table 12 shows the responsibility of ALCO at Jordanian commercial banks in setting risk 
metrics and risk exposure limits. In addition, specified risks metrics are used, as well as the 
responsible for reviewing ALCO report and frequency of reviewing. 
Table 12: The ALCO report and its role in setting risk metrics and exposures 
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
Setting risk metrics by ALCO 
Yes 10 50 50 
No 10 50 100 
Risk metrics by ALCO for liquidity risk  
Legal Liquidity Ratio 5 ----- ----- 
LTD 2 ----- ----- 
Concentration 1 ----- ----- 
Other 4 ----- ----- 
Risk metrics by ALCO for Interest rate risk 
IR GAP 4 ----- ----- 
DV01 1 ----- ----- 
Equity to income 1 ----- ----- 
Other 3 ----- ----- 
Risk metrics by ALCO for Credit risk 
NPL 1 ----- ----- 
Concentration 2 ----- ----- 
Other 3 ----- ----- 
Risk metrics by ALCO for Market risk 
FX Position 3 ----- ----- 
VaR 1 ----- ----- 
Other 2 ----- ----- 
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Setting risk exposure limits by ALCO 
Yes 10 50 50 
No 10 50 100 
ALCO report is reviewed by  
CEO 14 70 ----- 
Board of directors 10 50 ----- 
Central bank 9 45 ----- 
Others 7 35 ----- 
Shareholders 1 5 ----- 
Frequency of reviewing ALCO report 
Monthly 15 75 75 
Quarterly 5 25 100 
The results in Table 12 indicates that the ALCO in ten of the respondent banks (50%) is 
not responsible for setting risks metrics. In these ten banks, the legal liquidity ratio is used as 
well as the loan to deposit (LTD) ratio as major risk metrics to gauge liquidity risks. In addition, 
the ALCO uses interest rate gap and dollar duration (DV01) as metrics of interest rate risk, 
while using concentration and non-performing loans as risk metrics for credit risk. For market 
risk, they use FX position and value at risk (VaR). Some 50% of the banks stated that their 
ALCO is responsible for setting risk limits. Table 12 also shows the role of ALCO in setting 
risk metrics and limits. Some 50% of the respondents stated that this is not the responsibility 
of their ALCO. Two banks mentioned that the ALCO is not responsible for setting risk metrics 
but is responsible for setting risk limits. Two other banks stated that the ALCO is responsible 
for setting risk metrics while they are not responsible for setting risks limits. Eight banks (40%) 
stated that the ALCO is responsible for setting risks metrics and limits together, while another 
eight banks stated that the ALCO is not responsible for setting risk metrics or limits. 
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The ALCO report (output) is reviewed by the CEO in fourteen banks (70%) and reviewed by 
the board of directors in ten banks (50%). The Jordanian central bank reviewed the output 
reports of nine banks’ ALCO (45%) and one bank stated that the report is reviewed by 
shareholders. In seven banks (35%), the reports were reviewed by the group ALCO, external 
auditors, board risk committee, CFO and/or internal editors. The ALCO report (output) is 
reviewed on a monthly basis in fifteen banks (75%), while the remainder (25%) review the 
ALCO report on a quarterly basis.  
Table 13 summarises the responses about ALCO report input and output. The mean of the 
responses to the six statements is 4.05 for the five-point Likert scale. The highest mean (4.50) 
was that of the first statement, in which respondents viewed liquidity reports provided to ALCO 
as containing risk exposures and funding liquidity plans. The lowest mean (3.55) was for 
statement six concerning the central bank effectiveness of supervises ALCO decisions in 
commercial banks in Jordan. The results shown the respondents strongly agree with the 
statement that the ALCO report focuses on the overall performance of the bank as well as 
business levels and that it must focus on proposing strategies that could enhance future 
performance. Furthermore, they strongly agree that periodic reviews are conducted to assess 
the performance of the strategies adopted by commercial banks, but they were neutral about 
the board responsibility in adopting the strategy proposed by the ALCO report and the 
effectiveness of central bank in supervising ALCO decisions. 
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Table 13: ALCO inputs and outputs 
Item  Minimum Maximum Mean S.D 
Liquidity reports provided to 
ALCO contain risk exposures, 
funding liquidity plans, and other. 
4.00 5.00 4.50 0.51 
ALCO report must focus on 
proposing strategies that could 
enhance future performance. 
3.00 5.00 4.15 0.59 
ALCO report focuses on the 
overall performance of the bank 
and business level. 
3.00 5.00 4.20 0.62 
The Board of Directors are 
responsible for adopting the 
proposed strategies in the ALCO 
report. 
2.00 5.00 3.80 1.06 
A periodic review is conducted for 
reviewing the performance of 
adopted strategies. 
3.00 5.00 4.10 0.55 
The central bank effectively 
supervises ALCO decisions at 
your bank. 
2.00 5.00 3.55 0.76 
Average   
4.05 
 
Every ALCO at Jordanian commercial banks monitors liquidity risks, in line with Bessis 
(2015). This risk arises from volume and maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities. In 
addition, the majority of ALCOs at Jordanian commercial banks meet on a monthly basis in 
line with the literature that should meet on a regular basis with the asset and liability committee 
meeting each month (Choudhry, 2011). Furthermore, the inputs for ALCO from various 
departments of the bank focus on liquidity management, balance sheet performance, deposit 
concentration, and cost of funding. While a few banks (15%) of the respondents mentioned 
providing products activities in every business line reports, usually the features of the treasury 
reports that are provided to ALCO including financial and business line risk management 
(Bessis, 2015). The business line report by product can show the portion of total assets 
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represented by each business line and which line has the greatest forward funding requirements 
(Choudhry, 2011).  
Some 15% of the Jordanian commercial banks stated that the ALCO is not responsible for 
setting risk metrics and risk exposure limits. In addition, they did not mention a specific unit 
that deals with these duties and presented as an ALCO member such as A/L unit when the 
study asked before for ALCO members. Furthermore, the main risk metrics for liquidity risks 
in Jordanian commercial banks are the legal liquidity ratio and loan to deposit ratio, 
concentrations used as risk metrics in most of the banks that pointed for the ALCO is 
responsible for setting risks metrics, every metrics of them cover specific issue, to be sufficient 
should be used in conjunction with the other metrics such as LTD ratios (Choudhry, 2011). 
Furthermore, they use the IR Gap as a metric to measure interest rate risk and therefore should 
monitor market and interest rate forecast to increase the activation of these metrics (Vij, 2005). 
Most respondents stated that the CEO and board of directors were responsible for reviewing 
the ALCO report on a monthly basis (ADB, 2009). ALCO reports in Jordanian commercial 
banks include risk exposures and pay attention to various types of risks – liquidity risks in 
particular – as their reports include funding liquidity plans. In addition, the central bank of 
Jordan effectively supervises ALCO decisions at Jordanian commercial banks through its 
legislative powers to supervise the banking sector (IFC, 2008). These results are in line with 
the researcher expectations in the hypothesis section as ALCO is effectively involved in 
implementing ALM strategies and policies in Jordanian commercial banks. 
3.7.5 Liquidity risk 
Liquidity risk is considered the top priority of Jordanian commercial banks with 75% of 
the Jordanian commercial banks in the study stating that the main purpose of asset and liability 
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management is to manage liquidity risk. Table 14 shows the respondents’ answers related to 
managing, quantifying and monitoring liquidity risks in Jordanian commercial banks as well 
as the measures used to set liquidity risk limits.  
Table 14: Managing and monitoring liquidity risk 
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
Department responsible for managing liquidity risk 
Treasury Dep. 16 80 ----- 
Risk Management Dep. 10 50 ----- 
Finance Dep. 7 35 ----- 
Other 1 5 ----- 
Quantifying liquidity and funding liquidity risk 
Legal liquidity ratio 12 60 ----- 
Gap analysis 5 25 ----- 
Loan to deposit ratio (LTD) 5 25 ----- 
Liquidity ladders 4 20 ----- 
Stress test 4 20  
NPL 2 10 ----- 
Setting liquidity and funding liquidity risk limits 
Business model 8 40 ----- 
CBJ guidelines 8 40 ----- 
Risk appetite 5 25 ----- 
Liquidity risk management policy 3 15 ----- 
Assets and liabilities maturities 2 10 ----- 
Frequency of monitoring liquidity positions 
Daily 20 100 ----- 
 
As shown in Table 14, in 16 Jordanian commercial banks (80%) it is the treasury 
department that is responsible for managing liquidity risks. Other departments participate in 
managing liquidity risk in Jordanian commercial banks: ten banks (50%) listed their risk 
144 
 
management department; seven banks (35%) listed their finance department; and one bank 
(5%) listed the ALCO as being responsible for managing liquidity risk.  
Twelve (60%) of Jordan’s commercial banks rely mainly on legal liquidity ratios to quantify 
liquidity and funding liquidity risks. Five banks (25%) listed using the loan to deposit ratio 
(LTD) and gap analysis to quantify liquidity and funding liquidity risks. Four banks (20%) use 
the liquidity ladder and stress tests. While two banks (10%), indicate using non-performing 
loans as a measure to quantify liquidity risk and funding risks. Others measures such as 
financial resources concentration, contingency funding plan CFP were listed but do not appear 
to be widely used by Jordanian commercial banks. 
Table 14 also showed eight Jordanian commercial banks (40%) setting their limits for 
liquidity risk through their business model and central bank of Jordan guidelines. In addition, 
risk appetite and liquidity risk management policy are used to set liquidity risk limits in five 
and three banks, respectively. Moreover, two banks (10%) set liquidity risks and funding risk 
limits through asset and liabilities maturities. Liquidity positions, such as intraday liquidity, 
should be managed by banks to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis 
under both normal and stressed conditions (BIS, 2013). The Jordanian commercial banks 
indicated that they monitor their liquidity positions on daily basis, as shown in Table 14.  
The Jordanian commercial banks indicated that they use various methods to assess/monitor the 
magnitude of liquidity risk, and that they deal with shortages in their liquidity position through 
multiple procedures. Table 15 presents the methods/tools and procedures used. 
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Table 15: Liquidity risk assessment and funding liquidity risk 
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
Tools used for assessing liquidity risk 
Contractual maturity mismatch 18 90 ----- 
Concentration of funding 16 80 ----- 
Liquidity metrics 13 65 ----- 
Market-related monitoring tools 9 45 ----- 
Available unencumbered assets 5 25 ----- 
Shortages in liquidity position at your bank is dealt with through 
Inter-bank market 16 80 ----- 
Additional borrowing 15 75 ----- 
Lender of last resort (CBJ) 12 60 ----- 
Secondary markets 10 50 ----- 
Other 3 15 ----- 
Capital is considered one of the means that can be used to correct/ mitigate liquidity risk exposure 
Yes 13 65 65 
No 7 35 100 
Funding liquidity is a type of risk that banks are exposed to 
Yes 20 100 100 
Adopted measures to avoid the funding liquidity risk 
Monitoring liquidity ratios & limits 13 65 ----- 
CFP 5 25 ----- 
Diversifying Deposits 4 20 ----- 
Matching assets and liabilities 1 5 ----- 
Order of importance of funding liquidity risk forms 
Item 
Most 
Important  
Medium 
 Important  
Less  
Important  
Margin funding risk 30% 20% 50% 
Redemption risk 30% 60% 10% 
Rollover risk 40% 20% 40% 
Eighteen banks (90%) assess/monitor their liquidity risks through the contractual maturity 
mismatch tool; 16 (80%) use the concentration of funding indicator tool; 13 (65%) use liquidity 
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metrics; and nine (45%) use market-related monitoring tools. The available unencumbered 
assets indictor was used by five banks (25%), as shown in Table 15.  
Sixteen Jordanian commercial banks (80%) dealt with their liquidity shortages mainly 
through the inter-bank market while 15 banks (75%) chose to borrow more to cover their 
liquidity shortages. Twelve banks (60%) used facilities from the central bank as the lender of 
last resort and ten banks (50%) used the secondary markets. The banks also indicated other 
tools such restrictions on loan portfolio growth and including highly liquid assets in portfolios 
that can be liquated easily in the markets. 
From the results above, the researcher notice that the interbank market at Jordanian 
commercial banks is active through the dependency of 80% of the commercial banks on this 
market to cover and settle their liquidity position shortages that result from their central bank 
requirements or intraday activities. The central bank of Jordan tries to effect an undirected route 
in the interbank market through providing a weekly repo that might affect the volume and the 
rate of the interbank market. In addition, the study revealed that 13 banks – around 65% of the 
respondents – consider capital as one of the means that can be used to mitigate liquidity risk 
exposure. Furthermore, all of the commercial banks (100%) acknowledged that funding 
liquidity is a risk that commercial banks are exposed to. They rely mainly on monitoring their 
liquidity ratios and limits to avoid funding liquidity risk and contingency funding plans as well 
as diversifying their deposits and matching their assets and liabilities. The Jordanian 
commercial banks consider rollover risk to be the most important form of funding liquidity risk 
and redemption risk as the second most important risk that they face. They view margin funding 
risk as less significant. These results are shown in Table 15. 
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Eighteen (90%) of Jordan’s commercial banks had a liquidity technical reserve buffer while 
the other two (10%) did not. This illustrates that they hold their mandatory reserve amount at 
the central bank without benefiting from the maintenance period set by the central bank 
instructions.  
Table 16: Liquidity technical reserve buffers 
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative% 
Existence of liquidity technical reserve buffers 
Yes 18 90 90 
No 2 10 100 
Determining liquidity technical reserve volume 
Stress testing 10 50 ----- 
Liquidity management polices 10 50 ----- 
Risk appetite 4 20 ----- 
CBJ regulations 2 10 ----- 
Responsibility of determining liquidity technical reserve 
Head of treasury 13 65 ----- 
Head of risk management 8 40 ----- 
ALCO 7 35   
Head of finance 5 25 ----- 
CEO 4 20 ----- 
Head of retail banking  2 10 ----- 
Other 2 10 ----- 
Head of corporate banking 1 5 ----- 
In addition, half of the Jordanian commercial banks (50%) determine the volume of their 
liquidity technical reserve through stress testing and liquidity management policies. Risks 
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appetite and central bank regulations determine the volume of the liquidity technical reserve 
buffer for four and two of study respondent banks (20%, 10%) respectively. The head of the 
treasury department mainly responsible for determining the liquidity technical reserve, as 
indicated by thirteen commercial banks (65%). The head of the risk management department 
is also responsible, as indicated by eight banks; while ALCO determines the technical reserve 
buffer in seven banks (35%) and the head of finance in five (25%). CEOs in Jordanian 
commercial banks and heads of retail banking had less of a role in determine liquidity technical 
reserves for Jordan’s commercial banks, as indicated by only four banks (20%) for CEOs and 
two banks (10%) for heads of retail, as shown in Table 16. 
Jordan’s commercial banks consider liquidity risk the most important risk to manage. The 
questionnaire distributed for this study includes seven statements addressing liquidity risk 
management in Jordanian commercial banks. Table 17 provides information about the 
responses to these statements.  
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Table 17: Liquidity risk management  
  Item  Minimum Maximum Mean S.D 
1 Liquidity risk management is consistent 
with the overall strategy of the bank. 
4.00 5.00 4.40 0.50 
2 Liquidity risk is set according to the 
institutional and department level. 
3.00 5.00 4.10 0.64 
3 Liquidity risk exposure limits are set 
while considering operational liquidity 
needs. 
2.00 5.00 4.15 0.67 
4 Implementation of Basel III enhances 
liquidity risk management. 
4.00 5.00 4.30 0.47 
5 Implementation of Basel III adds 
additional strains on banks’ ability to 
make structural changes to their liquidity 
positions. 
3.00 5.00 4.10 0.72 
6 Contingent liquidity needs are taken into 
consideration while setting up liquidity 
risk exposures. 
3.00 5.00 4.15 0.59 
7 Financial derivatives are used as tools to 
manage liquidity risk. 
2.00 5.00 3.75 0.79 
 Average   
4.13 
 
 
Most Jordanian commercial banks strongly agreed that liquidity risk management is consistent 
with the overall strategy of the bank and that the liquidity risk level is set according to 
institutional and department agreement while considering operational liquidity needs. In 
addition, most of the respondents strongly agreed that the implementation of Basel III would 
enhance liquidity risk management and put additional strain on banks’ ability to make structural 
changes to their liquidity positions. Furthermore, they strongly agree that contingent liquidity 
needs are taken into consideration while setting up liquidity risk exposures. The Jordanian 
commercial banks they natural about using the financial derivatives as tools to manage liquidity 
risk. The highest value, 4.40, occurs on statement one, which states “Liquidity risk 
management is consistent with the overall strategy of the bank.” This confirms that liquidity 
risk management in Jordanian commercial banks is in line with their overall strategy. While 
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the lowest value, 3.75 occurs on statement seven, which states, “Financial derivatives are used 
as tools to manage liquidity risk”. The responses provide an indication that Jordanian 
commercial banks do not use advanced tools to manage their liquidity risks. 
Jordanian commercial banks manage liquidity risks through a participatory process among 
a number of departments – mainly the treasury and risk management departments. Therefore, 
the effect of the liquidity crunch that faced banks during the Global Financial Crisis reinforced 
the importance of liquidity management by treasury departments in particular in corporate 
treasury divisions or other departments (Choudhury, 2015). The Jordanian commercial banks 
apply multiple metrics and tools to quantify and mitigate liquidity risks. They mainly use the 
legal liquidity ratio alongside other risks metrics that can provide a wider view of liquidity risk 
exposure. In addition, the business model and risk appetite are mainly indicators used to set 
liquidity risk limit in line with the size and complexity of banks’ activities and business strategy 
(BIS, 2008). Furthermore, all of the Jordanian commercial banks monitor their liquidity 
positions on a daily basis to understand their liquidity needs and avoid liquidity risks that can 
arise from volume and maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities (Bessis, 2015).  
The contractual maturity mismatch used in most Jordanian commercial banks to 
assess/monitor liquidity risks expresses the gap between inflows and outflows of liquidity 
arising from long-term illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, respectively (Adalsteinsson, 2014; 
Pohl, 2017). This indicates and guides banks towards the attitude in extending loans and 
accepted deposits over the maturity mismatch in any specific time band. In general, the more 
diversified a bank’s source of deposits (funding structure), the less likely they are to be 
withdrawn at the same time. Jordanian commercial banks focus also on concentration of 
funding to determine the probability of deposits being withdrawn at the same time. Most 
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Jordanian commercial banks address shortages in their liquidity positions through the interbank 
market and by using central bank facilities (Aspachs, et al., 2005; Vodova, 2011).   
Jordanian commercial banks consider rollover risk, which is related to debt refinancing, as 
the most important form of funding for liquidity risk and redemption risk. This is related to 
redeeming fixed income instruments before or on their maturity date – a second risk they face 
– while the margin funding risks are less important, as shown in Table 15. Appropriate liquidity 
risk management must be consistent with banks’ overall strategy and pay attention to daily 
liquidity needs (Choudhry, 2011). These results support the main hypothesis that ALM is 
effective in Jordanian commercial banks as liquidity risk management is consistent with banks’ 
overall strategy. These findings are in line with the study sub-hypothesis.  
3.7.6 Interest rate risk 
This section provides information about interest rate risk management in Jordanian commercial 
banks as a way of quantifying and measuring the methods adopted to reduce the effects of 
interest rate risk. Table 18 summarises banks’ responses to interest risk management.  
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Table 18: Interest rate risk 
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
Quantifying interest rate risk 
IRS gap 11 55 ----- 
Stress testing 5 25 ----- 
NIM 3 15 ----- 
Earing at risk 2 10 ----- 
CBJ interest rates 1 5 ----- 
Measuring the Target of Interest Rate Margin  
Risk appetite and bank strategy 5 25 ----- 
Cost Of Funding 3 15 ----- 
GAP analysis 3 15 ----- 
ROA 1 5 ----- 
ROC 1 5 ----- 
NPV 1 5 ----- 
CBJ interest rates on monetary 
instruments 
1 5 
----- 
Interest rate risk management techniques 
Gap analysis 17 85 ----- 
Maturity ladder 17 85 ----- 
Simulation 8 40 ----- 
Methods of reducing interest rate risk 
Maturity matching of loans and deposits 16 80 ----- 
Floating rate loans 14 70 ----- 
Interest rate swaps 6 30 ----- 
Interest rate caps 1 5 ----- 
Using off-balance instruments to manage interest rate mismatches 
Yes 16 80 80 
No 4 20 100 
Prevailing type of instruments 
IR SWAPS 
4 25 ----- 
Forwards 
1 5 ----- 
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Jordanian commercial banks use a range of instruments and indicators to quantify interest rate 
risk with 11 banks (55%) using the sensitivity gap (IRS) and five (25%) using stress testing. 
Other instruments and indicators are also used such as net interest margin (NIM), earnings at 
risk and the central bank of Jordan interest rate, as shown in Table 18.  
The target of the interest rate margin in Jordanian commercial banks is measured and effected 
mainly by the risk appetite of a bank and the adopted strategy regarding interest rate risk 
management as indicated by five banks (25%) of the respondents. In addition, they indicate 
costs of funds and gap analysis as measures of the target of interest rate risk margin in three 
banks (15%). Other indicators and ratios such as ROA, ROC, NPV and CBJ interest rates on 
monetary instruments are used by only a few banks. 
Seventeen banks (85%) use gap analysis and maturity ladders as techniques to manage interest 
rate risks. Eight banks (40%) use the simulation technique. Other banks also use ratio limits. 
Sixteen banks (80%) use the technique of matching maturities of loans and deposits, and 
fourteen banks (70%) use floating rate loans and interest rate swaps. Only one bank uses 
interest rate caps and no banks use interest rate caps. Finally, sixteen banks (80%) of the 
respondents rely on using off-balance-sheet instruments to manage interest rate mismatches 
through interest rate swaps and forward rate agreements.  
3.7.7 Credit risk 
This potential risk appears when a bank borrower fails to meet their contractual obligations. 
Banks in general should pay to this risk, which can affect their ability to extend loans. This 
section will presents information on Jordanian commercial banks regarding how they quantify 
credit risk and their methods of reducing this potential risk. Table 19 summarises the responses 
to the study’s question on credit risks in Jordanian commercial banks. 
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Table 19: Credit risk 
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative% 
Quantifying credit risk 
Risk appetite and bank strategy 5 25 ----- 
NPL 4 20 ----- 
Basel & regulatory regulations 4 20 ----- 
Concentration (exposures) 4 20 ----- 
Expected credit losses 2 10 ----- 
Maturity gaps 1 5 ----- 
Stress testing 1 5 ----- 
Methods of reducing credit risk 
Collateral 18 90 ----- 
Determining customer credit worthiness 16 80 ----- 
Loan commitment 12 60 ----- 
Credit rationing 10 50 ----- 
Using off-balance sheet instruments to manage credit risk 
Yes 1 5 5 
No 19 95 100 
The respondents indicated that they rely on various measures to quantify credit risk in 
Jordanian commercial banks. Five banks (25%) used appetite to quantify credit risk. Four banks 
(20%) used non-performing loans levels and Basel sounds and concentration level. Two banks 
(10%) used expected credit losses while maturity gaps and stress testing were used by one bank 
each (10%). Furthermore, 18 Jordanian commercial banks (90%) try to reduce their credit risk 
using the by collateral method. Sixteen banks (80%) determine customer credit worthiness to 
reduce their potential credit risk. Twelve banks (60%) use loan commitments to reduce their 
credit risk. Half of the banks (50%) used credit rationing, while other banks used methods such 
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as credit reports including concentration and credit limit ratios. Nineteen banks (95%) indicated 
that they do not use off-balance-sheet instruments to manage their credit risk while one bank 
(5%) uses interest rate swaps as off-balance-sheet instruments, as shown in Table 19. 
3.7.8 Market Risk 
This section provides information about Jordanian commercial banks’ approach to market risk. 
Table 20 summarise banks’ responses to market risk.  
Table 20: Market risk 
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative% 
Quantifying market risk 
VAR 8 40 ----- 
Standardized approach 5 25 ----- 
Stress testing 3 15 ----- 
Concentration (exposures) 3 15 ----- 
Gap analysis 2 10 ----- 
Market-to-market 1 5 ----- 
Other 3 15 ----- 
Methods of reducing market risk 
Avoiding high exposure positions 18 90 ----- 
Monitoring macro-financial indicators 15 75 ----- 
Take offsetting trading positions 10 50 ----- 
Some 40% of Jordan’s commercial banks indicated that they rely mainly on value at risk 
(VaR) to quantify their market risk. Five banks (25%) use a standardized approach to market 
risk while three banks (15%) use stress testing and concentration (exposures). Two banks 
(10%) use gap analysis to quantify market risk while only one bank uses mark-to-market, as 
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shown in Table 20. Two banks (10%) use methods such as monitoring local and foreign 
financial indicators and limiting reports and calculating dollar duration (DV01) and risk 
appetite. Most Jordanian commercial banks (18 out of the sample of 20) try to reduce their 
market risks by avoiding high exposure positions. They also monitor macro-financial indicators 
to reduce the influence of market risk. Half of the respondents (50%) take offsetting trading 
positions to reduce their market risk.  
3.7.9 CFP and stress testing 
This section provides information regarding the existence of contingency funding plans and 
stress testing at Jordanian commercial banks and the frequency at which a CFP is reviewed and 
stress testing is performed. Table 21 summarises the responses of the Jordanian commercial 
banks.  
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Table 21: CFP and stress testing  
Item  Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
Have a CFP 
Yes 20 100 100 
Review CFP on a regular basis 
Yes 20 100 100 
Frequency of reviewing CFP 
Yearly 17 85 ----- 
Occasionally 2 10 ----- 
Perform stress testing on a regular basis 
Yes 18 90 ----- 
No 1 5 ----- 
Frequency of performing stress testing 
 Frequency Valid %  
Quarterly 10 55.6 ----- 
Semi- Annual  3 16.7 ----- 
Daily 2 11.1 ----- 
Yearly 2 11.1 ----- 
Monthly 1 5.6 ----- 
Total  18 100 ----- 
From the results above, all 20 of the Jordanian commercial banks had a contingency funding 
plan (CFP) when surveyed and review their CFP on a regular basis. Most Jordanian commercial 
banks (85%) review their plans on a yearly basis while two banks (10%) only review theirs 
occasionally. Eighteen banks (90%) perform stress-testing scenarios and one does not. 
In addition, ten banks (55.6%) of the eighteen that indicated that they perform stress tests 
mentioned that they perform stress tests on a quarterly basis. Two indicated that they perform 
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stress tests on a daily basis, and two others do so on a yearly basis. One bank does it on a 
monthly basis. The other three respondents for this question indicated other frequencies (every 
six months), as shown in Table 21.  
A contingency funding plan is a policy and procedure that serves banks as a guideline to address 
liquidity shortages in emergencies (BIS, 2008). Table 22 summarises the responses of the 
Jordanian commercial banks regarding elements and features of their contingency funding 
plan. 
Table 22: Contingency Funding Plan Features 
Item  Minimum Maximum Mean S.D 
1 A bank should develop an effective CFP to 
account for the outcome of alternative scenarios 
on liquidity positions and on risk mitigation 
factors. 
4.00 5.00 4.40 0.50 
2 
An effective CFP should contain strategies to deal 
with liquidity shortfalls and ensure the availability 
of sufficient liquidity resources to meet its 
obligations. 
4.00 5.00 4.30 0.47 
3 CFP should be reviewed on a regular basis to 
ensure that it remains operationally robust. 
3.00 5.00 4.35 0.59 
4 
CFP must take into account market liquidity 
conditions, operational constraints, the ability to 
raise funding, lender of last resort, and the 
consequences results from applying the plan itself. 
3.00 5.00 4.25 0.63 
5 CFP is concerned with low-probability and high-
impact events that could negatively affect the 
available liquidity resources. 
3.00 5.00 4.05 0.51 
 
Average   4.27  
The Jordanian commercial banks strongly agree with the statement that a bank should develop 
an effective CFP to account for the outcome of alternative scenarios on their liquidity positions 
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and risk mitigation factors. Such plans should contain strategies to deal with liquidity shortfalls 
to ensure the availability of sufficient liquidity resources to meet a bank’s obligations, as 
indicated in the first and second statements with values of 4.4 and 4.3, respectively. In addition, 
the Jordanian commercial banks strongly agreed that the CFP should be reviewed on a regular 
basis to ensure that it remains operationally robust with a mean value 4.35. Furthermore, the 
CFP must take into account market liquidity conditions, operational constraints, the ability to 
raise funding, the lender of last resort, and the results of applying the plan itself with a mean 
value 4.25. Moreover, the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that the CFP is 
concerned with low-probability and high-impact events that could negatively affect a bank’s 
available liquidity resources with a mean value 4.05.  
The responses about banks’ contingency funding plans have a mean of 4.27. They indicate that 
Jordanian commercial banks have contingency funding plans to address liquidity situations. In 
addition, CFPs incorporate strategies to deal with liquidity shortages. The Jordanian 
commercial banks review their CFP on a regular basis to ensure the validity of their procedures 
and take into account market liquidity conditions as well as their ability to raise funds from the 
central bank of Jordan. The results of the above mentioned statements were in line with the 
researcher expectations that CFP takes into account liquidity positions and the impact of 
changes in the market, even if it has a lower probability, which supports the view that Jordanian 
commercial banks manage their liquidity in stressed situations effectively. 
Many banks are implementing stress tests to ensure their stability in the short-term as well as 
in the long term. The main aim of these tests is to ensure that banks can continue their 
operations under severe scenarios (BIS, 2009). Table 23 summarise the main elements of stress 
testing at Jordanian commercial banks.  
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Table 23: Stress-Testing on liquidity elements  
Item Minimum Maximum Mean S.D 
1 
Stress testing should consider alternative scenarios on 
liquidity positions, risk mitigation, off-balance sheet 
items, contingent liabilities, and must review the 
assumptions underlying decisions concerning 
funding position. 
3.00 5.00 4.15 0.49 
2 
Stress testing should be performed on a regular basis 
to identify resources of liquidity stress and to ensure 
the adherence of the bank’s units to risk exposure 
limit guidelines. 
3.00 5.00 4.30 0.57 
3 
Stress testing should analyse the separate and 
combined impact of liquidity stress on cash flow, 
liquidity position, profitability, and solvency. 
4.00 5.00 4.20 0.41 
4 Stress testing should take market conditions, 
correlation between funding markets, and the scale of 
complexity in business activities. 
3.00 5.00 4.00 0.56 
5 Stress tests should highlight vulnerabilities in bank 
positions and propose remedial actions. 
1.00 5.00 4.05 0.89 
6 Stress test results should be integrated into day-to-day 
risk management. In addition, the results should be 
taken into consideration when setting risk exposure 
limits. 
1.00 5.00 4.05 0.83 
Average   4.125  
Jordanian commercial banks strongly agreed with the statement that stress testing should 
consider alternative scenarios regarding liquidity positions, risk mitigation, off-balance-sheet 
items, and contingent liabilities, and must review the assumptions underlying decisions 
concerning funding positions. These statements generated a mean value of 4.15 in the five-
point Likert scale. Furthermore, Jordanian commercial banks strongly agree that stress testing 
should be performed on a regular basis to identify sources of liquidity stress and to ensure 
banks’ adherence to risk exposure guidelines. These statements occurred with a mean value of 
4.15 in the five-point Likert scale, as indicated in Table 23. Moreover, Jordanian commercial 
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banks indicated that they strongly agree that stress testing should analyse the separate and 
combined impacts of liquidity stress on cash flow, liquidity position, profitability, and 
solvency. Furthermore, they agree that stress-testing scenarios should consider market 
conditions, correlations between funding markets and the complexity of banks’ business 
activities. Moreover, they strongly agree on statements number five and six, which assert that 
stress tests should highlight vulnerabilities in banks’ positions and propose remedial actions, 
and that the results of stress tests should be integrated into daily risk management practices and 
factored into the setting of risk exposure limits. 
The mean of the sample’s responses on the six statements about stress testing is 4.125, which 
indicates that Jordanian commercial banks conduct stress testing to improve their liquidity 
management. In addition, stress tests have alternative scenarios on liquidity positions and risk 
mitigation. Furthermore, stress test scenarios take into account market conditions in line with 
market funding and bank activities. The findings of these statements were similar to the 
researcher expectations in the hypothesis that stress-testing scenarios in Jordanian commercial 
banks are efficient in terms of improving liquidity management. 
3.7.10 Reliability test 
The researcher used Cronbach’s alpha to test the reliability of the measurement scale and 
internal consistency of this study. The results indicate that Cronbach’s alpha is sufficiently high 
and above 70%, as shown in Table 24. 
Table 24: Cronbach’s alpha reliability test result 
Item Value 
Number of Items 232 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.758 
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3.8 Conclusion  
This section of the study has used a questionnaire survey comprising of a sequence of questions 
to capture information from respondents. This data collection tool has been widely used by 
many as it can capture diverse types of primary data. The questionnaire was distributed among 
all Jordanian commercial banks, excluding Islamic banks as they adhere to Islamic Sharia Law, 
which proposes a different way of managing banks assets and liabilities. The response rate 
from the banks was 95.2% – a very a high rate given the small population of 21 banks in the 
country. 
The main aim of this research is to study ALM processes and the role of ALCO in commercial 
banks in Jordan through distributing a survey with a special focus on liquidity management to 
invite respondents to describe the current state of ALM in Jordanian commercial banks and the 
role of asset and liability committees. However, the researcher faced some limitations, such as 
the limited sample population, as the Jordanian economy is a small open economy with a 
banking sector comprised of 21 commercial banks. Therefore, there was a limited population 
to be surveyed as the ALM process is concentrated in the main branches and deals with resource 
allocation. In addition, according to the best of my knowledge, there is a serious lack of 
previous studies about ALM frameworks in Jordanian commercial banks.  
Many researchers have tried to identify the main elements of ALM frameworks within the 
context of the banking industry. In addition, they have sought to emphasise the importance of 
the ALCO as the implementation arm of ALM strategies and policies in order to mitigate 
various risks including fundamental risks and to maximise operational income. Setting the 
overall strategy for commercial banks to effectively manage asset-liability components 
requires a focus on various pillars. 
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The first pillar is concerned with managing banks’ liquidity positions in terms of their liquid 
assets and maturity profiles, while taking into account the market conditions. The second pillar 
focuses on risks stemming from day-to-day operations, such as default risk (Choudhry, 2011). 
Thus, the main pillars that govern ALM frameworks are the effectiveness of ALM processes 
in managing asset-liability components within the context of the overall bank strategies, which 
is determined by managing liquidity positions while taking into account market conditions. 
The effectiveness of ALM is considered one of the main factors in maximising profitability 
while mitigating the effects of risk factors (Bessis, 2011). The ALM framework should be 
compatible with the overall strategy of the bank as well as the individual business lines 
strategies planning, coordinating, and controlling the assets and liabilities (Charumathi, 2008). 
Further, the set goals of ALM should be clear and take into account various types of risks that 
affects banking operations, which could be mitigated through setting risk exposure limits and 
using various risk-mitigation tools (Zawalinska, 1999), as well as through the existence of CFP 
and performing stress tests periodically.  
Moreover, risks stemming from banking operations concern lending and trading activities 
(Chorafas, 2007; Choudhry, 2011). Banks must ensure the availability of funding to meet 
expected and unexpected future obligations. This can be done by broadening funding sources 
and having adequate reserve buffers to cushion liquidity shortfalls. In addition, ALM strategies 
and policies should be reviewed periodically through comparing actual performance with 
projections (BIS, 2008; Vento & La Ganga, 2009; Drehmann, 2013). Nevertheless, the 
developments in liquidity management supervision set by the Basel committee have increased 
the regulatory burden on banks. Although ALM was identified in the Basel II pillars, Basel III 
introduced new management standards to strengthen internal and regulatory supervision of 
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liquidity management in the banking industry (Kubat, 2014). Further, regulatory authorities are 
paying more attention to the ALM process. 
The implementation arm of ALM frameworks, the ALCO, is key to managing the ALM process 
and charting up strategies and policies for individual business lines as well as overall bank 
strategy. This is conducted through reporting analysis that focuses on lending margin, interest 
income, variance from last projection, customer business and future business by assessing 
projected returns, revenue and risk exposure. Further, they would consider the acceptance of 
risk exposure levels, existing risk limits, and hedging policies. The ALCO is dependent on 
reports from various units in the bank. Many ALM desks formulate their hedging strategy 
within the overall context of funding and liquidity policy. In addition, they should contain 
scenario planning under micro and macro level market conditions and the latest short-term 
projections. The evaluation process compares set guidelines with actual achievements (Bessis, 
2011; Choudhry, 2012). 
Therefore, an independent ALCO managing various risks is an operational safety measure 
(IFC, 2012). ALCO members should meet periodically to propose strategies and policies to 
board members. They are also responsible for setting risk exposure limits for risk metrics. 
Further, their focus should not only be directed towards liquidity and interest rate risk as they 
should have a broader view of the risks stemming from the business environment as well as the 
risks stemming from banking operations (Bessis, 2011; Choudhry, 2012). In addition, 
regulatory authorities may influence the output of the ALCO report through its legislative 
powers in supervising the banking sector (IFC, 2008). 
The results of the study indicate that Jordanian commercial banks already have an ALM 
process that governs their management of their assets and liabilities and that the ALCO is 
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responsible for. The results also show that the ALM is effective in most Jordanian commercial 
banks. However, the results pointed out some actions that should be taken to increase the 
effectiveness of the ALM process. For instance, the results indicated that the ALCO is not 
responsible for setting risk metrics that quantify various risks but is only responsible for setting 
risk exposure limits. Therefore, risk metrics should be defined by the ALCO when they set risk 
limits and exposures. Furthermore, the study revealed that the inputs for the ALCO lack 
comprehensive reports about overall economic and financial market conditions as the study 
respondents indicated that they monitor these variables in order to mitigate market risk. In 
addition, inputs regarding credit risk concentration and forecast reports are not provided to 
ALCO. Thus, a remedial action should be taken by the commercial banks as ALCO is 
responsible for proposing strategies to the board of directors regarding liquidity positions, 
product lines, and the overall strategy of the commercial bank. Nevertheless, the study 
respondents indicated that they were neutral about the board of directors’ adoption of the 
strategies set in the ALCO reports. Consequently, a feedback mechanism should be set between 
the board of directors and ALCO through the CEO in order to ensure the consistency of the 
overall bank strategy, noting that most of the respondents indicated that the CEO and board of 
directors are responsible for reviewing the ALCO report. 
The banks in this study pointed out that the ALCO committee meets regularly on a monthly 
basis. However, the ALM strategy assessment differs from one bank to another. Thus, banks 
that take more time to review their ALM strategy (e.g. quarterly and yearly) could be more 
prone to market risks and risks stemming from structural changes in liquidity positions. 
Accordingly, the implementation of Basel III will increase the resilience of liquidity 
management policies at commercial banks, and at the same times heighten the strain on banks 
with regard to supervisory requirements and structural changes in liquidity positions. 
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The results indicated that banks perform stress testing on a regular basis (quarterly). Also, they 
have a CFP that is reviewed on a yearly basis. Changes in market conditions and liquidity 
positions due to macroeconomic and financial conditions and day-to-day operations should be 
taken into consideration while performing stress testing and formulating CFP plans. 
Accordingly, banks should harmonize CFP reviews and perform stress tests more frequently. 
Furthermore, 90% of the study respondents indicated that they have technical liquidity buffers, 
which indicates that banks hold mandatory reserve requirements at the central bank without 
benefiting from the remuneration period that is set by the supervisory authorities. This study 
also indicated that banks tend to cover liquidity shortages through the inter-bank market and 
by resorting to additional borrowing to ensure the availability of liquidity to meet their 
obligations. Accordingly, a necessary action should be taken by the supervisory authorities to 
ensure inter-bank borrowing as it is indicated as the main sources to cover their liquidity 
shortages to decrease the cost of borrowing between commercial banks.  
Some 75% of Jordanian commercial banks in this survey reported that they prioritise 
management of liquidity risk. In addition, the financial crisis has promoted the adoption of 
more advanced liquidity risk policies and liquidity risk measurement methodologies 
(Scannella, 2016) as one of the lessons from the Global Financial Crisis was that liquidity risk 
can and does lead to the failure of financial institutions (DeYoung & Jang, 2016). Therefore, 
the next chapter will investigate more deeply the impact of bank internal factors on liquidity 
risk in Jordanian commercial banks. This study will help us to identify relationships that would 
help in mitigating liquidity risks at Jordanian commercial banks and could be applicable in 
commercial banks in other countries with similar characteristics to the Jordanian banking 
system. 
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Chapter Four: Liquidity Risk 
4.1 Introduction 
The Liquidity is the lifeline of all the business undertakings and banks that operate in the 
dynamic market environment, the inadequate liquidity or poor availability of cash can have 
a detrimental implication on their survival and sustainability (Dash, et al., 2011). Whereas, 
the risk that arises before a financial institution when it is not able to meet their obligations 
is the liquidity risk. In other words, it can be said that when the  banks fails to convert the 
assets into cash without compromising on the capital and income , as a wide range of factors 
can be used by banks to assess liquidity risks (Chen, et al., 2018). In addition, there is major 
factors that have been identified by the literature include banks internal factors, regulatory 
factors, macroeconomic aspects. Furthermore, liquidity risk can have an adverse implication 
on the performance of financial sector as well as banking institutions in particular, affect the 
profitability of financial institutions and banks to a great extent.  In the highly unpredictable 
and competitive environment, banks need to careful devise liquidity risk management that 
can have a major implication on their viability and sustainability (Arif & Anees, 2012). 
During the last decade in relation to global financial crises and new financial rules, the 
liquidity risk of banking has taken on such importance and become it  be essential to 
measure, manage, and assess the impact of liquidity risk on the economics of banking 
(Scannella, 2016). 
The impact of the global financial crisis on Jordanian commercial banks was limited due to 
their low exposure to the global financial system as well as the country’s underdeveloped 
financial market, limiting its access to financial tools to diversify their portfolios. These 
limits have been imprinted on Jordanian banks’ risk appetite as well as their market 
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behaviour. Jordanian banks have often been characterized as being more conservative with 
an emphasis on the traditional role of banks as financial intermediaries. This is apparent on 
their income statements as more than 60% of their revenues comes from interest rates on 
loans (Yaseen, et al., 2015 ). However, innovation in the financial markets as well as the 
repercussions of the Arab Spring have impacted Jordanian banks’ behaviour and made them 
more prudent regarding their local market exposures and the quality of their liquid assets as 
it caused some withdrawals from banks and caused some liquidity shortages at banks.  
Jordanian commercial banks size compared to other sectors in the economy promote 
necessity of authorities to shield this sector from the negative effects of these developments  
through improving the efficiency by enhancing banks’ regulations and developing sound 
operational risk methodologies in the banking system by charting the guidelines and 
instructions . The existence of effective framework that mitigates risk and allocate resources 
more effectively is essential for the banking sector (Choudhry, 2011).  
4.2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, the researcher will survey the literature on liquidity management and the 
factors that contribute to the mitigation of liquidity risks at commercial banks. The 
conducted survey indicates that some of these studies were empirical and focused on both 
developed and emerging market banking (Pagratis, et al., 2017; Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 
2015). Theories which are related to liquidity management have suggested strategies to 
mitigate liquidity risks at commercial banks and represented an extension from previous 
theoretical literature. In this section, the researcher will discuss and analyse liquidity risk 
management in the theoretical and empirical literature.  
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4.2.1 Theoretical Literature Review 
4.2.1.1 Liquidity Risk Management Theories  
The importance of the banking sector as an intermediary between depositors and creditors 
has triggered the motivation for laying a theoretical foundation for managing liquidity. 
Having a stable banking system is vital for the production process in any economy as a 
whole. Accordingly, many theories have emerged to enhance the banking framework 
through focusing on lending and investment portfolios as well as their funding base and 
liquidity positions. The common features of these theories are that commercial banks’ 
liquidity positions are impacted by many factors, some of which are internal, others of which 
are related to regulatory authorities’ conditions and the macroeconomic environment. Most 
of these theories indicate that maximising profits is subject to capital adequacy and liquidity 
considerations (Uchendu, 1995). 
The importance of commercial banks’ operations led to the emergence of theories that tried 
to explain how commercial banks operate within the ALM context (Baumol, 1954). 
Economists such as Keynes focused on the banking industry within a macroeconomic 
framework in order to explain the macroeconomic phenomenon and the dynamic 
interactions between economic agents’ behaviour, and commercial banks and the money 
supply. He highlighted the use of money as a need for day-to-day activity, storage of value, 
and for speculation purposes (Keynes, 1936). Also, his theory set many factors that affect 
economic agents’ choice to hold money at banks such as transactions costs, interest rates 
(Meltzer, 1963), and precautionary purposes (Whalen, 1966), etc. However, the Keynesian 
theory did not focus on profit maximisation for commercial banks and how they manage 
their liquidity; it only focused on commercial banks being a macroeconomic phenomenon. 
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Accordingly, the following will illustrate theories that have focused on commercial banking 
operations. 
4.2.1.1.1 Commercial Loan Theory 
Liquidity management theories can be traced back to Adam Smith (1723-1790) in the 
eighteenth century. He was the first to indicate that banks’ liquidity is dependent on short-
term, self-liquidating bills of exchange in the normal course of business (Humphrey, 1982). 
Commercial loan theory, which is also referred to as the “real bills doctrine”, states that the 
liquidity of banks is guaranteed as long as their assets are short-term in nature and self-
liquidating such as cash balances and short-term securities. This view was based on banks’ 
lending activities to merchants, which were mainly through discounted bills, which are 
short-term in nature, to finance their trading, production, transportation of goods, and 
distribution for short periods. Accordingly, central banks could contribute in managing 
commercial banks’ liquidity through short-term financing, which would ensure the 
availability of liquidity for the banking sector and appropriate money for the economy as a 
whole (Emmanuel, 1997; Alshatti, 2015). 
Furthermore, the abundance of money supply will be in line with the economic 
fundamentals. Money supply will increase due to the issuance of short-term commercial 
bills that are backed by transactions of goods and services – real transactions (Down, 1996). 
The doctrine highlights the importance of lending commercial papers that are backed by real 
transactions, which would make securities increase in line with the increase in money supply 
(Humphrey, 1982). These loans are viewed in the doctrine as “self-liquidating” because loan 
repayment depends on normal business processes. Moreover, financing short-term loans 
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allows banks to have high liquid revenue assets and therefore have the ability to meet their 
liabilities such as demand deposits (Emmanuel, 1997). 
However, the real bills doctrine ignores other types of extended credit such as land, 
equipment, and consumer goods acquisitions, which may be financed through banks and 
other financial institutions. Furthermore, the doctrine does not take into account the stability 
of core deposits in banks, which enables banks to extend loans for a reasonable period 
without becoming illiquid, as it assumes that depositors will withdraw their funds at the 
same time. Moreover, commercial papers’ degree of liquidity depends on the circumstances 
of the economy as well as the use of loans by firms. Accordingly, the real bills doctrine 
focused on the influence on both bank lending and the general economic activities. Also, it 
is founded on the “needs of trade” and could be viewed as an inadequate criterion for 
banking regulators as central banks could not influence the business cycle as it depends on 
fluctuations of money supply that are based on the needs of trade. However, the shift ability 
theory has included the ability of banks to shift their assets through selling them to a more 
liquid bank, as in the below. 
4.2.1.1.2 Shift Ability Theory 
The shift ability theory became increasingly popular after the US entered World War I and 
there was a need to finance the war, which led to the issuance of large amounts of 
government bonds. The Federal Reserve encouraged banks to buy these bonds through 
amending the Federal Reserve Act, which allowed banks to offer these securities as 
collateral against their borrowing from Federal Reserve banks. This development, along 
with the growth of a national market for government issues, made these securities an 
attractive asset for commercial banks, and convinced them that government securities were 
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more marketable than loans. These securities are hence a superior source of liquidity and 
banks were drawn into the government securities market (Summers, 1975). These 
developments have led commercial banks worldwide to become holders of a significant 
amount of government securities as it constitutes a high percentage of their earning assets. 
Indeed, this change in the composition of banks’ earning asset portfolios was but a deviation 
from a historic asset distribution pattern in commercial banking (Emmanuel, 1997).  
The evolution of banking operations has led to the perception that liquidity management is 
an issue governed by banks’ abilities to shift assets through selling them to a more liquid 
bank (Alshatti, 2015). According to this approach, banks could have enough liquidity 
through having readily marketable securities that could be converted to cash in normal 
conditions (Udoka, 2012). Also, it assumes that assets need not be linked to self-liquidating 
bills and held in other shiftable open-market assets such as government securities (Moti, et 
al., 2012). Moulton (1918, p. 723) mentioned that the bankers recognize that “the way to 
attain the minimum in the matter of reserves is not by relying upon maturities but by 
maintaining a considerable quantity of assets that can be shifted to other banks before 
maturity as necessity may require”. This theory does not, however, focus on commercial 
banks’ lending activities and instalment payments, which are in the centre of the anticipated 
income theory, as illustrated in the next section. 
 4.2.1.1.3 Anticipated Income Theory 
After the 1930s crisis, banks started to consider new channels for their funds through 
focusing on financing the longer-term needs of business. When World War II ended, banks’ 
portfolios began to shift as they started to lean towards the private sector instead of the 
government due to changes in resource allocations. The increase in credit activities in the 
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post-war era affected banks’ profits as their client base started to widen in parallel with their 
commercial activities. The change in banks’ attitudes towards long-term financing took 
place in parallel with their efforts of finding the right mixture of high liquid assets and other 
assets that could strike the balance between widening their operations and having enough 
liquidity to enable them to meet their commitments. These types of loans – medium to long-
term loans – qualify under the ‘anticipated income theory’ developed in 1949 by Herbert V. 
Prochnow (Prochnow, 1949; Emmanuel, 1997).  
The theory argues that banks can maintain their liquidity through structuring their loan 
payments according to expected borrower income rather than the offered collateral. 
Accordingly, banks will rely on debtors’ income and its coverage of debt-service 
requirements that is determined based on cash flow projections as they provide a clear 
anchor about loan quality and ability to repay. Expected flows for the borrower from main 
operations would assure both that the loan will be self-liquidating in nature and that the 
borrower is able to meet the interest and principal payments.  
During normal circumstances, this type of credit would function the same way as bank 
lending based on the commercial loan theory of liquidity. Furthermore, it has some 
similarities with traditional shiftability theories of bank liquidity as it assumes that banks 
during normal times extend loans to companies that can repay their instalments on time 
based on their historical relationship with the bank. Most of these firms have good 
management that incur profits and have contingency plans to meet short-term liquidity needs 
(Prochnow, 1949). According to this theory, loans will be paid off in a series of instalments, 
ensuring a steady stream of funds for the bank that can use them to cover their liquidity 
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needs. Furthermore, banks can sell these loans in the secondary markets if they face liquidity 
shortages (Alshatti, 2015). 
Consequently, it may be concluded that banks could rely on one of these theories or a 
combination of them to manage their earning assets, investments and liquidity positions. 
However, if liquidity shortages were a widespread phenomenon, the lenders of last resort, 
or central banks, could provide banks with liquidity in order to face large withdrawals 
(Prochnow, 1949). The theory of anticipated income has some drawbacks as it could be 
considered as a technique to examine the creditworthiness of customers and yet this theory 
fails to meet emergency cash requirements. Most of the theories above have focused on 
managing banking activities from the asset side and have not focused on managing liquidity 
needs through creating more liabilities on the balance sheet. Liability management theory, 
however, stresses the importance of the liability side in meeting banks’ liquidity needs, as 
discussed in the following section. 
4.2.1.1.4 Liability Management Theory 
Liability management theory has affected loan portfolios of commercial banks as it was 
founded when banks were under strong pressures when demand was growing for loans and 
these banks saw unparalleled growth in deposits (Emmanuel, 1997). Commercial banks can 
meet their liquidity needs by creating extra liabilities against them using various sources. 
These sources comprise borrowing from the central bank, issuing certificates of deposit 
(CDs), borrowing from other commercial banks etc. Therefore, liability management theory 
stresses the need for banks to shift their attention to the liability side of the balance sheet 
rather than just focusing on having high quality liquid assets (Alshatti, 2015). Liability 
management has been viewed as a major banking innovation and, as such, has significantly 
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influenced the outlook of bankers. Therefore, Emmanuel (as cited in Alshatti, 2015) states 
“banks can satisfy liquidity needs by borrowing in the money and capital markets. The 
fundamental contribution of this theory was to consider both sides of a bank’s balance sheet 
as sources of liquidity”. This theory only focuses on the liabilities side of the balance sheet 
and on the capital markets and their effects on the liquidity of financial institutions. The 
main resource that conventional banking relies on is time certificates of deposits; however, 
in times of crisis, money markets’ interest rates will increase due to the increased demand 
for liquidity, which limits the supply of certificate of deposits (Kusy & Ziemba, 1986).  
Furthermore, liability management theory has concluded that banks may construct extra 
liabilities through borrowing from the central bank or other financial institutions, which 
helps banks to acquire liquidity to fulfil their prerequisites. However, these borrowing 
sources are considered more costly than borrowing from different sources. Moreover, 
commercial banks may acquire more financing through raising capital, which secures them 
from various types of unsecured risks, depending on the costs of constructing liabilities to 
finance their operations from other resources. The volume of capital is relative to the net 
worth of resources, denoting the edge by which resources exceed liabilities (Saunders & 
Thomas, 1997). 
 Commercial banks should not depend on interbank markets to resolve their liquidity 
shortages as market rates are influenced by monetary policy operations and the mediation 
of central banks (Saunders & Thomas, 1997). A bank may have adequate resources to back 
its liabilities, and sufficient capital power, deposits and different liabilities, and through 
settling spreads between the interest payment assets and the cost of acquired assets to encase 
their common costs (Kusy & Ziemba, 1986). This creates a financial stream in the 
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conventional course of commercial banking as banks with adequate capital and sufficient 
funds that cover the liquidity demand have the ability to manage their liquidity holdings to 
avoid shortages or an overabundance liquidity. In this regard, a more balanced approach has 
been found, which focusses on the structure of both sides of the balance sheet, as discussed 
in the section below. 
4.2.1.1.5 The Ladder Approach 
The balance sheet structure could be considered a main factor that contributes to managing 
liquidity in financial institutions (Chaplin, et al., 2000). Accordingly, funding liquidity and 
liquidity conditions in the market are major factors in determining how banks manage their 
liquidity, as they have to be in a good position with enough liquidity to meet short-term 
obligations when they fall due through borrowing from the market or through liquidating 
some of the liquid assets in their portfolios. Banks’ operations impact the level of liquidity 
needed by banks as they specialize in areas that determine their cash flows. Banks that focus 
on lending activities are more prone to liquidity shortages and should have adequate buffers 
to face future liquidity needs. 
Accordingly, banks should pay more attention to both sides of their balance sheet and 
determine its structure through matching their assets and liabilities through comparing cash 
flows and time horizons (De Haan & Van den End, 2013). In addition, banks need to assess 
existing conditions and market potential of the expected behaviour of maturity for their 
assets and liability positions and take whatever steps are necessary to meet their unexpected 
liquidity needs. Liquidity risks stem from various resources related to day-to day operations 
with regards to lending and trading activities (Chorafas, 2007). Inability to meet their 
obligations will render a bank in default (Drehmann, 2013). Accordingly, banks are 
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responsible for ensuring the availability of funding to meet expected and unexpected future 
obligations without affecting their daily operations or the financial position of the 
institution, which is known as liquidity risk funding, over a specific horizon with reasonable 
costs (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008; Drehmann, 2013; Vento & La 
Ganga, 2009). 
4.2.1.2 The Evolution of Liquidity Management Theories 
Theoretical frameworks emerged to facilitate discussion of the role of the banking system 
in the economy. These have focused on the banking industry within a macroeconomic 
framework in order to explain macroeconomic phenomena and the dynamic interactions 
between economic agents’ behaviour, commercial banks and money supply. Liquidity risk 
management theories have highlighted the use of money in day-to-day activity, as a store of 
value and for speculation purposes (Keynes, 1936). Also, they have set many factors that 
affect economic agents’ choice to hold money at banks such as transactions costs, interest 
rates (Meltzer, 1963), ‘precautionary purposes’ (Whalen, 1966), etc. However, these 
theories have not focused on profit maximisation for commercial banks and how these banks 
manage their liquidity. 
Later, some theories emerged to explain how commercial banks operate within the context 
of ALM (Baumol, 1954). These theories suggested liquidity management strategies. 
Following the commercial loan theory, banks were focused on short-term, self-liquidating 
loans to ensure the availability of liquidity to meet their needs. Financing short-term loans 
allows banks to have high liquid earning assets and be capable of meeting their demand-
deposit liabilities. The shift ability theory represented an extension of the previous 
theoretical literature through recognizing that liquid assets could be used to meet liquidity 
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needs (Klein, 1971) through banks shifting their assets by selling them to more liquid banks 
in the secondary market before they matured. Banks could have enough liquidity through 
having readily marketable securities that could be converted to cash in normal conditions 
(Udoka, 2012). Also, it assumes that assets need not be linked with self-liquidating bills and 
held in other shiftable open-market assets, such as government securities (Moti, et al., 2012). 
The anticipated income theory suggested that borrower’s expected income is one of the 
major determinants for instalment amounts to loan payments. Banks that have high quality 
management could include a certain amount of loan investments that are expected to be 
liquidated in line with the abovementioned theories or through a combination of them. In 
the case of large withdrawals from the banking system, the central banks may intervene 
through ensuring the availability of liquidity for banks (Prochnow, 1949). 
Liability management theory includes commercial banks’ ability to fulfil their liquidity 
needs by borrowing in the capital and money markets (Alshatti, 2015). This requires 
available sources of liquidity to be matched to expected needs. However, the importance of 
balance sheet structure for financial institutions’ viability in turn stresses the importance of 
matching assets and liabilities over set time horizons. Banks need to assess the impact of 
current and potential market conditions on the predictable behaviour for their asset and 
liability positions and take any necessary steps to meet their unexpected liquidity needs. 
These theories highlighted many important factors that affect liquidity management and 
could increase the levels of liquidity risk that may stem from various resources related to 
day-to day operations with regards to lending and trading activities (Chorafas, 2007). The 
potential match between both sides of the balance sheet in terms of maturity and sensitivity 
to interest rates minimises liquidity and interest rate risks (Zawalinska, 1999; Belete, 2013). 
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Figure 26: Liquidity Management Theories21 
The main concern of the above-mentioned theories is to ensure the viability of the banking 
sector through analysing balance sheet operations and increasing banks’ effectiveness in 
mitigating risks. These theories have focused on preserving enough liquidity in banks 
through encouraging them to focus on their short-term operations through self-liquidating 
loans to ensure the availability of liquidity, structuring their loan payments according to the 
expected cash flows of their borrowers rather than the offered collateral, having readily 
                                            
21 This figure depicts the evolution of liquidity management theories and their main focus as some of these theories 
focused on managing banks operations on the assets side whereas others have focused on managing the liability 
side. The ladder approach suggests matching assets and liabilities within time horizons to mitigate liquidity risk.  
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marketable securities that could be converted to cash in normal conditions (Udoka, 2012), 
borrowing from capital markets, and matching their assets and liability positions to meet 
their unexpected liquidity needs. The next section presents a survey of the recent empirical 
literature about liquidity risk. 
4.2.2 Empirical Literature 
Recent literature investigated the impact of internal factors on liquidity at banks while taking 
into account other external factors. Some studies indicated that internal factors are the 
dominant variables that affects liquidity at banks, while other external factors such as the 
macroeconomic environment had limited or no impact on liquidity risk (Roman & Sargu, 
2015; Zaghdoudi & Hakimi, 2017; Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 2015). These results points to 
the importance of the individual characteristics and the role of management. On the other 
hand other studies focused on key sources of vulnerability for liquidity funding (Pagratis, et 
al., 2017) and how banks seek to mitigate the impact of mismatches on their performance 
(Bessis, 2010; Bonfim & Kim, 2012). 
The following section will discuss the existing empirical literature that has investigated the 
relationship between liquidity risk and other bank-specific factors. The surveyed empirical 
literature can be segmented into two main streams: one that focuses on the analysis of banks 
in multiple country studies, and the other that places emphasis on the examination of banks 
in single country studies. The main findings of these studies were that bank-specific factors, 
i.e. internal factors, have a major impact on liquidity risk faced by banks, as shown below. 
After surveying the existing literature, the researcher found that only a handful of studies 
have incorporated Jordan in their study samples due the limited availability of data for the 
country. Those that covered Jordan reported the low financial complexity in its financial 
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markets, and the conventional methods that commercial banks in Jordan employ in setting 
their strategies (Almumani, 2013). However, the literature on the determinants of liquidity 
risk for Jordanian banks is relatively scarce, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
the empirical research available was mostly focused on the case of the advanced economies 
(Roman & Sargu, 2015).  
4.2.2.1 Liquidity risk 
The survival of banking institutions in the current financial system depends mainly on their 
ability to meet their contractual obligations by ensuring the fulfilment of their needs of cash, 
liquid assets and collateral through synchronizing their funding resources in ordinary and 
crisis conditions (Federal Reserve, D.B.S.R., 1994). The liquidity of an asset depends on its 
convertibility and speed of conversion to cash with no or little loss (Nader, 2002). Thus, 
liquidity risk is the uncertainty surrounding the speed and availability of convertibility of an 
asset in a functional market in which there is active trading in the asset. The potential loss 
for the institution arises from its inability to meet its obligations when they fall due without 
incurring high costs.  
Accordingly, liquidity risk stems from the inability of firms to raise funds to meet their 
financing needs, or from their inability to execute transactions at prevailing market prices 
due to a lack of appetite among other market parties. This risk can adversely affect a bank’s 
earnings and capital. Thus, banks must ensure the availability of funds to face the demands 
of their depositors and borrowers at an acceptable cost. Liquidity risk is considered one of 
the main threats for financial institutions and their stability; therefore, liquidity buffers are 
crucial for liquidity risk management and to insulate these institutions against liquidity 
shocks (Khan, et al., 2017). 
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However, the vulnerability of the banking system to liquidity risk can be summarized 
through their main role, which focuses on using short-term funds and transforming them 
into long-term loans. Employing stress test scenarios for liquidity risk at US commercial 
banks amid the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, Pagratis et al. (2017) identified key 
sources of funding vulnerabilities, and concluded that large time deposits are the dominant 
funding vulnerability, whereas government securities largely support other classes of liquid 
assets. Consequently, banks should focus on managing their liquidity to enable them to meet 
their obligations as they fall due without incurring unacceptable losses (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2008). Many studies have defined liquidity risk as the ability of 
financial institutions to meet and settle their obligations as they come due (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2008; Chorafas, 2007; Federal Reserve, D.B.S.R., 1994; 
Drehmann, 2013; Choudhry, 2011; Vento & La Ganga, 2009).  
The ability of a bank to meet its obligations depends on the condition of the macroeconomic 
environment, the financial sector and entity specifics (Choudhry, 2011). Further, liquidity 
risks stem from various resources related to day-to day operations with regards to lending 
and trading activities (Chorafas, 2007). Therefore, the inability of these institutions to meet 
their obligations will render the bank in default (Drehmann, 2013). Accordingly, banks are 
committed to ensuring the availability of funding to cover expected and contingent future 
obligations without affecting their day to day operations or financial position, which is 
known as liquidity risk funding, over a specific horizon with reasonable costs (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008; Drehmann, 2013; Vento & La Ganga, 2009). 
The above-mentioned definitions have illustrated that there are three main sources of 
liquidity risks that could affect banks, namely: systemic risk, idiosyncratic risk, and 
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technical risk. Systemic risk can be attributed to market-wide risk, and under this category 
fall all external risk factors to the bank, such as market disturbances, lack of central bank 
funding or failure of the market mechanism in turning assets into cash. Individual or 
idiosyncratic risk is attributable to internal factors in the bank such as poor management, 
the disclosure of high losses or the loss of trust by clients, which reduces the bank’s ability 
to refinance its obligations and attract new ones. The technical risk can be created through 
the timing of the bank’s cash flows, i.e. when liquidity is available at the bank. Commercial 
banks could have large inflows in distant periods. However, in the short term, banks may 
have significant outflows that outweigh their liquidity buffers, and this creates mismatches 
in the cash flows (Adalsteinsson, 2014).  
Accordingly, banking activities with regards to funds management and maturity 
transformation is important for the process of liquidity risk (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; 
Rajan & Bird, 2003). Mismatches between assets and liabilities’ maturities create mismatch 
gaps, which constitute structural risks that are determined by the nature of funding resources 
and lending policies. As a result, banks are continually seeking to match their assets’ 
maturities with their short-term and medium-term funding resources. Such dependency 
presents the taxonomy of liquidity risk (Bessis, 2010; Bonfim & Kim, 2012). To manage 
liquidity risk, banks tend to maintain liquidity buffers that are comprised of market liquid 
assets in order to anticipate and meet liquidity demand within a reasonable timeframe. Thus, 
banks and other deposit-taking institutions tend to benefit from pooling liquidity to a large 
group of depositors (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). However, researchers cannot observe 
banks’ exposures to liquidity risk directly, but it is possible to perceive their structure, 
operations and changes in their liquidity buffers, which allows for the prediction of the 
manner in which internal and market factors affect their liquidity buffers. 
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4.2.2.2 Bank-specific Factors 
Sources of liquidity risk indicate that internal factors that contribute to commercial banks’ 
performance have a major impact on the management of their liquidity (Roman & Sargu, 
2015; Zaghdoudi & Hakimi, 2017). For example, some researchers indicated that the 
internal determinants of banks impact their liquidity risk, regardless of the liquidity risk 
measure that is adopted or the country in which it is operating. (Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 
2015). Accordingly, the individual characteristics are the bank-specific factors of the bank, 
which affect its performance. These factors are influenced by internal decisions adopted by 
the banks’ senior management. Consequently, controlling these factors is within the remit 
of the management board and differs from bank to bank according to their strategies, 
policies and procedures. These factors include the level of capitalization, credit and deposit 
portfolios’ composition, size, interest rates, management quality, bank size, profitability, 
concentration, disclosure and others. Empirical literature shows various approaches for 
approximating bank performance through using financial ratios for profitability or more 
complex measures such as composite indices to measure the effects of these factors on 
liquidity risk (Dang, 2011). The following sub-sections will discuss the main internal factors 
that are affected by liquidity risk, namely: profitability, credit risk, bank size, capital, and 
other factors such as quality of management.  
4.2.2.2.1 Profitability 
There is a large body of literature that investigates the factors that affect commercial banks’ 
profitability. The empirical studies on bank profitability have focused on specific countries 
(e.g. Berger, 1995; Angbazo, 1997; Barajas et al., 1999; Kosmidou, 2008; Naceur, 2003; 
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Badola & Verma, 2006; Heffernan & Fu, 2010; Lui & Wilson, 2010). 22 In addition, 
important studies have emphasized analysis of multiple countries (Bonner, et al., 2015; 
Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010; Barth, et al., 2003; 
Molyneux & Thornton, 1992; Bourke, 1989; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999). However, 
the main focus of these studies was bank profitability as a measure of performance, and 
these studies also tried to deduce the main factors that impact profitability. This section 
focuses on the empirical literature that has investigated the influence of bank profitability 
on liquidity risk.  
Empirical evidence shows that liquidity risk has a mixed influence on bank profitability 
depending on the type of financial model the banks operate. These findings may be 
attributable to the banks’ capital structure as greater bank capital reduces liquidity creation 
(Diamond & Rajan, 2000). For example, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) studied the main 
determinants of bank performances across 18 European countries over 1986 to 1989 and 
found an inverse significant relationship between profitability and liquidity holdings, 
measured by cash, deposits and securities as a percentage of total assets as liquidity holdings 
represent cost to banks. Furthermore, Bourke (1989) studied individual characteristics and 
exogenous determinants of profitability in 12 countries in Europe, North America and 
Australia, and found a significant positive relationship between liquidity and bank 
profitability. These results are counter-intuitive as profitability would result from a rise in 
the risk appetite and employing available resources to increase lending, which would result 
in a decline in the level of liquidity holdings at banks. Therefore, it could be explained that 
                                            
22 These studies have focused on the following countries: the US, Colombia, Greece, Tunisia, India, China and 
Japan. 
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higher profitability tends to attract more depositors due to the bank’s strong financial 
position, which increases the amount of available resources, hence liquidity holdings.  
Moreover, other studies have indicated the existence of a negative effect between liquidity 
and profitability. For instance, Barth et al. (2003) studied a large sample of banks across 55 
countries, and focused on the impact of banks’ supervision structure, scope and autonomy 
on banks’ profitability. Their results illustrated the existence of a relatively weak influence 
of supervision on the profitability of banks and an adverse effect of liquidity on profitability 
measured by return on assets. 
Kosmidou (2008) studied the determinants of banks’ profitability in Greece during the 
period 1990-2002, and found that the liquidity ratio is negatively related to return on average 
assets (ROAA). In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) studied various banks 
(1,334 banks) from 101 countries over the period 1995-2007 and concluded that banks’ 
income and funding strategies could be determined simultaneously. Their results indicated 
that a higher non-interest income or non-deposit funding share evokes materially higher 
bank risk, but it is difficult to establish the impact of either variable on the ROA due to 
endogeneity concerns. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence in the literature suggests that banks with high liquidity 
holdings tend to have lower interest rate margins. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
studied a sample of a large number of countries (80 countries) during the period 1988-1995 
and found that interest margin differences and bank profitability reflects individual 
characteristics and that funding resources, including customers’ deposits and short-term 
funding do not have a significant impact on net interest margins despite the fact that it lowers 
banks’ profitability.  
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Furthermore, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) concluded that the liquidity ratio 
negatively affects ROA and positively affects NIM when banks are facing increasing costs 
due to reserve requirements and restrictions set by supervisory authorities on lending 
through credit and macro-prudential measures. In addition, indirect costs are responsible for 
lowering net interest income. Also, Wójcik-Mazur and Szajt (2015) used a dataset of 19 
advanced economies’ commercial banks in 1994-2006 to research the causes of liquidity 
risk and found a long-term relationship between liquidity risk and the interest rate margin 
ratio. They attributed it to the impact of lending activities of commercial banks on the 
margin increase. However, they found a positive insignificant short-term relationship 
between these variables. The reason behind that is the level of the lending activity; the 
greater credit growth may result in a significant increase in NIM.  
However, in the longer term, banks would require additional financing resources, which 
would increase the costs incurred by banks. However, their magnitude is smaller than the 
outcome generated, which does not lower the margin but makes the relationship statistically 
insignificant. Moreover, Wójcik-Mazur and Szajt (2015) found a negative significant 
impact between liquidity risk and the total asset return rate, which suggests that financing 
the increasing lending activity requires the search for additional financing sources, with 
costs higher than traditional deposits. These results are similar to some past studies (e.g., 
Barth et al., 2003; Kosmidou, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Sufian & Chong, 
2008). Moreover, Pagratis et al. (2017) investigated the relationship between profitability 
and liquidity risk in the US using quarterly data from 2002 up to the financial crisis 
(2002:Q1–2009:Q1). They found that some banks can face some restrictions in accessing 
wholesale funding due to their size, which implies that small banks aim for higher interest 
rate margins compared to larger banks due to their higher dependence on net interest income 
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as a main factor that constitutes the majority of their profits. Others concluded that size has 
no effect on profitability (Athanasoglou, et al., 2008). Please refer to Appendix 3 Table 38, 
which summarizes the main studies that investigated the effects of profitability on liquidity 
risk. 
4.2.2.2.2 Credit risk 
Although a large body of literature has investigated the mutual impact between credit 
and liquidity risks, few studies, to the best of my knowledge, have analysed the interactions 
between those risks and their effects on commercial bank financial ratios over time. 
Moreover, there is no theoretical consensus on a certain model that reflects how these risks 
should interact with each other (Imbierowicz & Rauch, 2014). However, the influence of 
credit risk is considered the main determinant of bank lending behaviour. Credit risk arises 
when a bank’s customers fail to meet their obligations. Thus, a rise in customer defaults will 
put pressure on banks’ capital and decrease their risk appetite. Therefore, credit risk is 
associated with negative bank lending growth. Accordingly, banks can lend more credit to 
risky borrowers if they improve the way of managing their credit risk. Therefore, the 
advantage of improving banks’ risk management abilities is that it may result in greater 
credit availability instead of reducing overall risk in the banking system. 
Some researchers have indicated that equilibrium in loan markets depends on banks’  credit 
rationing behaviour based on borrowers’ probability of repayment and the riskiness of loans 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). This supports the empirical findings that greater exposure to credit 
risk reduces banks’ willingness to grant loans as banks may suffer from higher loan losses 
if the increase was due to a shift in credit supply (Keeton, 1999). Other studies emphasized 
these findings and found a modest effect of bank capital ratio changes on lending 
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(Berrospide & Edge, 2010). Moreover, the appetite for risk could be considered a crucial 
determinant for banks’ lending behaviour. The increase in long-term interest rates could 
change the risk appetite which would restructure banks’ balance sheets by moving away 
from government securities to increase their lending to the private sector (Peersman, 2011). 
These findings suggest the importance of setting banks’ credit risk exposures and the need 
for monitoring lending activity as such exposures have a major impact on liquidity holdings. 
The impact of credit risk on liquidity risk is positive in most of the surveyed empirical 
literature. Roman and Sargu (2015) indicated that impaired loans have a negative impact on 
liquidity, which is one of the major internal factors in the CEE countries.23 Other researchers 
investigated the effects of credit risk on liquidity indicators and some concluded that they 
have a significant impact. For example, Roulet (2018) gathered a sample of European 
commercial banks from 22 countries over the period 2008-2015 and found that liquidity 
ratios have positive but perverse effects on bank-lending-growth. These findings back the 
necessity for factoring in the heterogeneous characteristics of commercial banks before 
imposing new regulations.  
Furthermore, Roulet (2018) concluded that liquidity, measured by the ratio of the non-
required amount of stable funding to total assets, has a positive impact on European banks’ 
lending activity growth. However, it has a negative impact on retail extended credit. 
Moreover, European banks could decrease their exposure to credit retail lending when they 
are under pressure through having sufficient buffers. This result is consistent with a low 
interest rate environment, which is similar to the period after the Global Financial Crisis. 
                                            
23 CEE countries include: Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. 
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Also, Roulet (2018) pointed out that funding structures are an important factor in banks’ 
lending activities as the results indicated that the ratio of available stable funding to total 
assets (liquidity measure) had an insignificant impact on banks’ lending activities. 
Diamond and Rajan (2005) showed that the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk is positive. 
The authors concluded that if banks fund many projects with loans, they (the banks) could 
not meet depositors’ demands, which may trigger them to claim their funds’ back if their 
assets’ value have declined significantly. This implies that liquidity risk and credit risk 
increase simultaneously. Other researchers studied the reciprocal relationship between 
credit risk and liquidity risk. For example, Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) investigated 
the relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk for Iranian banks during the period 
2005-2012 and concluded that credit risk and liquidity risk have a positive and significant 
impact on each other.  
On the other hand, Ejoh et al. (2014) surveyed a sample of 80 respondents (banks) in Nigeria 
to assess the degree to which the impact of credit risk and liquidity risk influences the 
probability of bank defaults risk among deposit money banks. They concluded that there is 
a significant positive impact between credit risk and liquidity risk which illustrates that an 
increase in non-performing loans (credit risk) causes a bank to be more illiquid. Also, 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) investigated the relationship between credit risk and 
liquidity risk using a sample of US commercial banks data for the period from Q1 1998 to 
Q3 2010. They concluded that there is no economically meaningful relationship between 
liquidity risk and credit risk. However, the study found that the interaction between liquidity 
risk and credit risk increases the probability of default among banks, which calls for joint 
management of liquidity risk and credit risk in banks. 
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Wójcik-Mazur and Szajt (2015) analysed the determinants of liquidity risk for nineteen 
advanced economies’ commercial banks and concluded the existence of a negative 
relationship between liquidity measures and credit risk both in the long and short term. This 
implies the cyclical nature of liquidity risk as the strong increase of lending activity in 
relation to the volume of acquired deposits is accompanied by the decrease in credit risk. 
However, others argued that there is little evidence to support any reliable effect of liquidity 
risk and credit risks in US commercial banks. For example, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) 
analysed the relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk for US commercial banks 
during 1998-2010, and they concluded that both risk categories do not have an economically 
meaningful reciprocal contemporaneous or time-lagged relationship. However, they found 
that the relationship has an influence on default probability. The dynamism between credit 
and liquidity risks depends on the characteristics of the bank and accordingly could decrease 
the risk of default.  
Also, Kim and Sohn (2017) used data for commercial banks in the US during the period 
1993-2010 to investigate the effects of banks’ capital on extending loans that are reliant on 
liquidity levels. The researchers found that banks with a higher capital structure could affect 
banks’ lending positively, as measured by the growth rate of net loans and unused 
commitments, and are often related to larger banks with sufficient liquidity, especially 
during the Global Financial Crisis. Consequently, banks’ capital could have a positive 
impact on banks’ credit but only if the bank has sufficient liquidity buffers. 
Credit risk, liquidity and capital interrelations have been investigated in the GCC countries. 
For instance, in a study by Ghosh (2016), a data sample that covers the period of 1996-2012 
was used. From the findings, the author concluded that banks with higher liquidity ratios 
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tend to have lower loan growth rates. This effect had increased during the global financial 
crisis, which implies that credit risk and liquidity risk are positively related. His analysis 
illustrates that smaller banks tend to hoard more liquidity in response to higher loan portfolio 
risk. This finding is consistent with Kashyap and Stein (2000) who reported that small banks 
require higher high-quality liquid asset buffers due to frictions and higher costs of accessing 
uninsured wholesale funding.  
However, other views can be found in the empirical literature showing that after the global 
financial crisis, liquidity had an impact on bank lending as more strict liquidity requirements 
were set by regulatory authorities on banks. These requirements reduced the commercial 
banks’ lending activities, especially when economic conditions saw monetary policy ease 
with a zero lower bound in interest rates and low interest rates on government bonds (Berger 
& Bouwman, 2009). Please refer to Appendix 3 Table 39, which summarizes the main 
studies that investigated the effects of credit risk on liquidity risk among banks in multiple 
countries. 
4.2.2.2.3 Bank size 
The size of a financial institution has been widely used in empirical literature as a proxy for 
its importance (Kosmidou, et al., 2017). Some studies have expressed that size is a crude 
measure for the exposure of the firm to the financial system (Cahan, 1992). Bank size is a 
control variable that is widely used to control for differences in firm size, and many 
researchers have included bank size as a variable when studying liquidity determinants 
explicitly as bank failures could be associated with their size.  
Liquidity risk varies depending on bank size (Berger & Bouwman, 2009), and some studies 
have focused on the effect of bank size on performance. Accordingly, Berger and Bouwman 
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(2009) found that the effects of bank size have two different signs depending on the market 
structure and the regulatory and operational frameworks in each country (Asiri, 2007; Ali, 
et al., 2011; Belete, 2013; Laurine, 2013). Roman and Sargu (2015) examined the effects of 
bank-specific factors on liquidity risk for the period 2004-2011 in the CEE countries. These 
results illustrate that the effects of these factors on overall liquidity are divergent. 
Accordingly, large banks will attract more clients and increase their liquid assets using the 
crowding-in effect. 
Studies that have focused on the determinants of liquidity buffers at commercial banks 
added another dimension related to the existence of liquidity regulations. For example, 
Aspachs et al. (2005), Agénor et al. (2004) and Delechat et al. (2012) concluded that there 
is a negative effect between liquidity buffers and bank size. Larger liquidity buffers should 
be sought by smaller banks as they have higher funding costs (Kashyap & Stein, 2000); on 
the other hand, larger banks’ overall liquidity needs may be relatively lower as they face 
lower funding costs, which promotes them as a safe haven to avoid times of high 
uncertainties and systemic risks (Gatev & Strahan, 2006). Nonetheless, larger banks face 
liquidity risks that stem from different sources, which are regulated by supervisory 
authorities (Acharya & Merrouche, 2012).  
Other studies have concluded that liquidity ratios have a positive relationship with size and 
capital. For instance, Vodova (2011) studied the causes of liquidity risk using 22 banks 
during 2006-2009, and found that large banks have lower liquidity targets as they rely on 
the government and the lender of last resort in the case of shortages. These views support 
the notion that large banks may induce moral hazard behaviour that causes them to bear 
excessive risks, with the anticipation that the authorities will bail them out given that the 
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regulators may be reluctant to close them (Farhi & Tirole, 2012). Also, large banks that 
engage in multiple activities could be translated into higher systemic risks due to the low 
quality of management and low governance. Thus, systemic risk could be greater with the 
increase of bank size. Relevantly, Laeven et al. (2016) studied the systemic risk of large 
banks during the recent financial crisis to identify bank-specific factors that determine risk 
using a sample of 412 deposit-taking institutions from 56 countries. They found strong 
evidence that systemic risk increases with bank size. 
Bank size effects have been investigated in relation to the credit channel. For instance, 
Domac and Ferri (1999) examined whether East Asian countries24 were suffering from a 
credit crunch after the Asian crisis in 1997, and they concluded that the credit crunch was 
negatively affecting East Asian economies, particularly small-sized banks and enterprises 
as they were facing tighter constraints accessing credit markets. Also, Bonner et al. (2015) 
used data from nearly 7,000 banks from 30 OECD countries for the period 1998-2007 and 
found that the relationship between bank liquidity buffers and bank size is affected by 
liquidity regulations that are imposed by supervisory authorities on liquidity, which 
indicates that these regulations act as a substitute for bank liquidity management. These 
results are similar to DeYoung and Jang (2016) who used data on US commercial banks for 
the period 1992-2012 and concluded that larger banks tend to have lower liquidity targets 
than smaller banks but manage these targets more efficiently, given that most of these banks 
are large in size and that he liquidity costs for their bailouts are considered substantial 
(Gorton & Huang, 2002). 
                                            
24 East Asian countries include: Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  
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The effects of bank size on performance have received considerable attention in recent 
debates. In this regard, Hughes and Mester (2013) investigated the effects of bank size on 
performance through the scale economies. In their study, they used data from 842 top-tier 
bank holding companies in the United States in 2007 and found evidence that economies of 
scale exist at smaller banks and are even larger at large banks. They attributed their findings 
to technological advantages such as diversification and the spreading of information costs 
and other costs that do not increase proportionately with size. Bank size, through economies 
of scale, may influence the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency, as banks that 
are described as efficient can produce more output parts, which include liquid and other 
assets. 
Meanwhile, Altunbas et al. (2007) studied the relationship between capital, risk and 
efficiency for a large sample of European banks between 1992 and 2000. They concluded 
that loan loss reserves and loan growth are inversely linked, and that the size of bank affects 
the level of their riskiness – large commercial banks appear to be less risky than their smaller 
counterparts, while bigger efficient and inefficient banks also seem to have lower loan-loss 
reserve levels. Also, they found that banks with higher capital and liquidity levels have more 
exposure to various risks, which confirms the need for regulators to encourage banks to hold 
more capital and liquidity to cover their risks. 
Kim and Sohn (2017) reported that the effects of bank capital on lending differ depending 
upon the level of bank liquidity across bank sizes; their results showed that liquidity ratios’ 
coefficients are statistically significant and that the size effect is negative, which indicates 
that small banks focus on traditional lending activities to the non-financial sector, and 
therefore supply lending relatively more willingly than large banks do. Their results suggest 
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that large and medium banks rely on market funding to finance their lending activities while 
small banks face some impediments in accessing market funding. Please refer to Appendix 
3 Table 40, which summarizes the main studies that investigated the effects of bank size on 
liquidity risk among banks in multiple countries. 
4.2.2.2.4 Capital 
The implementation of the Basel I & II accords increased investigations into the capital rules 
introduced, the role of capital on banking performance, and lending activities. With the 
breakout of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the Basel committee introduced liquidity 
assessment measures and tightened capital adequacy rules in order to ensure banks’ viability 
and achieve financial stability (Ben Naceur & Roulet, 2017). Systemic risks were at the 
heart of the debates after the Global Financial Crisis; capital ratios, bank size and liquidity 
management are considered the main determinants of risks within the banking sector. Large 
banks were at the centre of these debates as they tend to have lower capital ratios, less stable 
funding, and more exposure to potentially risky market-based activities (Laeven, et al., 
2014). The Basel III accord address liquidity risk in banks using LCR and NSFR ratios.  
Several researchers supported the view that large banks contribute to systemic risk as they 
tend to engage in risky activities that are financed with short-term debt, which makes them 
more vulnerable to liquidity shocks and shortages (Kashyap, et al., 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 
2010). However, Laeven et al. (2016), using a sample of 412 deposit-taking institutions 
from 56 countries, found evidence that systemic risk is lower in more capitalized banks, 
with the effects particularly more pronounced for large banks. Also, Banerjee and Mio 
(2017) used data on UK banks to study the effects of liquidity regulation on banks’ balance 
sheets. They found evidence that well-capitalized banks experience stronger growth in their 
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balance sheets, accumulate less high-quality liquid assets, make efficient use of short-term 
intra financial loans, and have healthier growth in their non-financial sector lending 
portfolios.  
Others have concluded that capital regulations have a negative impact on bank performance 
and liquidity ratios. For example, Roulet (2018) used data on commercial banks in Europe 
to investigate the impact of the new Basel III capital and liquidity regulations on bank 
lending. The evidence supported that capital ratios have a significant negative impact on 
large European retail lending growth and other types of lending over the post-2008 financial 
crisis period.  
Kim and Sohn (2017) used a sample of quarterly observations of insured US commercial 
banks to examine whether the effect of bank capital on lending differs depending upon the 
level of bank liquidity. They indicated that a positive impact of capital can be noticed on 
credit growth rates but only for large banks. This link was significant during the period of 
the Global Financial Crisis. Accordingly, researchers stressed the positive impact of capital 
on credit only when banks have sufficient buffers. The coefficients of capital ratios with 
credit growth are dependent on banking size. The results were insignificant for large banks, 
but significant and positive for medium and small banks. 
The impact of the new Basel III capital and liquidity regulations has been thoroughly 
investigated following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Ben Naceur and Roulet (2017) used 
a data sample from 23 countries, mostly developed, over the period of 2008–2015. Their 
results indicated that capital ratios do not have a significant effect on credit growth at 
European banks, but capital regulatory measures represented by Tier I and Tier II have a 
significant negative impact on European banks’ credit growth. However, they found that 
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capital ratios have a significant negative impact on credit growth at US banks. Moreover, 
the study found a positive impact of liquidity ratios, measured by the non-required amount 
of stable funding to total assets, on credit growth in both European and US banks. Their 
findings indicate that banks tend to hold liquidity buffers and increase their holdings of 
liquid assets when they expand their risky activities to avoid liquidity shortages, and 
improving their ability to absorb risks. 
Also, Vodova (2011) used a set of data from 22 banks during 2006-2009 to investigate the 
causes of liquidity risk. The results indicate that liquidity does not increase with bank size 
– in fact, they indicated that large banks have lower liquidity ratios as they rely more on the 
lender of last resort, the central bank, in case the bank is facing pressures that threaten its 
viability. On the other hand, increases in capital adequacy have a positive impact on bank 
liquidity. Bonner et al. (2015) studied the determinants of liquidity holdings using a large 
sample of commercial banks, and they found that an increase in the capital ratio increases 
banks’ liquidity holdings. Furthermore, capital has moderate effects on a financial 
institution’s liquidity buffers as the presence of liquidity regulations neutralizes most of the 
bank and country-specific factors that affect the size of commercial banks’ liquidity buffers. 
Laeven et al. (2016) studied the systemic risk of large banks during the recent financial crisis 
to identify bank-specific factors that determine risk using a sample of 412 deposit-taking 
institutions from 56 countries. Their results validate the Basel approach of addressing 
systemic risks through capital surcharges rather than activity restrictions or liquidity tools 
as bank capital has a greater impact on systemic risks than bank funding or activities.  
Pagratis et al. (2017) investigated the relationship between profitability and liquidity risk in 
the US using quarterly data from 2002 up to the financial crisis (Q1 2002 to Q1 2009). They 
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found that the capital adequacy target is higher for smaller banks as they have a larger Tier 
I ratio than large banks. Also, they found that precautionary high-liquid assets are crucial 
for maturity transformation; however, they have low yield, which reduces banks’ 
profitability. Please refer to Appendix 3 Table 41, which summarizes the main studies that 
investigated the effects of bank capital on liquidity risk among banks in multiple countries. 
 4.2.2.2.5 Other internal Factors 
Other internal factors that affect liquidity management in commercial banks have been 
thoroughly discussed in the recent literature. For example, Almeida et al. (2004) illustrated 
that firms with higher financial constraints hoard more liquid assets. Therefore, the inability 
to access funding for firms may hinder banks through increasing their assets as they will 
have higher credit constraints. Thus, Delechat et al. (2012) found that financial development 
and management quality impact liquidity levels positively. Recently, many financial crises 
were caused by uncertainty over a bank’s solvency, which stressed the importance of banks’ 
disclosure requirements to complement regulation (Bonner, et al., 2015). 
Ratnovski (2013) focused on the importance of transparency within the banking sector as it 
allows banks to attract more funds and face some liquidity withdrawals. However, banks 
should always focus on liquidity requirements and complement them by adopting measures 
to improve access to market and bank transparency. In addition, he found that the 
government could choose to drive banks to adopt more transparency measures through 
decreasing their alternative costs. In addition, he highlighted the need for better corporate 
governance as a means for improving transparency among banks, which may increase the 
effectiveness of liquidity requirements. 
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Other factors that affect the banking industry have been heavily investigated – more 
specifically, concentration in the banking system, which refers to the exposure of banks to 
potentially incurring large losses that may threaten their viability or ability to continue 
operations. Consequently, risk concentration could be on both sides of the balance sheet, in 
the off-balance-sheet items, in the execution of day-to-day activities, or through a 
combination of these factors. Accordingly, the concentration exposure of banks can take 
many forms such as high exposure to an individual counterpart, a group of counterparts, 
specific industry, services …etc. (Basel Committee of Banking & Supervision , 2012).  
Systemic risk increases with a higher degree of bank concentration. Thus, increasing the 
probability of receiving public support, a more concentrated banking sector would be 
associated with lower liquidity buffers as it may lower banks’ incentives for holding 
liquidity. For instance, Repullo (2003) used panel data of 57 UK banks (resident) and 
concluded that strengthening the financial safety net lowers the incentives for banks to hold 
liquid assets. Also, Aspachs et al. (2005) confirmed these results as they showed that the 
increased probability of banks receiving lender of last resort support would decrease their 
liquidity holdings. 
Most of these factors contribute to increasing the efficiency of commercial banks, which 
measures banks’ ability to create income from their assets (ECB, 2010). Their performance 
is considered to have a crucial impact on stakeholders and investors’ decisions 
(Thoraneenitiyan & Avkiran, 2009). However, banking efficiency could be considered an 
unobserved variable as it is hard to measure due to the intangibility of banks’ products and 
services. The cost to income ratio illustrates firms’ ability to generate profits from their 
revenue sources (ECB, 2010). Several studies that have focused on European countries have 
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investigated the main factors that impact banks’ efficiency, and concluded that the 
environment and regulations hinder expansion in banks activities. However, these studies 
found that the regulations improve the cost and profit efficiency of banks (Maudos, et al., 
2002; Dietsch & Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Resti, 1997). Please refer to Appendix 3 Table 42, 
which summarises the main studies that investigated the effects of other factors on liquidity 
risk among banks in multiple countries. 
4.2.3 Linkages between Theories and Empirical Research  
The role of the banking system in the economy has spurred the evolution of theoretical 
frameworks as well as the evolution of empirical research in order to simplify the 
relationship between the internal, macroeconomic, and regulatory factors then to test these 
relationships and quantify their impact on banks’ liquidity positions and exposures. Theories 
emerged on how banks manage their assets and liabilities, suggesting various strategies for 
managing liquidity to ensure the availability of resources (Baumol, 1954). Banks could have 
enough liquidity through having readily marketable securities that could be converted to 
cash in normal conditions (Udoka, 2012). The anticipated income theory focused on the 
importance of timely loan repayments by borrowers as a means for sustaining enough 
liquidity at banks, which is often associated with risk appetite and banks’ willingness to 
grant loans as banks may suffer from higher loan losses if the increase was due to a shift in 
credit supply (Keeton, 1999). The decline in long-term interest rates is another factor that 
could change the risk appetite, which would restructure banks’ balance sheets by moving to 
government securities and decrease their lending exposure to the private sector (Peersman, 
2011). This in turn may result in shifting their assets to maximise their profits while ensuring 
the availability of liquidity in difficult market conditions. These conditions are more 
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applicable to the shiftability theory were banks shift their assets by selling them to more 
liquid banks in the secondary market before maturing. 
Financing operations through short-term debt may prove to incite more vulnerability at 
banks if the gap maturity widens between assets and liabilities. For example, Banerjee & 
Mio (2017) found that banks restructure their assets through increasing their high-quality 
liquid assets while decreasing their short-term financial loans. These measures are also 
compatible with the shiftability theory as well as the conservative nature of the banking 
sector in Jordan, under which its operations are impacted by the cycle of macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Furthermore, the ability of commercial banks to match their assets and 
liabilities through restructuring their maturities while ensuring the availability of liquidity 
for short-term financing at reasonable costs is one of the main factors that contributes to 
banks’ liquidity management. Therefore, funding strategies are determined in parallel with 
banks’ income (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010), which is why the ladder approach is 
relied on heavily to structure both sides of banks’ balance sheets according to their 
maturities while setting exposures to maximise banks’ profits while retaining enough 
liquidity. 
These actions could insulate banks from negative liquidity shocks. However, if liquidity 
shortages are considered a widespread phenomenon, many banks will fall short and require 
the intervention of the central bank as the lender of last resort (Prochnow, 1949). Recently, 
in the Global Financial Crisis, many large banks faced severe liquidity shortages. Central 
banks intervened to prevent them from failing through providing them with funding. These 
cases were investigated through empirical research and found that larger banks usually have 
lower liquidity targets and have the tendency to rely on the lender of last resort, supporting 
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the view that regulators will hesitate before closing them (Vodova, 2011; Farhi & Tirole, 
2012). 
Liability management theory includes the ability of commercial banks to fulfil their liquidity 
needs by borrowing in the capital and money markets (Alshatti, 2015). This requires banks 
to match their liquidity sources to their expected needs. However, the importance of balance 
sheet structure for financial institutions’ viability stresses the importance of matching assets 
and liabilities over set time horizons. Banks need to assess the impact of current and 
potential market conditions on the predictable maturity behaviour of their assets and liability 
positions and take whatever steps are necessary to meet unexpected liquidity needs. These 
theories highlighted many important factors that affect liquidity management and could 
increase the levels of liquidity risk that may stem from various resources related to day-to 
day operations with regards to lending and trading activities (Chorafas, 2007). The potential 
match between both sides of the balance sheet in terms of maturity and the sensitivity to 
interest rates minimises liquidity and interest rate risks (Zawalinska, 1999; Belete, 2013). 
These procedures of preserving liquidity are echoed in the empirical literature as banks are 
continually seeking to match their assets’ maturities with their short-term and medium-term 
funding resources. Such dependency presents the taxonomy of liquidity risk (Bessis, 2010; 
Bonfim & Kim, 2012). For example, Banerjee and Mio (2017) concluded that banks which 
tend to finance their risky activities through short-term debt are vulnerable to liquidity 
shocks and shortages. Others have concluded that liquidity and credit risk are negatively 
related as a strong increase of lending activity in relation to the volume of acquired deposits 
is accompanied by a decrease in credit risk (Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 2015). Also, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga’s (1999) results suggest that short-term liquidity acquired from 
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customers’ current, savings and time deposits do not have a significant impact on net interest 
income, although some evidence showed that it may lower profitability. Accordingly, the 
following section will contain a survey of the empirical literature that investigated the 
liquidity relationship with several factors. 
4.2.4 Liquidity Risk at Commercial Banks in Jordan  
Most of the available literature about the Jordanian-banking sector focused on the effect of 
liquidity on the profitability of the banking sector as only a few researchers investigated the 
effects of macroeconomic, regulatory and bank-specific factors on liquidity risk. In 
particular, most studies focused on the effect of bank-specific and macroeconomic 
environmental factors on banks’ profitability. Most of these studies used Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression. They found that assets and liabilities have a significant impact 
on banks’ profitability, represented by ROA and ROE (Al Shubiri, 2010; Alzorqan, 2014; 
Alshatti, 2015). Further, Al Shubiri (2010) stressed the importance of ALM on building a 
general liquidity strategy for commercial banks in Jordan. The macroeconomic factors were 
found to have a significant impact on profitability. 
Another paper compared liquidity risk management between Jordanian and Saudi banks  
Almumani (2013) , using a sample of 10 Saudi and 14 Jordanian banks over the period 2007-
2011. The results indicate a similarity in the interaction between the bank-specific variables 
and liquidity risk with the exception of bank size as it had a negative but insignificant 
relation in the case of Jordanian banks. The comparison between the two banks reveals that 
the Saudi banking system is more efficient in generating profit due to the efficient 
management of liquidity, whereas Jordanian banks have a more liquid position, which could 
hamper profit generation. 
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The large size of the commercial banks in Jordan compared to other sectors in the economy 
raise the need for the Jordanian authorities to shield the banking sector from the negative 
effects of economic crises through improving the efficiency of both sides of banks’ balance 
sheets (CBJ, 2000). Thus, evaluating the performance of banking institutions is an essential 
requirement to ensure the strength of the banking system, economic stability and growth. 
The nature and structure of the Jordanian economy leaves most economic sectors more 
susceptible to exogenous shocks and spill-overs from the global economy as well as its 
neighbouring countries (CBJ, 2015). 
The scant research on liquidity risk in the banking sector in Arab countries as a whole and 
in Jordan in particular is one of the main drivers of this study. This research will investigate 
the existing relationships between bank-specific variables, regulatory variables, and 
macroeconomic variables, and liquidity risk through both descriptive and econometric 
techniques. This study will help us in identifying relationships that would help to mitigate 
liquidity risks in Jordan’s commercial banks. 
4.2.5 Research Gap 
Liquidity risk management is one of the core functions of the bank treasury and finance 
departments. Its effects encompass the individual banking institutions to overall liquidity in the 
domestic market. The recent developments in the banking industry as well as the increased 
complexity of the financial markets has highlighted the need for banks to preserve their 
liquidity positions through focusing on liquidity management and the risks stemming from 
liquidity positions. Therefore, managing liquidity risks at banks has gained more momentum 
in recent years, especially in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis and supervisory authorities 
have implemented financial regulations accordingly.  
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The surveyed literature has shown that most empirical studies have focused on the effects of 
liquidity risk management on profitability. However, few studies have focused on the effects 
of profitability on liquidity risk. Most of the studies surveyed in the literature review showed 
the existence of a negative relationship between profitability and liquidity risk (Bonner, et al., 
2015; Bourke, 1989; Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010; 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Barth, et al., 2003; Molyneux & Thornton, 1992). 
Nonetheless, most of these studies were focused on cross-country analysis and their main 
datasets involved banks in advanced economies.  
Moreover, the empirical evidence on the relationship between credit and liquidity risk is mixed 
as there is no consensus in the theoretical models regarding the dynamics of liquidity and credit 
risks over time (Imbierowicz & Rauch, 2014). For example, Roman and Sargu (2015) indicated 
that credit risk is associated with negative bank lending growth. They also indicated that 
impaired loans have a negative impact on liquidity and that this is a major internal factor for 
banks. On the other hand, Imbierowicz & Rauch, (2014) investigated the relationship between 
credit risk and liquidity risk and concluded that there is no economically significant causality 
between the two. However, the study found that the interaction between liquidity risk and credit 
risk increases the probability of default among banks, which calls for joint management of 
liquidity risk and credit risk in banks. 
The introduction of new measures and tightened capital adequacy rules in order to ensure 
banks’ viability and achieve financial stability by the Basel committee resulted from the 
repercussions of the global Financial Crisis (Ben Naceur & Roulet, 2017). Systemic risks 
were at the heart of the debate with capital ratios, bank size and liquidity management all 
considered the main determinants of risks within the banking sector. Large banks were at 
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the centre of these debates as they tend to have lower capital ratios, less stable funding, and 
more exposure to potentially risky market-based activities (Laeven, et al., 2014). Also, 
Laeven et al. (2016) found evidence that systemic risk is lower in more-capitalized banks, 
with the effects particularly more pronounced for large banks. On the other hand, Roulet 
(2018) found that capital ratios have a significant negative impact on large European retail 
lending growth and other types of lending over the post-2008 financial crisis period. 
The effects of capitalization on banks have gone hand in hand with investigating the effects 
of size on banks’ performance as liquidity risk varies depending on bank size and some 
studies have focused on the relationship between bank size and performance. Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) found that the effects of bank size have two different signs depending on 
the market structure and the regulatory and operational frameworks in each country (Asiri, 
2007; Ali, et al., 2011; Belete, 2013; Laurine, 2013). However, Roman and Sargu (2015) 
found that their effects on overall liquidity are mixed. 
Other researchers focused on the effects of size on liquidity buffers, while others argued that 
larger banks are faced with liquidity risks stemming from various sources, which increases 
the level of regulation set by the regulatory authorities on these banks (Acharya & 
Merrouche, 2012). For example, Aspachs et al. (2005), Agénor et al. (2004) and Delechat 
et al. (2012) concluded that there is a negative effect between liquidity buffers and bank 
size. Small banks should hoard more liquidity as tapping into the financial markets would 
be costly compared to larger banks (Kashyap & Stein, 2000), whereas large banks may need 
lower liquidity holdings as they have easier access to funding with lower costs, which attract 
investors to protect them from uncertainties and systemic risk (Gatev & Strahan, 2006). 
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In this chapter, the study will focus on investigating the impact of the main bank specific 
variables on liquidity risk management in Jordan. This study will focus on analysing the 
effects of internal factors in a low-income country that is still affected by repercussions from 
the Global Financial Crisis and the instability in the region due to political struggles in many 
neighbouring countries. This study will try to close the gaps in the empirical literature with 
regards to investigating the effects of internal banking factors in a low-income country as 
most of the empirical literature has focused on advanced and emerging market economies.  
Furthermore, this study will control for the effects of the regulatory and macroeconomic 
environment. Furthermore, the research will study the effect of political instability as the 
Jordanian economy has been heavily influenced by the geopolitical tensions in the region 
under the banner of the Arab Spring. Moreover, due to the lack of theoretical foundations 
for the effects of interactions between credit risks and liquidity risk, this study will 
investigate these interactions on the liquidity risk in Jordan as most of the surveyed literature 
investigated these interactions in the US and Europe. 
4.3 Research Hypotheses 
In the empirical literature review section, the researcher found that internal factors have a 
major impact on banks’ management of their liquidity (Roman & Sargu, 2015; Zaghdoudi 
& Hakimi, 2017). For example, some researchers indicated that bank-specific factors impact 
liquidity risk irrespective of the ratios used and the countries under investigation (Wójcik-
Mazur & Szajt, 2015). In this section, the study hypotheses will focus on main internal 
factors. 
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I. Liquidity Risk and Profitability 
Banks with higher profitability ratios may face higher liquidity risks. However, the impact 
of profitability on liquidity risk management is dependent on the financial model banks 
operate, which determines the liquidity risk exposures and the desired level of profitability. 
A higher the share of other income or other funding than deposits could yield a higher bank 
risk (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010), where interest margins and bank profitability 
reflect a variety of determinants related to bank characteristics (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 
1999). 
The results of the empirical research varied on the relationship between profitability and 
liquidity risk. For example, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) found an inverse significant 
relationship between profitability and liquidity holdings. Also, Bourke (1989) found a 
significant positive relationship between liquidity and bank profitability. On the other hand, 
Barth et al. (2003) found that the structure of supervision had a weak influence on bank 
performance, and that liquidity ratios had a negative impact on profitability, measured by 
return on assets (ROA). Kosmidou (2008) found that liquidity ratios are negatively related 
to return on average assets (ROAA). Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) found that the 
liquidity ratio negatively affects ROA and positively affects NIM.  
Overall, the results in the empirical literature were mixed depending on the sample, time 
period, and banking sector in the countries under investigation. Accordingly, the researcher 
could expect that profitability ratios, measured by Return On Average Assets (ROAA) and 
the Return On Average Equity (ROAE), will have a negative impact on liquidity risk as the 
increase in profitability is a result of greater exposure due to a rise in risk appetite, riskier 
assets and a decrease in the quality of the overall assets and liquid assets. On the other hand, 
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the study could find a positive impact of profitability on liquidity as it increases the 
confidence of depositors and thereby the liquidity resources available. Furthermore, the 
researcher expect that the influence of net interest margin (NIM) to be weak due to the effect 
of regulatory measures set by supervisory authorities depending on the frameworks adopted 
by commercial banks.  
Hypothesis (1): Commercial banks with high profitability ratios face higher liquidity risk. 
II. Liquidity Risk and Credit Risk 
The interest rate structure has a great influence on risk appetite at banks (Peersman, 2011). 
Accordingly, setting credit risk exposures and monitoring lending activities may have a 
major impact on liquidity holdings. The impact of credit risk on liquidity risk is positive in 
most of the surveyed empirical literature (Roman & Sargu, 2015; Acharya & Viswanathan, 
2011). Also, Roulet (2018) found that liquidity indicators have positive but perverse effects 
on bank lending growth. He pointed out that funding structure is an important factor in 
banks’ lending activities as the results indicated that the ratio of available stable funding to 
total assets (liquidity measure) has an insignificant influence on bank’s lending activities. 
Diamond and Rajan (2005) showed that there is a positive relationship between liquidity 
risk and credit risk, implying that both increase simultaneously. On the other hand, Wójcik-
Mazur and Szajt (2015) found a negative relationship between liquidity measures and credit 
risk both in the long and short term. However, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) concluded 
that there is no economically meaningful relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk. 
They indicated that the interaction between liquidity risk and credit risk increases the 
probability of default among banks, which calls for joint management of these risks in 
banks. 
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Based on the above, the researcher expect credit risk, measured by non-performing loans 
(NPL), to have a positive impact on liquidity risk at Jordanian commercial banks as the 
relationship will be more elaborate due to the high reliance of banks on their regular 
operations to incur profits. The increase in the level of NPLs reduces banks’ asset quality 
and their ability to allocate their resources to their operations as they have to take more 
provisions against NPLs. 
Hypothesis (2): Commercial banks with high non-performing loans face higher liquidity 
risk. 
III. Liquidity Risk and Bank Size 
The empirical literature on banking has heavily investigated the influence of bank size on 
performance or used bank size as a control variable. The liquidity risks that banks face vary 
depending on bank size, market structure and the regulatory and operational frameworks in 
each country (Berger & Bouwman, 2009). Laeven et al. (2016) found strong evidence that 
systemic risk increases with bank size. Large banks that engage in multiple activities may 
face governance problems that could yield higher systemic risks (Bolton, et al., 2007).  
However, larger banks are faced with different types of liquidity risks than smaller banks as 
they have an extra task of top-down liquidity provision from the central bank into the 
banking system (Acharya & Merrouche, 2012). DeYoung and Jang (2016) concluded that 
larger banks tend to have lower liquidity targets than smaller banks but they manage these 
targets more efficiently. Similarly, Vodova (2011) found that large banks have lower 
liquidity targets as they rely on the government and the lender of last resort in the event of 
shortages. Aspachs et al. (2005), Agénor et al. (2004) and Delechat et al. (2012) concluded 
that there is a negative effect between liquidity buffers and bank size.  
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Bonner et al. (2015) found that the relationship between bank liquidity buffers and bank size 
is substantially weaker in countries with bank liquidity regulations, which implies that 
liquidity regulations act as a substitute for liquidity management at commercial banks. This 
result may explain why small banks should hoard more liquidity buffers due to the higher 
costs of accessing funding (Kashyap & Stein, 2000), whereas large banks may need lower 
liquidity holdings as they have easier access to funding with lower costs (Gatev & Strahan, 
2006). Accordingly, the researcher expect bank size to have  positive impact on liquidity as 
large banks tend to engage in more diverse operations than smaller ones. 
Hypothesis (3): Large commercial banks face higher liquidity risks. 
IV. Liquidity Risk and Capital 
Higher capital ratios reduce liquidity risks (Diamond & Rajan, 2000). Basel I & II have 
focused on bank capital ratios as one of the crucial factors for banking viability and 
achieving financial stability (Ben Naceur & Roulet, 2017). Laeven et al. (2016) concluded 
that risks are lower in well-capitalized banks. Banerjee and Mio (2017) found evidence that 
well-capitalized banks have stronger growth in their balance sheets, accumulate less high-
quality liquid assets and exhibit healthier growth in their non-financial sector lending 
portfolios. 
Similarly, Ben Naceur and Roulet (2017) indicated that capital has a positive impact on 
liquidity ratios. Their findings indicate that banks tend to hold liquidity buffers and increase 
their holdings of liquid assets when they expand their risky activities to avoid liquidity 
shortages, and improve their ability to absorb risks. On the other hand, Roulet (2018) found 
that capital ratios have a negative impact on lending growth and other types of lending over 
the post-2008 financial crisis period. 
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Furthermore, the impact of capital adequacy regulations on banks' insolvency and 
investments as they have an effect on the allocation of funds amongst the firms in the 
economy (Berger, et al., 2016; Kim & Santomero, 1988). They found that the effects of 
capital adequacy regulations on financial stability are ambiguous and that systemic risk 
might increase as a result of imposing capital constraints on banks, although capital 
adequacy regulations limit banks’ credit exposures. They concluded that capital adequacy 
regulations would lead to a lower risk exposure of the banking system (Eichberger & 
Summer, 2005). 
Therefore, the effect of capital on banks’ liquidity included the effects of banking 
regulations as Basel II focused on capital ratios to impose restrictions that would ensure 
banks’ viability. The study has used several measures for capital in order to capture the 
effect of capital on liquidity, and the researcher expect that all of these variables will have 
a positive effect on liquidity. 
Hypothesis (4): Commercial banks with higher capital face lower liquidity risks. 
V. Liquidity Risk and Banking Efficiency  
Having better internal factor ratios contributes to increasing the efficiency of commercial 
banks, which refers to the ability of banks to create revenues from their assets (ECB, 2010). 
However, banking efficiency could be considered an unobserved variable as it is hard to 
measure due to the intangibility of banks’ products and services. The cost to income ratio 
illustrates firms’ ability to generate profits from their revenue sources (ECB, 2010). Several 
studies that have focused on European countries have investigated the main factors that 
impact banks’ efficiency, and concluded that the environment and regulations affect several 
banking ratios that are related to their activities such as capital, lending and liquidity ratios. 
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However, these studies found that regulations improve the cost and profit efficiency of 
banks (Maudos, et al., 2002; Dietsch & Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Resti, 1997). 
Consequently, the researcher expect the quality of management, measured by the cost 
to income ratio (CTIR), to have a positive impact on liquidity as higher-quality management 
would reduce governance problems and result in better allocation of bank resources.  
Hypothesis (5): Commercial banks with higher efficiency face lower liquidity risks. 
4.4 Data and Methodology 
4.4.1 Data  
The variables employed in the econometric analysis were acquired from the BankScope 
database and the central bank of Jordan for thirteen banks depending on data availability for 
the period 2004-2015. The study started from 2004 as it marks the end of the economic and 
financial reforms in Jordan that were backed by the IMF (CBJ, 2015). These reforms 
resulted in the liberalization of the financial sector, the adoption of indirect monetary policy 
to manage liquidity in the domestic market, and the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime 
with the Jordanian dinar in late 1995.  
The sample population will consist of all operating commercial banks in Jordan. However, 
due to data limitations, and the existence of Islamic banks, which operate in Jordan, the study 
will exclude four Islamic banks as their practices, policies, and procedures differ from 
traditional commercial banks. Thus, the sample will include thirteen commercial banks. The 
yearly data will cover the period from 2004-2015 for the following commercial banks that 
operate in Jordan:  
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Table 25: List of the population in econometric analysis 
 
4.4.2 Research philosophy 
There are different patterns and methodologies that could be used to coordinate whether 
testing a theory (deductive) or building one (inductive). Accordingly, dealing with the 
relationships under investigation and understanding them through investigating these 
variables individually or collectively and explaining what happens to these variables in the 
real world. These questions can be answered by taking into consideration the following 
subjects while understanding the research paradigms of methodology, epistemology and 
ontology (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Creswell, 2009). 
Ontology deals with the relationships that are studied through two main arguments that deal 
with reality. The first argument is that the phenomena under investigation can be represented 
by a set of variables that could be studied individually (objectivism). The latter argument 
suggests that the phenomena could not be separated from individual awareness as the 
variables are interdependent of each other (constructivism). The first argument backs the 
positivist approach, which is concerned with scientific evidence that is normally associated 
with deductive methods. The second argument, which opposes the positivism of natural 
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science, supports the interpretivist approach where both are commonly associated with 
inductive methods (Creswell, 2009). 
The second paradigm, epistemology, deals with the nature of the association of the 
researcher with his research. Similarly, there are two main approaches in epistemology; the 
first approach, positivism, which sees observable evidence as the only form of defensible 
scientific findings that the researcher could get through neutral scientific procedures and 
that are not connected to the researcher; or, on the other hand, the second approach, 
interpretivism, which supports the view that relativism is subjective and differs from person 
to person, which implies that the researcher and his knowledge are interconnected (Creswell, 
2009). 
This part of the research will employ a deductive approach to construct and test the research 
hypotheses. Burrell and Morgan (1979) said that positivism “seeks to explain and predict 
what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships 
between its constituent elements”. 
Saunders et al. (2012) supported the view that the deduction approach that is concerned with 
positivism illustrates inter-relations between the variables of the phenomena under 
investigation and the need to conclude. Additionally, positivist researchers utilize 
quantitative and statistical analysis to explain their subjects. Neuman (2014) stated that 
“researchers prefer precise quantitative data and often use experiments, surveys, and 
statistics. They seek rigorous, exact measures and objective research and they test 
hypotheses by carefully analysing numbers from the measures”. In light of the researchers’ 
opinions, the properties of this research require the use of the deductive methods rather than 
the inductive approach: 
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 The deductive approach is more organised than the inductive approach and relies on 
experiments and scientific methods. 
  This study will test the hypotheses by investigating the impact of the independent 
variables and their causality with the independent variables, through collecting related 
statistics and using statistical and econometric methods. 
 The results of the analysis will be more reliable due to the reiteration of the experiments 
by different researchers. The same results indicate reliable results.  
 The results could be generalized to the whole population. 
 Quantitative data helps researchers to test hypotheses and answer the research 
questions; this approach is noticed in most business research. 
Accordingly, developing valid and viable hypotheses should take into consideration the 
impact of these variables on each other (Robson & McCartan, 2016). Consequently, the 
researcher will test the research hypotheses that were created based on quantitative data and 
the deductive approach. The following figure summarises the research philosophy and 
approach employed to achieve the study’s aims and objectives: 
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Figure 27: Research Philosophy Diagram25 
 
4.4.2.1 Quantitative and Qualitative methods 
There are three main research methods: the quantitative approach, qualitative approach and 
mixed approaches (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The qualitative approach employs descriptive 
                                            
25 The above figure shows that there are two main philosophical assumptions that can be used to conduct business studies. Thus, philosophical assumptions such 
as ontology and epistemology revealed that when researchers focus on testing hypotheses instead of building a new theory, the deductive approach must be adopted 
to get valid knowledge. The positivist epistemology paradigm relies on the quantitative approach to get valid knowledge. Furthermore, the positivism paradigm 
implies that in the case of collecting data externally – “Value Free Data” – the objectivist ontology and positivist epistemology must be used to get an acceptable 
knowledge. Thus, since this section of my research used secondary data, and these are indirectly obtained from the study population, the positivist and objectivist 
paradigms are used to these the hypotheses of this research (Walliman, 2017). 
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Objectivism
Reality is independent from 
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and other approaches that are non-numerical in nature to collect information used to explain 
and interpret a certain phenomenon (Creswell, 2009). 
This method is suitable for conducting research on social phenomena in a continuous period 
so that the researcher can identify changes in preferences and habits. The quantitative 
approach is usually used when the researcher employs statistical methods to test his 
hypotheses and make some conclusions than can be generalized. This method can be used 
in most studies that focus on quantification and measurement to collect and analyse numeric 
data ‘positivist epistemology-deductive’ (Bryman & Bell, 2011). However, it is subject to 
criticism as transparency or reliability can already be low and conclusions and facts may not 
be generalized (Berg & Lune, 2014). Moreover, this approach needs more time to acquire 
the needed data and analyse it, which may lead to insufficient conclusions (Berg & Lune, 
2014). 
Accordingly, to overcome the limitations in this approach, some researchers suggested the 
use of mixed methods to provide more comprehensive answers to research questions. 
However, according to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), the mixed method is suitable when 
either the qualitative method or quantitative method is not adequate to address the research 
problem. Despite numerous benefits of the mixed approach, there are some shortcomings. 
The mixed approach is more costly and needs further time compared to other methods. In 
addition, some conflicts between the results of the qualitative and the quantitative analysis 
should be resolved. 
The present study does not make use of the qualitative approach for several reasons. First, 
the main aim of the study is to investigate the impact of liquidity risk on banks’ internal 
factors in Jordanian commercial banks. Therefore, such investigation requires several years 
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of data to be clearly seen. Second, the researcher will use secondary data sources as it is 
fairly difficult to access the needed data via interviews. Furthermore, this study will rely on 
the deductive method, which is based on a theoretical background to develop and test the 
hypotheses. Third, the use of secondary data facilitates the comparison between the results 
of this study and previous studies in liquidity risk management. Finally, the process for 
analysing qualitative data is costly and time-intensive. Therefore, this section of the study 
will rely on one method to collect data, which is the quantitative method, through the Bank 
Scope database and the central bank of Jordan.  
4.4.3 Method 
Panel data is a term that refers to a set of two-dimensional data that contain time series 
observations and for a cross-sectional number of individuals. (Hsiao, 2007). Data availability 
is one of the main advantages of employing panel data, however, it is considered more costly 
than collecting cross-sectional or time series data. Moreover, panel data is widely used in 
developing countries where they may not have long time series as some of them have only 
recently started the tradition of collecting statistics. Therefore, panel data has several 
advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data (Nerlove, 2002; Hsiao, 2003). 
The inference of the model would be more accurate using panel data analysis  (Hsiao, 2007) as 
it has more degrees of freedom when compared to times series models and variability in the 
sample is larger when compared to cross sectional data, therefore improving the efficiency of 
the estimates. Moreover, the ability of panel data models is more elaborate in having more 
accurate results through taking into account ;the behavioural element in the data as well as 
accounting for the impact of variable omission or unobserved variables.  
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Another important issue for using panel data is the ability to rely on inter-individual differences 
for reducing collinearity between current and lag variables to estimate unrestricted time-
adjustment patterns, as the estimation of time adjustment pattern using time series data relies 
on arbitrary prior restrictions for models with time lags, which could be highly collinear  
(Hsiao, 2007). Furthermore, panel data generates more accurate predictions for individual 
outcomes by pooling the data rather than generating predictions of individual outcomes using 
the data on the individual in question (Hsiao, 2007).  
In this research section, the researcher will use panel data analysis to investigate the impact of 
internal factors on liquidity risk while controlling for the regulatory and macroeconomic 
environment. The reason behind that is that analysing liquidity risks on the banking sector 
through employing time-series analysis would yield results that would be hard to rely on due 
to the nature of the banking sector.  
In Jordan, there are two main types of banks – commercial banks and Islamic banks having 
different policies and operating processes as Islamic banks tend to comply with Sharia law, 
while commercial banks rely on interest rates as their main source of income. Moreover, the 
data available for these factors covers a short period, which will make it difficult to use usual 
time-series analysis as these methods rely on having restrictions on the model with time lags, 
which raises the collinearity between the variables. 
4.4.3.1 Random / fixed effects models 
Panel data is relatively easy to analyse under a set of assumptions to obtain robust regression 
results. Most econometric analysis is concerned with the impact of explanatory variables on 
the regression function, which implies that needed to hold the intercept term constant, which 
represents the unobservable random variable. In this research, the discussions will focus on 
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whether to treat the unobservable random variable as a fixed or random effect. The intercept 
term is crucial for panel data analysis. It is usually referred to as an unobserved, time-constant 
variable and is called an unobserved effect in panel data analysis.  
The basic unobserved effects model (UEM) can be written, for a randomly drawn cross-section 
observation i, as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
For 𝑡 = 1,2,3, … . , 𝑇. Also, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector (1xk) that contains observable variables that change 
across time and through cross-sections (i)… Furthermore, the model contains the unobserved 
component (𝑐𝑖) and the idiosyncratic errors that change across time as well as through cross-
sections. In empirical research, there are discussions about whether to treat the unobserved 
component as a random effect or as a fixed effect as it is viewed as a variable that could be 
estimated. In panel data models, the unobserved component is referred to as a random effect 
when it is treated as a random variable and a fixed effect when it is treated as a parameter to be 
estimated for each cross-section.  
These discussions about defining the nature of the unobserved component should be 
determined based on the characteristics of the sample as large random draws from cross-
sections would result in the unobserved component being treated as random along with the rest 
of the dependent and independent variables. This approach neglects the heterogeneity among 
cross-sections in the panel data. Therefore, determining whether the unobserved component is 
correlated with the explanatory variables is important for determining this issue. Mundlak’s 
(1978) approach yields important insights for understanding the difference between random 
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and fixed effect frameworks, and is very useful for testing whether the unobserved component 
is uncorrelated with the regressors (the critical assumption in a traditional random effects). 
Consequently, the researcher can deduct that the random effects framework is synonymous 
with no correlation between the observed independent variables and the unobserved effect, i.e. 
𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑇. On the other hand, under a fixed effect framework, 
treating the unobserved component as non-random means allowing for arbitrary dependence 
between the unobserved component and the explanatory variables. Practically, the key 
difference between a fixed effects approach and a correlated random effects approach is that in 
the former case, the relationship between the unobserved component and the independent 
variables is left entirely unspecified. Therefore, in the analysis of panel data models, the 
intercept term, C, (Mundlak , 1978) could be referred to as a random effect when the researcher 
treats it as a random variable and a fixed effect when it is used as a parameter to estimate for 
each cross-section observation. The main assumption that allows for determining which 
framework to adopt in panel data analysis is whether the constant term is correlated with the 
explanatory variables or not. In the random effect framework, zero correlation between the 
observed explanatory variables and the unobserved effect will be used to justify statistical 
inference. The fixed effect framework allows for random dependence between the unobserved 
effect and the observed explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2010).  
In this research, a panel estimation technique is used when the data set combines both time 
series and cross-sections. The flexibility in modelling differences in behaviour across 
observation units is the main advantage of a panel data set over a cross-section. The framework 
used will be as follows: 
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 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where 𝛼𝑖 is an individual effect, which is constant over time (t), and specific to the cross-
sectional unit (i). 𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents the regressors and 𝛽
′ represents the correspondent coefficient, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Equation (4) represents the general specification for the random and 
fixed models. Differences across groups are allowed in the fixed effect framework to capture 
the constant term differences through assuming dependency between the explanatory variable 
and the constant term. On the other hand, the random effects assume that the unobserved effect 
is uncorrelated with the regressors (Greene, 2012). The difference between the specification 
for the fixed model and random effects is the random disturbance (𝜇) characterizing 
observation (i) and is constant through time. In random effects specification, it is assumed that 
individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors 𝐸(𝑥𝑢) = 0. Thus, the random 
effects specification could be represented as follows: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
Testing whether the random or fixed framework is appropriate, the researcher will use the 
Hausman test, which focuses on testing whether the unobserved effect is not correlated with 
the explanatory variables. If the study rejects the null hypothesis, then the researcher should 
rely on using the fixed effect model as it would be more appropriate. In the case of having a 
large population, the random effect would be more appropriate to use, whereas the fixed effects 
framework would be more appropriate is the study focusing on a set of specific units (Baltagi, 
1995). 
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The researcher will employ bank-level data to investigate the effects of bank-specific factors 
over the period 2004 to 2015. In addition, the researcher will estimate the impact of liquidity 
risk for the commercial banks using the loan to deposits ratio (LTD) and liquid assets to total 
assets ratio (LQATA), and some bank-specific variables while controlling for the influence of 
regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The latter is a linear equation that has the following: 
 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘
5
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗
3
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
where (LR) represents the liquidity risk at bank (i) during time (t). In addition (xitk) 
represents the vectors for the banks’ characteristics while 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗 represents controlling for 
macroeconomic and regulatory influence. Also, are intercept terms and the 
regressors’ coefficients. The control variables are bank characteristics for bank i in period t−1. 
The list of control variables for bank characteristics and activities used in this study are M2 to 
GDP, inter-bank interest rates, and the required reserves ratio. The study wanted to control for 
these dimensions of development as it are focusing on internal factors on liquidity risk. The 
following section will include a detailed description of the variables used in the analysis. 
4.4.4 Variables Definitions 
The selected variables include the banking-specific characteristics and will include 
profitability, quality of management, size, credit risk, and capital. The study will use three 
ratios as a proxy for profitability in the commercial banks, namely return on average assets 
(ROAA), return on average equity (ROAE), and net interest margin (NIM). The quality of 
management was proxied by using cost to income ratio (CTIR); the size of the bank was 
estimated using the size of bank assets to total banking assets. As for credit risk and capital, 
the researcher will use non-performing loans to total assets (LOLTA), tier 1 regulatory capital 
(α, γ, β) 
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(TIER1), the total capital ratio (TCR), and equity to total assets (EQTA). The definition of all 
variables used in the econometric analysis is illustrated in Table 28. 
4.4.4.1 Liquidity risk variables 
ALM emerged to express the need to manage both assets and liabilities simultaneously in order 
for banks to mitigate against various risks and maximise their operating income. Liquidity risk 
stems from various resources that are related to day-to day operations with regards to lending 
and trading activities (Chorafas, 2007). Thus, the study used the loan to deposits ratio (LTD), 
and high liquid assets to total assets ratio (LQATA) as a proxy for liquidity risk as the ALCO 
monitors actual cash flows against its projections to determine the effect of transitory or 
permanent changes in loans and deposits that affect balance sheet positions and take proper 
actions. In addition, they focus on managing the maturities of the banks’ asset with the 
objective of covering cash flows from matured assets to meet liquidity needs (Koch, et al., 
1999; Al Shubiri, 2010; Alzorqan, 2014; Alshatti, 2015). 
Liquidity risk: As most bank risks are considered unobserved, researchers have tried to proxy 
its levels using financial ratios. As banks in Jordan are more conventional in nature, the study 
has used the loan to deposits ratio (LTD) and liquid assets to total assets (LQATA) (Bourke, 
1989; Molyneux & Thornton, 1992; Barth, et al., 2003; Dezfouli, et al., 2014; Bonner, et al., 
2015; Roulet, 2018). The loan to deposits ratio (LTD)26 is a widely used measure for liquidity 
at banks. It is percentage of total loans to total deposits. This ratio expresses the level of long-
term liquidity that covers banks’ credit. If the ratio is high, it signals that the banks would not 
have sufficient funds to cover their funding needs. Conversely, if the ratio is too low, the bank 
                                            
26 BankScope defines the loan to deposit ratio as gross loans to deposits and short-term funding. 
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may not be earning as much as it could be. Furthermore, liquid assets to total assets 
(LQATA)27 is considered an important indicator that can be used in managing liquidity and 
assessing if the bank has enough liquid assets. If a bank has a low ratio, it means that it could 
face liquidity problems as it does not have enough liquidity to meet its needs. 
Consequently, researchers have tried to use various measures as a proxy for liquidity risk. For 
example, Bai et al. (2018) used the liquidity mismatch index (LMI), which evaluates a bank’s 
liquidity based on its asset and liability structure through using measures for market and 
funding liquidity mismatches between the market liquidity of assets and funding liquidity for 
liabilities to predict the probability of a bank crash during the Global Financial Crisis. Also, it 
could be used as a macro-prudential liquidity indicator as it could be aggregated across banks 
unlike the Basel III liquidity measures (LCR, NSFR). Furthermore, the UK Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) introduced a new quantitative liquidity measure known as Individual 
Liquidity Guidance (ILG), which is a similar design to the LCR established by the Basel 
committee. Following the global agreement on LCR, ILG was superseded by LCR (Banerjee 
& Mio, 2017). Other researchers have used various liquidity ratio measures (Dezfouli, et al., 
2014; Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 2015) and have used the ratio of cash assets to total assets and 
net loans and total deposits to measure liquidity risk, respectively. Table 26 summarizes some 
liquidity measures used in other empirical research. 
 
 
                                            
27 According to BankScope, liquid assets include cash and due from banks, trading securities at fair value through 
income, loans and advances to banks, reverse repos and cash collaterals. 
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Table 26: Some liquidity measures used in empirical research 
Author(s)/ Year Liquidity risk Measure 
(Bourke, 1989) The ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
(Molyneux & Thornton, 1992) The ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999) The ratio of loans to total assets 
(Barth, et al., 2003) The ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
(Kosmidou, 2008) The ratio of net loans to customer and short term funding 
(Dezfouli, et al., 2014) The ratio of cash assets to total assets 
(Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 2015) Net loans and total deposits 
(Banerjee & Mio, 2017) Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG) 
(Bai, et al., 2018) Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI) 
 
4.4.4.2 Bank-specific Variables 
The focus of choosing the bank performance variables is to estimate the impact of bank-specific 
metrics on liquidity risks that pertain to profitability, capital adequacy, credit risk and quality 
management. The data for these variables was acquired directly from the BankScope database. 
Profitability: In the literature, profitability effects on liquidity are mixed. To investigate these 
effects, this study will use several profitability variables that are used by researchers 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Staikouras & Wood, 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 
2010; Sufian, 2011; Al-Jafari & Alchami, 2014; Pagratis, et al., 2017). Return on average 
assets (ROAA): A widely used indicator for tracking the profitability and scale of the financial 
performance of banks. ROAA is calculated by taking net income and dividing it by average 
total assets. Return on average equity (ROAE): Another measure of profitability that is 
computed by dividing net income by average shareholders' equity. Net interest margin 
(NIM): Another measure of profitability from the banks’ core functions. This is calculated by 
taking the difference between interest income on assets and interest expense on liabilities to 
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average earning assets. This ratio resembles a bank’s ability to make good investment 
decisions.  
Capital: Absorbing more bank risks with higher capital buffers (Berger & Bouwman, 2009), 
the implementation of the Basel accords I & II increased investigations of introduced capital 
rules, the role of capital in banking performance, and lending activities. Accordingly, this study 
will employ several measures for capital in order to capture the effect of capital on liquidity at 
commercial banks (Vodov, 2013; Bonner, et al., 2015; Roman & Sargu, 2015; Laeven, et al., 
2016; Kim & Sohn, 2017). Total capital ratio (TCR): Refers to bank capital (including tier 
one and tier two) to risk-weighted assets. It is used to assess a bank’s ability to protect 
depositors and is a measure of a bank capital. Tier 1 regulatory capital (TIER 1): Refers to 
a bank’s core capital to its risk-weighted assets. This ratio measure a bank's financial strength. 
Equity to total assets (EQTA): Represents the amount of assets that shareholders could claim. 
It is measured by dividing total shareholders’ equity to total assets. It is used to assess the 
financial health of a bank and financial leverage. 
Bank size: Banking industry market share is important to consumers and investors alike. It 
represents the size of a bank’s operations and the market structure. In this study, the researcher 
has calculated market share by taking the natural log of the total assets of each bank (Delechat, 
et al., 2012; Acharya & Merrouche, 2012; Roman & Sargu, 2015; DeYoung & Jang, 2016).  
Credit risk: The effects of credit risk on liquidity risk vary in the literature depending on 
heterogeneous banks’ characteristics and behaviour. Diamond and Rajan (2005) showed that 
there is a positive relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk. Roman and Sargu, (2015) 
indicated that impaired loans have a negative impact on liquidity, while Roulet (2018) found 
that liquidity indicators have positive but perverse effects on bank lending growth.  
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The study considered using non-performing loans to total assets (LOLTA), which is an 
indicator that can be calculated by dividing non-performing loan value by total assets using as 
a measure to proxy credit risk and increases in this ratio illustrate that a bank is more prone to 
the probability of customers defaulting.  
Quality of management: The capability of a bank to create revenues from an asset that it bears, 
reflecting the management quality of the bank, which is considered an important metric for 
investors and clients (Thoraneenitiyan & Avkiran, 2009). The study considered using the cost 
to income ratio (CTIR) (Maudos, et al., 2002; Dietsch & Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Resti, 1997), 
which is considered as a measure of the management quality of a bank. A lower ratio indicates 
that a bank is profitable and has high management quality. It is calculated by dividing operating 
expenses by operating income. Table 27 summarizes some liquidity measures used in the 
empirical research. 
Table 27 : Some bank internal factor measures used in empirical research 
 
Author(s)/ Year Bank specific metrics 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Pagratis, 
et al., 2017; Staikouras & Wood, 2004) 
Profitability  
(Vodov, 2013; Bonner, et al., 2015; Roman & 
Sargu, 2015; Laeven, et al., 2016; Kim & Sohn, 
2017) 
Capital 
Delechat, et al., 2012; Acharya & Merrouche, 
2012; Roman & Sargu, 2015; DeYoung & 
Jang, 2016 
Bank Size 
(Diamond & Rajan, 2005; Roman & Sargu, 
2015; Roulet, 2018) 
Credit Risk 
(Maudos, et al., 2002; Dietsch & Lozano-Vivas, 
2000; Resti, 1997) 
Quality of Management 
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4.4.4.3 Choice of Control variables  
Regulatory measures by supervisory authorities affect bank operations and exposures. The 
main focus of banks’ regulatory bodies is to safeguard banks through setting benchmarks that 
are focused on mitigating their risk exposure. The Basel committee has focused on regulations 
related to capital, concentrated activities, and liquidity management in banks as most of the 
recent financial crises have been caused by insolvency and liquidity shortages that were played 
out on the wholesale funding markets. Naceur and Kandil (2009) show that further regulations 
should be implemented in order to strengthen the stability of the financial system following the 
Global Financial Crisis. Also, Banerjee and Mio (2017) did not find any evidence to suggest 
that tightening liquidity regulations would shrink banks’ balance sheets, nor reduce the amount 
of lending to the non-financial sector. Moreover, Pagratis et al. (2017) used US banks’ quarterly 
data from 2002 up to the Global Financial Crisis (Q1 2002 to Q1 2009). They found through 
multiple stress scenarios that the intervention of the government is a predominant factor that 
allowed US banks to honour their maturity transformation role during the Global Financial 
Crisis. 
Several researchers have focused on the role of capital adequacy regulations in commercial 
banks, as they are a standardized measure put in place by regulators for banks and other 
depository institutions to determine how much liquidity is required to be held for a certain 
level of assets. For example, Laurine (2013) studied the determinants of liquidity risk in 
Zimbabwe and found that the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and required reserve ratio (RRR) 
have a negative impact on liquidity risk, and recommended that banks should focus on bank 
capitalization and interest rate spread. Thus, monetary authorities’ regulations could 
mitigate liquidity risks in the banking system through managing liquidity buffers as banks 
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often tend to expect to receive funding from their central bank in the case of a shortage 
(Aspachs, et al., 2005). 
Other researchers have studied the impact of capital adequacy regulations on banks' 
insolvency and aggregate investment as they have an effect on the allocation of funds 
amongst firms in the economy (Berger, et al., 2016; Kim & Santomero, 1988). They found 
that the effects of capital adequacy regulations on financial stability are ambiguous and that 
systemic risk might increase as a result of imposing capital constraints on banks, although 
capital adequacy regulations limit banks’ credit exposures. They concluded that capital 
adequacy regulations would lead to a lower risk exposure within the banking system 
(Eichberger & Summer, 2005). 
Ben Naceur and Roulet (2017) used a data sample of 23 countries28, mostly developed, over 
the period 2008–2015. They concluded that capital regulatory ratios have had a significant 
negative impact on US banks’ credit growth. In contrast, capital ratios do not have a 
significant impact on European banks’ credit growth. However, capital regulatory measures 
have a significant negative impact on European banks’ credit growth. Also, liquidity, as 
measured by the non-required amount of stable funding to total assets, has a significant 
positive impact on US and European banks’ credit activities.  
These findings suggest that banks in the study sample hold buffer stocks of liquid assets to 
expand their risky activities to avoid liquidity shortages when facing tighter market 
conditions and to improve their ability to absorb risks. Furthermore, Laeven et al. (2016) 
                                            
28 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
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studied the systemic risk of large banks during the recent financial crisis to identify bank-
specific factors that determine risk using a sample of 412 deposit-taking institutions from 
56 countries. They illustrated that inadequate capital explains systemic risk better than bank 
funding or operating activities, underpinning the Basel method of mitigating systemic risks 
through capital regulations rather than activity constraints. 
Moreover, the effects of monetary policy tools have been investigated by researchers. For 
instance, Kashyap and Stein (2000) used a large data sample for US commercial banks from 
1976 to 1993 to trace the effects of monetary policy on the lending behaviour of individual 
banks. They found that the impact of monetary policy on lending is stronger for banks with 
lower liquidity ratios (less liquid balance sheets). Also, they concluded that changes in 
monetary policy matters are greater for the lending of those banks with the least liquid 
balance sheets and confirmed the existence of the lending channel of monetary transition 
mechanism. Furthermore, Wójcik-Mazur and Szajt (2015) found that increased overnight 
interest rates encourage the intensification of banks’ engagement in the money market. In 
addition, Kim and Sohn (2017) found that federal funds’ effective rate had a positive 
significant impact on lending activities, which may imply the pro-cyclicality of monetary 
policy as hikes in interest rates appear at the peak of the economic cycle but rates then 
decline when the economy is facing exogenous shocks.  
On the other hand, the macroeconomic environment has been highlighted in empirical 
research as the macroeconomic environment conditions have an effect on banks’ 
performance and activities. The empirical literature has accounted for macroeconomic 
variables to capture the effect of economic conditions in a country on banks’ performance 
indicators, but the results were mixed and were subject to debate due to the endogeneity 
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between the macroeconomic environment and banks’ activities. Some researchers 
illustrated that the macroeconomic variables were found to have a significant positive 
impact on bank performance (Ali, et al., 2011; Athanasoglou, et al., 2008), while others 
concluded that the variables have a negative impact (Belete, 2013).  
Favourable economic conditions would impact positively on the supply and demand of 
commercial banking services. Thus, macroeconomic variables, which are considered one of 
the determinants of profitability and ALM strategy planning, will depend on the cyclicality 
of economic conditions in a country (Belete, 2013; Ali, et al., 2011). Moreover, Singh and 
Sharma (2016) investigated the effects of monetary policies and the business cycle on 
liquidity risk. They found that monetary policies and business cycles have a negative impact 
on excess liquidity and bank liquidity. Also, they found that the unemployment rate 
adversely affects demand for loans. Also, Zaghdoudi and Hakimi (2017) indicated that 
macroeconomic factors have different impacts on liquidity. They found that GDP has a 
positive impact whereas inflation rates have a negative impact on liquidity. 
Other studies have found that cyclicality in macroeconomic variables is one of the factors 
that affects volatility in ALM policies. Also, they found some evidence that ALM policy 
tends to resist the economic cycle which may induce some attention in planning and 
forecasting different scenarios of their operational effectiveness as the higher risks involved 
might cause higher losses (Novickytė & Petraitytė, 2014). Aspachs et al. (2005) highlighted 
the effects of the economic cycle on liquidity in the banking system using a sample of 57 
resident banks in the UK for the period 1985-2003. They suggested that banks appear to 
build up their liquidity buffers during economic downturns and draw them down in 
economic upturns. Moreover, Ben Moussa (2015) stressed the importance of the 
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macroeconomic effect on liquidity which was validated by Wójcik-Mazur and Szajt (2015) 
as they found the existence of a positive dependency relationship between GDP growth and 
liquidity risk.  
Kim and Sohn (2017) used a quarterly sample for US commercial banks for the period 1993-
2010 to examine the effects of banks’ capital on lending activities. Their results indicated 
that the effect of the economic environment, measured by GDP growth, is positive but more 
pronounced at larger banks. As for smaller banks, the macroeconomic effect was negligible 
and negative, which suggests that larger banks’ operations tend to be in tandem with the 
cyclicality of the GDP. Vodov’s (2013) results showed that a macroeconomic factor (GDP) 
has an ambiguous effect on the liquidity of commercial banks. However, macroeconomic 
factors’ effects on liquidity depend on the macroeconomic environment (Roman & Sargu, 
2015). 
Table 28: List of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variable  
Name Symbol Formula / Definition Data Source 
Loan to Deposit LTD Loan / deposit Bankscope 
Liquid Assets To Total 
Assets 
LQATA Liquid assets / total assets Bankscope 
Independent variables 
Bank specific variables 
Name Symbol Formula / Definition Data Source 
Profitability Ratio 
Return On Average 
Assets 
ROAA Net income / average total assets Bankscope 
Return On Average 
Equity 
ROAE Net income / average total equity Bankscope 
Net Interest Margin NIM Interest income - interest paid out Bankscope 
Capital Ratio 
Total Capital Ratio TCR 
Total capital / risk-weighted assets 
(RWAs) 
Bankscope 
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Tier 1 Regulatory 
Capital 
TEIR1 
Equity plus retained earnings to risk-
weighted assets 
Bankscope 
Equity to Total Assets EQTA Equity / total assets Bankscope 
Credit risk , bank size and Quality Management ratios 
Cost To Income Ratio CTIR 
Operating expenses/operating 
income 
Bankscope 
Market Share, size MARS Natural log of total assets Bankscope 
Non-Performing Loans 
to Total Assets 
LOLTA 
Total loans where payments have not 
been made for a period of 90 days / 
total assets 
Bankscope 
 
Control variables 
Regulatory variables 
Required Reserve Ratio RRR 
Portion of depositors' balances that 
banks must have on hand as cash. 
Central bank of Jordan 
Inter-bank interest rate IBR 
The rate of interest on short-term 
loans between banks. 
Central bank of Jordan 
Macroeconomic variables 
M2 to GDP MGDP 
The ratio of broad money supply to 
GDP. 
Central bank of Jordan 
Accordingly, in this study, the researcher will include three control variables: The Required 
Reserve Ratio (RRR), which is a requirement determined by a country's central bank, in 
order to capture the impact of mandatory liquidity buffers on liquidity. It is the stipulated 
portion of the customer’s deposits that banks must have on hand or in cash. Also, the Inter-
Bank Interest Rate (IBR), which is the rate of interest charged on short-term loans made 
between banks, and is included to capture the effects of monetary policy on banks as it is 
considered the operational target for the central bank. For capturing the effects of the 
macroeconomic environment, the study will use money supply (M2) to GDP (financial 
deepening index), which is a complex concept that expresses long-term economic growth. 
Many studies were in favour of the relationship between economic growth and money 
supply (Edward, 1973; Pradhan, 2009; McKinnon, 2010), which is considered a prime 
requirement for economic growth and a measure of the financial deepening of the economy. 
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Accordingly, the specification for the empirical models can be illustrated as follows: 
𝐿𝑇𝐷/𝐿𝑄𝐴𝑇𝐴
𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗
3
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3
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (9) 
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=  𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗
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𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗
3
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (12) 
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𝑖𝑡
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3
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𝐿𝑇𝐷/𝐿𝑄𝐴𝑇𝐴
𝑖𝑡
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Where LTD and LQATA are the dependent variables, which represent the loan to deposit 
ratio and high-quality liquid assets. On the right-hand side, the researcher used three 
variables to proxy profitability: return on average assets (ROAA), return on average equity 
(ROAE), and net interest margin (NIM). In addition, the researcher used Tier 1 regulatory 
capital (TIER1), total capital ratio (TCR), and equity to total assets (EQTA). Moreover, the 
researcher introduces quality of management proxied using cost to income ratio (CTIR). 
The size of the bank was estimated using the size of bank assets (MARS). As for credit risk, 
the researcher will use non-performing loans to total assets (LOLTA). The use of different 
variables as a proxy for profitability is that the ROAA and ROAE are often used in literature 
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to capture operating efficiency and the ability of commercial banks to generate revenues 
from various investments, whereas the net interest margins are more related to the core 
banking duties – namely taking deposits and lending credit. Furthermore, the study has used 
different variables to estimate the impact of capital on liquidity, as there are regulatory 
factors that are related to capital that could influence its impact on liquidity. 
4.4.5 Data Characteristics  
Before running the analysis, the researcher check the appropriateness of the data and the model 
through various tests in order to ensure that the underlying assumptions have not been violated 
and to thereby confirm that the findings of the study can be generalised. More details about 
these assumptions – namely, outliers, normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation – will be discussed in the next section. Descriptive statistics for all 13 banks 
are analysed to identify any mistyped or missing values, incomplete information, or extreme 
values. These values will be used to determine the existence of extreme abnormal values in the 
data as they tend to increase the error variance and affect the results of the analysis. One of the 
most common ways to check for these values is comparing the deviations of the observations 
from the mean ± 3 standard deviation. 
Dealing with the problem of outliers to have more reliable characteristics of the data statistical 
properties could be done through Winsorization. This is a method used to remove outliers in 
data by removing observations that are considered outliers on the higher ends of the 
distribution. A possible advantage of Winsorizing is that it preserves the information that a case 
had among the highest (or lowest) values in a distribution, but protects against some of the 
harmful effects of outliers. Furthermore, the researcher will apply normality testing on the 
panel dataset in order to check whether the data follows a normal distribution. 
239 
 
4.4.5.1 Data screening and post estimation tests 
Before running the analysis, the researcher must take a quick glance at the study main 
statistical data properties. The study final dataset consists of 2,184 bank-year observations and 
the descriptive statistics results show the original data, the Winsorized data at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles, 5th and 95th percentiles, and 10th and 90th percentiles, respectively. The following 
section will contain the descriptive statistics and data screening results. The descriptive 
statistics for bank performance indicators illustrated in Table 29 show divergent trends in their 
profitability, size, capital, and quality of management. 
Table 29: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Skew. Kurt. 
Liquidity Risk 
LTD 4.09 0.21 3.48 4.65 0.1 3.1 
LQATA 3.21 0.41 2.09 4.21 -0.3 2.7 
Profitability Ratio 
NIM 3.78 0.87 1.44 5.43 -1.1 4.4 
ROAA 0.32 0.58 -2.22 1.75 -1.8 9.6 
ROAE 2.31 0.61 -0.45 3.93 -1.9 10.6 
Capital Ratio 
TIER1 1.04 0.09 0.84 1.27 0.5 2.9 
TCR 2.89 0.25 2.36 3.61 0.6 3.0 
EQTA 14.17 2.93 6.48 21.96 -0.4 3.0 
Credit risk & Quality Management Ratios 
MARS 7.66 1.09 5.41 10.51 1.1 4.4 
CTIR 45.93 11.82 13.34 105.31 -0.9 6.4 
LOLTA 0.82 0.57 -0.77 3.19 0.1 4.7 
Control Variables 
RRR 1.59 0.14 1.36 1.96 1.2 5.1 
M2GDP 11.75 4.39 3.76 20.08 -0.8 3.6 
IBR 1.25 0.35 0.67 1.87 0.0 1.9 
This table reports the summary statistics of the annual data for the commercial banks sample in Jordan during the period 2004-2015. The results 
are shown for the mean and standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis for the data before Winsorization. 
 
The results are reported after taking the natural log for data transformation, except for bank 
size (MARS), which is proxied through taking the natural log of each bank’s total assets, to 
smooth the variability of data while capturing its behaviour. The raw data shows that most of 
the variables do not follow a normal distribution due to the existence of outliers, which could 
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be explained by taking a look at Jordanian banking sector structure as there is high 
concentration of assets and liabilities amongst certain banks compared to the rest of the sample, 
which could explain the existence of outliers in the sample as well as the heterogeneity among 
cross-sections. Therefore, to deal with the problem of outliers and make the data more reliable, 
Winsorization is used. The results, presented in Table 30, indicate that most of the outliers in 
the data were in the 90th percentile as observable changes in the mean of the data set and the 
standard deviation can be shown in the winsorized data at the 90th percentile. Some of the 
variable means increased after Winsorization while others decreased, showing that outliers 
were at both ends of the distributions. Removing those outliers deduced the standard deviation 
of the variables. 
Table 30: Descriptive statistics after Winzorization 
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. J-B Prob. 
Liquidity Risk 
LQATA_C 3.2 3.3 4.1 2.3 0.4 -0.1 2.4 2.4 0.30 
LTD_C 4.1 4.1 4.5 3.7 0.2 0.1 2.5 1.8 0.40 
Profitability Ratio 
ROAA_C 0.4 0.4 1.5 -1.8 0.4 -1.4 9.4 319.3 0.00 
ROAE_C 2.3 2.4 3.5 0.3 0.4 -1.0 7.2 142.4 0.00 
NIM_C 3.8 3.8 5.4 1.7 0.8 -0.3 2.6 4.1 0.13 
Capital Ratio 
TIER1_C 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.1 0.3 2.5 4.5 0.11 
TCR_C 2.9 2.8 3.4 2.5 0.2 0.5 2.6 6.2 0.05 
EQTA_C 14.1 14.2 19.3 8.3 2.6 0.0 2.1 5.3 0.07 
Credit risk & Quality Management ratios 
MARS_C 7.6 7.6 9.3 5.7 0.8 0.3 2.6 3.3 0.19 
CTIR_C 45.7 45.1 67.0 19.4 10.0 -0.2 2.6 2.6 0.27 
LOLTA_C 0.8 0.8 2.2 -0.4 0.5 0.0 3.5 1.4 0.50 
Control variables 
IBR_C 1.2 1.2 1.9 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.9 7.5 0.02 
RRR_C 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.4 0.1 1.1 4.9 56.5 0.00 
M2GDP_C 11.8 11.2 20.1 3.8 4.4 0.2 2.4 3.0 0.22 
The table reports the summary statistics of the annual data for the commercial banks sample in Jordan during the period 2004-2015. 
The results are shown for the mean and standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and J-B normality test for the Winsorized data at the 
90th percentile. 
After removing the outliers, the data for the 90th percentile (Winsorized) indicated that 
some of the variables were still not following normal distribution, indicating a high 
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heterogeneity between cross-section groups. However, the dependent (LTD, LQATA) 
variables were normal as the J-B test results indicated that the study accept the null hypothesis. 
As for the explanatory variables, the J-B test indicated that they (ROAA, ROAE, IBR, RRR) 
do not follow a normal distribution as the study has rejected the null hypothesis that the data 
follows a normal distribution. In addition, the rest of the variables were normally distributed at 
the 90th percentile (Winsorized). Therefore, the assumption of normality for some variables in 
the dataset is not met. However, while meeting the condition is desirable for reasons of 
estimator performance, it is not essential for either the random or fixed effects approaches for 
panel data (Clarke, et al., 2010).  
Moreover, Table 36 illustrates the correlation matrix between the variables. The matrix shows 
that (LTD) has a relatively weak positive correlation with (LOLTA, IBR, EQTA, CTIR, 
M2GDP, NIM, ROAA, RRR), whereas it has a negative weak correlation with (MARS, ROAE, 
TCR, TIER1). On the other hand, the dependent variable (LQATA) has a relatively strong 
positive correlation with M2GDP (54.2%) and a relatively weak positive correlation with 
(LOLTA, IBR, ROAA, ROAE, TCR, TIER1) and a weak negative correlation with (EQTA, 
CTIR, MARS, NIM, RRR). Therefore, most of the variables do not exhibit high correlation 
between each other.  
However, some profitability variables (ROAA, ROAE, NIM) and capital variables (TIER1, 
TCR, EQTA) have some high correlation between each other. For example, ROAA has a very 
strong positive correlation with ROAE (93.2%). In addition, TCR has a very strong positive 
correlation with TIER1 (96.9%) and EQTA has a strong positive correlation with TCR and 
TIER1 (54.8% and 57.4%). On the other hand, NIM has a relatively weak positive correlation 
with ROAA and ROAE (25.8% and 21.0%). In order to resolve the issue of high correlation 
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between the independent variables, namely ROAA, ROAE, NIM and TIER1, TCR, EQTA, the 
researcher split those variables in the estimation through having 18 models to capture the 
effects of those variables on liquidity risk and to consolidate the results by having more than 
one variable to proxy the effects of profitability and capital on liquidity risk – see Appendix 4.  
4.4.5.1.1 Normality test 
The Jarque-Bera test is a goodness-of-fit test of whether sample data have the skewness and 
kurtosis matching a normal distribution. It is considered one of the most widely used methods 
for testing whether the distribution underlying a sample is normal (Bowman & Shenton, 1975; 
Bera & Jarque, 1982; Jarque & Bera, 1987). It is defined as follows:  
 𝐽𝐵 = 𝑛 [
𝑆2
6
+
(𝐶 − 3)2
24
] (1) 
where S is the skewness, C is the kurtosis, and n is the number of observations. The JB test 
was derived by Bera and Jarque as the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test against Pearson family 
distributions. It has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom. The JB 
test is simple to compute and its power has proved comparable to other powerful tests. The 
results are shown in the table below. Normality test results indicated that most of the variables 
follow normal distribution at the 90th percentile except for EQTA, ROAA, ROAE, IBR and 
RRR.  
Table 31: Normality test 
Variable Adj. Chi 2 
Original data 99th%ile 95th%ile 90th%ile 
Liquidity Risk 
LTD 0.32 0.32 0.32 2.34 
LQATA 2.20 2.20 2.20 3.54 
Profitability Ratio 
NIM 4.37 4.37 4.37 4.40 
ROAA 58.54*** 58.54*** 58.54*** 47.5*** 
ROAE 61.51*** 61.51*** 61.51*** 32.73*** 
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Capital Ratio 
TIER1 4.15 4.15 4.15 5.43* 
TCR 8.15** 8.15** 8.15** 5.91* 
EQTA 2.14 2.14 2.14 13.55*** 
Credit risk & Quality Management ratios 
MARS 15.06*** 15.06*** 15.06*** 3.49 
CTIR 18.87*** 18.87*** 18.87*** 2.97 
LOLTA 9.06** 9.06** 9.06** 1.72 
Control variables 
IBR 27.03*** 27.03*** 27.03*** 27.03*** 
RRR 27.11*** 27.11*** 27.11*** 27.11*** 
M2GDP 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.21 
This table reports the results of the normality tests for the variables in the study. The results are shown for the data before Winsorization – 
Winsorized data at the 1st and 99th percentiles, 5th and 95th percentiles and 10th and 90th percentiles, respectively. The asterisk signs refer to the 
significance of the variables: * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%, respectively. 
 
4.4.5.1.2 Unit Root Test 
The analysis of panel data is focused more on cross-section analysis. The data sets are usually 
short and wide. Therefore, heterogeneity across groups is essential and could be considered as 
the main focus of the analysis (Greene, 2012). Panel data econometrics has been equipped with 
various investigative tools. One of the tools that have been developed is panel data unit root 
tests. The concepts involved in testing for unit roots in panel data are very much analogous to 
the time-series case. From an inferential point of view, treating a non-stationary regressor as if 
it were stationary will give very misleading and at worst nonsensical results. A variable is 
termed non-stationary if it contains a unit root. Such variables need to be differenced once or 
more to obtain a stationary variable. One of the weaknesses of many of the recent tests for unit 
roots in panel data was the reliance on the unrealistic assumption of cross-sectional 
independence.  
In empirical applications, this assumption was often seen to be violated. Hence there has 
emerged a growing literature on panel unit root tests with cross-sectional dependence. Many 
unit root tests have been proposed for use with panel data (Levin & Lin, 1992; Levin & Lin, 
1993; Levin, et al., 2002; Im, et al., 2003). Unit root testing in time series differences is that 
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the study is taking into account the asymptotic behaviour between the cross-sections (N) and 
the times series (T). The way in which N and T converge to infinity is critical if one wants to 
determine the asymptotic behaviour of estimators and tests used for non-stationary panels. 
Also, the main difference between unit root tests is the level of restriction imposed on 
coefficients’ heterogeneity and the inclusion / exclusion of deterministic terms. The researcher 
will briefly discuss the most common unit root test used for panel data, namely Levin-Lin-Chu 
Test and Im, Pesaran and Shin Test. Furthermore, cross-sectional dependence testing will be 
employed as in panel data, cross-sectional dependency can significantly affect the inference 
about slope parameters. 
The power of a test is the probability of rejecting the null when it is false and the null hypothesis 
is the unit root. Most panel unit root tests use the following general form: 
 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖,𝑙∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑙
𝑝𝑖
𝑙=1
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑦 is the variable that is needed to be tested, and 𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the deterministic component. If 𝜌𝑖 
= 0, this means that the y process has a unit root for individual 𝑖, while 𝜌𝑖 <  0 means that the 
process is stationary around the deterministic part. The testing procedures almost uniformly 
allow the short-run dynamics (the lag polynomial in ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑙) to differ among individuals, not 
just in coefficients but also in the number of lags (𝑝𝑖). Because differing values of 𝑝𝑖 mean 
different samples, the testing procedures need to allow for unbalanced samples. Furthermore, 
the coefficients on deterministic variables and the variance of 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are also allowed to vary, 
which means that most of the inputs of the general form will be heterogeneous. 
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Levin et al. (2002) proposed a test which allows for individual specific effects as well as 
dynamic heterogeneity across groups, and requires that 𝑁/𝑇 → 0, as the cross-sectional 
dimension (N) and the time series dimension (T) tend to infinity. This test is considered to 
perform well when (N) lies between 10 and 250 and when (T) lies between 5 and 250. However, 
one disadvantage of the test statistic is that it relies critically on the assumption of cross-
sectional independence (Breitung, 2000). Moreover, Im et al. (2003) suggested the use of the 
mean of individual unit root statistics for dynamic heterogenous panels. The test uses a 
standardized T-bar statistic, which is built on the Augmented Dicky Fuller statistics averaged 
across the groups. This statistical method (under general settings) converges in probability to 
a standard normal variate sequentially with (T, N) tend to infinity. In this study, the researcher 
will focus on Levin, Lin and Chu test (2002) as it is more appropriate for panel data with finite 
and small (N, T) dimensions. The results are illustrated for the Winsorized data at the 90th 
percentile in Table 32. 
Table 32: Unit Root Test Results 
Variable 
Level 1st Difference 
Result 
None Intercept 
Intercept & 
Trend 
None Intercept 
Intercept 
& Trend 
Levin, Lin & Chu Unit root test (Common unit root process) 
LTD 0.565 -3.175*** -4.877*** -9.331*** -6.742*** -7.100*** I(0) 
LQATA -4.265*** -2.182** -0.577 -7.016*** -2.818*** -3.444*** I(0) 
ROAA -5.630*** -7.516*** -3.979*** -9.477*** -0.005 1.565 I(0) 
ROAE -4.233*** -9.659*** -2.949*** -8.678*** -1.911** -0.980 I(0) 
NIM 0.168 -1.767** -1.487* -8.606*** -2.125** -0.816 I(0) 
TCR -0.573 -1.626** -28.326*** -11.972*** -30.643*** -24.967*** I(0) 
TEIR1 -0.143 -3.094*** -31.821*** 12.950*** -25.728*** -21.319*** I(0) 
EQTA 0.436 -1.033 -16.363*** -11.774*** -19.530*** -15.425*** I(0) 
CTIR 1.339 -0.153 -1.532* -10.901*** -1.165*** -3.167*** I(1) 
MARS 5.034 -2.823*** -4.227*** -5.660*** -3.821*** -2.211** I(0) 
LOLTA -4.493*** -2.545*** -1.348* -6.358*** -1.999** -1.638* I(0) 
RRR 0.721 -1.361* -0.769 -7.931*** -3.255*** -1.756** I(1) 
IBR -5.127*** -1.835** -7.240*** -10.297*** -4.259*** -1.794** I(0) 
M2GDP -6.346*** -3.427*** -0.668 -13.151*** 10.878*** 14.096*** I(0) 
Im, Pesaran, Shin Unit root test (Individual unit root process) 
LTD ----- -1.51* -1.858** ----- -4.259*** -1.034 I(0) 
LQATA ----- 1.036 2.025 ----- -2.611*** -0.897 I(1) 
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ROAA ----- -4.393*** -1.351* ----- -3.681*** -1.159 I(0) 
ROAE ----- -4.905*** -0.334 ----- -2.939*** -1.136 I(0) 
NIM ----- -0.161 0.522 ----- -2.744*** -0.343 I(1) 
TCR ----- -0.308 -6.209*** ----- -8.701*** -4.004*** I(0) 
TEIR1 ----- -0.969 -7.149*** ----- -7.953*** -3.919*** I(0) 
EQTA ----- -0.777 -4.711*** ----- -6.865*** -3.091*** I(0) 
CTIR ----- -1.571* -1.491* ----- -4.138*** -1.469*** I(1) 
MARS ----- -1.206 -0.370 ----- -2.051** -0.325 I(1) 
LOLTA ----- -0.549 0.229 ----- -1.055 0.785 I(2) 
RRR ----- -1.736** 0.116 ----- -1.035 1.095 I(0) 
IBR ----- -2.997*** -4.701*** ----- -3.368*** -0.344 I(0) 
M2GDP ----- 0.579 0.344 ----- -8.088*** -4.511*** I(1) 
This table reports the results of the unit root test for the LLC and IPS test for the winsorized data at the 90th percentile. The asterisk signs refer to the 
significance of the variables: * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%, respectively.  
The above table shows that the researcher used the panel unit root tests from Levin, Lin and 
Chu (2002) (LLC) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS) to test whether the data are non-
stationary in a panel context. The Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test assumes a common root 
process whereas the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test assumes an individual unit root process. 
Common unit root can be defined as an AR structure for the series under consideration. In 
contrast, the individual root allows for having a different AR structure in the same series 
(Barbieri, 2009). 
The reported results in the following table indicate that the dependent variable (LTD) is 
stationary at the level in both tests whereas (LQATA) is stationary at the first difference using 
the IPS test and stationary at the level using the LLC test, which indicates that allowing for 
different AR coefficients in each series. The results were compatible with the assumptions of 
the IPS test that allows for differences across groups and different AR structures converge to 
an equilibrium point with the same speed making this test less restrictive when compared to 
LLC test (Barbieri, 2009). Most of the variables were stationary except for RRR and CTIR 
whereas NIM, MARS and M2GDP were stationary at I(I) and LOLTA was stationary at I(2).  
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4.4.5.1.3 Multicollinearity  
Data characteristics often lead to biases in regressions. One of the important issues that 
researchers should deal with is multicollinearity, which refers to a high degree of correlation 
between two or more predictors where actions should be taken into account to have reliable 
estimates of the impact of independent variables on the dependent variable. There are two 
common methods to investigate this issue: correlation matrices and variance inflation factor 
(VIF), which could be expressed according to the following formula: 
 𝑉𝐼𝐹 = 1/(1 − 𝑅𝑖
2) 
where Ri
2 is the regression of predictors (i=1, 2, 3…..p) against all remaining independent 
variables. The accepted ratio of VIF has been a subject of debate in literature. Some researchers 
have expressed that a value of 10 is the maximum accepted level (Hair, et al., 1995). However, 
maximum values of 5 (Rogerson, 2001) and 4 (Pan & Jackson, 2008) have also been argued. 
However, when VIF reach a threshold, they attempt to reduce collinearity through omitting 
variables using Ridge Regression for data analysis, or through constructing an index to 
combine those variables. Values of the VIF do not discount regression results, call for the need 
of variable omissions or suggest the use of ridge regression (O’brien, 2007). Furthermore, serial 
correlation in residuals should be tested; it occurs when one observation’s error term (𝜀𝑖) is 
correlated with another observation’s error term (𝜀𝑖):Corr (𝜀𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖 ) ≠ 0, thus the study will suffer 
from the autocorrelation.  
4.4.5.1.4 Serial Correlation  
Serial correlation, or autocorrelation, often appear in panel data sets error terms as the 
influence of an error term in a certain period affects the latter error term. One of the main panel 
data assumptions for linear regressions is that data are not serially correlated. However, if the 
error term was serially correlated, the estimators will be consistent but will not be unbiased and 
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efficient. The main reason for this issue is the omission of an explanatory variable that has a 
significant impact on the dependent variable (Baltagi, 2005).  
Detecting serial correlation can be done by employing Wooldridge tests for serial correlation 
in the idiosyncratic error term in a panel data model as the test has good power properties with 
samples of moderate size (Wooldridge, 2002). The null hypothesis in this test is that there is 
no serial correlation.  
4.4.5.1.5 Heteroscedasticity  
Considering an estimation as best linear unbiased estimator, the researcher should test for the 
existence of heteroskedasticity. There is more than one test that can be used to do so. In this 
research, the researcher will employ the Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test. These tests 
measure the level of disturbances in regressions that their variances are not constant across the 
sample set (Greene, 2012) through testing for the existence of conditional heteroskedasticity 
through detecting changes in variances throughout the observation. The estimation of the F in 
the BP test can be done through the following equation: 
?̂?2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜒 + 𝜈 
where ?̂? is the squared residual and 𝜒 are the independent variables. The BP test investigates 
(nR2) with the number of explanatory variables (K). R refers to the squared residual regression 
of the dependent variable. The test employs the variance of the residual to measure the 
dependency on the observations of the explanatory variables. The existence of 
heteroskedasticity results in inefficient estimations (Baltagi, 2005). The null hypothesis in the 
BP test is that residuals are homoscedastic.  
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Accordingly, rejecting the null hypothesis means the existence of heteroskedasticity. 
Researchers have suggested the use of weighted OLS to solve this problem; however, most 
researchers prefer the use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Stock & Watson, 2003). 
In this study, employing the second method if the BP confirmed the existence of 
heteroskedasticity in the OLS regression models where liquidity risk, represented by LTD and 
LQATA, is the dependent variable. The test was used to determine whether the variance in the 
residuals was constant; the null hypothesis is that residuals are homoscedastic. The researcher 
will use Robust Standard Errors to resolve the heteroskedasticity issue and increase the 
efficiency of the estimation. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
This study has used quantitative analysis in order to estimate the impact of internal factors on 
liquidity risk measures for the period 2004-2015 for domestic commercial banks in Jordan. The 
researcher has used three variables that express profitability (ROAA, ROAE, NIM) and the same 
for capital (TIER1, TCR, EQTA).  
The main reason behind this approach is that profitability measures usually express different 
meanings depending on the indicator. For example, ROAA is often associated with ROAE, a 
widely used indicator that expresses profitability, assessing banks’ efficiency managing their 
revenues and expenses and their ability to generate profits from their financial assets. On the 
other hand, the NIM expresses the net revenues from banks’ core functions regardless of fees, 
which are considered as another element in the bank income statement, as it succinctly 
summarizes the effectiveness of banks’ interest-bearing assets. 
Moreover, banks’ capital is subject to different regulations set by the supervisory authorities in 
accordance with Basel regulations to ensure the stability of the banking sector. These 
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regulations may influence the expected impact of capital on liquidity risk, therefore, different 
sets of variables were used to estimate the impact of capital on liquidity risk. Furthermore, the 
study had investigated the impact of these variables while controlling for the regulatory and 
macroeconomic environment through using three econometric techniques and reporting their 
results in order to investigate whether the unobserved component is equal or varies through 
cross-section by using random and fixed effects. In addition, the study used OLS regression to 
test the properties of the data and to authenticate the results that the researcher received from 
the adopted model based on the Hausman test. 
The following section will present the empirical results of the estimated models for the two 
dependent variables used to proxy liquidity risk (LTD, LQATA). The researcher has estimated 
the impact of internal variables on liquidity risk while controlling for regulatory and 
macroeconomic variables. The estimation for several models was employed to resolve the high 
correlation between variables that are used to proxy profitability and capital and to consolidate 
the results on the impact of these variables on liquidity risk.  
The main advantage of a panel data set over a cross-section is that it permits greater flexibility 
in modelling differences in behaviour across observation units. Differences across groups are 
allowed in the fixed effect framework to capture the constant term differences through 
assuming dependency between the explanatory variable and the constant term. On the other 
hand, the random effects assume that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with the regressors 
(Greene, 2012). Testing whether the random or fixed framework is appropriate, the study will 
use the Hausman test, which focuses on testing whether the unobserved effect is not correlated 
with the explanatory variables. If the study rejects the null hypothesis, then the researcher 
should rely on using the fixed effect model as it would be more appropriate. Accordingly, the 
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study has bank-level data to investigate the effects of internal factors over the period 2004 to 
2015 while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic effects. 
4.5.1 Loan to Deposit ratio (LTD) analysis  
The following table illustrates the results from the models where LTD is the dependent variable. 
Taking a quick glance at the results, they indicate that whether the unobserved component is 
fixed amongst cross-sections or varies is inconclusive. The results may be in part due to 
employing the capital variables, which are influenced by the regulatory measures to which 
banks are subjected to ensuring their stability. As for the analysis of the results for the 
explanatory variables, the researcher has grouped some of these variables based on their 
definitions. In the empirical estimation, the study has used OLS, random, and fixed-effects 
models to estimate the impact of various internal factors on liquidity risk. This analysis will 
compare the results of different models, though most of the results have the same sign in the 
three methods.  
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Table 33: Empirical results about the impact of internal variables on liquidity risk 
/LTD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(LTD) 
Model 1 
RE 
Model 2 
FE 
Model 3 
RE 
Model 4 
FE 
Model 5 
FE 
Model 6 
RE 
Model 7 
FE 
Model 8 
FE 
Model 9 
RE 
Profitability Ratio 
ROAA 0.109*** 
(0.031) 
0.117*** 
(0.031) 
0.058* 
(0.031) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
ROAE ----- ----- ----- 0.033 
(0.025) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
0.055** 
(0.026) 
----- ----- ----- 
NIM ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.169*** 
(0.014) 
0.168*** 
(0.015) 
0.139*** 
(0.013) 
Capital Ratio 
TCR -0.033 
(0.079) 
----- ----- 0.042 
(0.039) 
----- ----- -0.028 
(0.047) 
----- ----- 
TIER1 ----- 0.174 
(0.170) 
----- ----- 0.268** 
(0.135) 
----- ----- 0.038 
(0.127) 
----- 
EQTA ----- ----- 0.026*** 
(0.005) 
----- ----- 0.030*** 
(0.006) 
----- ----- 0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Credit risk & Quality Management Ratios 
CTIR 0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.005) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.086** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
MARS -0.098*** 
(0.036) 
-0.024 
(0.047) 
-0.067** 
(0.034) 
-0.037 
(0.031) 
-0.034 
(0.032) 
-0.068*** 
(0.019) 
0.005 
(0.035) 
-0.079** 
(-0.079) 
-0.088*** 
(0.028) 
LOLTA 0.030 
(0.029) 
-0.011 
(0.024) 
0.038 
(0.027) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
0.007 
(0.023) 
0.039 
(0.029) 
0.099** 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.016) 
0.021 
(0.018) 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.393*** 
(0.056) 
0.295*** 
(0.070) 
0.222** 
(0.087) 
0.293*** 
(0.038) 
0.285*** 
(0.034) 
0.225*** 
(0.059) 
0.113*** 
(0.038) 
0.095*** 
(0.037) 
0.079* 
(0.044) 
IBR 0.082** 
(0.034) 
0.071*** 
(0.025) 
0.059* 
(0.032) 
0.092*** 
(0.027) 
0.086*** 
(0.026) 
0.062*** 
(0.019) 
-0.002 
(0.018) 
0.111*** 
(0.017) 
0.086*** 
(0.021) 
M2GDP -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.039** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
DARS 0.082** 
(0.035) 
-0.085** 
(0.031) 
0.048 
(0.033) 
0.090** 
(0.027) 
0.091*** 
(0.026) 
0.050** 
(0.023) 
0.003*** 
(0.015) 
0.039** 
(0.016) 
0.015 
(0.019) 
Constant 3.966*** 
(0.407) 
3.342*** 
(0.411) 
3.528*** 
(0.278) 
3.522*** 
(0.291) 
3.331*** 
(0.337) 
3.363*** 
(0.172) 
3.733*** 
(0.392) 
3.566*** 
(0.390) 
3.611*** 
(0.204) 
R2 0.234 0.703 0.349 0.674 0.671 0.347 0.818 0.818 0.529 
F-statistic 4.955*** 15.142*** 8.717*** 13.194*** 13.071*** 8.641*** 28.668*** 28.709*** 18.266*** 
No. Obs. 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
This table presents the results of the analysis of the econometric models that were mentioned in the methodology section. The analysis is done for the period 2004 to 2015. 
The dependent variable in these models was the loan to deposits ratio (LTD) whereas the internal factors include ratios for profitability, capital, size, non-performing loans 
and cost to income ratio. The selection of the models between random and fixed effects was based on the results of the Hausman test. Standard errors in the parentheses are 
the white robust standard errors. The asterisk signs refer to the significance of the variables: * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%. 
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4.5.1.1 Profitability 
In commercial banking in Jordan, banks usually depend on lending as their main source of 
income as interest revenues constitute about 60% of the total revenues for the banking sector. 
In the first three models, profitability as expressed by ROAA was statistically significant at a 
99% confidence level in the first two models and at 90% in the third. An increase of one unit 
in the ROAA would result in an increase of liquidity risk, measured by LTD, of (0.058 to 
0.109). Thus, an increase in the ROAA would result in LTD increasing by a marginally small 
amount. In the next three models, ROAE was found to be significant at 95% in the sixth model 
with a relatively smaller impact on LTD than ROAA, i.e. an increase on the ROAE by one unit 
would result in an increase in liquidity risk by 0.055. In addition, the NIM was significant at 
99% confidence level at all models, with a higher impact than ROAA and ROAE. An increase 
in the NIM by one unit would result in an increase in liquidity risk between (0.139 to 0.169). 
The results for these variables in the OLS models and the random effects models were the 
same, indicating a negative impact of profitability on liquidity, which has a positive 
relationship with liquidity risk; therefore, the researcher can deduct that profitability has a 
positive impact on liquidity risk in all of the above models. 
These results are in line with the nature and characteristics of the Jordanian banking sector, 
which relies on traditional banking roles as its main source of income. The results (see Table 
33) state that profitability, measured by ROAA, has a positive impact on LTD, which is used 
as a proxy for liquidity risk, indicating that an increase in the ROAA at Jordanian banks would 
result in an increase in liquidity risk. In addition, ROAE has a positive but insignificant impact 
on liquidity risk measured by LTD, stressing the same results that the study got earlier. 
Moreover, the NIM impact on liquidity risk was positive and significant at a 99% confidence 
level in the last three models.  
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The results suggest that NIM, which is used to express the ability of the bank to generate net 
revenues from their core functions (extending credit and accept deposits from their 
counterparts), has a higher and significant impact on liquidity risk, measured by LTD, 
compared to the impact of ROAA and ROAE, which include the revenues generated from fees 
and charges. This is consistent with the fact that the conservative nature of commercial banks 
in Jordan and the low complexity of the financial market in which they operate leads to the 
conclusion that banks’ lending growth will be highly associated with liquidity risk as it has a 
direct impact on NIM. In addition, the results implicitly indicate that an increase in interest 
expenses that results from the rise in liquidity acquired from deposits has a negative impact on 
liquidity risk, measured by LTD. Therefore, an increase in banks’ risk appetite would result in 
an increase in their credit exposures and affect the structure of their balance sheets through 
decreasing the level of liquid assets held by commercial banks at the expense of liquid assets. 
Striving to maximise profits through reducing the amount of liquid assets that is available 
would impact bank operations exposure, which would result in high risk exposure through 
increased credit lending. 
Also, these results indicate the Jordanian banks have limited capacity in accessing liquidity 
resources through deposits of wholesale funding, thus influencing liquidity risk positively. 
These results were consistent with Wójcik-Mazur and Szajt (2015), whom reported a positive 
relationship between liquidity risk and interest rate margin ratio, which was attributed to the 
impact of lending activities of commercial banks on the margin increase. The reason behind 
that is the level of lending activity; greater credit growth may result in a significant increase in 
NIM. Pagratis et al. (2017) attributed the positive impact to banks’ ability to access wholesale 
funding due to their size, which implies that small banks aim for higher interest rate margins 
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compared to larger banks due to their higher dependence on net interest income as a main factor 
that constitutes the majority of their profits. 
The results came in line with the researcher expectations in the hypothesis section. As banks 
in Jordan rely mainly on traditional banking as their main source of revenue, maximising their 
profit would result in higher exposure to liquidity risk. Therefore, banks in Jordan should pay 
more attention to their market exposures due to its negative impact on liquidity; thus their 
liquidity risk would increase if they adopted more aggressive policies. The results that the 
researcher got are backed by the findings of some articles in the literature, which stated that an 
increase in profitability would impact liquidity negatively, therefore increasing banks’ 
exposure to liquidity risk and heightening their need to search for additional funding resources 
(e.g., Barth et al., 2003; Kosmidou, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Sufian & Chong, 
2008; Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 2015; Pagratis et. al, 2017). 
4.5.1.2 Capital 
The measures of capital that are referred to in the models are widely used in empirical research. 
TIER1 is equity capital and disclosed reserves that are divided by risk-weighted assets. TIER1 
is considered a measure of banks’ strength and is one of the measures implemented by banks 
and supervised by regulatory authorities in accordance with the Basel regulations. It is a 
measure of the bank’s core capital.  
Similarly, the TCR measures a bank’s capital in relation to the risk taken through weighting its 
assets. The idea behind these two measures is to ensure a bank has enough capital to cover the 
risk taken through its lending activities. Around 50% of TCR comprise TIER1. Furthermore, 
EQTA is a measure of the percentage of banks’ assets funded by private equity. The higher the 
ratio, the less debt the bank uses to acquire assets. It signifies that investors believe that the 
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bank is worth investing in. In addition, it is cheaper to finance through equity, which entails 
less debt-servicing costs. 
The results of the models show that TCR does not have a significant impact on liquidity risk, 
measured by LTD, in all of the models. In addition, TIER1 has a significant positive impact on 
LTD, which is a proxy for liquidity risk at a 95% confidence level only in the fifth model. An 
increase of one unit in TIER1 variable will result in an increase of 0.268, indicating that TIER1 
capital has a positive impact on LTD, which has a positive relationship with liquidity risk. 
Therefore, the researcher can deduct that TIER1 ratio has a positive impact on liquidity risk, 
therefore, regulatory authorities should take into consideration the level of liquidity in the 
banking system and the management framework of liquidity management at commercial banks 
before setting Tier 1 ratios and identify their components.  
The EQTA has a positive and significant impact on LTD at a 99% confidence level. An increase 
of one unit in EQTA would result in an increase in LTD of 0.017 to 0.03, indicating a positive 
impact of EQTA on liquidity risk. The results of the OLS and random effects models indicate 
that the TCR and the TIER1 variables mostly have an insignificant negative impact on liquidity 
risk while EQTA has a positive significant impact in all of the models. 
The models show that TIER1 has the highest positive impact on LTD, whereas the EQTA 
impact was positive in all of the models. The results show the influence of regulatory 
frameworks that are set by supervisory authorities in accordance with Basel requirements, 
which is around 8% of risk-weighted assets. In addition, banks are required to have liquidity 
buffers in order to cover the operational risks that arise from their day-to-day operations.  
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An increase in TIER1, which includes generated profits, is associated with higher liquidity risk, 
which implicitly shows that variations in TIER1 are largely associated with changes in the 
profits generated by banks as most of the paid-in capital, required and optional reserves are 
stable. Therefore, the researcher can deduct that an increase in TIER1 capital that results from 
a rise in profits would increase the liquidity risks faced by banks. Moreover, banks with 
adequate liquidity buffers would insulate the impact of capital on liquidity risk. In addition, the 
results indicate that a higher capital structure could impact liquidity risk positively through the 
relationship between a bank’s capital structure and its lending activities if it has sufficient 
liquidity buffers. 
The impact of capital frameworks that are set by central banks requires banks to relate the 
amount of high quality capital to cover their risky operations through having a minimum 
requirement. This would result in TIER1 being a factor that is responsive to changes in risk-
weighted assets depending on banks’ risk appetite, the expansion of their activities, and the 
quality of their assets. These results can be related to the commercial banks in Jordan where 
most of the components on the equity side are stable with the exception of retained earnings, 
which are impacted by the level of profits generated each year.  
The findings of the empirical estimation were counter-intuitive to the researcher expectations 
in the hypothesis section. The researcher has expected that banks with higher capital ratios be 
exposed to lower liquidity risk levels. However, the analysis clearly shows that it has a positive 
impact on liquidity risk. The main reason for this is that well-capitalized banks tends to have 
lower liquidity targets, which is consistent with the results of Banerjee and Mio (2017), who 
found evidence that stronger banks with higher capitalization ratios have lower liquidity 
targets. Moreover, the nature of the banking system and its reliance on lending as a main source 
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of income and on private funding for capitalization means that its tends to employ available 
resources to maximise profits. Moreover, Ben Naceur and Roulet (2017) indicated that capital 
has a positive impact of liquidity ratios. 
4.5.1.3 Bank Size 
The researcher has used the natural log of the total assets for Jordanian commercial banks 
in Jordan, which is an asset-based measure, in order to estimate the impact of bank size on 
liquidity risk. The results in the above models were mostly significant at a 95% confidence 
level and had a negative impact on LTD, thus negatively influencing liquidity risk. An increase 
of the bank size by one unit would result in an increase of (-0.067 to -0.098), emphasizing the 
negative impact of the bank size on liquidity risk. These results were also similar in the OLS 
and random effects model.  
This demonstrated that bank size has a negative impact on liquidity risk as larger banks tend to 
have different operations as well as their core banking business. Large banks will also attract 
more clients and increase their liquid assets and deposit base through their market power 
competitions. Moreover, the large bank will more attractive to big corporates as a safeguard 
(storage) of their money that will enhance the liquidity position of the large bank and minimize 
liquidity risks. In addition, the distribution of larger banks’ branch networks in Jordan play a 
vital role in accepting deposits from all clients. The results in the LTD models were 
counterintuitive to the researcher expectations in the hypothesis section that banks with higher 
size, measured by the total assets of each individual bank, tend to face higher liquidity risk as 
the researcher expected larger banks to require higher liquidity allocations. The results of the 
study analysis are backed up by some conclusions from the empirical literature (Aspachs et al. 
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2005; Agénor et al. 2004; Delechat et al. 2012; Kashyap & Stein, 2000; Gatev & Strahan, 
2006). 
4.5.1.4 Credit 
The findings of the model showed that there is an insignificant relationship between LTD 
and non-performing loans except for the seventh model where the impact was significant at 
95% confidence level. An increase in credit risk, which is represented by non-preforming loans 
(LOLTA), would result in an increase in LTD by 0.099, positively impacting liquidity risk. In 
addition, it is worth noting that LOLTA was only significant in the seventh model and has a 
fairly small impact on LTD. The results were similar between the OLS, random and fixed 
effects models. The findings indicate that a deterioration in asset quality would result in an 
increase in the liquidity risks faced by banks. Indeed, if banks started to expand their credit 
operations within the domestic market regardless of the quality of the assets that are acquired, 
this would result in an increase in the level of non-performing loans at banks and the loss 
provisions that are taken to cover these losses. This in turn would result in a deterioration in 
banks’ liquidity levels and impact their risk appetite negatively, thus increasing the costs borne. 
Risk appetite could be considered a crucial factor that impacts liquidity risk as it is directly 
related to credit risk and bank lending behaviour. Setting credit risk exposures and the need for 
continued monitoring of lending activities has a positive impact on liquidity risk. The findings 
of the analysis are backed up by the empirical literature (Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; Ejoh 
et al., 2014; Roman and Sargu, 2015, Wójcik-Mazur and Szajt, 2015; Roulet, 2018), implying 
a positive impact between liquidity risk and lending activities.  
It is worth noting that non-performing loans were only significant in one model. The reason 
behind these results could be explained through the existence of regulatory measures that were 
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set by the central bank and adopted by commercial banks in Jordan, influencing the impact of 
non-performing loans on liquidity. Furthermore, there is another influence from the impact of 
credit risk on liquidity risk through interest rate structure, which is determined indirectly 
through the monetary policy adopted by the central banks. An increase in interest rates in the 
market will incentivise the risk appetite of commercial banks, increasing their lending activities 
to maximise profits. 
These results illustrate the importance of setting credit risk exposures within commercial banks 
while taking into consideration the desired levels of liquidity holdings to mitigate against the 
impact of liquidity risk. Relating those findings to commercial banks in Jordan highlights the 
importance of having good asset quality as Jordanian banks depend on their traditional market 
roles as a major source for generating revenues and maximising their profits. 
The findings of the empirical model were aligned with the researcher expectations in the 
hypothesis section that an increase in credit risk, measured by non-performing loans, would 
positively impact the liquidity risk faced by Jordanian commercial banks, which is also 
consistent with most of the surveyed empirical literature (Roulet, 2018; Roman & Sargu, 2015; 
Acharya & Viswanathan, 2011). This shows that there is a positive relationship between 
liquidity risk and credit risks, implying that liquidity risk and credit risk increase in a 
simultaneous manner. 
4.5.1.5 Management Efficiency 
The findings of the models indicate that CTIR, which is used as a proxy for the quality of 
management in the analysis, signals a bank’s ability to generate more profits from revenue 
sources through minimizing costs. The CTIR has a positive impact on LTD at a 95% 
confidence level in most of the models. An increase in CTIR by one unit, which is used as a 
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proxy for quality of management, would result in an increase of LTD by (0.003 to 0.086), 
implying a fairly small negative impact between the quality of management and liquidity risk. 
An increase in the level of CTIR could be attributed to lower efficiency to manage risks by 
management, which would result in a higher liquidity risk being faced by the banks. The results 
were also similar in the OLS, random, and fixed effects models but mostly insignificant in the 
OLS model. The findings indicate a small impact of the quality of management on liquidity 
risk.  
The results could be explained by the impact of the quality of management on banks’ costs, 
which usually decline when management are more efficient at allocating resources more 
efficiently, therefore minimizing banks’ costs and increasing their revenues. This is related to 
cost management, which emphasizes maximising revenue per unit of cost. The quality of 
management is an unobserved variable that is hard to estimate due to the intangibility of its 
products and services. 
These results are strongly related to the environment under which Jordanian banks operate. The 
cost to income ratio (CTIR) is considered an important factor as it is closely linked to the core 
functions of banks due to the nature of activities of domestic banks that are mainly linked to 
extending credit to various institutions. Therefore, the study could view this ratio in Jordan as 
the average revenue per unit cost for credit facilities because the majority of revenues for 
domestic commercial banks comes from interest payments, which indicate that more efficient 
management for resources would result in an increase in revenues per unit cost, which results 
in a decline in the liquidity risks faced by banks.  
The results were in tandem with the researcher initial assessment in the hypothesis section that 
commercial banks with higher efficiency face lower liquidity risks. Moreover, these results 
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were consistent with the evidence in the empirical literature that having better quality 
management decreases firm exposure to liquidity risk (Maudos, et al., 2002; Dietsch & Lozano-
Vivas, 2000; Resti, 1997; ECB, 2010). 
4.5.1.6 Control Variables 
Control variables, which are regulatory variables, have been statistically significant in most 
of the models in Table 33. The reported results were also similar to the OLS, random and fixed-
effects models. More importantly, the analysis shows that regulatory control variables had a 
significant and positive impact on liquidity risk, with LTD as a proxy having a positive impact 
on liquidity risk. These results could be explained through the impact of higher required 
reserves from the central bank, which decreases the amount of available liquidity. Moreover, 
higher interest rates could increase exposure to liquidity risk as it increases the costs borne by 
banks to secure available funding from the market. 
Furthermore, the macroeconomic environment control variable was statistically insignificant 
in most of the reported models in Table 33. This indicates that the regulatory measures set by 
the central bank play a crucial role in insulating the impact of the macroeconomic cycles as 
well on the commercial banks in Jordan. Nevertheless, the dummy variable, which represents 
the impact of the Arab Spring that started in 2010, had a positive impact on liquidity risk, 
proxied by LTD, indicating that Jordanian banks have been impacted negatively by their 
macroeconomic environment as it decreased their ability to collect funding through deposits as 
well as expanding their credit exposure in the market due to the difficult external conditions. 
These results, especially for the regulatory variables, were backed by various findings in the 
empirical literature (Laurine, 2013; Berger et al., 2016; Kim & Santomero, 1988; Eichberger 
& Summer, 2005; Ben Naceur and Roulet 2017; Laeven et al. 2016).  
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4.5.2 Liquid Assets to Total Assets ratio (LQATA) analysis  
Table 34 illustrate the results from the models where LQATA is the dependent variable. 
Table 34: Empirical results about the impact of internal variables on liquidity risk / 
LQATA 
Dependent 
Variable 
(LQATA) 
Model 10 
FE 
Model 11 
FE 
Model 12 
FE 
Model 13 
FE 
Model 14 
FE 
Model 15 
FE 
Model 16 
FE 
Model 17 
FE 
Model 18 
FE 
Profitability Ratio 
ROAA -0.091* 
(0.046) 
-0.094** 
(0.046) 
-0.018 
(0.057) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
ROAE ----- ----- ----- 0.009 
(0.034) 
0.012 
(0.347) 
-0.049 
(0.057) 
----- ----- ----- 
NIM ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -0.169*** 
(0.021) 
-0.164*** 
(0.020) 
-0.161*** 
(0.033) 
Capital Ratio 
TCR 0.441*** 
(0.103) 
----- ----- 0.411*** 
(0.090) 
----- ----- 0.406*** 
(0.094) 
----- ----- 
TIER1 ----- 1.326*** 
(0.334) 
----- ----- 1.229*** 
(0.292) 
----- ----- 1.176*** 
(0.302) 
----- 
EQTA ----- ----- -0.023*** 
(0.008) 
----- ----- -0.025*** 
(0.001) 
----- ----- -0.008 
(0.033) 
Credit risk & Quality Management Ratios 
CTIR -0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.0023) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
MARS -0.135* 
(0.076) 
-0.149** 
(0.076) 
-0.217** 
(0.092) 
-0.127* 
(0.077) 
-0.142* 
(0.077) 
-0.217** 
(0.099) 
-0.140** 
(0.061) 
-0.154** 
(0.064) 
-0.231*** 
(0.072) 
LOLTA 0.106*** 
(0.039) 
0.104*** 
(0.037) 
0.104** 
(0.053) 
0.111*** 
(0.038) 
0.110*** 
(0.036) 
0.054 
(0.065) 
0.101*** 
(0.035) 
0.097*** 
(0.034) 
0.095** 
(0.046) 
Control Variables 
RRR -0.738*** 
(0.136) 
-0.771*** 
(0.141) 
-0.516** 
(0.209) 
-0.704*** 
(0.144) 
-0.732*** 
(0.148) 
-0.542** 
(0.242) 
-0.460*** 
(0.118) 
-0.486*** 
(0.119) 
-0.388*** 
(0.157) 
IBR -0.018 
(-0.077) 
-0.022 
(0.076) 
0.012 
(0.086) 
-0.038 
(0.076) 
-0.042 
(0.075) 
0.033 
(0.096) 
-0.042 
(0.060) 
-0.044 
(0.061) 
-0.011 
(0.065) 
M2GDP 0.013* 
(0.008) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.0095) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
DARS -0.351*** 
(0.111) 
-0.352*** 
(0.113) 
-0.349*** 
(0.118) 
-0.345*** 
(0.109) 
-0.346*** 
(0.111) 
-0.359*** 
(0.137) 
-0.296*** 
(0.078) 
-0.297*** 
(0.081) 
-0.305*** 
(0.084) 
Constant 4.365*** 
(0.659) 
4.362*** 
(0.689) 
6.261*** 
(0.671) 
4.218*** 
(0.554) 
4.211*** 
(0.576) 
6.505*** 
(0.663) 
4.770*** 
(0.593) 
4.793*** 
(0.637) 
6.534*** 
(0.546) 
R2 0.769 0.775 0.744 0.759 0.764 0.709 0.825 0.823 0.805 
F-statistic 21.292*** 22.003 18.555*** 20.145*** 20.703*** 15.614*** 30.119 29.792*** 26.424*** 
No. Obs. 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
This table presents the results of the analysis of the econometric models that were mentioned in the methodology section. The analysis is done for 
the period 2004 to 2015. The dependent variable in these models was the liquid assets to total assets ratio (LQATA) whereas the internal factors 
include ratios for profitability, capital, size, non-performing loans and cost to income ratio. The selection of the models between random and fixed 
effects was based on the results of the Hausman test. Standard errors in the parentheses are the White robust standard errors The asterisk signs refer 
to the significance of the variables: * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%. 
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Taking a brief look at the results, they indicate that whether the unobserved component is fixed 
amongst cross-sections or varies were fixed among cross-sections meaning that group means 
are fixed among cross-sections. These results are the results of using variables that are 
influenced by the regulations that are set by regulatory bodies such as capital, and measures 
that are in place related to liquidity, which would be the same across banks. As for the analysis 
of the results for the explanatory variables, the study has grouped some of these variables based 
on their definitions. In the empirical estimation, the study has used OLS, random, and fixed 
effects models in order to estimate the impact of various internal factors on liquidity risk. The 
analysis will compare the results of different models, though most of the results have the same 
sign in the three methods.  
4.5.2.1 Profitability 
In Jordanian commercial banks, lending is considered the main source of income, as interest 
revenues constitute more than half of the total revenues for the banking sector. In the first three 
models, profitability as expressed by ROAA was statistically significant at a 90% confidence 
level in the first two models. An expected (-0.094 to -0.091) percentage change in LQATA 
when ROAA increases by 1% change as the relationship between liquid assets and liquidity 
risk is reversed. Thus, an increase in the ROAA would result in a decline in LQATA by a 
marginally small amount.  
In the next three models, ROAE was found to be insignificant. In addition, the NIM was 
significant at a 99% confidence level in all models, with a higher impact than ROAA and 
ROAE. An increase in the NIM by one unit would result in a decline in liquid assets between 
(-0.169 to -0.161). The results for these variables in the OLS models and the random effects 
models were the same, indicating a negative impact of profitability on liquidity, which has a 
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positive relationship with liquidity risk; therefore, the researcher can deduct that profitability 
has a positive impact on liquidity risk in all of the above models. 
The same impact of profitability on liquidity risk is found in LQATA models as in the LTD 
models as profitability, measured by ROAA, has a negative impact on liquid assets, which 
means that profitability has a positive impact on liquidity risk, indicating that an increase in 
ROAA at Jordanian banks results in an increase in liquidity risk. In addition, ROAE has a 
positive but insignificant impact on liquidity risk measured by LQATA, stressing the same 
results that the study got earlier. Moreover, the NIM impact on liquid assets to total assets was 
negative at 99% confidence in the last three models, therefore demonstrating a positive impact 
on liquidity risk. 
The results demonstrated that NIM, which is used to express the ability of a bank to generate 
net revenues from its core functions (extending credit and accepting deposits from 
counterparts), has a higher and significant impact on liquidity risk, measured by LQATA, 
compared to the impact of ROAA and ROAE, which include the revenues generated from fees 
and charges. This is consistent with the conservative nature of commercial banks in Jordan and 
the low complexity of the financial market in which they operate, which leads to the conclusion 
that banks’ lending growth will be highly associated with liquidity risk as it has a direct impact 
on NIM.  
In addition, the results implicitly indicate that an increase in interest expenses, which result 
from a rise in liquidity acquired from deposits, has a negative impact on liquidity risk, measured 
by LQATA. Therefore, an increase in banks’ risk appetite would result in an increase in their 
credit exposures and affect the structure of their balance sheets through decreasing the level of 
liquid assets held by commercial banks at the expense of liquid assets. Striving to maximise 
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profits through reducing the amount of liquid assets available would impact bank operations 
exposure, which in turn would result in a high risk exposure through increased credit lending. 
In addition, these results indicate that Jordanian banks have limited capacity to access liquidity 
resources through deposits of wholesale funding, thus positively influencing their liquidity risk. 
These results were consistent with Wójcik-Mazur and Szajt (2015), who reported a positive 
relationship between liquidity risk and the interest rate margin ratio, which was attributed to 
the impact of commercial banks’ lending activities on their margin. This is due to the level of 
lending activity; the greater credit growth may result in a significant increase in NIM. 
Furthermore, Pagratis et al. (2017) attributed the positive impact to banks’ ability to access 
wholesale funding due to their size, which implies that small banks aim for higher interest rate 
margins compared to larger banks due to their higher dependence on net interest income as a 
main factor that constitutes the majority of their profits. 
The results came in line with the researcher expectations in the hypothesis section. As banks 
in Jordan rely mainly on traditional banking as their main source of revenue, maximising their 
profits would result in greater exposure to liquidity risk. Therefore, banks in Jordan should pay 
more attention to their market exposures due to its negative impact on liquidity. Adopting more 
aggressive policies would therefore increase their liquidity risk. The results that the study got 
are backed by the findings of some articles in the literature, which stated that an increase in 
profitability would impact liquidity negatively and, therefore, increase banks’ exposure to 
liquidity risk and heighten their need to search for additional funding resources (e.g., Barth et 
al., 2003; Kosmidou, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Sufian & Chong, 2008; Wójcik-
Mazur & Szajt, 2015; Pagratis et. al, 2017). 
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4.5.2.2 Capital 
Measures of capital that are referred to in the models are widely used in empirical research. 
The TIER1 is equity capital and disclosed reserves that are divided by risk-weighted assets. 
TIER1 is considered as a measure of banks’ strength and is one of the measures that are 
implemented by banks and supervised by regulatory authorities in accordance with Basel 
regulations. It is a measure of a bank’s core capital. Similarly, the TCR measures a bank’s 
capital in relation to its risk taken through weighting its assets. The idea behind these two 
measures is to ensure banks have enough capital to cover the risk posed from their lending 
activities. Around 50% of TCR comprise of  TIER1. Furthermore, EQTA is a measure for the 
percentage of banks’ assets that are funded by private equity. The higher the ratio, the less debt 
that the company used to acquire assets. This signifies that investors believe that the bank as 
worth investing in. In addition, it is cheaper to finance through equity as it entails less debt-
servicing costs. 
The results of the models show that TCR has a significant impact on liquidity risk at a 99% 
confidence interval, measured by LQATA, in all of the models. An increase in TCR by one 
unit will result in an increase in LQATA by (0.406 to 0.441), which is translated as a negative 
impact on liquidity risk. TIER1 also has a positive significant impact on LQATA at a 99% 
confidence interval, which has a negative impact on liquidity risk. An increase in one unit in 
TIER1 would result in an increase in LQATA by (1.176 to 1.326). In contrast, EQTA has a 
significant negative impact on LQATA at a 99% confidence interval between (-0.023 to 0.025), 
which means that EQTA has a positive impact on liquidity risk as the relationship between 
liquid assets (LQATA) and EQTA is negative. The impact of TIER1 is higher than TCR and 
both of them have a different impact compared to EQTA, which is negative and fairly small. 
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The deviation of the results between those variables is due to the influence of capital regulations 
that are set by regulatory bodies in accordance with Basel requirements. The difference 
between the impact of capital on liquidity risk was found to be positive in the case of using 
LTD and negative when using LQATA as proxies for liquidity risk. This is mainly due to the 
nature of both indicators and their relationship with liquidity risk. LTD is an indicator that 
measures the ratio of loans to total deposits, therefore the higher the ratio, the lower the 
available liquidity at banks and the higher the liquidity risk. LQATA, by contrast, measures 
the share of liquid assets to total assets. Jordanian banks’ ownership structure and their reliance 
on family finance is an important factor that should be taken into consideration while analysing 
the impact of capital (Omet, 2005). Accordingly, an increase in capital through private 
financing would result in an increase in liquid assets, as investors will have a more risk-averse 
attitude compared to debt financing. However, the increase in bank capitalization will increase 
the credibility and strength of the bank, increasing the deposits that banks acquire from their 
depositors.  
The rise in resources at banks will increase the cost of holding large amounts of liquidity and 
the ability of the bank to extend credit. In addition, bank owners will strive to increase the 
return of their capital injections, which would result in aggressive polices to increase their 
return through enlarging their credit portfolio. Therefore, increasing capital would result in 
increasing liquid assets at first, but the following increase in deposits and bullish policies after 
capitalization would result in an increase in the liquidity risks that banks are facing. 
Banks are required to have liquidity buffers in order to cover the operational risks that result 
from their day-to-day operations. Banks with adequate liquidity buffers would insulate the 
impact of capital on liquidity risk. The results of the OLS and random effects models indicate 
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that the TCR and TIER1 variables have a significant positive impact on LQATA, which is 
translated as negative on liquidity risk while EQTA has a negative significant impact on 
LQATA, which is translated as a positive impact on liquidity risk in all of the models. 
Therefore, the study can deduct that many internal factors influence the impact of capital on 
liquidity risk at commercial banks in Jordan. The impact will depend on the ownership 
structure, liquidity holding levels at banks, efficiency of management, and the existence of 
liquidity buffers at banks, as well as their risk appetite and creditworthiness. Accordingly, it 
will be hard to distinguish the impact of capital while alleviating the influence of these factors 
on capital and liquidity risk. 
The findings of the empirical estimation were similar to the researcher expectations in the 
hypothesis section where LQATA is the dependent variable. The researcher had expected 
banks with higher capital ratios to be exposed to lower liquidity risk levels. Kim and Sohn 
(2017) and Bonner et al. (2015) indicated that a positive impact of capital is that an increase in 
the capital ratio increases banks’ liquidity holdings. In addition, capital has moderate effects 
on a financial institution’s liquidity buffers as the presence of liquidity regulations neutralizes 
most of the bank and country-specific factors that affect the size of commercial banks’ liquidity 
buffers. 
4.5.2.3 Bank Size 
The researcher has used the natural log of the total assets of commercial banks in Jordan – an 
asset-based measure – in order to estimate the impact of bank size on liquidity risk. The results 
in the above models were mostly significant at a 90% confidence level and had a negative 
impact on LQATA, thus positively influencing liquidity risk. An increase of the size by one 
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unit would result in a decline of (-0.127 to -0.231), emphasizing the negative impact of the size 
on LQATA. 
This indicates that bank size has a positive impact on liquidity risk when using LQATA as a 
proxy for liquidity risk as larger banks tend to have different operations than core banking 
businesses, and therefore set lower liquidity target levels. Moreover, banks with a larger share 
of operations may have higher exposure to market conditions and the cyclicality of the 
economy, increasing their revenues and their operations at peak episodes while decreasing their 
asset quality, resulting in an increase in the need for liquidity to cover their risks.  
These results are in contrast with the researcher initial expectation that larger banks measured 
by total assets tend to face higher liquidity risk as the study expected a larger bank to need 
higher liquidity allocations. The results of the study analysis are backed up by some 
conclusions from the empirical literature (Aspachs et al. 2005; Agénor et al. 2004; Delechat et 
al. 2012; Kashyap & Stein, 2000; Gatev & Strahan, 2006), which point larger banks’ ability to 
have lower liquidity targets than smaller banks through their higher efficiency in managing 
their risks, thus freeing up more liquidity. Being more prone to liquidity risk could be related 
to the characteristics of Jordanian banks where two banks have more than 50% market share in 
terms of total assets, which increases the vulnerability of the banking system in Jordan to 
systematically domestic important banks. This requires further supervision to ensure that they 
are healthy. 
4.5.2.4 Credit 
The results indicate that non-performing loans have a positive and significant impact on 
LQATA at a 95% confidence level in all of the LQATA models, except for the 15th model, 
where the impact was statistically insignificant. An increase in LOLTA by one unit results in 
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a rise in LQATA by (0.095 to 0.111). The results in the models captured the influence of credit 
regulations that are set by supervisory authorities on asset quality and their impact on banks’ 
financial statements. The increase in non-performing loans as a result of the deterioration of 
the asset quality at commercial banks would result in an increase in the credit risk faced by 
banks and require increasing provisions against expected losses in accordance with the 
supervisory regulations. Though regulations have improved asset quality with regards to 
lending, banks still have to account for loan defaults and expenses that occur. Loan loss 
provisions are a standard accounting adjustment made to a bank’s loan loss reserves included 
in its financial statements.  
Therefore, a rise in non-performing loans would require banks to increase their provisions for 
the expected losses, which would result in an increase in the levels of liquidity held by banks, 
which decrease its impact on liquidity risk. The regulations by supervisory authorities seem to 
have a higher impact on liquidity risk if the above results were compared with the previous 
models where LTD is the dependent variable. Most of the model results were insignificant 
except for one model which showed that non-performing loans positively impact liquidity risks 
in Jordanian commercial banks. The results were similar between the OLS, random and fixed 
effects models.  
Accordingly, the impact of an increase in credit risk due to a rise in non-performing loans 
would increase the level of liquid assets held by banks and therefore negatively impact liquidity 
risk. This impact comes directly from loan loss provisions, which have a higher impact in 
Jordan than other influences on risk appetite and the confidence of depositors. The results in 
the LQATA models were counterintuitive to the researcher expectations in the hypothesis 
section that commercial banks with high non-performing loans face higher liquidity risk. The 
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results in the LTD models were mostly insignificant but had a different sign. These results can 
be explained by the impact of the regulations set by supervisory authorities on credit exposures 
and the need for banks to make loss provisions against their bad loans. The results for both 
models were backed by the results found by Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), who concluded 
that there is no economically meaningful relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk. 
They indicated that the interaction between liquidity risk and credit risk increases the 
probability of default among banks, which calls for joint management of these risks in banks. 
4.5.2.5 Management Efficiency 
The findings of the models indicate that the cost to income ratio (CTIR), which is used as a 
proxy for the quality of management in the analysis, signals a bank’s ability to generate more 
profits from revenue sources through minimizing costs. A higher CTIR suggests lower-quality 
management. CTIR has a negative impact on LQATA at a 90% confidence level in most of the 
models. An increase in CTIR by one unit, which is used as a proxy for quality of management, 
would result in a decline in LQATA by (-0.004 to -0.007), implying a fairly small negative 
impact between quality of management and liquidity risk. The results were also similar in the 
OLS, random, and fixed effects models but mostly insignificant in the OLS and random effect 
models.  
An increase in the CTIR, which is a proxy for the quality of management, due to a deterioration 
in the quality of management would result in a decline in the level of liquid assets held by 
commercial banks, which in turn would positively impact liquidity risk. Therefore, the study 
can deduce that there is a negative but small influence between the quality of management and 
liquidity risk. The results could be explained by the impact of the quality of management on 
banks costs, which usually decline when management can allocate resources more efficiently, 
273 
 
thereby minimizing bank costs and increasing revenues. This is related to cost management, 
which emphasizes maximising revenue per unit of cost. Quality of management is an 
unobserved variable that is hard to estimate due to the intangibility of banks’ products and 
services. 
These results are strongly related to the environment under which Jordanian banks operate. The 
cost to income ratio (CTIR) is considered an important factor as it is closely linked to the core 
functions of banks due to the nature of activities of domestic banks that are mainly linked to 
extending credit to various institutions. Therefore, the researcher could view this ratio in Jordan 
as the average revenue per unit cost for credit facilities because the majority of revenues for 
domestic commercial banks comes from interest payments, which indicate that more efficient 
management for resources would result in an increase in revenues per unit cost, which results 
in a decline in the liquidity risks faced by banks.  
The results were in tandem with the researcher initial assessment in the hypothesis section that 
commercial banks with higher efficiency face lower liquidity risks. Moreover, these results 
were consistent with the evidence in the empirical literature that having better quality 
management contributes  decreases liquidity risk exposure (Maudos, et al., 2002; Dietsch & 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Resti, 1997; ECB, 2010). 
4.5.2.6 Control Variables 
Some of the control variables, which include regulatory and macroeconomic variables, have 
been statistically significant in most of the models, especially RRR in Table 34. The reported 
results were also similar to the OLS, random and fixed effects models. The findings show that 
RRR has a significant negative impact on LQATA at a 95% confidence level for all of the 
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LQATA models, indicating that required reserve ratios have a positive impact on liquidity risk 
as higher required reserves at the central bank decrease the amount of liquidity available.  
The impact of interbank interest rates on LQATA was insignificant in all of the models. 
M2GDP had a significant impact of LQATA in the three models at a 90% confidence level, 
but a fairly small one. An increase in M2GDP, which is a complex concept that expresses long-
term economic growth, would result in an increase in LQATA, and decrease the level of 
liquidity risk faced by commercial banks. The dummy variable which represents the impact of 
the Arab Spring that started since 2010 had a negative impact on LQATA, which is translated 
into a positive impact on liquidity risk. This indicates that Jordanian banks have been 
negatively impacted by their macroeconomic environment as it decreases their ability to collect 
funding through deposits as well as extend credit in the market due to the difficult external 
conditions. These results, especially for the regulatory variables, were backed by findings in 
the empirical literature (Laurine, 2013; Berger et al., 2016; Kim & Santomero, 1988; 
Eichberger & Summer, 2005; Ben Naceur and Roulet, 2017; Laeven et al., 2016). 
4.5.3 Post Estimation Test Results 
The researcher has employed several tests to check for the robustness of the models used in the 
analysis. The following table shows the results of the adopted models in the analysis (fixed and 
random effects models). The F-statistics test is used to test the overall significance of the 
regression model. Specifically, it tests the null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients 
are equal to zero. This tests the full model against a model with no variables and with the 
estimate of the dependent variable being the mean of the values of the dependent variable. This 
shows that all of the models of LTD and LQATA were significant at the 1% confidence level. 
The R-squared results were relatively high, indicating that the variables in the models explain 
275 
 
most of the variations in the independent variables. Moreover, the J-B test shows that the 
residuals of the regressions were normally distributed. The VIF for the models shows that 
multicollinearity does not exist in the models as all of the results were below the 10 threshold. 
The redundant fixed effects tests show that the effects were significant in all of the fixed effects 
models that were selected based on the Hausman test results.  
Table 35: Robustness tests for the LTD and LQATA models 
Test Model 1 
RE 
Model 2 
FE 
Model 3 
RE 
Model 4 
FE 
Model 5 
FE 
Model 6 
RE 
Model 7 
FE 
Model 8 
FE 
Model 9 
RE 
F-statistic 4.955*** 15.142*** 8.717*** 13.194*** 13.071*** 8.641*** 28.668*** 28.709*** 18.266*** 
R2 0.234 0.703 0.349 0.674 0.671 0.347 0.818 0.818 0.529 
JB-Test 0.820 2.246 1.776 1.669 1.711 2.193 1.439 1.463 2.348 
Heteroscedasticity 
test  
4.040*** 
 
1.723 3.892*** 2.33** 2.326* 3.898*** 1.534 1.441 1.173 
VIF 1.305 3.367 1.536 3.067 3.039 1.531 5.495 5.495 2.398 
Redundant fixed 
effects ----- 
15.342*** ----- 12.961*** 12.748*** ----- 23.567*** 24.220*** ----- 
Hausman test 13.63 ----- 3.87 ----- ----- 12.97 ----- ----- 9.05 
Wooldridge serial 
corr.  13.619*** 
0.974 15.231*** 4.393 0.459 17.393*** 1.942 1.273 34.865*** 
Test Model 10 
FE 
Model 11 
FE 
Model 12 
FE 
Model 13 
FE 
Model 14 
FE 
Model 15 
FE 
Model 16 
FE 
Model 17 
FE 
Model 18 
FE 
F-statistic 21.292*** 22.003 18.555*** 20.145*** 20.703*** 15.614*** 30.119 29.792*** 26.424*** 
R2 0.769 0.775 0.744 0.759 0.764 0.709 0.825 0.823 0.805 
JB-Test 2.817 2.993 3.633 2.746 2.905 0.901 2.962 3.127 2.209 
Heteroscedasticity 
test  
1.727 1.556 1.751* 1.576 1.449 1.799 2.346* 2.200* 2.118* 
VIF 4.329 4.445 3.906 4.149 4.237 3.436 5.714 5.649 5.128 
Redundant fixed 
effects 
3.964*** 4.226*** 3.987*** 3.597*** 3.801*** 2.737*** 5.479*** 5.708*** 5.515*** 
Hausman test ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Wooldridge serial 
corr.  
0.864 0.974 1.252 1.535 1.710 0.925 0.067 0.107 0.588 
This table presents the robustness test results for the LTD and LQATA models. The tests include the F-statistic test to see the significance of the overall models; R2, which is a 
statistical measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression line; the Jarque-Bera test to gauge the normality of the residuals; the White heteroscedasticity test to see 
whether the data suffers from unequal variability across the range; VIF results, which quantify the extent of correlation between one predictor and the other predictors in a model; 
the redundant fixed effects to test the significance of the effects; the Hausman test to choose whether the fixed or the random effects are more appropriate; and the serial correlations 
test. The asterisk signs refer to the significance of the variables: * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
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However, some of the models suffered from heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the 
LTD models, namely models 1, 3, 4 and 6 for heteroscedasticity and 1, 3, 6 and 9 for serial 
correlation. As for the LQATA models, the test results confirms that they did not suffer from 
statistical problems such as heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. The reason behind the 
problem is that the structure of the banking system in Jordan is concentrated with two banks 
having a market share of more than 50%, which is the reason why the data had to be Winsorized 
before estimating the models.  
4.6 Conclusions  
The analysis in this chapter covered 13 domestic commercial banks in Jordan during the period 
2004 to 2015 to estimate the impact of banks’ internal factors – namely, profitability, capital, 
credit risk, size and quality of management – while controlling for the regulatory and 
macroeconomic environment. The researcher has used the loan-to-deposit ratio and liquid 
assets to total assets ratio as proxies for liquidity risk limited by the available data from banks’ 
financial statements. The used data had outliers due to the structure of the banking sector in 
Jordan where two banks share, in terms of assets, more than 50% of the market. Therefore, the 
data was Winsorized at the level of the 90th percentile to remove outliers. 
The study has faced several limitations while conducting this research. The first was the limited 
data available as only 13 of the 21 banks had data available. Therefore, the analysis covered 13 
domestic commercial banks. Data could not be obtained for the others through the BankScope 
database or manual data entry as these banks are considered as branches of foreign banks that 
reside in Jordan and their balance sheets are often consolidated into their foreign counterparts 
and not published separately. Moreover, the limited availability of long time-series data for 
each bank constrained the researcher to investigate the research problem in a time span that is 
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in parallel with the development of the banking system in Jordan. In addition, very few studies 
have investigated the impact of internal factors such as profitability, capital, credit, size and 
quality of management on liquidity risk within Jordanian commercial banks, whether domestic 
or foreign branches, and most relevant studies in the literature have focused on the impact of 
these factors on profitability. 
The econometric techniques used in this chapter were OLS, fixed and random effects, which 
were mainly used in order to observe the behaviour of the unobserved component between 
cross-sections in the estimated models. The results showed that profitability has a positive 
impact on liquidity risk. The influence of profitability comes from the limited liquidity 
resources that banks have in Jordan. An increase in banks’ risk appetite would result in an 
increase in their credit exposures and affect the structure of their balance sheets through 
decreasing the level of liquid assets held by commercial banks at the expense of liquid assets. 
Striving to maximise profits through reducing the amount of liquid assets available would 
impact bank operating exposure, which would result in high risk exposure through increased 
credit lending. 
The analysis shows asset quality deteriorated due to a rise in non-performing loans, and the 
impact of capital on liquidity risk is influenced by regulatory measures set by the supervisory 
authorities in addition to internal measures that banks take in order to ensure their viability, 
such as limiting certain exposures and the existence of liquidity buffers. Therefore, the impact 
of capital and credit – represented by Tier 1, the total capital ratio and equity to total assets and 
non-performing loans – on liquidity risk was found to be ambiguous due to the interactions 
between different factors.  
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The impact of bank size, measured by the percentage of bank assets to total banking assets, 
was different between the two main variables (LTD and LQATA) as larger banks tend to have 
more operations than just their core banking business, and have more efficient management of 
liquidity, therefore requiring lower liquidity target levels. Larger banks will also attract more 
clients and increase their liquid assets through their market power. Moreover, banks with a 
larger share of operations may have higher exposure to market conditions and the cyclicality 
of the economy. This can increase their revenues at peak episodes while decreasing their profits 
and assets quality, resulting in an increase in the need for liquidity to cover their risks, though 
they are considered more efficient in terms of managing their liquidity. 
The impact of the quality of management on bank costs, which usually decline when 
management can allocate resources more efficiently, minimizes banks costs and increases 
revenues. This is related to cost management, which emphasizes maximising revenue per unit 
of cost. Quality of management is an unobserved variable that is hard to estimate due to the 
intangibility of banks’ products and services. The core functions of Jordanian banks are mainly 
linked to extending credit to various institutions. Therefore, the researcher could view this ratio 
in Jordan as the average revenue per unit cost for credit facilities because the majority of 
revenues for domestic commercial banks come from interest payments, which indicate that 
more efficient management of resources would result in an increase in revenue per unit cost. 
This results in a decline in the liquidity risks faced by banks.  
The control variables for the regulatory environment had a positive impact on liquidity risk 
with regards to the required reserve ratio where an increase in the percentages required by the 
authorities results in a decline in the amount of liquid assets available. Moreover, the impact 
of interbank interest rates was found to be positive as higher interest rates could increase banks’ 
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exposures to liquidity risk as it increases the costs borne by banks to secure available funding 
from the market. The macroeconomic environment control variable was statistically 
insignificant in most of the reported models, indicating that the regulatory measures set by the 
central bank plays a crucial role in insulating Jordan’s commercial banks from the impacts of 
macroeconomic cycles. Nevertheless, the dummy variable which represents the impact of the 
Arab Spring that started in 2010 had a positive impact on liquidity risk. This indicated that 
Jordanian banks have been negatively impacted by their macroeconomic environment as it 
decreased their ability to collect funding through deposits as well as extend credit to customers. 
The findings indicate that internal factors have a major impact on the liquidity risk faced by 
commercial banks in Jordan. These influences are intertwined with the regulatory measures 
imposed by the regulatory authorities, which signals that most banks depend on regulatory 
frameworks to manage their risks. Moreover, the results points to the importance of the risk 
appetite of commercial banks and their impact on liquidity exposures, which will be influenced 
in the near future by the adoption of Basel III. The issue of size plays an important role in terms 
of banks’ exposure to liquidity risk, signalling the importance of having more supervision for 
larger banks in order to reduce their systemic risks and ensure their viability. Finally, the 
existence of efficient management team who can allocate resources more efficiently can limit 
the liquidity risks facing banks. 
The implication of the results discussed above and the study analysis is that when trying to 
understand the internal factors that impact liquidity risk within Jordan’s commercial banks, it 
is necessary to include all of the abovementioned factors and not only consider direct 
contributors to liquidity risk. Therefore, banks in Jordan should take into account the impact 
of credit, capital, size, profitability, management quality and regulatory and macroeconomic 
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factors when setting liquidity risk exposures. These factors should be analysed and reported on 
a regular basis to the ALCO committee, which is responsible for determining the bank’s asset-
liability management framework.  
 
  
Table 36: Correlation Matrix 
Variable  LTD LQATA LOLTA IBR EQTA CTIR M2GDP MARS NIM ROAA ROAE RRR TCR TIER1 
LTD 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
LQATA -0.361*** 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
LOLTA 0.252*** 0.051 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
IBR 0.119 0.341*** -0.018 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
EQTA 0.410*** -0.251*** -0.216*** 0.075 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
CTIR 0.109 -0.063 0.342*** -0.146* -0.228*** 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
M2GDP 0.014 0.542*** -0.040 0.427*** -0.077 -0.133* 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
MARS -0.230*** -0.008 -0.181** -0.127 -0.033 -0.074 -0.214*** 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
NIM 0.394*** -0.276*** 0.078 -0.082 0.082 0.017 -0.105 0.025 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
ROAA 0.040 0.205** -0.160** 0.290*** 0.129 -0.406*** 0.350*** -0.129 0.258*** 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
ROAE -0.114 0.318*** -0.065 0.271*** -0.216*** -0.325*** 0.392*** -0.120 0.210*** 0.932*** 1 ----- ----- ----- 
RRR 0.175** -0.177** -0.283*** 0.122 0.184** 0.017 0.204** 0.060 0.150* -0.059 -0.134* 1 ----- ----- 
TCR -0.121 0.165** -0.381*** 0.154* 0.548*** -0.152* 0.163* -0.336*** -0.128 0.222*** 0.035 0.033 1 -----  
TIER1 -0.113 0.104 -0.391*** 0.123 0.574*** -0.210*** 0.092 -0.311*** -0.143* 0.220*** 0.015 0.062 0.969*** 1 
This table reports the correlation coefficients of all variables used over the period from 2004-2015 for the original data. The asterisk signs refer to the significance of the variables: * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%, respectively. 
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Chapter Five: Main finding, Conclusion, Recommendations and 
Final Remarks 
5.1 Main Findings 
The main findings of the first part, which is related to a survey carried out with the 
commercial banks population in Jordan, shows that all commercial banks have an 
ALM process to address the many risks and challenges that are or may be faced by 
banks in the near future. The primary aim of ALM at Jordanian commercial banks 
is to manage risk exposure. The main role of ALM is to provide metrics for various 
types of risk exposure and to help financial institutions hedge against risks 
(Choudhry, 2011; Zawalinska, 1999). The ALM process deals with managing risk 
exposures, asset liability mismatches and pricing interest rate products through 
covering investment and hedging strategies, methodologies for measuring risks, and 
limit-setting and control to a lesser degree. In addition, the results shows that most 
banks’ ALM strategy is consistent with the overall strategy of the bank. 
Most of these banks also indicated that the two main risk exposures that the ALM 
process is concerned about is managing liquidity and interest rate risks, respectively. 
Managing these risks is done through various tools depending on the scope of the 
ALM process at each bank. For liquidity risk, banks indicated that the main tools 
that they use in managing these risks are cash flow matching, asset liability 
projections, and duration matching in order to preserve the solvency of the bank and 
its ability to meet its financial obligations (Vij, 2005). As for the functional scope of 
ALCO, which is the implementation arm of the ALM strategy, the results show that 
liquidity risk is its main focus, followed by interest rate risk, market risk, exchange 
rate risk, and credit risk, respectively. The risk that arises from volume and maturity 
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mismatches of assets and liabilities is a core focus of ALCO (Bessis, 2015). 
However, around half of the respondents indicated that ALCO is not responsible for 
setting risk exposure limits for liquidity risk, as banks should abide by regulatory 
measures and central bank guidelines in this regard, such as the legal liquidity ratio 
and loan to deposit (LTD) ratio. As for the interest rate risk, the interest rate gap and 
dollar duration (DV01) are the metrics of interest rate risk. Moreover, liquidity 
reports provided to ALCO contain risk exposures, funding liquidity plans, which 
focus on the overall performance of a bank, as well as the business level and must 
focus on proposing strategies that could enhance the performance in the future and 
would allow the bank to tackle any challenge it is facing or will face (Suresh & 
Krishnan, 2018). 
Most of the banks agreed that their adopted strategies are periodically reviewed but 
the frequency of this oversight differs from one bank to another. They also agreed 
that the department that tends to be most responsible for managing liquidity risks is 
the treasury department as it is also responsible for managing the balance sheet, as 
indicated in the survey. Some banks indicated that risk management finance 
departments had a role in managing liquidity risks. Furthermore, Jordanian 
commercial banks indicated that they assess/monitor liquidity risks mainly through 
contractual maturity mismatch that expresses the gap in liquidity inflows and 
outflows arising from long-term illiquid assets and liquid liabilities (Adalsteinsson, 
2014; Pohl, 2017). Furthermore, the results show that using the concentration of 
funding indicator tool, and liquidity metrics, market-related monitoring as well the 
available unencumbered assets indictor are used to assess liquidity risk. Liquidity 
shortages are mainly dealt with through the Inter-bank market where banks borrow 
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to cover their shortages. Others indicated that they used the facilities of their central 
bank as the lender of last resort, and secondary markets as manly the banks have 
lower liquidity targets as they rely on the lender of last resort in case of shortages 
(Aspachs, et al., 2005; Vodova, 2011). The survey results shows that liquidity risk 
is the main focus of ALM and the focal point for the ALCO. In parallel, it indicates 
an over-reliance in the market on central bank guidelines and the absence of a 
comprehensive liquidity management strategy at banks as some of them indicated 
that they have used and identified the lender of last resort as one of the main tools 
for covering liquidity shortages. Therefore, the second part of this thesis focused on 
the impact of internal factors on liquidity risk at commercial banks while controlling 
for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. 
The second part of this thesis shows that internal factors have a big impact on bank 
liquidity. The empirical models showed that a rise in profitability would negatively 
impact banks in Jordan as they rely heavily on traditional banking as a main source 
of revenue, and maximizing their profit would result in higher exposure to liquidity 
risk. There is therefore a positive relationship between liquidity risk and interest rate 
margin ratio, which is attributed to the impact of the lending activities of commercial 
banks on their margins (Wójcik-Mazur & Szajt, 2015). In addition, capital showed 
a positive impact on liquidity risk. These results show the influence of regulatory 
frameworks that are set be supervisory authorities in accordance with Basel 
requirements (around 8% of risk-weighted assets). In addition, banks are required to 
have liquidity buffers in order to cover their operational risks that result from a 
bank’s day to day operations. Capitalized banks also have stronger growth in their 
balance sheets; accumulate less high quality liquid assets tend to finance their risky 
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activities through short-term debt are vulnerable to liquidity shocks and shortages 
(Banerjee & Mio, 2017). 
Moreover, bank size had a negative impact on liquidity risk, as large banks tend to 
have different operations beyond their core banking business. Moreover, large banks 
are more attractive to high-liquidity clients and companies and retailers as safe-guard 
of their money that minimizes liquidity risks by enhancing liquidity positions. In 
addition, large banks’ branch networks also enrich their liquidity position. The 
findings of the models indicate that the negative impact between quality of 
management and liquidity risk. An increase in the level of cost to income could be 
attributed to management having lower efficiency regarding managing risks. This 
would result in banks facing higher liquidity risk, and could be explained by the 
impact of the quality of management on banks’ costs. CTIR illustrates firms’ ability 
to generate profits from their revenue sources (ECB, 2010), which ordinarily decline 
when management are more efficient at allocating resources. As for credit risk, 
which is proxied by non-performing loans, the models indicate that there is no 
significant relationship with liquidity.   
Regulatory control variables had a significant and positive impact on liquidity risk. 
These results could be clarified through the impact of higher required reserves from 
the central bank, which decreases the amount of liquidity available. Macroeconomic 
variables showed an insignificant impact on liquidity, indicating that the regulatory 
measures set by the central bank also play a crucial role in insulating the impact of 
macroeconomic cycles on the commercial banks in Jordan. Nevertheless, the dummy 
variable – which represents the impact of the Arab Spring that started in 2010 – had 
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a positive impact on liquidity risk, indicating that Jordanian banks have been 
impacted negatively by the macroeconomic environment as it has decreased their 
ability to collect funding through deposits as well as expand their credit exposure in 
the market due to the difficult external conditions.  
5.2 Conclusion  
Commercial banks in Jordan are vital for financing other sectors. The turmoil in the 
MENA region and eruption of the Arab Spring in 2010, as well as the Global Financial 
Crisis, exacerbated the challenges that banks in MENA area face, including Jordan. The 
thesis addressed commercial banks in Jordan in two sections. The first concerned 
exploring the current ALM frameworks and roles of ALCO in Jordanian commercial 
banks through questionnaires that comprised of a sequence of questions to capture 
information from respondents. The banking sector in Jordan comprises 25 banks, 4 of 
which are Islamic. The rest (21) are commercial banks, 13 of which are domestic and 
the rest foreign. The questionnaire was distributed to all of the commercial banks in 
Jordan excluding Islamic banks as they adhere to Islamic Sharia Law, which proposes 
a different way of managing banks assets and liabilities. The second part of the thesis 
was concerned with the factors the impact liquidity risk in banks and focused on internal 
factors such as profitability, capital, credit, size and quality of management while 
controlling for the impact of the regulatory and macroeconomic environments on 
commercial banks. The data used was acquired from the BankScope database and the 
central bank of Jordan for 13 banks (depending on data availability) for the period 2004 
to 2015.  
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The survey results indicate that Jordan’s commercial banks already have an ALM 
process that governs their assets and liabilities management and that the ALCO is 
responsible for the ALM process but is not responsible for setting risk metrics that 
quantify various risks. Rather, it is only responsible for setting risk exposure limits. In 
addition, the inputs for the ALCO lack comprehensive reports about the overall 
economic and financial market conditions. The Jordanian commercial banks were 
neutral about their board of directors’ adoption of the strategies set out in the ALCO 
reports. Most of the respondents indicated that the CEO and board of directors of their 
bank were responsible for reviewing the ALCO report. ALCOs meet regularly, usually 
on a monthly basis, but ALM strategy assessments differ from bank to bank. In addition, 
banks perform stress-testing on a regular basis (quarterly) and review their CFP each 
year. Most Jordanian commercial banks have technical liquidity buffers, which indicate 
that banks hold mandatory reserve requirements at the central bank of Jordan without 
benefiting from the remuneration period, and 80% cover liquidity shortages through the 
inter-bank market.  
The results of the second part, which examined thirteen domestic commercial banks in 
Jordan during the period 2004 to 2015 to estimate the impact of banks’ internal factors 
on liquidity risk, showed that profitability has a positive impact on liquidity risk. The 
influence of profitability comes from the limited liquidity resources that banks have in 
Jordan. An increase in banks’ risk appetite would result in an increase in their credit 
exposures and affect the structure of their balance sheets. The impact of bank size, 
measured by the percent of its assets to total assets, was different between the two main 
variables (LTD and LQATA) as larger banks tend to have different operations beyond 
their core banking business, and have more efficient management of liquidity; 
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therefore, they have lower liquidity targets and also tend to attract more clients. This 
increases their liquid assets through their market power. The impact of the quality of 
management on liquidity risk was proxied using the cost to income ratio. This usually 
declines when management are more efficient at allocating resources. In Jordan, this 
ratio could be viewed as the average revenue per unit cost for credit facilities because 
the majority of revenues for domestic commercial banks comes from interest payments. 
This indicates that more efficient management of resources would result in an increase 
in revenues per unit cost, which results in a decline in the liquidity risks faced by banks.  
The impact of capital on liquidity risk is influenced by the regulatory measures set by 
supervisory authorities. The impact of capital and credit, represented by Tier1, the total 
capital ratio and equity to total assets and non-performing loans, on liquidity risk was 
found to be ambiguous due to the interactions between the different factors. 
5.3 Research Contribution 
This research will contribute to the existing body of knowledge through providing 
a fair assessment of the current ALM framework in Jordan as, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge; very few studies have yet been concerned with the ALM 
framework in the MENA region in general and in Jordan specifically. This research will 
conduct a survey of all Jordan commercial banks to explore the current ALM 
framework, the main duties of ALCO, and the focus of ALM in terms of risks and the 
tools that are used to mitigate against these risks. In addition, the survey will enrich the 
body of knowledge through surveying commercial banks’ practices in dealing with 
liquidity risk through ALM.  
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In additions, this research will enrich the existing literature in terms of the tools, as 
the survey tool that used in this research built in a way to cover most of aspects of risks 
management behaviour for banks in general and commercial banks in particular 
covered most of the techniques that could applied in other banks environments. The 
shape of this study could be helpful for the researchers in field of risk management 
studies and banking management. 
The outcome of the survey show that not enough attention is being directed to this 
issue some variety in the role of ALCO is shown as well as its structure within the 
commercial banks, implicitly indicating that there is no clear definition from the 
supervisory authorities on the main roles of ALCO within ALM in Jordan.  Taking into 
account the political volatility of the region and its impact on banks operations, 
commercial banks are using different metrics to set their exposures although the 
macroeconomic, regulatory and products are relatively the same, pointing to the level 
of risk appetite on which these banks operate and their dependency on the central bank 
in setting metrics for risks. In addition, about 40% of the population have indicated 
market risk as being the most important risk factor, followed by credit risk at 20%, 
shedding light on the vulnerability of the banking system in Jordan to the political 
instability in the region, which impacts both macroeconomic and financial conditions. 
This is reflected in banks’ risk appetites as most banks indicated that they are avoiding 
high-risk exposures to reduce their overall risk.  
Therefore, this study is one of the first studies to present the ALM process and 
main responsibilities of ALCO within the population of commercial banks in Jordan. 
This study also tests whether the ALM process is effective in commercial banks through 
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employing a set of sub-hypotheses related to managing banks’ balance sheet, namely: 
the main types of risks, such as liquidity, credit, market, and interest rate risks. It also 
looks at the stress testing and contingency funding plans that banks adopt based on their 
supervisory authorities’ instructions. 
Furthermore, the second part of this thesis will assess the impact of various variables 
related to banking operations and the regulatory framework in Jordan, including the 
impact of macroeconomic conditions on Jordanian commercial banks’ liquidity. In 
addition, the study will deduct useful conclusions and recommendations that would 
help the banking industry to enhance the existing ALM framework, and help banks to 
develop a comprehensive and applicable ALM framework tailored to the Jordanian 
banking system by identifying the main factors that impact liquidity risk.  
The results in the second part clearly indicate that internal factors have a major impact 
on liquidity risk as the strategic plan of commercial banks impact the structure of banks’ 
balance sheet and their operations, and thereby their liquidity positions and risk 
exposures. Therefore, having a consistent strategic plan that is aligned with the bank 
goals regarding maximizing profits and risk appetite, while mitigating against risk 
exposures, is imperative to control changes in these factors. 
For example, the results indicated that profitability had a positive impact on liquidity 
risk, which in the case of Jordanian banks should be warranted by the limited resources 
that banks have, their limited access to wholesale funding, and their reliance on 
conventional banking as their primary means of generating revenues. On the other hand, 
the quality of management had a negative impact on liquidity risk, implying the 
importance of having an efficient management who are able to set strategic plans and 
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limits on risk exposures and risk appetite taking the regulatory and macroeconomic 
circumstances in Jordan into consideration.  
To the best of my knowledge, the study found no previous research on Jordanian 
banking that have the same scope as this questionnaire as most of the available studies 
only study the ALM as a small part of banks’ process of maximizing profit without 
getting into detail about how the ALM process actually works and the role and the scope 
of the ALCO.  
5.4 Policy Implications and Recommendations  
The results of this study provide some implications for policy-makers, banks 
shareholders, academics, as well as, regulatory institutions such as the central bank of 
Jordan. Central banks in countries with similar banking sector, characteristics may find 
the results useful for drafting regulations and policies related to liquidity risk 
management in commercial banks. This would help to safeguard the banking sector 
through encouraging banks to develop guidelines for liquidity management that 
promote transparency in risk management. Regulators could also use this study to set 
guidelines built on the recommendations of the Basel committee. The general findings 
in this study, if shared with other researches, will have remarkable implications in chart 
up risks identifications for financial institutions as well as developing internal reporting 
systems for ALCOs. 
The main conclusions of the research clearly show that internal factors have the biggest 
impact on liquidity risk. Only half of the population in the survey are concerned with 
meeting the liquidity requirements set by their central bank. This indicates the lack of 
a comprehensive framework for liquidity management at commercial banks given the 
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limited capacity of ALCOs to set risk exposures in some banks. This highlights the 
importance of the regulatory body to help banks construct a framework for liquidity 
management that takes a holistic approach to dealing with issues related to transparency 
in risk management, proper delegation of authorities, adequate reporting, and funding 
sources. Such frameworks should be a part of the strategic plans and targets set by 
banks.    
It is hard to set out one best strategy for liquidity management – but multi strategies can 
be adopted to achieve banks goals in profit and growth and enhance commercial banks’ 
abilities in managing their liquidity positions and risks. It is Worth to point out the 
growth in banks’ balance sheet is crucial, it need an appropriate framework support this 
growth and minimize the risks. Therefore, banks’ ALM strategies should be organised 
with other risk plans implemented first followed by banks goals to support and ensuring 
banks sustainable growth. 
Accordingly, the main recommendations from the thesis can be summarized as follows: 
I. Clear framework for liquidity risk management: 
The Jordanian commercial banks should ensure the consistency of their liquidity 
management frameworks with the strategic objectives of operational divisions, taking 
into account the asset and liability structures, capital positions and liquidity on different 
stages, by currencies, products and terms. The liquidity risk framework is extremely 
important from the viewpoint of ensuring the soundness and suitability of banking 
system, the bank management is responsible for taking the initiative in chart up a clear 
liquidity risk management framework, and reviewing in Periodic manner whether the 
framework is appropriate to the bank risk profile, and the nature of its business. 
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II. Setting a proper reporting system for ALCO with adequate terms of 
reference: 
There are no international guidelines that set the main terms of reference for ALCO 
core functions and its designated authority to identify and set risk exposures. Therefore, 
setting a general framework for banks to serve as a guide for an ALCO, with the 
understanding that the ALCO may carry out additional functions and adopt other 
policies and procedures as may be appropriate in light of changing business, legislative, 
regulatory and other conditions, might be useful in reaching a census about the 
committee’s core functions and streamlining the process across banks, which would 
help to reform the process. 
Furthermore, streamlining the process should be in parallel with the reporting system 
for the ALCO, which should include some main macroeconomic and financial 
conditions as well as the main risk exposures at the bank such as liquidity, interest rate 
and credit risk. A feedback mechanism should be established between the board of 
directors and the ALCO through the CEO in order to ensure the consistency of the 
overall bank strategy. 
III. Having a CFP that is continuously updated: 
CFPs at commercial banks should be reviewed periodically, which includes testing the 
CFP, reviewing threshold values for early warning signals and defined normal levels 
for the liquidity risk indicators and updates to the CFP. These changes should take into 
consideration developments in macroeconomic and financial conditions as well as 
changes in the adopted business model. 
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IV. Enhancing coordination between banks and supervisory authorities:  
Supervisory authorities, represented by the central bank in Jordan, have taken a keen 
interest in supervising financial institutions’ liquidity positions as well as liquidity risk 
levels, especially after the Global Financial Crisis, which urged the Basel committee to 
issue the Basel III guidelines that are mainly concerned with liquidity management. 
These changes have increased the regulatory burden on the central bank and increased 
banks’ reliance on its guidelines with regards to liquidity, as shown by the survey 
results. Accordingly, banks could still be lacking a comprehensive framework related 
to liquidity risk management. Therefore, increased coordination between banks and 
central banks is needed through establish systems for assess and measure risks. The 
results of the survey indicated that ALM processes are effective in most Jordanian 
commercial banks, as supported by the results of the sub-hypotheses. Still, some actions 
should be taken in order to insulate banks from liquidity risks, taking into consideration 
the political instability in the region and its impact on the macroeconomic conditions. 
Therefore, the following are a set of recommendations for commercial banks that could 
be implemented: 
Commercial banks should reform the ALCO process as follows: 
ALCO should identify risk metrics that can be used to identify risk exposures as ALCO 
is not responsible for identifying these metrics at present. Therefore, ALCO should be 
more involved in this process. Moreover, around half of the study population indicated 
that their ALCO is not responsible for setting risk exposures as banks are only 
concerned with meeting their minimum regulatory requirements. Therefore, the 
involvement of ALCO in setting risk exposures should be encouraged by supervisory 
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authorities as it would increase the effectiveness of banks in managing both sides of 
their balance sheet. 
Furthermore, inputs for the ALCO should be comprehensive and take into account 
changes in the overall economic and financial market conditions. 
Some banks do not provide the ALCO with credit risk concentration data and forecast 
reports as they only aim to meet the minimum requirements set by the central bank. 
Thus, a remedial action should be taken by the commercial banks as the ALCO is 
responsible for proposing strategies to the board of directors regarding liquidity 
positions, product lines, and the overall strategy of the commercial bank. 
A feedback mechanism should be set between the board of directors and ALCO through 
the CEO in order to ensure the consistency of the overall bank strategy. 
The supervisory authorities, represented by the central bank, should take into 
consideration the results of this survey given the emphasis of Basel III on liquidity 
management, which is an integral part of the ALM process. More specifically, central 
banks should be involved in laying the fundamentals of ALM and ALCO through 
structuring an overall framework for commercial banks to follow that clearly identifies 
the responsibilities of the ALCO as the results of the survey show that their 
responsibilities vary from bank to bank. As 50% of ALCOs in banks are responsible 
for setting risk exposures, different banks have different exposure metrics. 
5.5 Research Limitations 
This research came up against a number of limitations. The limitations in the ALM 
part were as a follows: 
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 Limited population: The Jordanian economy is a small open economy with 
a banking sector comprised of 21 commercial banks and a number of Islamic 
banks. Therefore, this is a limited population to survey.  
 Lack of prior research studies: According to the best of the researcher 
knowledge, very few studies have yet surveyed ALM processes.  
 Bank responsiveness: The researcher confirmed to the banks that the results 
of the survey would not be published on a bank-by-bank level. However, the 
responses from the banks may not reflect their real resource-management 
processes due to disclosure issues or the respondents’ lack of knowledge of 
their actual ALM processes. 
In addition, the study faced some limitations in the liquidity risk evaluation part as 
follows: 
 Data limitations: There are 21 commercial banks in Jordan. Thirteen are 
domestic banks and the rest are foreign banks branches. In this part of the 
paper, the analysis only included the 13 domestic commercial banks as data 
for the rest of the population could not be obtained through the BankScope 
database or through manual data entry as the other 8 commercial banks are 
considered branches of foreign banks that reside in Jordan but whose balance 
sheets are often incorporated in the consolidated balance sheet of the foreign 
parent and are not published separately. Moreover, the researcher could not 
estimate the liquidity gap indicator due to limited data releases from these 
banks in their balance sheet. In addition, the small-time span of the data is 
considered another limitation that led to having a relatively small dataset. 
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 Lack of prior research studies: According to the best of the researcher 
knowledge, very few studies have investigated the impact of internal factors 
such as profitability, capital, credit, size and quality of management on 
liquidity risk at Jordanian commercial banks, whether domestic of foreign 
branches. Most previous studies have focused on the impact of these factors 
on profitability. 
 Longitudinal effect: Compared to the long history of literature on bank 
management in both a global as well as domestic context, this research was 
carried out over a fairly short period of time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 298 
 
References 
Abed, G. & Davoodi, H., 2003. Challenges of growth and globalization in the Middle 
East and North Africa, Washington D.C,: IMF. 
Abu Hussain, H. & Al-Ajmi, J., 2012. Risk management practices of conventional 
and Islamic banks in Bahrain. The Journal of Risk Finance, 13(3), pp. 215-239. 
Acharya, V. V. & Merrouche, O., 2012. Precautionary hoarding of liquidity and 
interbank markets: Evidence from the subprime crisis. Review of Finance, 17(1), pp. 
107-160. 
Acharya, V. V. & Viswanathan, S., 2011. Leverage, moral hazard, and liquidity. The 
Journal of Finance, 66(1), pp. 99-138. 
Adalsteinsson, G., 2014. The Liquidity Risk Management Guide: From Policy to 
Pitfalls. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons. 
Adam, A., 2008. Handbook of asset and liability management from model to optimal 
return strategies. West Sussex: John Wiely and Sons, LTD. 
ADB, 2009. Risk Management and Asset and Liability Management in Banks, 
Bangkok: Asian Development Bank. 
Agnello, L. & Sousa, R., 2012. How do banking crises impact on income inequality?. 
Applied Economics Letters, 19(15), pp. 1425-1429. 
Al Shubiri, F., 2010. Impact of bank asset and liability management on profitability: 
Empirical investigation. Journal of Applied Research in Finance (JARF), 2(4), pp. 
101-109. 
Alam, M. Z. & Masukujjaman, M., 2011. Risk Management Practices: A Critical 
Diagnosis Of Some Selected Commercial Banks In Bangladesh. Journal of Business 
and Technology (Dhaka), 6(1), pp. 15-35. 
Ali, K., Akhtar, M. & Ahmed, H., 2011. Bank-Specific and Macroeconomic 
Indicators of Profitability-Empirical Evidence from the Commercial Banks of 
Pakistan. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2(6), pp. 235-242. 
Al-Jafari, M. K. & Alchami, M., 2014. Determinants of bank profitability: Evidence 
from Syria , 4(1), .. Journal of Applied Finance and Banking, 4(1), pp. 17-45. 
Almeida, H., Campello, M. & Weisbach, M. S., 2004. The cash flow sensitivity of 
cash. The Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1777-1804. 
Almumani, M., 2013. Liquidity Risk Management: A Comparative Study between 
Saudi and Jordanian Banks. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research in Business, 3(2), 
pp. 1-10. 
 299 
 
AL-Mutairi, A. & Naser, K., 2015. Determinants Of Capital Structure Of Banking 
Sector In Gcc: An Empirical Investigation. Asian Economic and Financial Review, 
5(7), pp. 959-972. 
Alshatti, A., 2015. The Effect of the Liquidity Management on Profitability in the 
Jordanian Commercial Banks. International Journal of Business and Management, 
10(1), p. 62. 
Al-Tamimi, H. A. H. & Al-Mazrooei , F. M., 2007. Banks’ Risk Management: A 
Comparison Study Of Uae National And Foreign Banks. The Journal of Risk Finance 
, 8(4), pp. 394-409. 
Al-Tamimi, K. A. M. & Obeidat, S. F., 2013. Determinants of Capital Adequacy in 
Commercial Banks of Jordan an Empirical Study. International Journal of Academic 
Research in Economics and Management Sciences, 2(4), pp. 44-58. 
Altunbas, Y., Carbo, S., Gardener, E. P. & Molyneux, P., 2007. Examining the 
relationships between capital, risk and efficiency in European banking. European 
Financial Management, 13(1), pp. 49-70. 
Alzorqan, S., 2014. Bank liquidity risk and performance: an empirical study of the 
banking system in Jordan. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(12), pp. 
155-164. 
Anand, K., Bédard-Pagé, G. & Traclet, V., 2014. Stress Testing the Canadian 
Banking System: A System-Wide Approach, Ottawa: Bank Of Canada. 
Arif, A. & Anees, A. N., 2012. Liquidity risk and performance of banking system. 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 20(1), pp. 182-195. 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s, 2017. Asset Liability Management Policy, 
Beijing, China: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s. 
Asiri, B., 2007. Assets-liabilities management in banks-a case of Kuwait. Indian 
Journal of Economics and Business, 6(1), p. 103. 
Aspachs, O., Nier, E. & Tiesset, M., 2005. Liquidity, banking regulation and the 
macroeconomy. Review of Financial Studies, 24(6), pp. 2166-2205. 
Athanasoglou, P., Brissimis, S. & Delis, M., 2008. Bank-specific, industry-specific 
and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability. Journal of international 
financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 18(2), pp. 121-136. 
Bai, J., Krishnamurthy, A. & Weymuller, C. H., 2018. Measuring liquidity mismatch 
in the banking sector. The Journal of Finance, 73(1), pp. 51-93. 
Baltagi, B., 1995. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. New York: John Wiley. 
Baltagi, H., 2005. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. 3rd ed. West Sussex: John 
Wiley and Sons ltd. 
 300 
 
Banerjee, R. N. & Mio, H., 2017. The impact of liquidity regulation on banks. Journal 
of Financial Intermediation, pp. 1-15. 
Barbieri, L., 2009. PANEL UNIT ROOT TESTS UNDER CROSS-SECTIONAL 
DEPENDENCE: AN OVERVIEW. Journal of Statistics: Advances in Theory and 
Applications, 1(2), pp. 117-158. 
Barth, J. R., Nolle, D. E., Phumiwasana, T. & Yago, G., 2003. A cross‐country 
analysis of the bank supervisory framework and bank performance. Financial 
Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 12(2), pp. 67-120. 
Basel Committee of Banking & Supervision , 2012. Principles for the Supervision of 
Financial conglomerates, Basel, Switzerland: Bank for international settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008. Principles for sound liquidity risk 
management and supervision. Bank for International Settelments (BIS). 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010. Basel III: International framework 
for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring. BIS, pp. 1-47. 
Baumol, W. J., 1954. Professor Copeland’s study of moneyflows.. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 36(1), pp. 102-104. 
Beck, K. L., Goldreyer, E. F. & D’Antonio, L. J., 2000. DURATION GAP IN THE 
CONTEXT OF A BANK’S STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS. Journal of 
Financial and Strategic Decisions, 13(2), pp. 57-71. 
Belete, T., 2013. Asset Liability Management and Commercial Banks Profitability in 
Ethiopia. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 4(10), pp. 77-91. 
Ben Naceur, S. & Roulet, C., 2017. Basel III and Bank-Lending: Evidence from the 
United States and Europe. IMF Working papers, Volume No. WP/17/xx, pp. 1-49. 
Bera, A. & Jarque, C., 1982. Model specification tests: A simultaneous approach. 
Journal of Econometrics, Volume 20, p. 59–82. 
Berg, B. L. & Lune, H., 2014. Qualitative research methods for the social sciences. 
Eighth ed. s.l.:Pearson Education Limited. 
Berger, A. N., B. C. H., Kick, T. & Schaeck, K., 2016. Bank liquidity creation 
following regulatory interventions and capital support. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, Volume 26, pp. 115-141. 
Berger, A. N. & Bouwman, C. H., 2009. Bank liquidity creation. The review of 
financial studies, 22(9), pp. 3779-3837. 
Berkowitz, J. & O'Brien, J., 2002. How Accurate are Value-at-Risk Models at 
Commercial Banks?. The journal of finance, pp. 1093-1111. 
Berrospide, J. M. & Edge, R. M., 2010. The effects of bank capital on lending: What 
do we know, and what does it mean?. CAMA Working Paper Series , pp. 1-48. 
 301 
 
Bessis, J., 2010. Risk Management in Banking. s.l.:Wiley. 
Bessis, J., 2011. Risk management in banking. 2nd ed. Chichester: Wiley. 
Bessis, J., 2011. Risk Management in Banking. 3 rd ed. West Sussex: John Wiely & 
Sons LTD. 
Bessis, J., 2015. Risk Management in Banking. 4th ed. West Sussex: John Wiely & 
Sons LTD. 
BIS, 2004. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards, Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
BIS, 2008. Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk. s.l.:Bank for International Settlement 
Paper, Basel Committee. 
BIS, 2008. Principles for sound liquidity risk management and supervision. Bank for 
International Settelments (BIS). 
BIS, 2009. Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision, s.l.: Bnak 
For International Settlments. 
BIS, 2012. Supervisory and bank stress testing: range of practices , s.l.: Bank for 
International Settlements . 
BIS, 2013. Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring 
Tools.. Bank of International settlements, pp. 1-75. 
BIS, 2013. Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management, s.l.: Bank for 
International Settlements. 
BIS, 2014. Basel III: the net stable funding ratio , s.l.: Bank for International 
Settlements . 
BIS, 2015. A brief history of the Basel Committee, s.l.: Bank for International 
Settelements. 
Blaikie, N., 2007. Approaches to Social Enquiry: Advancing Knowledge. 2nd edition. 
ed. cambridge: Polity Press. 
BOI, 2013. Supervisor of Banks: Proper Conduct of Banking Business Directive, s.l.: 
Bank of Israel. 
Bolton, P., Freixas, X. & Shapiro, J., 2007. Conflicts of interest, information 
provision, and competition in the financial services industry. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 85(2), pp. 297-330. 
Bonfim, D. & Kim, M., 2012. Liquidity Risk in Banking: Is There Herding?. 
European Banking Center Discussion Paper, pp. No. 2012-024. 
Bonner, C., Van Lelyveld, I. & Zymek, R., 2015. Banks’ liquidity buffers and the role 
of liquidity regulation. Journal of Financial Services Research, 48(3), pp. 215-234. 
 302 
 
Bourke, P., 1989. ‘Concentration and other determinants of bank profitability in 
Europe, North America and Australia. Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 13, 
pp. 65-79. 
Bowman, K. & Shenton, L., 1975. Omnibus test contours for departures from 
normality based on b1 and b2. Biometrika, Volume 62, p. 243–250. 
Bradley, S. & Crane, D., 1972. A dynamic model for bond portfolio management. 
Management Science , 19(2), pp. 139-151. 
Breitung, J., 2000. The local power of some unit root tests for panel data. In: B. H. 
Baltagi, ed. Advances in Econometrics. Amsterdam: JAY Press, p. 161–178. 
Bryant, R., 2013. Contingency Funding Plan: Banking Busywork or Essential 
Management Tool?, Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
Bryman, A., 2016. Social research methods.. fifth edition ed. s.l.:Oxford university 
press.. 
Bryman, A. & Bell, E., 2011. Business Research Methods. 3rd ed. s.l.:Oxford 
University Press. 
Buehler, K. a. S. A., 2008. How is Asset and Liability Management Changing? 
Insights from the McKinsey Survey. RMA JOURNAL. 
Cahan, S., 1992. The effect of antitrust investigations on discretionary accruals: A 
refined test of the political-cost hypothesis. Accounting Review, Volume 67, pp. 77-
95. 
Canada, D., 2004. The Importance of Auditing the Asset/Liability Management 
Process. BANK ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, 17(6), pp. 17-22. 
CBJ, 1969: 1989. Annual report, Amman: Central bank of Jordan. 
CBJ, 1970. Annual Report , Amman: CBJ. 
CBJ, 1992. Annual Report, Amman: CBJ. 
CBJ, 1993. Annual Report, Amman: Central bank of Jordan . 
CBJ, 2000. Annual report, Amman: Central bank of Jordan. 
CBJ, 2001. Annual report, Amman: Central bank of Jordan. 
CBJ, 2008. Annual Report, Amman: CBJ. 
CBJ, 2011. Annual Report, Amman: CBJ. 
CBJ, 2012. Financial Stability Report, Amman: Central bank of Jordan. 
CBJ, 2013. Annual Report , Amman: CBJ. 
CBJ, 2014. Annual Repoer, Amman: CBJ. 
 303 
 
CBJ, 2015. Annual Report , Amman: CBJ. 
CBJ, 2016. Financial Stability Report, Amman: Central Bnak of Jordan. 
CBJ, 2017. Annual Repoer, Amman: Central Bank Of Jordan. 
CBJ, 2017. Financial Stability Report, Amman: Central bank of Jordan. 
Chambers, D. & Charnes, A., 1961. Inter-temporal analysis and optimization of bank 
portfolios. Management Science, 7(4), pp. 393-410. 
Chaplin, G., Emblow, A. & Michael, I., 2000. Banking system liquidity: 
Developments and issues. Financial Stability Review, Volume 9, p. 93–112. 
Charumathi, B., 2008. Asset Liability Management in Indian Banking Industry-with 
special reference to Interest Rate Risk Management in ICICI Bank. London, World 
Congress on Engineering (Vol. 2). 
Chatterjee, C. & Dutta, P., 2016. Exploring The Linkage Between Profits And Asset–
Liability Management: Evidence From Indian Commercial Banks. Paradigm, 20(2), 
pp. 131-142. 
Chen, Y.-K., Shen* , C.-H., Kao , L. & Yeh, C.-Y., 2018. Bank Liquidity Risk and 
Performance. Review of Paciﬁc Basin Financial Markets and Policies, 21(1), pp. 
1850007-1. 
Chorafas, D., 2007. Risk accounting and risk management for accountants. 1st 
Edition ed. s.l.:Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Choudhry , M., 2011. Bank Asset-Liability and Liquidity Risk Management. In: Asset 
and Liability Management Handbook. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Choudhry , M., 2018. An introduction to banking principles, strategy and risk 
management. 2nd ed. s.l.:Wiley & Sons . 
Choudhry, M., 2011. An introduction to banking: liquidity risk and asset-liability 
management. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons. 
Choudhry, M., 2012. The Principles of Banking. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons. 
Choudhry, M., 2018. An introduction to banking principles, strategy and risk 
management. 2nd ed. s.l.:Wiley & Sons. 
Choudhury, R., 2015. Rethinking the treasury operating model. Journal of Financial 
Perspectives, 3(1), pp. 141-156. 
Clarke, et al., 2010. The choice between fixed and random effects models: some 
considerations for educational research.. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) , 
Volume Discussion Paper No. 5287 , pp. 2-34. 
Cohen, K. & Hammer, F., 1967. Linear programming models for optimal bank 
dynamic balance sheet management. Journal of Finance, 22(2), pp. 147-165. 
 304 
 
Connelly, L., 2008. Pilot studies. Medsurg Nursing. 17(6), pp. 411-413. 
Creswell, J., 2003. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods. 
2nd ed. London: Sage. 
Creswell, J. W., 2009. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed 
Methods Approaches. Canadian Journal of University Continuing Education, 35(2). 
Creswell, J. W. & Plano Clark, V. L., 2007. Designing and Conducting Mixed 
Methods. s.l.:s.n. 
Dang, U., 2011. The CAMEL rating system in banking supervision. A case study.. 
Arcada University of Applied Sciences, pp. 1-43. 
Dash, M. & Pathak , R., 2011. A Linear Programming Model for Assessing Asset-
Liability Management in Banks. Journal of Financial Risk Management, 8(1)., 8(1). 
Dash, M., Venkatesh, K. & B. D., B., 2011. An Analysis of Asset-Liability 
Management in Indian Banks.  
De Haan, L. & Van den End, J. W., 2013. Banks’ responses to funding liquidity 
shocks:Lending adjustment, liquidity hoarding and fire sales. Journal of International 
Financial Markets, Volume 26, pp. 152-174. 
De Vaus, D., 2002. SURVEYS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH. Fifth ed. London: Routledge. 
De, B., 2003. Ownership Effects On Bank Ownership Effects On Bank Performance: 
A Panel Study Of Performance: A Panel Study Of Indian Banks. s.l., s.n. 
Dedu, V. & Vasilache, M., 2008. Optimizing the banking activity using assets & 
liabilities management. Theoretical and applied economics, 10(10), p. 31. 
Delechat, C., Arbelaez, C. H., Muthoora, M. P. S. & Vtyurina, S., 2012. The 
Determinants of Banks' Liquidity Buffers in Central America. IMF Working papers, 
Volume No.(WP/12/301), pp. 1-42. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Huizinga, H., 1999. Determinants of commercial bank interest 
margins and profitability: some international evidence. The World Bank Economic 
Review, 13(2), pp. 379-408. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Huizinga, H., 2010. Bank activity and funding strategies: The 
impact on risk and returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 98(3), pp. 626-650. 
Dent, K., Westwood, B. & Segoviano, M., 2016. Stress testing of banks an 
introduction, London: Bank Of England. 
DeYoung, R. & Jang, K. Y., 2016. Do banks actively manage their liquidity?. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, Volume 66, pp. 143-161. 
DeYoung, R. & Yom, C., 2008. On the independence of assets and liabilities: 
Evidence from U.S. commercial banks, 1990–2005. Journal of Financial Stability, 
4(3), pp. 275-503. 
 305 
 
Dezfouli, M. H. K., Hasanzadeh, A. & Shahchera, M., 2014. Inspecting the 
effectiveness of liquidity risk on banks profitability. Kuwait Chapter of the Arabian 
Journal of Business and Management Review, 3(9), pp. 191-207. 
Diamond, D. & Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. 
Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), pp. 401-419. 
Diamond, D. & Rajan, R., 2000. A Theory of bank capital. The Journal of Finance, 
55(6), pp. 2431-2465. 
Diamond, D. W. & Rajan, R. G., 2005. Liquidity shortages and banking crises. The 
Journal of finance, 60(2), pp. 615-647. 
DICO, 2018. Guidance Note: Liquidity , Ontario: Deposit Insurance Corporation of 
Ontario. 
Dietsch, M. & Lozano-Vivas, A., 2000. How the environment determines banking 
efficiency: A comparison between French and Spanish industries. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 24(6), pp. 985-1004. 
Dillman, D. S. J. a. C. L., 2014. Internet, Phone, Mail, and Mixed-Mode Surveys: The 
Tailored Design Method. 4th Edition ed. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. 
Down, K., 1996. Competition and finance: a reinterpretation of financial and 
monetary economics. 1st ed. London: Macmillan press. 
Drehmann, M. a. N. K., 2013. Funding liquidity risk: definition and measurement. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(7), pp. 2173-2182. 
ECB, 2010. Beyond ROE – How to measure bank performance , Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany: European Central Bank . 
Edward, S., 1973. Financial deepening in economic development. s.l.:Business and 
Economics Review. 
Eichberger, J. & Summer, M., 2005. Bank capital, liquidity, and systemic risk. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(2), pp. 547-555. 
Ejoh, N., Okpa, I. & Inyang, E., 2014. The Relationship and effect of Credit and 
Liquidity Risk on Bank Default Risk among Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(16), pp. 142-150. 
Emmanuel, R., 1997. Commercial Banking in an Era of Deregulation. s.l.:Greenwood 
Publishing Group, Incorporated. 
Engle, R. F. & Manganelli, S., 2001. Value at risk models in finance, Frankfurt: 
European Central Bank (ECB). 
Farhi, E. & Tirole, J., 2012. Collective moral hazard, maturity mismatch, and 
systemic bailouts. American Economic Review, 102(1), pp. 60-93. 
 306 
 
Faruk, M. O. & Alam, R., 2014. Asset Liability Management of a Commercial Bank- 
A Study on Prime. International Journal of Information, Business and Management, 
6(1), p. 106. 
FCA, 2019. Prudential sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment 
Firms, Liquidity standards, London: Financial Conduct Authority’s. 
FED, 2010. Interagency Policy Statement On Funding And Liquidity Risk 
Management, Washington, D. C.: Federal Reserve. 
Federal Reserve, D.B.S.R., 1994. Commercial Bank Examination Manual, 
Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve. 
Fiedler, R., 2000. Liquidity Risk. The Professional Handbook of Financial Risk 
Management. Great Britain: s.n. 
Gabriel , M., 2016. An effective ALCO formation process. Bank Asset/Liability 
Management, May, 32(5), p. 3. 
Gatev, E. & Strahan, P. E., 2006. Banks' advantage in hedging liquidity risk: Theory 
and evidence from the commercial paper market. The Journal of Finance, 61(2), pp. 
867-892. 
Ghosh, S., 2016. Capital buffer, credit risk and liquidity behaviour: evidence for GCC 
banks , 58(4), .. Comparative Economic Studies, 58(4), pp. 539-569. 
Gorton, G. & Huang, L., 2002. Liquidity, Efficiency and Bank Bailouts, 8. NBER , p. 
Working Paper No. w915. 
Greener, S., 2008. Business research methods. s.l.:BookBoon, Ventus Publishing. 
Greene, W., 2012. Econometric Analysis. 7th ed. Essex: Pearson Education Limited. 
Greuning , H. v. & Bratanovic, S. B., 2009. Analyzing Banking Risk A Framework for 
Assessing Corporate Governance and Risk Management. 3rd ed. WASHINGTON, 
D.C: The world Bank. 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L. & Black, W. C., 1995. Multivariate data 
analyses with readings. New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs. 
Harker, P. & Zenios, S., 2000. Performance of Financial Institutions: Efficiency, 
Innovation, Regulations. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hsiao, C., 2003. Analysis of Panel Data. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University 
Press,. 
Hsiao, C., 2007. Panel data analysis—advantages and challenges. test, 16(1), pp. 1-22. 
Hughes, J. P. & Mester, L. J., 2013. Who said large banks don’t experience scale 
economies? Evidence from a risk-return-driven cost function. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 22(4), pp. 559-585. 
 307 
 
Humphrey, T., 1982. The Real Bills Doctrine. FRB Richmond Economic Review, 
68(5), pp. 3-13. 
IFC, 2008. How Can a Medium-Sized Bank Develop Its Own Asset/Liability Risk 
Management System?, s.l.: International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group . 
IFC, 2012. Standards on Risk Governance in Financial Institutions, Dniprovsky 
Uzviz: International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group. 
Imbierowicz, B. & Rauch, C., 2014. The relationship between liquidity risk and credit 
risk in banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 40, pp. 242-256. 
IMF, IEO, 2005. Evaluation Report. IMF Support to Jordan, 1989–2004, Washington 
DC.: IMF. 
IMF, 2000. Jordan Letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic and Financial 
Policies, Washington D.C.: IMF. 
IMF, 2012. Request for a Stand-By Arrangement, Washington D.C.: IMF. 
IMF, 2013. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, Washington D.C.: 
IMF. 
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. & Shin, Y., 2003. Testing for unit roots in Heterogenous 
panels. Journal of Econometrics , Volume 115, pp. 53-74. 
Ismal, R., 2013. Islamic banking in Indonesia: new perspectives on monetary and 
financial issues.. 1st ed. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons. 
Iyer, T. & Sahu, B. K., 2018. stress testing 101 for banks helping banks and financial 
institution in india manage risk through improved stress testing practices, s.l.: 
Accenture. 
Jarque, C. & Bera, A., 1987. A test for normality of observations and regression 
residuals. International Statistical Review, Volume 55, p. 163–172. 
Johnson, B., 2011. Educational research: Quantitative, qualitative, and mixed 
approaches. s.l.:Sage. 
Jorion, P., 1996. Measuring the Risk in Value at Risk. Financial Analysts Journal, 
52(6), pp. 47-56. 
Joshi, S. P. & Sontakay, R. V., 2017. Review Paper on Asset Liability Management in 
Banking System. Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, 3(6), pp. 670-678. 
Kao, C., 1999. Spurious regression and residual-based tests for cointegration in panel 
data. Journal of Econometrics, 90(1), pp. 1-44. 
Kaplan, P., 1998. Asset allocation models using the Markowitz approach. Ibbotson 
Associates. 
 308 
 
Kashyap, A. K., Rajan, R. & Stein, J. C., 2002. Banks as liquidity providers: An 
explanation for the coexistence of lending and deposit‐taking. The Journal of Finance, 
57(1), pp. 33-73. 
Kashyap, A. K. & Stein, J. C., 2000. What do a million observations on banks say 
about the transmission of monetary policy?. American Economic Review, 90(3), pp. 
407-428. 
Keeton, W. R., 1999. Does faster loan growth lead to higher loan losses?. Economic 
review-Federal reserve bank of Kansas City, Volume 84, pp. 57-76. 
Keynes, J. M., 1936. The general theory of employment, money and interest. 
Adelaide: University of Adelaide. 
Khachatryan, H., Poddar, T. & R., S., 2006. The Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
in Jordan. IMF working papers, Volume (WP/06/48). 
Khan, M. S., Scheule, H. & Wu, E., 2017. Funding liquidity and bank risk taking. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 82, pp. 203-2016. 
Kim, D. & Santomero, A. M., 1988. Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation. The 
Journal of Finance, 43(5), pp. 1219-1233. 
Kim, D. & Sohn, W., 2017. The effect of bank capital on lending: Does liquidity 
matter? . Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 77, pp. 95-107. 
Klein, M. A., 1971. A theory of the banking firm. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 3(2), pp. 205-2018. 
Koch, T., MacDonald, S. & Scott, S., 1999. Bank Mnanagement. London: Fort Worth. 
Kosmidou, K., 2008. The determinants of banks' profits in Greece during the period 
of EU financial integration. Managerial Finance, 34(3), pp. 146-159. 
Kosmidou, K., Kousenidis, D., Ladas, A. & Negkakis, C., 2017. Determinants of risk 
in the banking sector during the European Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial 
Stability, Volume 33, pp. 285-296. 
Kosmidou, K., Pasiouras, F. & Floropoulos, J., 2004. Linking profits to asset-liability 
management of domestic and foreign banks in the UK. Applied Financial Economics, 
14(18), pp. 1319-1324. 
Kosmidou, K. & Zopounidis, C., 2004. COMBINING GOAL PROGRAMMING 
MODEL WITH SIMULATION ANALYSIS FOR BANK ASSET LIABILITY 
MANAGEMENT. NFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research, 42(3), pp. 
175-187. 
Kubat, M., 2014. Does Basel III bring anything new? A comparison between capital 
accords Basel II and Basel III. Vienna, International Institute of Social and Economic 
Sciences (No. 0401713). 
 309 
 
Kupiec, P. & Lee, Y., 2012. What Factors Explain Differences in Return on Assets 
among Community Banks?, s.l.: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
Kusy, M. I. & Ziemba, W. T., 1986. A bank asset and liability management model. 
Operations research, 34(3), pp. 356-376. 
Laeven, L., Ratnovski, L. & Tong, H., 2014. Bank Size and Systemic Risk. IMF 
Working papers, Volume No. (SDN/14/04), pp. 1-33. 
Laeven, L., Ratnovski, L. & Tong, H., 2016. Bank size, capital, and systemic risk: 
Some international evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 69, pp. S25-
S34. 
Laurine, C., 2013. Zimbabwean Commercial Banks Liquidity Risk Determinants after 
Dollarisation. Journal of Applied Finance and Banking, 3(6), p. 97. 
Levin, A. & Lin, C., 1992. Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and finite 
sample properties. University of California, Department of Economics Disscussion 
paper. 
Levin, A. & Lin, C., 1993. Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: New results. University of 
California, Department of Economics Discussion Paper. 
Levin, A., Lin, C. & Chu, C., 2002. Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and 
finite-sample properties. Journal of Econometrics, Volume 108, pp. 1-24. 
Lewis, P., Saunders, M. & Thornhill, A., 2009. Research Methods for Business 
Students. 5th ed. Essex: Pearson Education Limited. 
Lewis, P., Saunders, M. & Thornhill, A., 2012. Research methods for business 
students. Essex: Pearson Education Limited. 
Markowitz, H., 1968. Portfolio selection: efficient diversification of investments. 
s.l.:Yale university press. 
Maudos, J. N., Pastor, J. M., Pérez, F. & Quesada, J., 2002. Cost and profit efficiency 
in European banks. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money, 12(1), pp. 33-58. 
Maziad, S., 2009. Monetary Policy and the Central bank in Jordan. IMF, pp. 1-29. 
McKinnon, R., 2010. Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Meena,, A. K. & Dhar, J., 2014. An Empirical Analysis and Comparative Study of 
Liquidity Ratios and Asset-Liability Management of Banks Operating in India. 
International Journal of Economics and Management Engineering, 8(1), pp. 342-348. 
Meltzer, A. H., 1963. The demand for money: The evidence from the time series.. The 
Journal of Political Economy, 71(3), pp. 219-246. 
 310 
 
Mokni, R. B. S., Echchabi, A. & Rajhi, M. T., 2015. Risk Management Practiced 
Tools in the MENA Region: A Comparative Study between Islamic and Conventional 
Banks. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 20(3), pp. 261-277. 
Molyneux, P. & Thornton, J., 1992. Determinants of European bank profitability: A 
note. Journal of banking & Finance , 16(6), pp. 1173-1178. 
Moti, H., Masinde, J. & Mugenda, N., 2012. Effectiveness of Credit Management 
Systems on loans performance: Empirical evidence from micro finance Sector in 
Kenya. International Journal of Business, Humanities, and technology, 2(16), pp. 99-
108. 
Mundlak , Y., 1978. On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data. 
Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 46(1), pp. 69-85. 
Mun, Y. L. & Thaker, H. M., 2017. Asset Liability Management Of Conventional 
And Islamic Banks In Malaysia. Journal of Islamic Economics, 9(1), pp. 33-52. 
Myers, M., 2013. Qualitative research in business and management. s.l.:Sage. 
Nader, J., 2002. The Manager's Concise Guide to Risk. First Edition ed. West Sussex, 
England: John Wiley & sons Ltd. 
Nerlove, M., 2002. Essays in panel data econometrics. 1st ed. Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press. 
NIB, 2015. Risk Management Policies, Finland: Nordic Investment Bank. 
Novickytėa, L. & Petraitytėa, I., 2014. Assessment of banks asset and liability 
management: problems and perspectives (case of Lithuania). Procedia-Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, 24 01, Volume 110, pp. 1082-1093. 
Novickytė, L. & Petraitytė, I., 2014. Assessment of banks asset and liability 
management: problems and perspectives (case of Lithuania). Social and Behavioural 
Sciences, Volume 110, pp. 1082-1093. 
O’brien, R. M., 2007. A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation 
factors. Quality & quantity, 41(5), pp. 673-690. 
Omet, G., 2005. Ownership structures in MENA countries: listed companies, state-
owned, family enterprises and some policy implications. In MENA Regional 
Corporate Governance Forum: Advancing the Corporate Governance Agenda in 
MENA.. [Online]  
Available at: http://www. oecd. org/ 
Oppenheim, A., 2000. Questionnaire design, interviewing and attitude measurement.. 
s.l.:Bloomsbury. 
Pagratis, S., Topaloglou, N. & Tsionas, M.  ,.2017 . System stress testing of bank 
liquidity risk. Journal of International Money and Finance, Volume 73, pp. 22-40. 
 311 
 
Pan, Y. & Jackson, R. T., 2008. Ethnic difference in the relationship between acute 
inflammation and and serum ferritin in US adult males. Epidemiology and Infection, 
Volume 136, pp. 421-431. 
Peersman, G., 2011. Bank lending shocks and the euro area business cycle . Working 
Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, 
Belgium, pp. 1-24. 
Pohl, M., 2017. Basel III liquidity monitoring tools. Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Pradhan, R., 2009. The Nexus Between Financial Development and Economic 
Growth in India: Evidence from Multivariate VAR Model. International Journal of 
Research and Reviews in Applied Sciences, 1(2), pp. 141-151. 
Prochnow, .., 1949. Bank liquidity and the new doctrine of anticipated income.. The 
Journal of Finance, 4(4), pp. 298-314. 
Raghavan, R. S., 2015. Risk, The Business Driver In Banks. Chennai : Notion Press. 
Rajan, R. S. & Bird, G., 2003. Banks, Maturity Mismatches and Liquidity Crisis: A 
Simple Model. International Economics / Economics Internazionale, 56(2), pp. 182-
195. 
Ratnovski, L., 2013. Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management. IMF 
working papers, Volume No. (WP/13/16), pp. 1-41. 
Resti, A., 1997. Evaluating the cost-efficiency of the Italian banking system: What 
can be learned from the joint application of parametric and non-parametric 
techniques. Journal of Banking and Finance, 21(2), pp. 221-250. 
Rhoades, S., 1993. Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Federal Reserve Bulletin, 79(3), pp. 
188-189. 
Robson, C. a. M. K., 2016. Real world research.. Fourth ed. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons. 
Rogerson, P. A., 2001. Statistical methods for geography. London: Sage. 
Roman, A. & Sargu, A. C., 2015. The impact of bank-specific factors on the 
commercial banks liquidity: empirical evidence from CEE countries. Procedia 
Economics and Finance, Volume 20, pp. 571-579. 
Romanyuk, Y., 2010. Asset-Liability Management: An Overview, s.l.: Bank of 
Canada. 
Roulet, C., 2018. Basel III: Effects of capital and liquidity regulations on European 
bank lending. Journal of Economics and Business, Volume 95, pp. 26-46. 
Saunders, A. & Thomas, H. A. L., 1997. Financial institutions management. Boston: 
Irwin. 
 312 
 
Sayeed, M. a. H. M., 2010. Impact of Asset Liability Management on Profitability: A 
study on Public Vs Private Commercial Banks in Bangladesh.  
Scannella, E., 2016. Theory and regulation of liquidity risk management in banking. 
International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management, 19(1-2), pp. 4-21. 
Schlumberger, O., 2002. Jordan’s Economy in the 1990s: Transition to Development. 
In: G. Joffe, ed. Jordan in Transition. London: C. Hurst & Co, pp. 225-253. 
Selma , M. . R. B., Abdelghani , E. & Rajhi , M. T., 2013. Risk Management Tools 
Practiced In Tunisian Commercial Bank. Studies in Business & Economics, 8(1), pp. 
55-78. 
Sharpe, W. & Tint, L., 1990. Liabilities-A New Approach. Journal of Portfolio 
Management, 16(2), pp. 5-10. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W., 2010. Unstable banking. Journal of financial 
economics, 97(3), pp. 306-318. 
Shrestha, S., 2015. ASSET LIABILITY MANAGEMENT AND COMMERCIAL 
BANKS’ PROFITABILITY IN NEPAL. Academic Voices A Multidisciplinary 
Journal, 5(1), pp. 40-47. 
Staikouras, C. K. & Wood, G. E., 2004. The determinants of European bank 
profitability. International business and economics research journal, Volume 3, pp. 
57-68. 
Stiglitz, J. E. & Weiss, A., 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect 
information. The American economic review, 71(3), pp. 393-410. 
Stock, H. & Watson, W., 2003. Instructional Statadatasets for econometrics. Boston: 
Boston College Department of Economics. 
Stragiotti, F., 2009. Stress Testing And Contingency Funding Plans: Analysis Of 
Current Practices In The Luxembourg Banking Sector, s.l.: Banque centrale du 
Luxembourg. 
Sufian, F., 2011. Profitability of the Korean banking sector: Panel evidence on bank-
specific and macroeconomic determinants . Journal of economics and management, 
7(1), pp. 43-72. 
Sufian, F. & Chong, R. R., 2008. Determinants of bank profitability in a developing 
economy: empirical evidence from the Philippines. Asian Academy of Management 
Journal of Accounting & Finance, 4(2), pp. 91-112. 
Summers, B. J., 1975. Loan Commitments to business in the United States banking 
history. Economic review, pp. 15-23. 
Suresh, G. & Krishnan, P. A., 2018. Asset-Liability Management as a Risk 
Management Tool in Commercial Banks in India. IUP Journal of Bank Management, 
17(1). 
 313 
 
Tee, E., 2017. Asset Liability Management and the Profitability of Listed Banks in 
Ghana. Journal of Economics and Finance, 8(3), pp. 09-14. 
Tektas, A., Nur Ozkan-Gunay, E. & Gunay, G., 2005. Asset and liability management 
in financial crisis. The Journal of Risk Finance, 6(2), pp. 135-149. 
Tektas, E. G. n. a. G. G., 2005. Asset and liability management in financial crisis. The 
Journal of Risk Finance, 6(2), pp. 135-149. 
Telser, L. G., 1955. Safety first and hedging. The Review of Economic Studies, 23(1), 
pp. 1-16. 
Thoraneenitiyan, N. & Avkiran, N. K., 2009. Measuring the impact of restructuring 
and country-specific factors on the efficiency of post-crisis East Asian banking 
systems: Integrating DEA with SFA. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 43(4), pp. 
240-252. 
Toby, A. J., 2010. Global Financial Crisis And Bank Management Practices In 
Nigeria: Survey Findings. Journal of Financial Management and Analysis, 23(2), pp. 
27-51. 
Uchendu, O. A., 1995. Monetary Policy and the Performance of Commercial Banks.. 
Nigeria CBN economic and financial review, 33(2). 
Udoka, C. O. A. .., 2012. An Analytical and Theoretical Investigation of The 
Determinants of Deposit Money Bank’s Investment in Treasury Bills in Nigeria 1970-
2009. European Journal of Business and Management, 4(21). 
Vento, G. & La Ganga, P., 2009. Bank liquidity risk management and supervision: 
which lessons from recent market turmoil. Journal of Money, Investment and 
Banking, Issue 10, pp. 79-126. 
Vij, M., 2005. Managing gap: a case study approach to asset-liability management of 
banks. The Journal of Business Perspective, pp. 49-58. 
Vodova, P., 2011. Liquidity of Czech commercial banks and its determinants. 
International Journal of mathematical models and methods in applied sciences, 5(6), 
pp. 1060-1067. 
Vodov, P., 2013. Determinants of commercial bank liquidity in Hungary. E-Finanse, 
9(3), p. 46. 
Whalen, E. L., 1966. A rationalization of the precautionary demand for cash. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics,, 80(2), pp. 314-324. 
Wilson, J., 2014. Essentials of business research: A guide to doing your research 
project. s.l.:SAGE. 
Wójcik-Mazur, A. & Szajt, M., 2015. Determinants of liquidity risk in commercial 
banks in the European Union. Argumenta Oeconomica, 35(2), pp. 25-47. 
 314 
 
Wooldridge, J., 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
Cambridge: MIT press. 
Wooldridge, J. M., 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 2nd 
ed. London: The MIT Press. 
Yaseen, H., Omet, G. & Kahmash, F., 2015 . On the Entry of Foreign Banks: The 
Jordanian Experience. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 7(7). 
Zaghdoudi, K. & Hakimi, A., 2017. The determinants of liquidity risk: Evidence from 
Tunisian banks. Journal of Applied Finance and Banking, 7(2), pp. 71-81. 
Zawalinska, K., 1999. Asset and Liability Management-The Institutional Approach to 
ALM by Commercial Banks in Poland: A Special Focus on Risk Management. CASE 
Network Studies and Analyses, Volume 185. 
Zenios, S. A. & Ziemba, W. T., 2006. Handbook of Asset and Liability Management: 
Theory and Methodology. 1st ed. North-Holland: Elsevier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 315 
 
Appendices  
Appendix 1: 
Table 37: Main studies that investigated Asset and Liabilities 
Management 
Authors/ 
Year 
Country Period Methodology Findings 
(Zawalinska, 
1999) 
Banks 
In Poland. 
1999 
Survey 
techniques   
Liquidity risk as having the greatest influence on the decisions of 
their bank. The credit risk as the second most important risk. 
Most of the Poland banks have both a formal ALM policy and an 
ALCO. Nevertheless, three or 9 percent of the surveyed banks 
have no formal ALM policy, and only two have no ALCO. 
ALCO meets either once a week or twice a month. Highlighted 
the importance of privatizing public banks to improve 
profitability, efficiency and risk management, it create a 
favourable climate for implementation of more advanced risk 
Management and measurement techniques. 
(Alam & 
Masukujjaman, 
2011) 
five 
commercial 
banks in 
Bangladesh 
2010 
Questionnaire 
survey  
Credit risk as the first important risks followed market risk, 
operational risk. Liquidity risk. The main risk oversight is 
responsibility of Board of Directors; the Executive Committee 
monitors risk, while all banking operation activities oversees by 
the Audit Committee. The banks employ the credit policy with 
the approval from Board of Director of Credit risk management 
division for their credit risk management. Bank maintains 
customer’s confidence is maintained in ensuring liquidity this the 
opinion regarding liquidity risks. Internal rating system and risk-
adjusted rate of return on capital were the important techniques 
used for Managing Risk. 
(Toby, 2010) 
24 Nigerian 
Deposit Money 
Banks. 
 
2007-2008 
Questionnaire 
and interview 
 
The meltdown of stock market as affecting banks liquidity 
profiles the most in Nigeria. The loose monetary policy make 
portfolio constrain on Nigerian balance sheet. The banks held 
more shout term investment than long-term after the financial 
crisis, and held more primary cash with the RR due the wake of 
global crisis and impose more constraint on liquidity portfolio. 
Majority of banks were focused on expanding their asset as a 
target and then make controlling on the funds source as 
necessary. The internal issues that influence corporate 
governance in banks in Nigeria: weak risk management, 
difficulty in changing management, conflicts of interest, non-
existent dependable mechanisms for obtaining information to the 
Board, and unclear pay of directors. 
(Al-Tamimi & 
Al-Mazrooei , 
2007) 
8 national 
conventional 
and 5 foreign 
conventional 
banks 4 Islamic 
banks in UAE  
2006 
Questionnaire 
survey 
Three most crucial risk types that UAE commercial banks are 
facing namely: foreign exchange risk, credit risk, and operating 
risk. The large majority of the banks (90%), the four most crucial 
risk identiﬁcation methods are as follows: inspection by risk 
manager of the bank, audits, analysis of ﬁnancial statements, and 
risk survey. the UAE commercial banks are efficiently assessing 
and analysing risk They use a quantitative and qualitative 
analysis methods, the assessment of the costs and benefits of 
addressing risks, and the prioritizing of risks to assessment and 
the risks . the UAE commercial banks have an efficient risk 
monitoring and controlling system. The national and foreign 
banks of UAE significantly differ in terms of their risk 
assessment practice and analysis, and in their risk monitoring and 
controlling. the practices of risk management are primarily 
impacted by speciﬁc factors including economic conditions, 
competition and regulations. 
(Mokni, et al., 
2015) 
24 conventional 
and 23 Islamic 
in MENA area 
 
2012-2013 
Questionnaire 
survey 
The credit risk is the most crucial, while liquidity risk was the 
second most crucial in both types of banks. Banks have a 
committee/section responsible for identifying, monitoring, and 
controlling different risks. Both types of bank rely on the 
traditional credit risk mitigation tools.  Analysing type of 
depositors, withdrawing factor, as a Procedures to manage 
liquidity risk. Funds in central banks used for managing liquidity 
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risk, followed by cash reserve in both types of banks. Islamic 
banks do not use the more technically advanced risk 
measurement approaches in monitoring market risk as those used 
by conventional counterparts .There was no differences in risk 
perception between both types of bank particularly with respect 
to liquidity risk, foreign exchange risk and operational risk. 
However, there difference for both credit risk and market risk. 
(Abu Hussain & 
Al-Ajmi, 2012) 
8 conventional, 
4 Islamic, and 5 
leading foreign 
banks in 
Bahrain 
 
2009-2010 
Questionnaire 
survey 
Credit risk, is the first important risks, Liquidity risk ranked as 
the second most important risk. The bank risk staff, audit and 
physical inspection and financial statement analysis as the three 
methods most widely used to identify types of risks in Bahrain 
banks. Bankers believe that banks operating in Bahrain have 
efficient Risk monitoring and control system. The risk levels 
Islamic banks were facing were considerably higher as opposed 
to those that conventional banks were facing. Depositories should 
expect to receive higher rate because the Islamic banks face 
higher risks over all. In addition, the borrowers will pay more 
interest because the Islamic banks share the asset risk with them. 
(Selma , et al., 
2013) 
16  Tunisian 
banks 
2012 
Questionnaire 
survey 
The collateral and guarantees is most popularly employed 
methods of credit risk mitigation. Strengthen liquidity risk 
management function and Diversified funding sources and 
improving treasury and ALM systems  and Revise contingency 
funding plan (CFP) appear as a tools in managing liquidity risks 
.Analysing  the type of depositors, withdrawing factors and type 
of deposits, tenor and monitoring and evaluation as a procedures 
used to manage liquidity risk in the Tunisian banks .  The stress 
tests were used for reporting to board of directors and senior 
management. Most of the Tunisian banks continue to rely on 
traditional methods to mitigate credit risk such as collateral. The 
internal audit one of the most used tools to mitigate the 
operational risk in the banks sample .The Tunisian banks not used 
value at risk (VAR) in extensively in the type of market risk.   
(DeYoung & 
Yom, 2008) 
US commercial 
banks 
 
1990-2005 
canonical 
correlation 
analysis 
The developments of the banks activities and a strong 
supervisory safety may have caused the decreased need for banks 
to practice strict ALM. The financial innovation expand the 
methods that used by bank to manage their risks. Weaker 
relationship between asset and liability among banks that 
intensively employ strategies of risk mitigation.  
(Kosmidou & 
Zopounidis, 
2004) 
Greek 
commercial 
bank. 
1999-2000 
Goal 
programing 
and 
simulation 
analysis 
The market trend and the frequent fluctuations of the market rates 
emphasize the need for all financial institutions to have an ALM 
system, which can use an accurate representation of their current 
position and the favourable scenarios later. The current strategy 
for the Greek banks it is not optimal and they need to re-evaluate 
their present policies.  
(Tektas, 2005) 
Two Medium-
scale Turkey 
commercial 
banks 
1999-2000 
 
 
 
Goal 
programing 
They concentrating on the banks’ program goals, liquidity, 
capital adequacy ratio, deposits and loans market share, and 
revenues. Optimistic and pessimistic scenarios were run in the 
optimistic scenario, the two banks are assumed to accomplish the 
prescribed goals in the program. On the other hand, in the 
pessimistic scenario, the banks are expected to accordingly adjust 
their balance sheet. 
(Kosmidou, et al., 
2004) 
36 Domestic 
banks 44 
foreign banks 
in UK  
1996–2002 
Statistical 
cost 
accounting 
method. 
They found disparity in the banks’ returns and linked it to the 
difference in the composition of asset-liability between foreign 
and domestic banks, suggested paying more attention to liability 
management as opposed to asset management. In addition, how 
and where the management should allocate its time and devotion 
for improve the performance. 
(Shrestha, 2015) 
7 commercial 
banks in Nepal 
2007-2014 
pooled OLS 
regression 
analysis 
Positive rate of ROA and the rate differs based on assets. On the 
other hand, The cost rate on liabilities appears to be negative and 
the rate differs based on liabilities. The GDP and Inflation rate as 
the macroeconomic variables that negatively affect the 
profitability of Nepal commercial banks, the banks need focusing 
on increasing the public awareness for the attainment of greater 
saving and fixed deposits, as this will consequently improve 
banks’ performance in providing loans. 
(Tee, 2017) 
Listed Banks in 
Ghana  
2008-2012 
multiple 
linear 
regression 
A significant negative impact of total liabilities (fixed deposits 
and saving) on commercial banks’ profitability. Total bank asset 
had a positive significant effect on Ghana banks profitability. 
Real Interest rate as one of the macroeconomic variables 
imparted no significant impact on commercial banks’ 
profitability. While general rate of inflation had a negative effect 
on profitability.  
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(Chatterjee & 
Dutta, 2016) 
20 Private and 
26 public 
commercial  
banks in India  
2005-2013 
panel data 
regression 
(fixed and 
random 
effect) 
The low-profit banks had greater return rate on loans and 
advances, fixed assets. Lower rates of return on deposits placings 
to banks as opposed to the high-profit counterparts. Moreover, 
the high-profit banks had the lowest cost rate on other funding. 
Whereas for the low-profit counterparts, ‘short-term funding’ 
appeared to be the cheapest funding source. The negative impact 
of the level of non-performing assets on profitability for both. 
(Meena, & Dhar, 
2014) 
Three banks 
from public, 
private and 
foreign banks in 
India 
2002-2011 
Analysis of 
maturity gap 
All banks are financing their short-term liabilities using their 
long-term assets. The amount of cash that banks were keeping 
could cause issues in the long run because such practice appears 
to be weakening the profits of these banks. The practices of ALM 
are entirely dictated by banks’ management. The gap between 
RSA and RSL positive in buckets less than 29 days that banks 
not taking risks on short-term liquidity positions.  
(Novickytėa & 
Petraitytėa, 2014) 
commercial 
banks and 
foreign banks 
branches in 
Lithuania 
fourth quarter 
of 2000 to 
the second 
quarter of 
2013 
X12-ARIMA 
analysis tool 
pack 
The share of loans in total assets ratio is more sensitive to the 
economic cycles than the deposit. Banks appear to be managing 
their assets and liability while also trying to impact both their 
activity and profitability. The moral hazard is apparent in 
Lithuanian financial sector as the most risky balance sheet items 
change in risk-free manner after the Bank of Lithuania deploys 
conservative measures. The financial sector appeared to be more 
inclined to take more risk in ALM when there was economic 
upturn.  
(Suresh & 
Krishnan, 2018) 
Two public and 
two private 
banks in India  
2007-2008 
2016-2017 
Gaps analysis 
The public banks had negative mismatches in short term and in 
medium term. This attitude will effect on the income interest in 
case increasing in the interest rate. While in long term had a 
positive Gap .NPA in public banks higher than the private banks, 
might effect on their profitability. Private banks had positive gap 
in most of the period of the study, both types of bank nee to 
control on the mismatches. To avoid any liquidity problem in 
short or long term.  
(Dash & Pathak , 
2011) 
Among 57 
public, private, 
and foreign 
banks in India 
2007-2008 
linear 
programming 
model 
The procedure of ALM used by Indian public banks appeared 
to be better and more diversified, and this finding has been 
linked to the composition of banks. The ownership and the 
structure of the banks have effect on the ALM procedure. Thirty 
percent of the sample in public sector exposed to interest rate 
risk. The Indian banks should careful maintenance and 
monitoring of positions of asset-liability, and balancing of 
profitability, liquidity as well as interest rate risk. 
(Mun & Thaker, 
2017) 
six 
Conventional 
and six Islamic 
banks in  
Malaysia 
2010-2013 ANOVA 
ALM had a significant effect on the profitability for two types 
of banks.  The management efficiency, liquidity ratio, degree of 
risk aversion insignificant in both of banks. The asset quality 
variables negative in Conventional while positive in Islamic 
banks with profitability .Noted the difference in findings for 
both bank types, and this difference was attributed to the 
different operation method employed by each type of banks. 
(AL-Mutairi & 
Naser, 2015) 
47 commercial 
banks listed in 
GCC  
2001-2010 
Regression 
model  
Most of the banks in GCC under the sample were financed by 
debts, and this actually accounted for more than 80% these 
banks’ capital. The profitability affect the capital structure 
decision. The ROA, tangibility asset and size, had a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between the capital 
structure of GCC banks and their profitability. Negative 
relationship between bank size and leverage. This may suggest 
that the smaller the bank in terms of total assets, the more 
outsource fund will be use.  While a positive and statistically 
significant linkage between capital structure and age and growth 
in GCC banks. 
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Appendix 2: 
 Appendix 2-1: Letter written to the surveyed bank 
 
2017 
 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam,  
I would like to invite you to participate in my research about the Asset Liability 
Management (ALM). I am aware of the tremendous business pressure and the limited 
availability for accepting my request, but I kindly request your participation noting that it would 
not take more than 35 minutes from your time to answer this questionnaire. Your contribution 
will be an important part of my PhD research project which is carried out in Lord Ashcroft 
International Business School, Anglia Ruskin University. 
Please refer to the questionnaire attached to this letter about the objectives of the survey 
and as well as instructions for answering the questionnaire. Finally, I would like to thank you 
for your kind cooperation and assure you that data and opinions provided will be treated with 
strict confidentiality. 
 
 
Sincerely yours,  
 
Ahmad Al-Naimi, PhD candidate 
Lord Ashcroft International Business School 
Anglia Ruskin University 
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Appendix 2-2: Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire on Asset Liability Management in 
Jordanian commercial banks29 
 
 
Lord Ashcroft International Business School 
Anglia Ruskin University 
 
 
2017 
 
 
 
                                            
This questionnaire survey was established as a part of a project for the award of PhD in finance.  
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Preface 
The Asset Liability Committee (ALCO) plays a key management function that spans 
the entire financial institutions by assisting the Board of Directors (BoDs) to assess the 
adequacy of the Asset Liability Management (ALM) policy and monitor the 
implementation of ALM and related procedures.  
This questionnaire is designed to describe the current Asset Liability Management 
(ALM) framework for commercial banks in Jordan.  
The samples will constitute of all commercial banks operating in Jordan. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Your replies will be anonymous and all information provided 
in this questionnaire will be treated in strict confidence. 
If you would like further information about the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to 
contact Ahmad Al-Naimi (email: ahmad.al4@pgr.anglia.ac.uk) at Anglia Ruskin 
University, the United Kingdom.  
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Conceptual Framework 
The following section contains basic definitions that survey respondents should 
consider while answering the questionnaire. These definitions, based on Choudhry 
(2011)30, have been carefully selected to create a common level of understanding and 
ensure consistency. 
Asset Liability Committee (ALCO): A committee, established within the 
organizational structure of the bank that oversees all aspects of asset liability 
management through formulating ALM policies and ALM reporting strategies. In 
addition, the committee oversees liquidity and funding management, formulating 
hedging policy, transfer-pricing system, and interest rate risk exposure management, 
etc. 
Asset Liability Management (ALM): The processes that provide the decision makers 
with a wide variety of strategies and risks that should be considered to maximize the 
earnings and the value of the bank by managing the entire balance sheet.  
Contingency Funding Plan (CFP): Strategies that address liquidity shortfalls in 
emergency situations and identify sources of potential liquidity strain to ensure that 
current exposures remain in accordance with a bank’s established liquidity risk 
tolerance. 
Credit Risk: The risk of loss of principal and/or loss of interest due to a borrower's 
failure to repay a loan or otherwise meet a contractual obligation. 
Hedging: An investment made to reduce the risk exposure of price movements in assets 
or liabilities. 
                                            
30 Choudhry, M., 2011. An introduction to banking: liquidity risk and asset-liability management (Vol. 
30). John Wiley & Sons. 
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Interest rate risk: The potential impact of changes in interest rates on the net asset 
value of a financial institution’s balance sheet and earnings resulting from interest rates 
changes. 
Liquidity Risk: The uncertainty surrounding the speed and the availability of 
convertibility with the presence of a readily market where assets can be active traded. 
Liquidity Management: The ability of the bank to meet its obligations as they fall due, 
depending on the condition of the macroeconomic environment, sector and entity 
specifics. 
Liquidity stress testing: A pack of tools that are used in assessing the ALM 
sensitivities and vulnerabilities to changing economic conditions on both the back book 
and planned future business. 
Market risk: The probability of incurring losses due to changes in overall financial 
market factors. 
Instructions for completing the Questionnaire 
Please read the following instructions before starting to answer the survey questions: 
Each Question requires one answer only, unless otherwise specified. 
If you do not understand a question or it is unclear please omit the question and move 
on to the next. 
Some questions may require to provide an opinion. Please fill it in the designated area. 
Some questions provide flexibilities to offer your own answer, shown as ‘Other’. If you 
choose ‘Other’, please specify in the designated area. 
Please read the questions carefully in the questionnaire and provide the most accurate 
answers. This questionnaire will take less than 30 minutes. 
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Questionnaire on Asset Liability Management 
Part I: Basic Information 
1.1 Name of the Bank:  
1.2 The Position of the 
respondent:  
1.3 Department/ Unit:  
1.4 Telephone Number:  
1.5 Gender:  
1.6 Age: Less than 25 25-40 
41-54 55 and over 
I prefer not say  
 
1.7 Educational 
Level: 
High School Diploma 
Bachelor Degree Post Graduate 
 
 
1.8 Working 
Experience: 
Less than five years Five to ten years 
Ten to fifteen years More than fifteen years 
 
Part II: Organizational structure 
2.1 Which department in your bank is responsible for managing assets and 
liabilities? 
 Finance Dep. Treasury Dep. 
 Risk Management Dep Other, please specify (………………) 
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2.2 Do you have an Asset Liability Committee (ALCO)? 
 Yes No 
2.3 Please tick ALL the positions that are represented in the ALCO of your bank: 
 CEO 
Head of treasury 
Head of risk management 
Head of retail banking 
Head of Finance 
Head of corporate banking 
Head of SMEs banking. 
Head of compliance Department 
Head of Internal Audit Department 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
Part III: Asset Liability Management (ALM) 
3.1 Do you have an Asset Liability Management (ALM) process? 
 Yes 
No 
3.2 What are the aims of the ALM in your bank? 
  
3.3 Please rank the following risk exposures according to their order of importance in your 
ALM process (Please fill with (X) if a type of risk isn’t covered at your ALM process): 
 (  )   Interest rate risk (  )   Liquidity risk 
 (  )   Credit risk (  )   Operations risk 
 (  )   Foreign exchange risk (  )   Market risk 
3.4 Which areas are covered by the ALM policies at your bank? Please tick all that apply. 
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 Investment and hedging strategies 
Methodology for measurement of risks 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
New product approval 
Limit setting and control 
 
3.5 Please choose the management tools used in the ALM process at your bank. 
 Duration matching 
Cash flow matching 
Asset/liability Projections 
Efficient frontier Analysis 
Description 
Other, please specify (………………..) 
3.6 How often your bank assess ALM strategies? 
 Daily 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Yearly 
Occasionally 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
 
3.7 To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Please tick one numeric 
value corresponding to your opinion for each statement (number ‘5’ represents 
‘Strongly agree’, while number 1 represents ‘Strongly disagree’) 
Statement 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
ag
re
e 
A
g
re
e 
 N
eu
tr
al
 
 D
is
ag
re
e 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
d
is
ag
re
e 
 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
The ALM strategy is set by ALCO.      
ALM strategy is set in accordance with the 
overall strategic objectives of the bank and 
disseminated throughout the bank. 
     
ALM strategy is consistent with the operational 
objectives and takes into account the balance 
sheet structure, and the status of different 
product lines. 
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The ALM is a dynamic process that is based on 
analysing, assessing, and reviewing the 
effectiveness of the set strategies based on 
reports and findings. 
     
The ALM strategy considers the potential 
impact on non-quantifiable risks. 
     
Risk exposure limits are set based on the 
overall strategy of the bank in a way that takes 
product line levels into consideration. 
     
ALM process incorporates operational, credit 
and market risks, as well as formulates risk 
exposure strategies and sets limits. 
     
Part IV: ALCO committee 
4.1 Please choose all the functional scope of risks that ALCO considers at your 
bank? 
 Liquidity Risk 
Interest Rate Risk 
Credit Risk 
Market Risk 
Operational Risk 
Exchange Rate Risk 
Other, please specify (………………….) 
4.2 Please tick the frequency of ALCO meetings: 
 Daily 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
 
Yearly 
Occasionally 
Other, please specify (………………….) 
4.3 What Reports are provided to ALCO at your bank? 
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4.4 Is ALCO responsible for setting risk metrics? 
 Yes No 
4.5 If your answer is (Yes), please indicate whether the risk metrics cover the 
following types of risk: 
 Liquidity Risk              ……………………… 
Interest Rate Risk         ……………………… 
Credit Risk                   ……………………… 
Market Risk                  ……………………… 
Other, please specify     ……………………… 
4.6 Is ALCO responsible for setting risk exposure limits? 
 Yes No 
4.7 Who will review ALCO report? Please choose all that apply: 
 Board of Directors 
CEO 
Shareholders 
Central Bank 
Other, please specify (…………………..) 
 
4.8 How often ALCO report is reviewed at your bank? 
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 Daily 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Yearly 
Occasionally 
Other, please specify (………………….) 
4.9 
To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Please tick one 
numeric value corresponding to your opinion for each statement (number ‘5’ 
represents ‘Strongly agree’, while number 1 represents ‘Strongly disagree’) 
Statement 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
ag
re
e 
A
g
re
e 
 N
eu
tr
al
 
 D
is
ag
re
e 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
d
is
ag
re
e 
 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
Liquidity reports provided to 
ALCO contain risk exposures, 
funding liquidity plans, and other. 
     
ALCO report must focus on 
proposing strategies that could 
enhance the performance in the 
future. 
     
ALCO report focuses on the 
overall performance of the bank 
and business level. 
     
The Board of Directors are 
responsible for adopting the 
proposed strategies in the ALCO 
report. 
     
A periodic review is conducted for 
reviewing the performance of 
adopted strategies. 
     
The Central bank effectively 
supervises ALCO decisions at 
your bank. 
     
Part V: Liquidity Risk 
5.1 Which department is responsible for managing liquidity risk? 
 Finance Dep. Treasury Dep. 
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 Risk Management 
Dep 
Other, please specify (…………………) 
5.2 How does your bank quantify liquidity risk and funding risk? 
  
5.3 How the limits of liquidity risk and funding risk are set? 
  
5.4 How often your bank monitor liquidity positions: 
 Daily 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
 
Yearly 
Occasionally 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
5.5 What are the tools used for assessing liquidity risk at your bank? 
 Liquidity metrics 
Contractual 
Maturity Mismatch 
Concentration of 
funding 
Available Unencumbered Assets 
Market-related monitoring tools 
Other, please specify (………………….) 
5.6 
 
How your bank deals with a shortage in liquidity positions at your bank? Please 
tick all that apply. 
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 Additional borrowing 
Lender of Last resort 
(CBJ) 
Secondary markets 
Inter-bank market 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
5.7 Capital is considered as one of the means that can be used to correct/ mitigate 
liquidity risk exposure: 
 Yes No 
5.8 Do you consider funding liquidity as a type of risk that banks are exposed to? 
 Yes No 
5.9 What measures that your bank will use to avoid the Funding Liquidity risk at 
your bank? 
  
5.10 Please rank the following form of funding liquidity risk according to their 
order of importance to your bank (‘1’ stands for most important, ‘3’ stands for 
less important): 
 (        )   Margin 
funding risk 
(        )   Rollover risk 
(       )   Redemption risk 
 
5.11 Does your bank have Liquidity technical reserve buffers? 
 Yes No 
5.12 How does your bank determine Liquidity technical reserve volume? 
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5.13 Who is responsible to determine the Liquidity technical reserve at your bank? 
Please tick all that apply. 
 CEO 
ALCO 
Head of treasury 
Head of risk 
management 
Head of retail 
banking 
Head of corporate banking 
Head of SMEs banking. 
Head of compliance Department 
Head of Finance 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
5.14 To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Please tick one 
numeric value corresponding to your opinion for each statement (number ‘5’ 
represents ‘Strongly agree’, while number 1 represents ‘Strongly disagree’) 
Statement 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
ag
re
e 
A
g
re
e 
 N
eu
tr
al
 
 D
is
ag
re
e 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
d
is
ag
re
e 
 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
Liquidity risk management is 
consistent with the overall 
strategy of the bank. 
     
Liquidity risk is set according to 
the institutional and department 
level. 
     
Liquidity risk exposure limits are 
set while considering the 
operational liquidity needs. 
     
Implementation of Basel III 
enhances liquidity risk 
management. 
     
Implementation of Basel III adds 
additional strains on banks’ ability 
to make structural changes in 
liquidity positions. 
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Contingent liquidity needs are 
taken into consideration while 
setting up liquidity risk exposures. 
     
Financial derivatives are used as 
tools to manage liquidity risk. 
     
 
Part VI: Interest rate risk 
6.1 How does your bank quantify interest rate risk? 
  
6.2 How you measure the Target of Interest Rate Margin? 
  
6.3 What techniques that your bank uses to manage interest rate risk: 
 Gap analysis (RSAa,RSLs) 
maturity ladder 
simulation 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
 
6.4 What methods your bank uses to reduce interest rate risk? Please tick all that 
apply. 
 Maturity matching of loans and deposits 
Floating-rate loans 
Other, please specify (…………….) 
Interest rate swaps 
Interest rate caps 
Interest rate future contracts 
 
6.5 Does your bank use off-balance Instruments to manage interest rate 
mismatches? 
 Yes No 
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6.6 If your answer was (yes), please specify the prevailing types of instruments? 
  
Part VII: Credit risk 
7.1 How does your bank Quantify credit risk? 
  
7.2 What methods that your bank uses to reduce credit risk? Please tick all that apply. 
 Determining customer credit worthiness 
Loan commitment 
Other, please specify (…………….) 
Credit rationing 
Collateral 
 
7.3 Does your bank use off-balance sheet instruments to manage credit risk (such 
as credit derivatives)? 
 Yes No 
7.4 If your answer was (Yes), please specify the prevailing type of instruments? 
  
Part VIII: Market risk 
8.1 How does your bank quantify market risk? 
  
8.2 What methods your bank uses to reduce market risk? Please tick all that apply. 
 Avoiding high exposure positions. 
Take offsetting trading positions. 
Monitoring macro-financial indicators 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
Part IX: Contingency Funding Plans (CFP) and stress testing 
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9.1 Does your bank have a CFP? 
 Yes No 
9.2 Does your bank review CFPs on a regular basis? 
 Yes No 
9.3 If your answer is (Yes), please indicate the frequency of reviewing your CFPs: 
 Daily 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Yearly 
Occasionally 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
9.4 Does your bank perform stress testing on a regular basis? 
 Yes No 
9.5 If your answer is (Yes), please indicate the frequency of performing stress testing at your bank: 
 Daily 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
 
Yearly 
Occasionally 
Other, please specify (……………….) 
 
9.6 To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Please tick one numeric value 
corresponding to your personal opinion for each statement (number ‘5’ represents ‘Strongly 
agree’, while number 1 represents ‘Strongly disagree’) 
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Statement 
S
tr
o
n
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e 
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 D
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(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
A bank should develop an effective CFP to 
account for the outcome of alternative 
scenarios on liquidity positions and on risk 
mitigation factors.  
     
An effective CFP should contain strategies 
to deal with liquidity shortfalls and ensure 
the availability of sufficient liquidity 
resources to meet its obligations. 
     
CFP should be reviewed on a regular basis 
to ensure that it remains operationally 
robust. 
     
CFP must take into account market 
liquidity conditions, operational 
constraints, the ability to raise funding, 
lender of last resort, and the consequences 
results from applying the plan itself.  
     
CFP is concerned with low-probability and 
high-impact events that could negatively 
affect the available liquidity resources. 
     
Stress testing should consider alternative 
scenarios on liquidity positions, risk 
mitigation, off-balance sheet items, 
contingent liabilities, and must review the 
assumptions underlying decisions 
concerning funding position. 
     
Stress testing should be performed on a 
regular basis to identify resources of 
liquidity stress and to ensure the adherence 
of the bank’s units to risk exposure limit 
guidelines.  
     
Stress testing should analyse the separate 
and combined impact of liquidity stress on 
cash flow, liquidity position, profitability, 
and solvency. 
     
Stress testing should take market 
conditions, correlation between funding 
markets, and the scale of complexity in 
business activities. 
     
Stress tests should highlights 
vulnerabilities in the banks positions and 
propose remedial action. 
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Stress tests results should be integrated into 
day-to-day risk management. In addition, 
its results should be taken into 
consideration while setting risk exposure 
limits. 
     
 
End of questionnaire. 
Thank you for your time and cooperation. 
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Appendix 2-3: The Survey Questionnaire Sample 
As mentioned above the survey questionnaire sample will consist of the following 
operating domestic and foreign banks in Jordan:   
No. Domestic Banks No. Foreign Banks 
1 Arab Bank PLC 1 Egyptian Arab Land Bank 
2 Jordan Ahli Bank PLC 2 Rafidain Bank 
3 Bank of Jordan PLC 3 Citibank N.A. 
4 Cairo Amman Bank 4 Standard Chartered Bank 
5 The Housing Bank for Trade and 
Finance 
5 National Bank of Kuwait 
6 Jordan Kuwait Bank 6 Banque Audi SAL 
7 Jordan Commercial Bank 7 BLOM Bank 
8 Arab Jordan Investment Bank 
8 National Bank of Abu Dhabi 
9 Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 
10 Investment Bank 
11 Union Bank 
12 Societe Generale De Banque-Jordanie 
13 Capital Bank of Jordan 
Total Banks in the sample 21 Banks 
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Appendix 3: 
Table 38: Main studies that investigated profitability and liquidity risk  
Authors/ 
Year 
Country Period Methodology Findings 
(Staikouras 
& Wood, 
2004) 
European 
banking 
sector 
1994–1998 Fixed effect 
estimator 
A negative impact of risk on bank 
profitability 
(Sufian, 
2011) 
Korean 
banking 
sector 
1986–1995 Fixed effect 
estimator 
A negative impact of risks related 
to bank profitability while 
concentration has positive effect 
on profitability 
(Bonner, et 
al., 2015) 
OECD 
Countries 
1998-2007 OLS with  
a dynamic 
GMM panel 
estimator 
Institution’s Profit and Capital 
ratio has moderate effects on the 
size of its liquidity buffer; its 
Deposits from clients have a large 
impact. Likely attributable to a 
lack of funding diversification 
(Al-Jafari 
& Alchami, 
2014) 
Syrian 
banking 
sector 
2004-2011 GMM 
estimator 
Liquidity risk has a negative 
impact on profitability as higher 
liquidity risks result in lower 
profits 
(Dezfouli, 
et al., 2014) 
Iranian 
Banking 
system 
2005-2011 Four-step 
econometric 
model and 
GMM linear 
forecasting 
model 
Higher liquidity holdings in banks 
increase their costs at times of 
inflation which reduces their 
profitability. 
(Pagratis, 
et al., 2017) 
U.S. 
commercial 
banks 
2002:Q1–
2009:Q1 
Stochastic 
dominance 
efficiency 
methods 
Small banks seem to have a 
higher target for net interest 
margin than large banks, possibly 
due to higher dependence of 
small banks’ core profitability on 
net interest income. Also, US 
commercial exhausted their 
ability to self-insure against 
liquidity shocks, implying that 
the lender of last resort functions 
as indispensable. 
(Wójcik-
Mazur & 
Szajt, 2015) 
Nineteen 
advanced 
economies’ 
commercial 
banks 
1994-2006 2SLS 
estimator 
A positive, long-term relation 
between liquidity risk and 
interest rate margin ratio 
(Molyneux 
& 
Eighteen 
European 
countries 
1986-1989  A weak inverse relationship with 
profitability is also to be expected 
as liquidity holdings (particularly 
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Thornton, 
1992) 
those imposed by the authorities) 
represent a cost to the bank. 
(Sufian & 
Chong, 
2008) 
Philippines 
banking 
sector 
1990-2005 Fixed and 
random 
effects 
estimator 
Risk is negatively related to bank 
profitability 
(Barth, et 
al., 2003) 
2300 banks 
in 55 
countries 
(supervision)  The liquidity ratio is negatively 
related to ROA. 
(Demirgüç-
Kunt & 
Huizinga, 
2010) 
International 
sample of 
101 
countries 
and 1334 
banks 
1995-2007 Fixed effect 
estimator 
Banks that hold a high fraction of 
liquid assets have lower net 
interest margins, which are 
consistent with banks receiving 
lower returns on holding cash or 
securities, but are facing a 
competitive market for deposits. 
(Kosmidou, 
2008) 
23 banks in 
Greece 
1990-2002 Fixed effect 
estimator 
The liquidity ratio is negatively 
related to return on average assets 
(ROAA). 
(Bourke, 
1989) 
   The liquidity ratio is positively 
related to return on assets (ROA). 
(Demirgüç-
Kunt & 
Huizinga, 
1999) 
80 countries 1988-1995 Fixed effect 
estimator 
Liquidity ratio negatively affects 
ROA and positively affects NIM 
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Table 39: Main studies that investigated the effects of credit risk on 
liquidity risk 
Authors/ 
Year 
Country Period Methodology Findings 
(Roulet, 2018) 
European 
commercial 
banks from 
22 countries 
2008-2015 OLS estimator 
Liquidity ratios has a 
significant and 
positive impact on 
commercial-lending-
growth for large and 
small European 
banks 
(Acharya & 
Viswanathan, 
2011) 
Iranian 
Banking 
sector 
2005-2012 
A benchmark 
model of risk-
shifting and 
asset sales 
A significant positive 
impact between 
credit risk and 
liquidity risk 
(Ejoh, et al., 
2014) 
Nigerian 
Banks 
Survey (80 
respondents) 
Pearson product 
moment 
correlation and 
chi-square 
statistical tool 
A positive 
relationship 
between liquidity 
risk and credit 
risk 
(Ghosh, 2016) 
GCC 
banking 
sector 
1996-2012 3SLS estimation 
A positive 
relationship 
between liquidity 
risk and credit 
risk 
(Berger & 
Bouwman, 
2009) 
U.S. 
Commercial 
banks 
1993-2003 
Fixed effect 
estimator 
Liquidity 
indicators have 
positive but 
perverse effects 
on bank-lending-
growth 
(Imbierowicz 
& Rauch, 
2014) 
U.S. 
Commercial 
banks 
1998:Q1 to 
2010:Q3 
3SLS 
There is no 
economically 
meaningful 
relationship 
between liquidity 
risk and credit 
risk 
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(Kim & Sohn, 
2017) 
U.S. 
Commercial 
banks 
1993-2010 
Fixed effect 
estimator 
The interaction 
between credit 
risk and liquidity 
risk is negligible 
for small and 
medium banks 
but is 
significantly 
positive and 
prominent for 
large banks 
 
 
Table 40: Main studies that investigated the effects of bank size on 
liquidity risk 
Authors/ 
Year 
Country Period Methodology Findings 
(Acharya & 
Merrouche, 
2012) 
UK Banks 
02 January 
2007 to 30 
June 2008 
2SLS estimator 
Small banks’ borrowing 
cost is significantly 
dependent on the 
variations in their own 
liquidity buffer while this 
is not the case for large 
banks. 
(Kim & 
Sohn, 2017) 
U.S. 
Commercial 
banks 
1993-2010 
Fixed effect 
estimator 
The effect of an increase 
in capital ratio on credit 
growth is significantly 
negative for low liquidity 
ratios, and the effect 
becomes significantly 
positive only after large 
banks retain sufficient 
liquid assets. 
(Roman & 
Sargu, 
2015) 
CEE 
countries 
2004-2011 OLS estimator 
Size effects on the overall 
liquidity are mixed. 
(DeYoung 
& Jang, 
2016) 
U.S. 
Commercial 
banks 
1992-2012 
GMM estimator 
& OLS estimator 
As banks increase in size, 
they set lower liquidity 
targets and manage them 
more efficiently. 
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(Vodova, 
2011) 
22 Czech 
commercial 
banks 
2006-2009 
Fixed effects 
estimator 
Liquidity ratios have a 
positive relationship with 
size and capital. 
(Bonner, et 
al., 2015) 
7000 banks 
from 30 
OECD 
countries 
1998-2007 
Pooled OLS 
estimations with 
robust standard 
errors 
The relationship between 
bank liquidity buffers 
with bank size is 
substantially weaker in 
countries with bank 
liquidity regulations. 
(Laeven, et 
al., 2016) 
412 
deposit-
taking 
institutions 
from 56 
countries 
2006-2008 
Fixed effects 
estimator 
Systemic risk increases 
with bank size. 
(Hughes & 
Mester, 
2013) 
842 top-tier 
bank 
holding 
companies 
in the US  
2007 
2SLS and GMM 
estimator 
Scale economies exist at 
smaller banks and are 
even larger at large banks. 
(Altunbas, 
et al., 2007) 
Banks in 15 
European 
countries 
1992-2000 
Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) 
approach 
There are strong positive 
relationships between 
liquidity and risk as banks 
with higher liquidity 
levels have higher reserve 
levels. 
(Aspachs, et 
al., 2005) 
57 UK 
resident 
banks 
1985Q1 - 
2003Q4 
Fixed effect 
estimator 
There is insignificant 
effect of size on banks’ 
holdings of liquid assets. 
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Table 41: Main studies that investigated the effects of capital on liquidity 
risk 
Authors/ 
Year 
Country Period Methodology Findings 
(Roulet, 
2018) 
European 
commercial 
banks from 
22 countries 
2008-2015 
OLS 
estimator 
Capital ratios have significant 
negative impact on large 
European retail lending growth 
and other types of lending over 
the post 2008 financial crisis 
period. 
(Kim & 
Sohn, 2017) 
U.S. 
Commercial 
banks 
1993-2010 
Fixed effect 
estimator 
An increase in bank capital on 
credit growth is positively 
associated with the level of 
bank liquidity only for large 
banks 
(Roman & 
Sargu, 
2015) 
CEE 
countries 
2004-2011 
OLS 
estimator 
There is a positive link between 
the ROAE indicator and the 
liquidity indicator 
(Vodova, 
2011) 
22 Czech 
commercial 
banks 
2006-2009 
Fixed 
effects 
estimator 
Increases in capital adequacy 
have a positive impact on bank 
liquidity 
(Bonner, et 
al., 2015) 
7000 banks 
from 30 
OECD 
countries 
1998-2007 
Pooled OLS 
estimations 
with robust 
standard 
errors 
The relationship between bank 
liquidity buffers with bank size 
is substantially weaker in 
countries with bank liquidity 
regulations 
(Laeven, et 
al., 2016) 
412 
deposit-
taking 
institutions 
from 56 
countries 
2006-2008 
Fixed 
effects 
estimator 
Systemic risk is lower in more-
capitalized banks, with the 
effects particularly more 
pronounced for large banks 
(Pagratis, et 
al., 2017) 
U.S. 
commercial 
banks 
2002:Q1–
2009:Q1 
Stochastic 
dominance 
efficiency 
methods 
Capital adequacy targets are 
higher for smaller banks as they 
have larger Tier I ratio and that 
precautionary high liquid assets 
buffers are important for banks 
to perform their maturity 
transformation role. 
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Table 42: Main studies that investigated the effects of other factors  on 
liquidity risk 
Authors/ 
Year 
Country Period Methodology Findings 
(Almeida, et 
al., 2004) 
U.S 
Firms 
1971-2000 
Fixed effect 
estimator 
Financially constrained 
firms have a higher 
propensity to save cash. 
(Bonner, et 
al., 2015) 
7000 
banks 
from 30 
OECD 
countries 
1998-2007 
Pooled OLS 
estimations with 
robust standard 
errors 
Complementarity of 
disclosure and liquidity 
requirements provides a 
strong rationale for 
considering them jointly in 
the design of regulation. 
(Ratnovski, 
2013) 
------ ------ 
A model of bank 
liquidity risk 
liquidity 
Requirements should be 
complemented by measures 
that increase bank 
incentives to adopt 
transparency. 
(Resti, 1997) 
Panel 
sample of 
270 
Italian 
banks 
1988-1992 DEA and SFA 
There is a direct 
relationship between 
productive efficiency and 
asset quality. 
(Aspachs, et 
al., 2005) 
 
57 UK 
resident 
banks 
1985Q1 - 
2003Q4 
Fixed effect 
estimator 
The increased probability 
of banks receiving the 
lender of last resort support 
will decrease their liquidity 
holdings 
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Appendix 4: 
Model (1) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LTD) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAA 0.06* 0.109*** 0.118*** 
Capital 
TCR -0.119 -0.033 0.020 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.0003 0.004** 0.003** 
Bank Size 
MARS -0.0721*** -0.098*** -0.028** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.055* 0.030 0.009 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.395*** 0.393*** 0.305*** 
IBR 0.080* 0.082** 0.075*** 
M2GDP -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
Dummy Variables 
DARS 0.052 0.082** 0.085*** 
Constant 4.222*** 3.966*** 3.481*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 4.288*** 4.955*** 15.191*** 
R2 0.21 0.234 0.704 
JB-Test 0.490 0.820 2.162 
Heteroscedasticity test  5.871*** 4.040*** 1.684 
VIF 1.265 1.305 3.38 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 15.484*** 
Hausman test ----- 13.63 ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr.  28.018*** 13.619*** 0.498 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the first model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (2) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LTD) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAA 0.060* 0.107*** 0.117*** 
Capital 
TIER1 -0.347* -0.005 0.174 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.0006 0.004** 0.003** 
Bank Size 
MARS -0.073*** -0.094*** -0.024 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.055* 0.033 -0.011 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.406*** 0.391*** 0.295*** 
IBR 0.081* 0.082** 0.071*** 
M2GDP -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
Dummy Variables 
DARS 0.055 0.082** -0.085** 
Constant 4.242*** 3.842*** 3.342*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 4.333*** 4.905*** 15.142*** 
R2 0.211 0.232 0.703 
JB-Test 0.731 0.793 2.246 
Heteroscedasticity test 5.653*** 5.61*** 1.723 
VIF 1.267 1.302 3.367 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 15.342*** 
Hausman test ----- 32.74*** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 31.947*** 31.947*** 0.974 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the second model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 347 
 
Model (3) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LTD) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAA 0.035 0.058* 0.062** 
Capital 
EQTA 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR 0.002 0.004*** 0.003*** 
Bank Size 
MARS -0.048*** -0.067** -0.018 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.107*** 0.038 0.009 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.269*** 0.222** 0.162*** 
IBR 0.050 0.059* 0.049** 
M2GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
Dummy Variables 
DARS 0.027 0.048 0.056** 
Constant 3.352*** 3.528*** 3.307*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 8.044*** 8.717*** 20.479*** 
R2 0.331 0.349 0.762 
JB-Test 1.473 1.776 0.978 
Heteroscedasticity test 3.376*** 3.892*** 1.994 
VIF 1.494 1.536 4.201 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 16.842*** 
Hausman test ----- 3.87 ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 19.944*** 15.231*** 1.093 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the third model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 348 
 
Model (4) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LTD) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAE -0.022 0.042** 0.033 
Capital 
TCR -0.114 0.012 0.042 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.002 0.002** 0.001 
Bank Size 
MARS -0.073*** -0.0989*** -0.037 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.053* 0.0278 0.004 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.351*** 0.381*** 0.293*** 
IBR 0.095** 0.099*** 0.092*** 
M2GDP -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
Dummy Variables 
DARS 0.047 0.0862** 0.090** 
Constant 4.379*** 3.821*** 3.522*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 3.974*** 3.558*** 13.194*** 
R2 0.196 0.179 0.674 
JB-Test 0.121 0.596 1.669 
Heteroscedasticity test 6.802*** 4.601*** 2.33** 
VIF 1.243 1.218 3.067 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 12.961*** 
Hausman test ----- 11.22** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 37.077*** 26.433*** 4.393 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the fourth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (5) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LTD) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAE -0.023 0.042** 0.039 
Capital 
TIER1 -0.340** 0.123 0.268** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.001 0.002** 0.001 
Bank Size 
MARS -0.074*** -0.094*** -0.034 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.053* 0.030 0.007 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.360*** 0.377*** 0.285*** 
IBR 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.086*** 
M2GDP -0.002 -0.003 -0.003* 
Dummy Variables 
DARS 0.050* 0.085** 0.091*** 
Constant 4.409*** 3.696*** 3.331*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 4.022*** 3.575*** 13.071*** 
R2 0.198 0.181 0.671 
JB-Test 0.204 0.584 1.711 
Heteroscedasticity test 6.749*** 4.730*** 2.326* 
VIF 1.246 1.221 3.039 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 12.748*** 
Hausman test ----- 12.97 ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 41.668*** 26.012*** 0.459 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the fifth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (6) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LTD) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAE 0.040 0.055** 0.043** 
Capital 
EQTA 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
Bank Size 
MARS -0.048*** -0.068*** -0.021 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.108*** 0.039 0.009 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.275*** 0.225*** 0.161*** 
IBR 0.052** 0.062*** 0.054*** 
M2GDP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Dummy Variables 
DARS 0.029* 0.050** 0.056*** 
Constant 3.223*** 3.363*** 3.201*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 8.085*** 8.641*** 19.677*** 
R2 0.332 0.347 0.755 
JB-Test 1.519 2.193 0.971 
Heteroscedasticity test 3.357*** 3.898*** 2.163* 
VIF 1.497 1.531 4.08 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 16.077 *** 
Hausman test ----- 12.97 ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 20.652*** 17.393*** 2.222 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the sixth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (7) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LTD) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
NIM 0.088*** 0.167*** 0.169*** 
Capital 
TCR -0.118** -0.048 -0.028 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.000 0.002* 0.003*** 
Bank Size 
MARS -0.088*** -0.121*** -0.086** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.027 0.009 0.005 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.246*** 0.143*** 0.099** 
IBR 0.096*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 
M2GDP -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
Dummy Variables 
DARS 0.028 0.029 0.039** 
Constant 4.298*** 4.044*** 3.733*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 8.143 15.868*** 28.668*** 
R2 0.334 0.494 0.818 
JB-Test 3.162 3.306 1.439 
Heteroscedasticity test 2.938*** 1.456 1.534 
VIF 1.502 1.976 5.495 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 23.567*** 
Hausman test ----- 16.14* ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 36.852*** 11.613*** 1.942 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the seventh model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (8) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LTD) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
NIM 0.087*** 0.165*** 0.168*** 
Capital 
TIER1 -0.313** -0.011 0.038 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.001* 0.002* 0.003*** 
Bank Size 
MARS -0.087*** -0.114*** -0.079** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.031 0.012 0.008 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.259*** 0.143*** 0.095*** 
IBR 0.098*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 
M2GDP -0.003* -0.003 -0.002 
Dummy Variables 
DARS 0.032 0.030 0.039** 
Constant 4.268*** 3.873*** 3.566*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 8.099*** 15.657*** 28.709*** 
R2 0.333 0.491 0.818 
JB-Test 3.20 3.657 1.463 
Heteroscedasticity test 2.681*** 1.466 1.441 
VIF 1.499 1.964 5.495 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 24.220*** 
Hausman test ----- 18.68** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 42.418*** 13.955*** 1.273 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the eight model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 353 
 
Model (9) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LTD) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
NIM 0.081*** 0.139*** 0.133*** 
Capital 
EQTA 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR 0.002** 0.003** 0.004*** 
Bank Size 
MARS -0.064*** -0.088*** -0.047** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.081*** 0.021 0.0196 
Control Variables 
RRR 0.149*** 0.079* 0.052 
IBR 0.063*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 
M2GDP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Dummy Variables 
DARS 0.007 0.015 0.021 
Constant 3.417*** 3.611*** 3.321*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 12.826 18.266*** 33.603 
R2 0.441 0.529 0.840 
JB-Test 0.121 2.348 1.265 
Heteroscedasticity test 1.667* 1.173 1.459 
VIF 1.788 2.398 6.25 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 21.167*** 
Hausman test ----- 9.05 ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 52.108*** 34.865*** 0.459 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the ninth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (10) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LQATA) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAA -0.061 -0.079 -0.091* 
Capital 
TCR 0.260*** 0.294*** 0.441*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.001 -0.002 -0.005** 
Bank Size 
MARS 0.124*** 0.114*** -0.135* 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.058 0.079* 0.106*** 
Control Variables 
RRR -1.008*** -0.972*** -0.738*** 
IBR 0.016 0.014 -0.018 
M2GDP 0.021* 0.021* 0.013* 
Dummy Variables 
DARS -0.491*** -0.489*** -0.351*** 
Constant 3.111*** 3.124*** 4.365*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 29.094*** 30.285*** 21.292*** 
R2 0.642 0.651 0.769 
JB-Test 3.223 3.465 2.817 
Heteroscedasticity test 2.431** 2.561** 1.727 
VIF 2.793 2.865 4.329 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 3.964*** 
Hausman test ----- 20.26** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 0.309 0.269 0.864 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the tenth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (11) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LQATA) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAA -0.059 -0.079 -0.094** 
Capital 
TEIR1 0.728*** 0.832*** 1.326*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.002 -0.002 -0.004* 
Bank Size 
MARS 0.124*** 0.113*** -0.149** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.056 0.077* 0.104*** 
Control Variables 
RRR -1.034*** -0.999*** -0.771*** 
IBR 0.013 0.010 -0.022 
M2GDP 0.022* 0.021* 0.015** 
Dummy Variables 
DARS -0.497*** -0.496*** -0.352*** 
Constant 3.117*** 3.126*** 4.362*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 29.141*** 30.342*** 22.003 
R2 0.642 0.651 0.775 
JB-Test 3.038 3.202 2.993 
Heteroscedasticity test 2.337** 2.442** 1.556 
VIF 2.793 2.865 4.445 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 4.226*** 
Hausman test ----- 21.07** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr.  0.296 0.259 0.974 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the eleventh model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (12) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LQATA) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAA -0.037 -0.041 -0.018 
Capital 
EQTA -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.023*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.003 -0.003 -0.006** 
Bank Size 
MARS 0.092*** 0.086*** -0.217** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA -0.008 0.011 0.104** 
Control Variables 
RRR -0.952*** -0.924*** -0.516** 
IBR 0.037 0.034 0.012 
M2GDP 0.020 0.019 0.009 
Dummy Variables 
DARS -0.481*** -0.482*** -0.349*** 
Constant 4.385*** 4.407*** 6.261*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 28.732*** 29.111*** 18.555*** 
R2 0.639 0.642 0.744 
JB-Test 3.265 3.205 3.633 
Heteroscedasticity test 2.685*** 2.681*** 1.751* 
VIF 2.771 2.793 3.906 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 3.987*** 
Hausman test ----- 22.76*** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr.  0.380 0.399 1.252 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the twelfth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (13) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LQATA) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAE 0.021 0.006 0.009 
Capital 
TCR 0.256*** 0.274*** 0.411*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Bank Size 
MARS 0.125*** 0.117*** -0.127* 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.061 0.078** 0.111*** 
Control Variables 
RRR -0.965*** -0.940*** -0.704*** 
IBR 0.001 -0.003 -0.038 
M2GDP 0.019 0.019 0.012 
Dummy Variables 
DARS -0.486*** -0.488*** -0.345*** 
Constant 2.962*** 3.028*** 4.218*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 28.761*** 29.474*** 20.145*** 
R2 0.639 0.645 0.759 
JB-Test 2.612 2.871 2.746 
Heteroscedasticity test 2.002** 2.094** 1.576 
VIF 2.770 2.816 4.149 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 3.597*** 
Hausman test ----- 17.25** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr.  0.672 0.646 1.535 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the Thirteenth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk 
and internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results 
are for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 
commercial banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed 
effect test is more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically 
significant at 5%. *** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (14) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LQATA) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAE 0.022 0.008 0.012 
Capital 
TIER1 0.721*** 0.775*** 1.229*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Bank Size 
MARS 0.125*** 0.117*** -0.142* 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.058 0.076** 0.110*** 
Control Variables 
RRR -0.988*** -0.965*** -0.732*** 
IBR -0.002 -0.006 -0.042 
M2GDP 0.019* 0.019 0.013 
Dummy Variables 
DARS -0.492*** -0.494*** -0.346*** 
Constant 2.955*** 3.019*** 4.211*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 28.818*** 29.521*** 20.703*** 
R2 0.639 0.645 0.764 
JB-Test 2.476 2.687 2.905 
Heteroscedasticity test 1.944 2.016** 1.449 
VIF 2.770 2.816 4.237 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 3.801*** 
Hausman test ----- 17.66** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr.  0.664 0.643 1.710 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the fourteenth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk 
and internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results 
are for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 
commercial banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed 
effect test is more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically 
significant at 5%. *** Statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 359 
 
Model (15) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LQATA) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
ROAE -0.032 -0.035 -0.049 
Capital 
EQTA -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.025*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.002 -0.003 -0.007** 
Bank Size 
MARS 0.092*** 0.086*** -0.217** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA -0.008 0.012 0.054 
Control Variables 
RRR -0.952*** -0.924*** -0.542** 
IBR 0.034 0.031 0.033 
M2GDP 0.019 0.019 0.010 
Dummy Variables 
DARS -0.482*** -0.483*** -0.359*** 
Constant 4.474*** 4.508*** 6.505*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 28.686*** 29.067*** 15.614*** 
R2 0.638 0.642 0.709 
JB-Test 3.206 3.139 0.901 
Heteroscedasticity test 2.654** 2.642** 1.799 
VIF 2.762 2.793 3.436 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 2.737*** 
Hausman test ----- 22.74*** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr.  0.388 0.407 0.925 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the fifteens model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (16) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LQATA) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
NIM -0.063*** -0.088*** -0.169*** 
Capital 
TCR 0.257*** 0.297*** 0.406*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR 0.001 -0.002 -0.005*** 
Bank Size 
MARS 0.136*** 0.125*** -0.140** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.078** 0.103*** 0.101*** 
Control Variables 
RRR -0.894*** -0.815*** -0.460*** 
IBR 0.001 -0.007 -0.042 
M2GDP 0.020* 0.019 0.009 
Dummy Variables 
DARS -0.473*** -0.462*** -0.296*** 
Constant 3.044*** 3.063*** 4.770*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 30.658*** 32.611*** 30.119*** 
R2 0.653 0.667 0.825 
JB-Test 3.139 3.024 2.962 
Heteroscedasticity test 2.858*** 2.839** 2.346* 
VIF 2.881 3.003 5.714 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 5.479*** 
Hausman test ----- 65.65*** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr.  0.240 0.162 0.067 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the sixteenth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (17) results 
Dependent Variable 
(LQATA) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
NIM -0.061*** -0.086*** -0.164*** 
Capital 
TIER1 0.696*** 0.815*** 1.176*** 
Quality of Management 
CTIR 0.001 -0.002 -0.004** 
Bank Size 
MARS 0.134*** 0.124*** -0.154** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.074** 0.099*** 0.097*** 
Control Variables 
RRR -0.923*** -0.845*** -0.486*** 
IBR -0.002 -0.010 -0.044 
M2GDP 0.021* 0.019* 0.010* 
Dummy Variables 
DARS -0.480*** -0.470*** -0.297*** 
Constant 3.083*** 3.097*** 4.793*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 30.581*** 32.549*** 29.792*** 
R2 0.653 0.667 0.823 
JB-Test 2.903 2.658 3.127 
Heteroscedasticity test 2.797*** 2.809** 2.200* 
VIF 2.881 3.003 5.649 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 5.708*** 
Hausman test ----- 45.07*** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr.  0.237 0.16 0.107 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the seventeenth model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk 
and internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results 
are for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 
commercial banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed 
effect test is more suitable  than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically 
significant at 5%. *** Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Model (18) results 
 
Dependent Variable 
(LQATA) 
OLS RE FE 
Internal Factors 
Profitability 
NIM -0.057*** -0.065*** -0.161*** 
Capital 
EQTA -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.008 
Quality of Management 
CTIR -0.002 -0.0023 -0.005** 
Bank Size 
MARS 0.103*** 0.097*** -0.231*** 
Credit risk 
LOLTA 0.011 0.032 0.095** 
Control Variables 
RRR -0.861*** -0.825*** -0.388*** 
IBR 0.025 0.021 -0.011 
M2GDP 0.018 0.019 0.009 
Dummy Variables 
DARS -0.466*** -0.465*** -0.305*** 
Constant 4.324*** 4.341*** 6.534*** 
Robustness tests 
F-statistic 30.144*** 30.682*** 26.424*** 
R2 0.650 0.654 0.805 
JB-Test 3.764 3.688 2.209 
Heteroscedasticity test 3.630*** 3.321** 2.118* 
VIF 2.857 2.890 5.128 
Redundant fixed effects ----- ----- 5.515*** 
Hausman test ----- 44.50*** ----- 
Wooldridge serial corr. 0.314 0.316 0.588 
No. observations 156 156 156 
This table report the results of the Eighteen model for capturing the causal relationship between liquidity risk and 
internal factors while controlling for regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The reported regression results are 
for the OLS, fixed and random effects. The sample contains data for the period 2004 to 2015 for 13 commercial 
banks. Standard errors in are clustered at the bank level. Hausman test results reveal that the fixed effect test is 
more suitable than the random effects model. * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
